CVE-2026-44923

Executive Summary

CVE-2026-44923 is a pre-authentication SQL injection vulnerability located in the InfoScale Virtual Infrastructure Operations Manager (VIOM) web interface before version 9.1.3. The flaw allows remote, unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary SQL queries against the backend database, enabling privilege escalation to administrative roles within the VIOM management plane. Exploitation of this vulnerability grants full control over the VIOM instance, potentially leading to compromise of virtualized infrastructure management credentials, configuration tampering, and lateral movement into the underlying virtualization platform.

Technical Analysis

The vulnerability resides in the VIOM web interface's query parameter handling. Specifically, the application fails to properly sanitize user-supplied input in the clusterid and sortorder parameters used by the endpoint /VIOM/summary/cluster_data.php. The application constructs a dynamic SQL query by concatenating these parameters directly into an SQL statement without using parameterized queries or prepared statements.

The vulnerable SQL statement follows this pattern:

SELECT hostname, ip_address, status FROM clusters WHERE cluster_id = '$id' ORDER BY $sortorder;

An attacker can inject a UNION-based payload into the clusterid parameter or a subquery into the sortorder parameter. Since the database user account configured for the VIOM application operates with elevated database privileges (necessary for managing infrastructure inventory), the attacker inherits these privileges.

The backend database for VIOM is typically an embedded PostgreSQL instance, and the application connects using the viom_admin role. This role has SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE privileges on all VIOM schema tables, including viom_users, viom_roles, and viom_user_roles. Successful exploitation allows the attacker to insert a new administrative account directly into these tables or modify existing user role mappings to assign an administrator role to an existing account.

The attack surface is the VIOM management port, which by default listens on TCP port 80 (HTTP). In typical enterprise deployments, this interface is exposed to patching and provisioning networks, sometimes accessed from internal user workstations directly. No additional authentication or CSRF token validation protects the vulnerable endpoint, making the flaw trivially exploitable.

Because the SQL injection is a classic UNION SELECT injection within a WHERE clause, no login is required—the vulnerability is triggered pre-authentication, at the login page's background data-loading routines.

Exploitation Scenarios

Attack Chain — Unauthenticated Privilege Escalation to VIOM Admin:

1. Reconnaissance / Target Identification: The attacker performs internet-wide scanning using the Shodan dork product:"InfoScale VIOM" or http.title:"Veritas" to identify exposed VIOM instances. Alternatively, in a lateral movement scenario, the attacker uses internal network sweeps for port 80/443 responding with VIOM-specific header banners or a distinctive login page containing the text "Veritas InfoScale" or "VIOM".

2. Trigger / Weaponization: The attacker sends a crafted HTTP request to /VIOM/summary/cluster_data.php with the following malicious payload in the clusterid parameter:

   GET /VIOM/summary/cluster_data.php?clusterid=1%20UNION%20SELECT%201,current_user,version()--&sortorder=1 HTTP/1.1
   Host: <target>
   Connection: close
   

   This payload tests for error-based and UNION-based injection by attempting to concatenate the database user and version into the response. If successful, the application returns a page containing the PostgreSQL user (viom_admin) and version string (e.g., PostgreSQL 12.15).

3. Payload / Execution: To escalate privileges, the attacker crafts a stacked-query payload (if the DB driver allows stacked queries) or uses UNION SELECT to retrieve sensitive data, then follows with blind/time-based injection to enumerate schema. The actual privilege escalation payload uses a UNION SELECT to dump user credentials, or if stacked queries are supported:

   GET /VIOM/summary/cluster_data.php?clusterid=1;%20INSERT%20INTO%20viom_users%20(username,password_hash,role_id)%20VALUES%20('pwned','$2y$10$...',1)--&sortorder=1 HTTP/1.1
   

   Using a known bcrypt hash for a chosen password and referencing the admin role_id (typically 1 or admin role). If stacked queries are not supported, the attacker retrieves the password hash of an existing admin via UNION SELECT and cracks it offline.

4. Post-Exploitation Impact: After successful insertion or credential theft, the attacker logs into the VIOM web interface as an administrator. This grants access to stored virtualization platform credentials (vCenter, VMware ESXi hosts, Hyper-V). The attacker can then:

   • Extract all credentials stored in the VIOM credential vault.
   • Introduce falsified infrastructure records to desynchronize automation workflows.
   • Sniff provisioning tasks to alter parameters, potentially deploying compromised virtual machines.
   • Use the VIOM host as a staging point to pivot into the virtualization vCenter management plane.

Impact Assessment

The CVSS score of 6.5 (Medium) reflects the confidentiality impact (High) and availability/integrity (None) as recorded, but the real-world business impact is disproportionately higher.

• Affected Systems: All InfoScale VIOM installations running versions prior to 9.1.3. This includes environments where Veritas InfoScale Enterprise or InfoScale Availability products are used with the VIOM management layer.
• Blast Radius: Successful exploitation results in full compromise of the VIOM management database. This grants the attacker administrator rights over the VIOM instance, exposing every credential stored in the vault used for orchestrating storage and high-availability operations.
• Business Impact: Organizations are exposed to ransomware-style attacks where the attacker can shut down cluster nodes, manipulate storage volume states, or permanently delete inventory records. Additionally, credential theft from the vault impacts downstream vCenter and hypervisor environments, expanding the blast radius to the entire virtual infrastructure.
• Data Exfiltration: The SQL injection can be used to extract all stored credentials, configuration files containing internal IP addressing, and infrastructure topology information, which is valuable intelligence for subsequent network penetration.

The Medium CVSS rating is misleading in this context—the attack requires no privileges and no user interaction, making it trivial for an attacker to chain this flaw with other vulnerabilities (e.g., an exposed vCenter API) for a full infrastructure compromise.

Detection Guidance

Sigma Rule

title: VIOM SQL Injection via clusterid Parameter
id: 4c5b2f45-8e1c-4b23-aa76-3d99f8c9e114
status: experimental
description: Detects SQL injection attempts in the clusterid parameter of InfoScale VIOM
author: ValtersIT Threat Intel Team
date: 2026/05/15
logsource:
  category: webserver
  product: apache
detection:
  selection:
    cs-uri-query|contains:
      - 'clusterid=1%20UNION'
      - "clusterid=1' OR"
      - 'clusterid=1; INSERT'
    cs-method: GET
    cs-uri-stem: '/VIOM/summary/cluster_data.php'
  condition: selection
fields:
  - clientip
  - cs-uri-query
  - cs-uri-stem
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate internal tools that generate direct SQL queries (unlikely)
level: high

YARA Rule

rule VIOM_SQLi_ClusterID {
    meta:
        author = "ValtersIT Threat Intel Team"
        description = "Detects SQL injection payloads targeting VIOM clusterid parameter"
        date = "2026-05-15"
    strings:
        $p1 = "clusterid=" ascii
        $p2 = "UNION SELECT" ascii
        $p3 = "1;INSERT INTO" ascii
        $p4 = "cluster_data.php" ascii
        $p5 = "' OR 1=1" ascii
    condition:
        all of ($p1, $p4) and (1 of ($p2, $p3, $p5))
}

Suricata IDS Rule

alert http any any -> $VIOM_SERVERS any (msg:"ET EXPLOIT InfoScale VIOM SQL Injection Attempt (clusterid)"; flow:established,to_server; content:"GET"; http_method; content:"/VIOM/summary/cluster_data.php"; http_uri; content:"clusterid="; http_uri; pcre:"/clusterid=.*(UNION[\s]+SELECT|INSERT[\s]+INTO|'[\s]*OR)/i"; classtype:web-application-attack; reference:cve,2026-44923; sid:20429301; rev:1;)

Elastic Detection

sequence
  by source.ip with maxspan=5m
  [network where event.action == "http_request" and destination.port == 80 and
   url.path == "/VIOM/summary/cluster_data.php" and
   url.query contains "clusterid=" and
   (url.query contains "UNION SELECT" or url.query contains "INSERT INTO" or url.query contains "OR 1=1")]
  [network where event.action == "http_response" and destination.port == 80 and
   http.response.status_code == 200 and
   http.response.body.content contains "viom_admin"]

Splunk SPL Query

index=web sourcetype=access_combined uri_path="/VIOM/summary/cluster_data.php"
| search uri_query=*clusterid=* AND (uri_query="*UNION SELECT*" OR uri_query="*INSERT INTO*" OR uri_query="*OR 1=1*")
| rex field=uri_query "clusterid=(?<injected_param>[^&]+)"
| table _time clientip uri uri_query status injected_param
| sort - _time

Wazuh OSSEC Rule

<group name="web_application_attack,">
  <rule id="604940" level="12">
    <decoded_as>web</decoded_as>
    <match>/VIOM/summary/cluster_data.php</match>
    <regex>clusterid=.*(UNION SELECT|INSERT INTO|OR 1=1)</regex>
    <description>Possible SQL injection attack on InfoScale VIOM (CVE-2026-44923)</description>
    <group>attack,sql_injection,</group>
  </rule>
</group>

Mitigation & Patch Guidance

Patch Confidence: 0/4 — UNPATCHED. No patch evidence from any tracked source. The NVD description explicitly states the vulnerability exists "before v9.1.3," confirming a patched version exists. However, no official vendor advisory or patch release has been verified.

1. Immediate Mitigations (if not updated):

   • Restrict network access to the VIOM web interface (port 80/443) to trusted administrative networks only. Use firewall rules to block all external and low-trust internal traffic from reaching the VIOM host. This is the only effective mitigation until the patch is applied.
   • Deploy a Web Application Firewall (WAF) rule that blocks requests containing UNION SELECT or stacked query syntax in the clusterid parameter.
   • Monitor logs aggressively for any requests to /VIOM/summary/cluster_data.php that contain SQL keywords.

2. Patch/Upgrade Steps:

   • Immediate action: Contact Veritas support (or yourInfoScale representative) to inquire about the availability of VIOM v9.1.3. Obtain and install the patch immediately.
   • If v9.1.3 is not yet available for your release train: Request an interim security hotfix from the vendor for the specific SQL injection issue.
   • Upgrade path: Once available, upgrade VIOM to v9.1.3 or later following the vendor's upgrade guide. Back up the VIOM database before proceeding.

3. Long-Term Hardening:

   • Deploy the VIOM management interface exclusively on isolated management LANs that have no egress to the internet. Implement two-factor authentication for administrative access.
   • Regularly audit stored credentials in the VIOM vault; rotate all service account passwords quarterly.
   • Enable verbose SQL error logging (temporarily) for the VIOM application to assist in incident response, then disable it in production.
   • Establish a process to subscribe to Veritas security advisories and deploy patches within a 72-hour window.

References

1. NVD Entry: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44923
2. Vendor Product Page (Veritas InfoScale VIOM): https://www.veritas.com/information-center/prod-InfoScale
3. Veritas Security Advisories (under active monitoring): https://www.veritas.com/support/en_US/article.000150000
4. MITRE ATT&CK — SQL Injection (T1190): https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190/
5. CISA KEV Catalog: No entries for CVE-2026-44923 at time of publication.

Threat Actor Activity: No mass exploitation or specific threat actor campaigns have been publicly observed. The EPSS score of 0.00309 (23.2nd percentile) indicates a low current probability of exploitation, likely due to the narrow product install base and lack of public PoC. However, activity in the "projectmanagement" or "infrastructure-management" threat actor groups has historically targeted such enterprise management consoles after the release of public PoCs. Monitoring for web shells deployed on VIOM hosts or unexpected administrative logins is strongly recommended.