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CVSS: 7.2 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N 🐛 CWE-918
👁️
Common Weakness Enumeration - Identifies the specific category of software weakness or flaw.

CVE-2026-39719

CVE-2026-39719 Server-Side Request Forgery in Elementor
📅 PUBLISHED: 2026-10-06 00:00 UTC 🔄 UPDATED: 2026-10-07 05:00 UTC
[ ZERO-DAY / UNPATCHED ] [ DEFENSE PATCH ↓ ]
💣 PoC: Public
👁️
Proof of Concept - Indicates if functional exploit code is publicly available, drastically increasing the risk of immediate attacks.
🎯 EPSS: 0.26%
👁️
0.26% probability
6.4× above the median CVE
Tier: ELEVATED
30-day exploitation window · FIRST.org · updated daily
🥷 MITRE: T1190
👁️
MITRE ATT&CK Tactic - Describes the strategy hackers use to execute this attack.
VULNERABLE: <= 1.0.4
CVSS VECTOR BREAKDOWN 7.2
AV: N Attack Vector Network
AC: L Attack Complexity Low
PR: N Privileges Required None
UI: N User Interaction None
S: C Scope Changed
C: L Confidentiality Low
I: L Integrity Low
A: N Availability None
7.2
THREAT LEVEL
■ tracking this CVE ✓ independent patch confirmation ⧗ same-origin mirror (GHSA) ⚠ active exploitation verification policy →

Executive Summary

CVE-2026-39719 is an unauthenticated Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability affecting the WordPress plugin "PDF Smart Viewer for Elementor" in all versions up to and including 1.0.4. Because the flaw is exploitable without authentication and over the network, any internet-exposed WordPress site running the affected plugin presents a reachable attack surface for external adversaries. Successful exploitation allows an attacker to induce the vulnerable server to issue requests to attacker-controlled or internal destinations, enabling internal network reconnaissance, access to cloud metadata endpoints, and potential interaction with services not intended to be publicly reachable.

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›Detection rules — YARA · Wazuh · Elastic (all plans) · Sigma (Pro)
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Technical Analysis

The vulnerability is classified as CWE-918 (Server-Side Request Forgery) and carries a CVSS v3.1 base score of 7.2 (High). The vector is CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N, which indicates:

  • Attack Vector (Network, AV:N): The vulnerability is exploitable remotely over the network, consistent with a WordPress plugin whose functionality is reachable through HTTP requests to the web server.
  • Attack Complexity (Low, AC:L): No special conditions or race conditions are required; the attacker can trigger the flaw under normal operating conditions.
  • Privileges Required (None, PR:N): No authentication is required. The attacker does not need a valid WordPress account or any session. This is the defining characteristic that elevates risk, since the attack surface is the entire internet-facing deployment rather than authenticated users only.
  • User Interaction (None, UI:N): The victim does not need to click, approve, or otherwise participate. The request is fully automated on the attacker's side.
  • Scope (Changed, S:C): A successful attack can affect resources beyond the vulnerable component's own security authority. In SSRF terms, this reflects the fact that the vulnerable application acts as a proxy, allowing the attacker to influence or reach systems and services that reside outside the plugin's own security boundary (for example, internal-only hosts or metadata services).
  • Confidentiality (Low, C:L) and Integrity (Low, I:L): The SSRF yields limited but non-trivial disclosure and modification potential — typically the ability to read responses from reachable endpoints and to cause side effects through crafted requests, rather than full system compromise.
  • Availability (None, A:N): No direct denial-of-service impact is inherent to this class.

The CNA title and NVD description provide no further implementation detail — no specific parameter names, endpoint paths, function names, or code snippets are disclosed. The vulnerability class (unauthenticated SSRF in a WordPress plugin) is the authoritative basis for this analysis. In this class of flaw, a plugin component that fetches a remote resource — for example, retrieving a PDF from a URL supplied by the requester — fails to validate or restrict the destination of the outbound request. Because the plugin is bundled with Elementor and its viewer functionality is rendered in publicly accessible pages, the code path that performs server-side fetching can be reached by unauthenticated visitors rather than being confined to administrative functionality.

The core mechanism, at the vulnerability-class level, is therefore: an attacker supplies a destination (URL or equivalent resource locator) to a server-side fetch routine; the server performs the request on the attacker's behalf from within its own network trust boundary; and the attacker observes or infers the outcome. Where the plugin is used to render PDFs or preview documents, the server-side fetch is intrinsic to the feature — which is what makes SSRF the relevant risk.

The "Scope: Changed" rating is significant. It means the security authority violated is not limited to the plugin itself: the vulnerable WordPress server effectively becomes a pivot point into whatever the server can reach — internal HTTP services, administrative interfaces bound to localhost or private ranges, and in cloud-hosted environments, instance metadata endpoints. This broadens the qualitative impact well beyond the plugin's own function.

No patch, workaround, or fixed version is identified in any tracked source (patch confidence 0/4; patch sources empty). No public PoC, no exploit code, and no Nuclei template are available. There is no CISA KEV listing, and the EPSS score has not yet been assigned by FIRST.org. The absence of a PoC and KEV status does not reduce the underlying risk: SSRF is a well-understood, readily exploited vulnerability class, and the unauthenticated, network-reachable nature of this instance means exploitation requires only the ability to send crafted HTTP requests.

Exploitation Scenarios

Because no public PoC exists, the following attack chain is inferred strictly from the vulnerability class (unauthenticated SSRF) and the CVSS vector. No specific parameter, endpoint, or code names are asserted, as none are provided in the available data.

  1. Reconnaissance / target identification. The attacker enumerates internet-facing WordPress sites and identifies those running "PDF Smart Viewer for Elementor" version 1.0.4 or earlier. This can be done passively via web page fingerprinting (plugin assets, markup, or generator hints) or actively via search engines and internet-scanning services. The attacker does not need any account or credential on the target site.

  2. Triggering the flaw. The attacker identifies the plugin functionality that causes the server to fetch a remote resource. Because the vulnerability is unauthenticated and network-reachable, the attacker submits a request in which the server-side fetch destination is controlled by attacker-supplied input, pointing it either at an attacker-controlled host or at an internal/otherwise unreachable address. No authentication step is required to reach this path.

  3. Payload / execution method (class-level). The attacker directs the server to issue the outbound request to a chosen destination. Common SSRF objectives at this stage include: targeting internal RFC1918 addresses and localhost-bound services; targeting cloud instance metadata endpoints to harvest credentials or configuration; and pointing the fetch at an attacker-controlled listener to confirm out-of-band reachability (for example, via DNS or HTTP callbacks). The precise payload syntax is not disclosed and is not asserted here.

  4. Post-exploitation impact. Given the CVSS subscores (Confidentiality: Low, Integrity: Low, Scope: Changed), the attacker can expect limited but meaningful effects: information disclosure from reachable internal endpoints and the ability to cause limited side effects through crafted requests. In cloud environments, metadata access via SSRF can be a stepping stone to broader compromise. Scope Changed underscores that the impact can extend to systems outside the plugin's own boundary. Availability impact is rated None, so no direct outage is implied.

The absence of a public PoC, exploit code, and Nuclei template means defenders cannot rely on signature availability; detection must be based on behavior (outbound requests from the web server to unexpected destinations) rather than on a known exploit string.

Impact Assessment

The practical impact spans both confidentiality and integrity at the Low level, with a Scope Change that meaningfully amplifies the blast radius:

  • Affected systems: Any WordPress deployment with the "PDF Smart Viewer for Elementor" plugin at version 1.0.4 or earlier, particularly those exposed to the public internet. Sites where the plugin's viewing features are reachable without login are the primary exposure.
  • Authentication boundary: Because Privileges Required is None, the attack surface is the full population of internet-facing sites running the plugin, not a subset of authenticated users. This maximizes the number of candidate victims and removes any credential-acquisition step from the attacker's playbook.
  • Blast radius: With Scope Changed, the vulnerability can be used to reach resources outside the plugin's own context. In shared-hosting and cloud environments, the WordPress instance can act as a pivot toward internal network segments or metadata services. The Confidentiality and Integrity ratings of Low set expectations: partial disclosure and limited modification rather than full server takeover.
  • Business impact: For a typical organization, outcomes can include exposure of internal service responses, leakage of tokens or credentials through metadata access in cloud-hosted sites, and use of the site as a pivot for further internal reconnaissance. Reputational and compliance exposure follows from any resulting data disclosure.
  • Exploitation likelihood context: No CISA KEV entry and no EPSS score currently exist, and no public exploit is known. However, SSRF is a mature and well-understood class; the unauthenticated, network-reachable profile of this instance means the barrier to a custom exploit is low for a motivated adversary. The CVSS score of 7.2 (High) should be treated as the operative severity.

Detection Guidance

Sigma Rule

title: Potential SSRF Exploitation - PDF Smart Viewer for Elementor (CVE-2026-39719)
id: 8f3a1c2e-5b7d-4e9a-9c1f-2d6e8a4b7c30
status: experimental
description: Detects web server processes on WordPress hosts making outbound requests to private/internal or metadata ranges, consistent with SSRF exploitation of an unauthenticated PDF viewer endpoint.
references:
  - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39719
author: valtersit.com Threat Intelligence
date: 2026/01/01
tags:
  - attack.t1190
  - cve.2026-39719
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_proc:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\httpd.exe'
      - '\nginx.exe'
  selection_net:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - '169.254.169.254'
      - '127.0.0.1'
      - 'localhost'
      - 'metadata.google.internal'
      - '0.0.0.0'
  condition: selection_proc and selection_net
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate plugin health checks to localhost
  - Administrative diagnostics
level: medium

For Linux web servers, an equivalent rule should key on process_creation for apache2/nginx/php-fpm combined with connection attempts (network_connection events) to RFC1918 and 169.254.169.254 destinations. Because the plugin executes server-side, the most reliable signal is the web server initiating connections to internal or cloud-metadata destinations not otherwise expected from that host.

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2026_39719_SSRF_PDF_SMART_VIEWER
{
    meta:
        description = "Detects PDF Smart Viewer for Elementor plugin files (<=1.0.4) associated with CVE-2026-39719 unauthenticated SSRF"
        author = "valtersit.com Threat Intelligence"
        reference = "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39719"
        date = "2026-01-01"
        severity = "high"
    strings:
        $plugin_slug = "pdf-smart-viewer-for-elementor" ascii nocase
        $plugin_name = "PDF Smart Viewer for Elementor" ascii nocase
        $ver = /Version:\s*1\.0\.[0-4]/ ascii
        $fetch1 = "wp_remote_get" ascii
        $fetch2 = "wp_remote_post" ascii
        $fetch3 = "file_get_contents" ascii
        $fetch4 = "curl_exec" ascii
        $urlvar = "url" ascii nocase
    condition:
        (($plugin_slug or $plugin_name or $ver) and any of ($fetch*)) or
        ($plugin_slug and $urlvar)
}

Suricata IDS Rule

alert http any any -> any any (msg:"CVE-2026-39719 Possible SSRF Exploitation - PDF Smart Viewer for Elementor"; flow:established,to_server; http.method; content:"GET"; http.uri; content:"pdf"; nocase; content:"url="; nocase; pcre:"/(169\.254\.169\.254|127\.0\.0\.1|localhost|metadata\.google\.internal|0\.0\.0\.0|10\.\d+\.\d+\.\d+|192\.168\.\d+\.\d+|172\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[01])\.\d+\.\d+)/Ri"; classtype:attempted-recon; reference:cve,2026-39719; sid:2026397190; rev:1;)

Note: the specific request parameter and path are not disclosed in the available data; this rule targets the generic pattern of a plugin request carrying a URL value that resolves to internal or metadata destinations. Tune the http.uri content to the deployment's observed plugin path before enabling.

Elastic Detection

sequence by host.name with maxspan=5s
  [process where process.name in ("apache2","nginx","httpd","php-fpm") and event.type == "start"] with runs=1
  [network where destination.ip in ("169.254.169.254","127.0.0.1") or cidrmatch("10.0.0.0/8", destination.ip) or cidrmatch("192.168.0.0/16", destination.ip) or cidrmatch("172.16.0.0/12", destination.ip)]

This EQL rule correlates a web server process event with a subsequent outbound connection to a private, loopback, or cloud-metadata destination — the behavioral signature of server-side request forgery.

Splunk SPL Query

index=web OR index=proxy sourcetype=access_combined OR sourcetype=pan:traffic
| eval dest=coalesce(dest_ip, url)
| where match(dest, "169\.254\.169\.254|127\.0\.0\.1|localhost|metadata\.google\.internal|^10\.|^192\.168\.|^172\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[01])\.")
| search (uri="*url=*" OR uri="*pdf*") 
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(uri) as uris by src_ip, dest, host
| where count > 0
| sort - count

This query surfaces requests where a URL-bearing parameter co-occurs with a destination in private, loopback, or metadata ranges — a strong indicator of SSRF probing.

Wazuh OSSEC Rule

<group name="web,wordpress,ssrf,">
  <rule id="100719" level="10">
    <if_sid>31100,31101,31103,31104,31106</if_sid>
    <id>^CVE-2026-39719</id>
    <description>CVE-2026-39719: Possible unauthenticated SSRF attempt against PDF Smart Viewer for Elementor (internal or metadata destination).</description>
    <group>web_scan,ssrf,</group>
  </rule>

  <rule id="100720" level="12">
    <if_group>web|accesslog</if_group>
    <regex>url=(https?://)?(169\.254\.169\.254|127\.0\.0\.1|localhost|metadata\.google\.internal)</regex>
    <description>CVE-2026-39719: SSRF payload targeting loopback or cloud metadata endpoint observed in HTTP request.</description>
    <mitre>
      <id>T1190</id>
    </mitre>
    <group>ssrf,cve_2026_39719,</group>
  </rule>
</group>

Deploy against WordPress access logs and web server error logs. Tune the regex to match the deployment's actual parameter naming once the vulnerable code path is identified.

Mitigation & Patch Guidance

Patch confidence: 0/4 (UNPATCHED — no patch evidence from any tracked source). No fixed version has been released, and no vendor workaround is documented.

  1. Immediate mitigations (deploy now):

    • If the plugin is not business-critical, deactivate and remove "PDF Smart Viewer for Elementor" from all WordPress installations. This eliminates the attack surface entirely and is the most reliable interim control given the absence of a patch.
    • If the plugin must remain active, restrict access to the plugin's rendering endpoints at the reverse proxy / WAF layer: allow only required source IPs, and block requests in which a URL-bearing parameter points to private, loopback, or metadata ranges (127.0.0.0/8, 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16, 169.254.169.254).
    • Enforce egress filtering on the web server host so that outbound requests to internal ranges and cloud metadata endpoints are denied by default. In cloud environments, require IMDSv2 and restrict metadata access to the host only.
    • Deploy WAF rules (generic SSRF signatures plus the parameter-level blocks above) as a compensating control while unpatched.
  2. Patch / upgrade steps:

    • No patched version is currently available. Monitor the vendor's plugin repository and the NVD entry for a fixed release; upgrade immediately once a patched version exceeds 1.0.4.
    • Track the plugin's release notes and any vendor advisory for the fix announcement. Until then, treat the plugin as EOL-in-effect for security purposes.
  3. Long-term hardening:

    • Maintain an inventory of WordPress plugins and versions, with automated alerts when a plugin in use appears in vulnerability feeds.
    • Enforce least-privilege egress for all web-hosting tiers: default-deny outbound traffic with explicit allowlists for required external services.
    • Enable IMDSv2 (and prohibit IMDSv1) across all cloud instances to blunt metadata-based SSRF impact.
    • Apply a web application firewall with SSRF-specific rulesets and validate URL/allowlist logic for all server-side fetch features in any plugin that renders external content.
    • Monitor for future CVE and vendor advisories specific to "PDF Smart Viewer for Elementor"; subscribe to vulnerability feeds and the WordPress plugin directory for updated releases.

References

No threat actor campaigns, exploit-in-the-wild evidence, public PoC, exploit code, or Nuclei template have been identified for CVE-2026-39719. CISA KEV status: NOT listed. EPSS: not yet scored by FIRST.org.

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product:"Elementor"
title:"Elementor"

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