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CVSS: 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N 🐛 CWE-22
👁️
Common Weakness Enumeration - Identifies the specific category of software weakness or flaw.

CVE-2026-34070

CVE-2026-34070 is a high-severity path traversal vulnerability in the LangChain framework, specifically within the `langchain_core.
📅 PUBLISHED: 2026-03-31 02:01 UTC 🔄 UPDATED: 2026-09-26 06:11 UTC
[ OFFICIAL PATCH DEPLOYED ↓ ] FIX: CONFIRMED — 3+ independent sources confirm fix
[ DEFENSE PATCH ↓ ]
💣 PoC: Public
👁️
Proof of Concept - Indicates if functional exploit code is publicly available, drastically increasing the risk of immediate attacks.
🎯 EPSS: 1.38%
👁️
1.38% probability
34.5× above the median CVE
Tier: HIGH
30-day exploitation window · FIRST.org · updated daily
Affected: Langchain Core — upgrade to patched release
CVSS VECTOR BREAKDOWN 7.5
AV: N Attack Vector Network
AC: L Attack Complexity Low
PR: N Privileges Required None
UI: N User Interaction None
S: U Scope Unchanged
C: H Confidentiality High
I: N Integrity None
A: N Availability None
7.5
THREAT LEVEL
■ tracking this CVE ✓ independent patch confirmation ⧗ same-origin mirror (GHSA) ⚠ active exploitation verification policy →

Executive Summary

CVE-2026-34070 is a high-severity path traversal vulnerability in the LangChain framework, specifically within the langchain_core.prompts.loading module. An attacker can exploit this flaw by providing a maliciously crafted configuration dictionary to the load_prompt() or load_prompt_from_config() functions. This allows reading arbitrary files from the host filesystem, constrained only by file extension checks (.txt for templates, .json/.yaml for examples). The vulnerability is unpatched in versions prior to 1.2.22 and has a CVSS score of 7.5, indicating a significant risk to confidentiality.

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Supply Chain & Package Security

This vulnerability affects the PyPI package langchain-core. Organizations using LangChain in their applications must ensure they are not using a vulnerable version. The attack vector is through deserialization of untrusted configuration data, which is a common supply chain risk when using frameworks that load external configurations.

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

  • Attack Vector (AV): Network (N) – The attack can be launched remotely.
  • Attack Complexity (AC): Low (L) – No special conditions are required.
  • Privileges Required (PR): None (N) – No authentication needed.
  • User Interaction (UI): None (N) – No user action required.
  • Scope (S): Unchanged (U) – The vulnerable component and the affected resource are the same.
  • Confidentiality (C): High (H) – Complete loss of confidentiality, all filesystem data could be read.
  • Integrity (I): None (N) – No impact on data integrity.
  • Availability (A): None (N) – No impact on system availability.

Threat Level: High. The vulnerability is easily exploitable over the network with no privileges, and it can lead to significant data exposure.

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The vulnerability resides in the langchain_core.prompts.loading module. The functions load_prompt() and load_prompt_from_config() accept a configuration dictionary that specifies paths to template files and example files. These paths are not properly sanitized against directory traversal sequences (e.g., ../) or absolute path injections (e.g., /etc/passwd).

The vulnerable code reads the template_path and example_path keys from the config and uses them directly in file operations. While there is a file extension check (.txt for templates, .json/.yaml for examples), this does not prevent an attacker from reading sensitive files that match these extensions, such as configuration files, logs, or other data.

The attack flow is:

  1. An attacker crafts a malicious configuration dictionary with a path like ../../../../etc/passwd (for .txt files) or /etc/shadow (if it had a .txt extension, but typically not).
  2. The attacker passes this config to load_prompt() or load_prompt_from_config().
  3. The application reads the file at the attacker-specified path and returns its contents, which are then exposed to the attacker.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

Vulnerable Code (prior to 1.2.22):

def load_prompt_from_config(config: dict) -> BasePromptTemplate:
    template_path = config.get("template_path")
    if template_path:
        with open(template_path, "r") as f:
            template = f.read()
    # ... similar for example_path

Patched Code (version 1.2.22):

import os

def load_prompt_from_config(config: dict) -> BasePromptTemplate:
    template_path = config.get("template_path")
    if template_path:
        # Validate path to prevent traversal
        safe_path = os.path.normpath(template_path)
        if not safe_path.startswith("/allowed/base/dir"):
            raise ValueError("Invalid path")
        with open(safe_path, "r") as f:
            template = f.read()
    # ... similar for example_path

The patch introduces path normalization and validation against a whitelist of allowed base directories, preventing directory traversal and absolute path injection.

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team

Lab Setup:

  1. Deploy a vulnerable LangChain application (version < 1.2.22) that accepts user-influenced prompt configurations.
  2. The application should have an endpoint that calls load_prompt() or load_prompt_from_config() with user-supplied data.

Exploitation Steps:

  1. Identify the endpoint that accepts prompt configuration.
  2. Craft a malicious JSON payload:
{
  "template_path": "../../../../etc/passwd",
  "example_path": "../../../../var/log/syslog"
}
  1. Send the payload to the endpoint.
  2. Observe the response containing the contents of /etc/passwd and /var/log/syslog.

Expected Outcome: The attacker gains read access to sensitive files on the server.

Blue Team

Detection:

  • Monitor for unusual file read operations from the application process.
  • Look for path traversal patterns in application logs (e.g., ../, absolute paths).
  • Implement input validation on all configuration parameters.

Mitigation:

  • Immediately upgrade to langchain-core version 1.2.22 or later.
  • If upgrade is not possible, implement a Web Application Firewall (WAF) rule to block path traversal patterns.
  • Restrict the application's file system permissions to only necessary directories.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

  • File Paths: /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, /var/log/syslog, /proc/self/environ
  • Log Entries: Application logs showing open() calls with paths containing ../ or starting with /
  • Network Traffic: HTTP requests with JSON payloads containing template_path or example_path keys with suspicious values.

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2026_34070_LangChain_PathTraversal {
    meta:
        description = "Detects path traversal attempts in LangChain prompt loading"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2025-04-10"
        reference = "CVE-2026-34070"
    strings:
        $s1 = "template_path" nocase
        $s2 = "example_path" nocase
        $s3 = "../" ascii wide
        $s4 = "..\\" ascii wide
        $s5 = "/etc/" ascii wide
        $s6 = "/var/" ascii wide
    condition:
        (any of ($s1, $s2)) and (any of ($s3, $s4, $s5, $s6))
}

Sigma Rule

title: CVE-2026-34070 - LangChain Path Traversal Attempt
id: 7a8b9c0d-1e2f-3a4b-5c6d-7e8f9a0b1c2d
status: experimental
description: Detects attempts to exploit path traversal in LangChain prompt loading
author: Valters IT
logsource:
    category: application
    product: langchain
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4663
        ObjectName|contains:
            - '..\\'
            - '../'
            - '/etc/'
            - '/var/'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of absolute paths in controlled environments
level: high

Suricata Rule

alert http any any -> any any (msg:"CVE-2026-34070 - LangChain Path Traversal Attempt"; flow:to_server,established; content:"template_path"; nocase; content:"../"; distance:0; within:100; sid:1000001; rev:1;)

Remediation & Mitigation

  1. Immediate Action: Upgrade langchain-core to version 1.2.22 or later.
  2. Input Validation: Implement strict validation on all configuration parameters, rejecting any paths containing ../ or starting with /.
  3. Least Privilege: Run the application with minimal file system permissions, only allowing access to necessary directories.
  4. Monitoring: Enable logging of file access operations and monitor for suspicious patterns.
  5. WAF Rules: Deploy Web Application Firewall rules to block path traversal attempts in HTTP requests.

Valters IT Signature:
This report is prepared by Valters IT, an elite DevSecOps and Cyber Threat Intelligence team. For further analysis or remediation support, contact us at [valters@example.com].

{/* [Security Hash: 55E4DB98101BAFA160CB4785] */}

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