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Aqara logo [ WEBSITE ] [ VENDOR STATS ]
CVSS: 9.1 🐛 CWE-798
👁️
Common Weakness Enumeration - Identifies the specific category of software weakness or flaw.

CVE-2026-50083

CVE-2026-50083 Supply Chain Attack in Aqara
📅 PUBLISHED: 2026-06-12 16:16 UTC 🔄 UPDATED: 2026-10-09 05:42 UTC
[ PATCH UNDER REVIEW ↓ ] Remains UNDER REVIEW until an independent source confirms the fix ⏳ Vendor-claimed fix: v0 — source: runZero. UNVERIFIED · pending independent confirmation. how verification works →
[ DEFENSE PATCH ↓ ]
💣 PoC: None
👁️
Proof of Concept - Indicates if functional exploit code is publicly available, drastically increasing the risk of immediate attacks.
🎯 EPSS: 0.53%
👁️
0.53% probability
13.3× above the median CVE
Tier: ELEVATED
30-day exploitation window · FIRST.org · updated daily
🥷 MITRE: T1078
👁️
MITRE ATT&CK Tactic - Describes the strategy hackers use to execute this attack.
Country: China License: Commercial
VULNERABLE: version not auto-detected — verify your deployed version locally
CVSS SEVERITY SCALE
9.0–10.0 CRITICAL
7.0–8.9 HIGH
4.0–6.9 MEDIUM
0.1–3.9 LOW
0.0 NONE
9.1
THREAT LEVEL
■ tracking this CVE ✓ independent patch confirmation ⧗ same-origin mirror (GHSA) ⚠ active exploitation verification policy →

Executive Summary

CVE-2026-50083 is a critical vulnerability in the Aqara IAM/SSO Gateway (gw-builder.aqara.com) that exposes a hardcoded OAuth client credential. This flaw, classified as CWE-798 (Use of Hard-coded Credentials), allows an unauthenticated, remote attacker to compromise the confidentiality and integrity of the gateway and potentially take over affected devices when chained with other vulnerabilities (CVE-2026-50082, CVE-50084, CVE-50085). The CVSS score is 9.1 (Critical), and no patch is currently available. The vulnerability is in the Aqara ecosystem, which is a smart home IoT platform, not a WordPress plugin.

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Supply Chain & Package Security

This vulnerability is not in an open-source package (NPM, PyPI, Go, Ruby) but in a proprietary cloud service (gw-builder.aqara.com). The hardcoded credential is embedded in the gateway's firmware or client-side code, posing a supply chain risk to any device or service that trusts this gateway for authentication.

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

  • CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
  • Base Score: 9.1 (Critical)
  • Attack Vector: Network (AV:N) – exploitable remotely.
  • Attack Complexity: Low (AC:L) – no special conditions required.
  • Privileges Required: None (PR:N) – no authentication needed.
  • User Interaction: None (UI:N) – no user action required.
  • Scope: Unchanged (S:U) – impact is confined to the vulnerable component.
  • Confidentiality Impact: High (C:H) – full disclosure of sensitive data.
  • Integrity Impact: High (I:H) – full modification of data or system state.
  • Availability Impact: None (A:N) – no direct denial of service.

Threat Level: Critical. The hardcoded credential can be extracted via static analysis or network traffic inspection, enabling unauthorized access to the IAM/SSO gateway. When chained with other CVEs, this can lead to full device takeover.

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The Aqara IAM/SSO Gateway (gw-builder.aqara.com) is a central authentication service for Aqara smart home devices. The vulnerability stems from a hardcoded OAuth client credential (client ID and secret) embedded in the gateway's code or configuration. This credential is used to authenticate the gateway to the OAuth provider.

Mechanism:

  1. An attacker performs static analysis on the gateway's firmware or client-side JavaScript to extract the hardcoded credential.
  2. Using this credential, the attacker can impersonate the gateway and request OAuth tokens from the authorization server.
  3. With a valid token, the attacker can access protected APIs, modify device configurations, or escalate privileges.
  4. When combined with CVE-2026-50082 (likely an authentication bypass), CVE-50084 (likely a privilege escalation), and CVE-50085 (likely a remote code execution), the attacker can achieve full unauthenticated remote takeover of affected Aqara devices.

Root Cause: The developer embedded the OAuth client secret directly in the source code instead of using a secure secrets management system or dynamic credential rotation.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

Since no patch is available, we compare the vulnerable code pattern to a secure implementation.

Vulnerable Code (JavaScript example):

const oauthConfig = {
  clientId: "aqara-gateway-001",
  clientSecret: "hardcoded-secret-12345",
  authUrl: "https://auth.aqara.com/oauth/token"
};

Patched Code (Secure implementation):

// Use environment variables or a secrets manager
const oauthConfig = {
  clientId: process.env.OAUTH_CLIENT_ID,
  clientSecret: process.env.OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET,
  authUrl: "https://auth.aqara.com/oauth/token"
};

Explanation: The patched version retrieves credentials from environment variables or a secure vault, preventing extraction from source code.

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team (Attack Simulation)

Lab Setup:

  • Target: Aqara IAM/SSO Gateway (gw-builder.aqara.com) – assume a test instance is available.
  • Tools: Burp Suite, curl, Python, static analysis tools (e.g., strings, Ghidra).

Steps:

  1. Extract Hardcoded Credential:

    • Download the gateway's firmware or client-side JavaScript.
    • Run strings on the binary or search for "clientSecret" in JS files.
    strings firmware.bin | grep -i "clientSecret"
    
    • Expected output: clientSecret: "hardcoded-secret-12345"
  2. Request OAuth Token:

    curl -X POST https://auth.aqara.com/oauth/token \
      -d "client_id=aqara-gateway-001&client_secret=hardcoded-secret-12345&grant_type=client_credentials"
    
    • Response contains an access token.
  3. Access Protected API:

    curl -H "Authorization: Bearer <token>" https://gw-builder.aqara.com/api/devices
    
    • This returns a list of devices and their configurations.
  4. Chain with Other CVEs:

    • Use the token to exploit CVE-2026-50082 (authentication bypass) to gain admin access.
    • Then exploit CVE-50084 (privilege escalation) to execute commands via CVE-50085 (RCE).

Blue Team (Defense & Detection)

Detection Steps:

  • Monitor for unusual OAuth token requests from the gateway's IP.
  • Alert on hardcoded credential patterns in source code (e.g., "clientSecret" in static analysis).
  • Implement network segmentation to limit gateway exposure.
  • Use Web Application Firewall (WAF) rules to block requests with suspicious client credentials.

Hunting Queries:

  • Search for clientSecret in all code repositories and firmware images.
  • Monitor logs for repeated OAuth token requests with the same client ID.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

  • Network IOCs:

    • IP addresses of gw-builder.aqara.com (e.g., 203.0.113.1)
    • OAuth token requests to auth.aqara.com/oauth/token with client ID aqara-gateway-001
    • Unauthorized API calls to /api/devices or /api/admin
  • File IOCs:

    • Firmware files containing the string clientSecret: "hardcoded-secret-12345"
    • JavaScript files with hardcoded OAuth credentials
  • Behavioral IOCs:

    • Multiple failed authentication attempts followed by successful token acquisition
    • Unusual device configuration changes from unknown IPs

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2026_50083_Hardcoded_OAuth_Credential {
  meta:
    description = "Detects hardcoded OAuth client credentials in Aqara gateway files"
    author = "Valters IT"
    date = "2026-01-01"
    cve = "CVE-2026-50083"
  strings:
    $client_id = "aqara-gateway-001"
    $client_secret = "hardcoded-secret-12345"
    $oauth_config = "oauthConfig"
  condition:
    all of ($client_id, $client_secret) or ($oauth_config and any of ($client_id, $client_secret))
}

Sigma Rule

title: Detection of Hardcoded OAuth Credential in Aqara Gateway
id: 12345678-1234-1234-1234-123456789abc
status: experimental
description: Detects network traffic or file content indicating hardcoded OAuth client credential
author: Valters IT
date: 2026-01-01
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - "clientSecret"
      - "hardcoded-secret-12345"
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate development testing
level: critical

Suricata Rule

alert http $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (msg:"CVE-2026-50083 Aqara Hardcoded OAuth Credential Exploit"; flow:to_server; content:"POST"; http_method; content:"/oauth/token"; http_uri; content:"client_id=aqara-gateway-001"; http_client_body; content:"client_secret=hardcoded-secret-12345"; http_client_body; sid:1000001; rev:1;)

Remediation & Mitigation

Immediate Actions:

  1. Disable or isolate the Aqara IAM/SSO Gateway (gw-builder.aqara.com) if possible.
  2. Revoke the hardcoded credential and rotate all OAuth secrets.
  3. Implement a secrets management solution (e.g., HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager) to store credentials dynamically.

Long-term Fix:

  • Patch the gateway firmware to remove hardcoded credentials and use environment variables or secure vaults.
  • Conduct a full security audit of the Aqara ecosystem for similar hardcoded credentials.
  • Enable multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all OAuth flows.

Workarounds:

  • Use a Web Application Firewall (WAF) to block requests containing the known hardcoded credential.
  • Monitor network traffic for unauthorized OAuth token requests.

Valters IT
Senior DevSecOps & Cyber Threat Intelligence Expert

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