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CVSS: 6.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H 🐛 CWE-409
👁️
Common Weakness Enumeration - Identifies the specific category of software weakness or flaw.

CVE-2026-5132

CVE-2026-5132 Vulnerability in Mattermost
📅 PUBLISHED: 2026-09-14 00:00 UTC 🔄 UPDATED: 2026-09-22 10:15 UTC
[ ZERO-DAY / UNPATCHED ] [ DEFENSE PATCH ↓ ]
💣 PoC: None
👁️
Proof of Concept - Indicates if functional exploit code is publicly available, drastically increasing the risk of immediate attacks.
🎯 EPSS: 0.24%
👁️
0.24% probability
5.9× above the median CVE
Tier: ELEVATED
30-day exploitation window · FIRST.org · updated daily
🥷 MITRE: T1499
👁️
MITRE ATT&CK Tactic - Describes the strategy hackers use to execute this attack.
VULNERABLE: 11.9.x <= 11.9.0, 11.8.x <= 11.8.4, 11.7.x <= 11.7.7, 10.11.x <= 10.11.22
CVSS VECTOR BREAKDOWN 6.5
AV: N Attack Vector Network
AC: L Attack Complexity Low
PR: L Privileges Required Low
UI: N User Interaction None
S: U Scope Unchanged
C: N Confidentiality None
I: N Integrity None
A: H Availability High
6.5
THREAT LEVEL
■ tracking this CVE ✓ independent patch confirmation ⧗ same-origin mirror (GHSA) ⚠ active exploitation verification policy →

Executive Summary

CVE-2026-5132 is a denial-of-service vulnerability in Mattermost that allows an authenticated attacker to exhaust server memory by sending numerous Session Description Protocol (SDP) messages compressed with zlib that decompress to disproportionately large sizes. The flaw is a missing decompression size limit (CWE-409, "Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data"), affecting Mattermost server versions 11.9.x <= 11.9.0, 11.8.x <= 11.8.4, 11.7.x <= 11.7.7, and 10.11.x <= 10.11.22. Successful exploitation crashes or severely degrades the affected Mattermost server, disrupting chat, notifications, and integrations for all users on the instance.

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›Detection rules — YARA · Wazuh · Elastic (all plans) · Sigma (Pro)
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Technical Analysis

The vulnerability resides in Mattermost's handling of SDP messages compressed using the zlib format. SDP is the standard session-announcement format used by WebRTC-based real-time media signaling (voice/video calls). Mattermost's calls integration uses compressed SDP payloads to reduce transport overhead. The root cause is that the server does not enforce a limit on the size of the unpacked (decompressed) data after zlib inflation — it only (at most) limits the size of the compressed input.

This is a classic decompression bomb / zlib bomb condition (CWE-409). zlib permits compression ratios in the order of hundreds or thousands to one depending on payload content. Because the server allocates memory proportional to the inflated output, a small number of specially crafted compressed SDP messages can cause the process to allocate very large buffers. The NVD description explicitly states the failure is to "limit size of unpacked SDP messages compressed with zlib," and that this "allows attacker to deny service or crash server via sending many SDP messages that unpack to large size."

Attack surface: any Mattermost deployment where WebRTC / calls functionality is enabled and reachable by an authenticated user. The CVSS vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N) confirms network reachability, low attack complexity, and a requirement for a low-privileged authenticated account — no user interaction. The confidentiality and integrity subscores are N (no data exposure), while availability is H (complete loss of availability), yielding the 6.5 base score.

Note that the affected version ranges include a 10.11.x Extended Support Release (ESR) branch, meaning long-lived enterprise deployments may remain exposed even after users upgrade major versions elsewhere.

No public proof-of-concept, exploit code, or Nuclei template is currently available. EPSS is 0.00235 (14.6th percentile), indicating low near-term exploitation likelihood relative to the broader corpus, and CVE-2026-5132 is not listed in CISA KEV.

Exploitation Scenarios

No public PoC is available; the chain below is inferred at the vulnerability-class level (compressed-payload memory exhaustion) strictly from the NVD description. No specific endpoints, parameter names, or function names are asserted, since none are provided in the source data.

  1. Reconnaissance / target identification. The attacker identifies a reachable Mattermost instance — typically via the web interface or a known Mattermost hostname — and confirms that calls/WebRTC signaling (and therefore SDP handling) is enabled on the deployment. Authentication is required (PR:L), so the attacker obtains any low-privileged member account (self-registration or a guest account is often sufficient).

  2. Triggering the flaw class. Using the authenticated session, the attacker submits SDP messages that have been zlib-compressed such that each compressed message is small on the wire but inflates to a large size when the server decompresses it. Because the server does not cap the unpacked size, each message forces an allocation proportional to the inflated data — not the transmitted bytes.

  3. Payload/execution at the class level. The attacker sends many such SDP messages (low rate is enough given high per-message amplification). The aggregate decompressed footprint scales quickly, exhausting available process memory or triggering allocation failures, out-of-memory conditions, or crashes of the Mattermost server process.

  4. Post-exploitation impact. The Mattermost service becomes unresponsive or terminates, denying chat, file sharing, notifications, and integrations to all tenants/users of the instance. Depending on deployment (e.g., containerized workloads without memory limits or with aggressive OOM behavior), restart loops or node-level memory pressure may prolong the outage. There is no data theft or integrity impact per the CVSS profile.

Impact Assessment

  • Business impact: Full or partial outage of the Mattermost collaboration platform for the duration of the attack. Because Mattermost is frequently a primary incident-response and communications channel, DoS outages can impair an organization's ability to coordinate during other incidents (a compounding risk).
  • Affected systems: Mattermost server deployments on the 11.9.x (<=11.9.0), 11.8.x (<=11.8.4), 11.7.x (<=11.7.7), and 10.11.x (<=10.11.22) branches. Multi-tenant or SaaS-style deployments may have larger blast radius; self-hosted enterprise ESR instances on 10.11.x are of particular concern.
  • Blast radius: Scoped to the affected server process/node hosting Mattermost. Because exploitation requires only a single low-privileged account and low complexity, an insider or an attacker with any valid account can repeatedly target the instance.
  • CVSS subscores: AV:N (network reachable), AC:L (no special conditions), PR:L (authenticated low-privilege), UI:N (no victim interaction), S:U (impact confined to the vulnerable component), C:N/I:N (no confidentiality or integrity loss), A:H (high availability impact). Base score 6.5 (Medium).
  • Exploit likelihood: EPSS 0.00235 (~14.6th percentile); no public PoC; not in CISA KEV. Near-term opportunistic exploitation is low but non-negligible for internet-exposed instances with open registration.

Detection Guidance

Sigma Rule

title: Potential Mattermost zlib SDP Decompression Bomb (CVE-2026-5132)
id: 3b7e9c2a-6f1d-4a8c-9d2e-5c0f8a1b7e21
status: experimental
description: Detects large outbound WebRTC/SDP signaling submissions or abnormal decompression-related events from Mattermost that may indicate exploitation of CVE-2026-5132.
references:
  - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-5132
  - https://mattermost.com/security-updates/
author: Valters IT Threat Intelligence
date: 2026-01-01
logsource:
  product: mattermost
  service: application
detection:
  selection_sdp:
    msg|contains: 'SDP'
  selection_anomaly:
    - msg|contains: 'out of memory'
    - msg|contains: 'runtime: out of memory'
    - msg|contains: 'decompress'
    - msg|contains: 'zlib'
  selection_size:
    sdp_unpacked_size|gte: 1048576
  condition: selection_sdp and (selection_anomaly or selection_size)
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate large SDP payloads from screen-sharing or multi-party calls
level: medium
tags:
  - attack.t1499
  - cve.2026.5132

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2026_5132_Mattermost_SDP_ZlibBomb
{
    meta:
        description = "Detects HTTP request bodies carrying zlib-compressed SDP payloads that may be abuse vectors for CVE-2026-5132"
        author = "Valters IT Threat Intelligence"
        reference = "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-5132"
        date = "2026-01-01"
        cve = "CVE-2026-5132"

    strings:
        $sdp1 = "v=0" ascii
        $sdp2 = "m=audio" ascii
        $sdp3 = "m=video" ascii
        $zlib_hdr1 = { 78 01 }
        $zlib_hdr2 = { 78 9C }
        $zlib_hdr3 = { 78 DA }

    condition:
        uint16(0) != 0x1F8B and
        any of ($zlib_hdr*) and
        any of ($sdp*)
}

Suricata IDS Rule

alert http any any -> any any (msg:"CVE-2026-5132 Potential Mattermost zlib SDP Decompression Bomb Attempt"; flow:established,to_server; http.method; content:"POST"; http.header; content:"application/octet-stream"; http.request_body; content:"|78 9c|"; byte_test:2,>,4096,0,relative,little,string; classtype:attempted-dos; reference:cve,2026-5132; reference:url,mattermost.com/security-updates; sid:20265132; rev:1;)

Elastic Detection

sequence by user.id with maxspan=60s
  [ network where network.protocol == "http" and http.request.method == "POST" and
    http.request.body.content : "SDP" and http.request.body.bytes > 5000 ]
  [ logs where log.level == "error" and
    (message : "out of memory" or message : "panic" or message : "SDP") ]

Splunk SPL Query

index=mattermost sourcetype=mattermost:server
(("SDP" AND (msg="*out of memory*" OR msg="*panic*"))
 OR (msg="*decompress*" AND msg="*SDP*"))
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(user) as users values(src_ip) as sources by host, msg
| where count > 5
| eval first_seen=strftime(first_seen,"%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S"), last_seen=strftime(last_seen,"%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S")
| sort -count

Wazuh OSSEC Rule

<group name="mattermost,cve-2026-5132,">
  <rule id="20265132" level="10">
    <decoded_as>json</decoded_as>
    <field name="message">SDP</field>
    <field name="level">error</field>
    <match>out of memory|panic|decompress|zlib|SDP</match>
    <description>CVE-2026-5132: Possible Mattermost zlib SDP decompression bomb causing memory exhaustion.</description>
    <mitre>
      <id>T1499</id>
    </mitre>
    <group>dos,availability,</group>
  </rule>
</group>

Mitigation & Patch Guidance

Patch confidence: 0/4 (UNPATCHED — no patch evidence from any tracked source).

  1. Immediate mitigations (no vendor patch available):

    • Enforce OS/container memory limits and separate Mattermost into isolated resource pools (e.g., cgroups, Kubernetes resources.limits) so a single instance OOM does not cascade to the node.
    • Enforce strict request-body size limits and, where possible, decompressed-output limits at the reverse proxy / API gateway fronting Mattermost.
    • Reduce exposed attack surface: restrict authenticated access, disable open self-registration and guest accounts, and, if calls/WebRTC signaling is not required, disable the feature to eliminate the SDP processing path.
    • Rate-limit authenticated signaling submissions per user/IP and enable alerting on repeated large compressed-body uploads.
    • Place the Mattermost instance behind authenticated access (VPN/zero-trust proxy) so the PR:L requirement is harder to satisfy for external attackers.
  2. Patch/upgrade steps:

    • No fixed version is available in the data provided. Monitor Mattermost Advisory MMSA-2026-00643 and the vendor security update page for a fixed release, and track NVD for the patch reference.
    • When a fix is published, upgrade affected branches (10.11.x ESR, 11.7.x, 11.8.x, 11.9.x) to the designated patched release and verify that version no longer falls in the listed ranges.
    • Re-validate that the fix enforces a bounded decompressed size limit before upgrading production at scale.
  3. Long-term hardening:

    • Require bounded outputs on all decompression routines (deflate/gzip/zlib) across the codebase — enforce a maximum inflated size and reject payloads exceeding a safe ratio — consistent with CWE-409 defensive guidance.
    • Add fuzz and stress tests targeting compressed signaling/WebRTC payload handling.
    • Maintain staged rollout and a documented emergency-restart runbook for DoS scenarios; ensure horizontal redundancy so loss of one instance does not fully deny the service.

References

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product:"Mattermost"
title:"Mattermost"
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