☠️
EXFILTRATING
DATA...
01010111 10110010 00101001 11000110 01101100 10011011 00010001 11100101 01000010 10101111
[ <-- BACK_TO_SEARCH ]
X.Org logo [ WEBSITE ] [ VENDOR STATS ]
CVSS: 8.5 🐛 CWE-122
👁️
Common Weakness Enumeration - Identifies the specific category of software weakness or flaw.

CVE-2026-56003

CVE-2026-56003 Buffer Overflow in libXfont2
📅 PUBLISHED: 2026-07-08 09:25 UTC 🔄 UPDATED: 2026-10-11 17:46 UTC
[ OFFICIAL PATCH DEPLOYED ↓ ] FIX: CONFIRMED — 3+ distinct origins confirm fix
[ DEFENSE PATCH ↓ ]
💣 PoC: None
👁️
Proof of Concept - Indicates if functional exploit code is publicly available, drastically increasing the risk of immediate attacks.
🎯 EPSS: 0.40%
👁️
0.40% probability
10.0× above the median CVE
Tier: ELEVATED
30-day exploitation window · FIRST.org · updated daily
Country: United States License: Open Source
Affected: versions below 2.0.8 — upgrade to patched release
CVSS SEVERITY SCALE
9.0–10.0 CRITICAL
7.0–8.9 HIGH
4.0–6.9 MEDIUM
0.1–3.9 LOW
0.0 NONE
8.5
THREAT LEVEL
■ tracking this CVE ✓ independent patch confirmation ⧗ same-origin mirror (GHSA) ⚠ active exploitation verification policy →

Executive Summary

CVE-2026-56003 is a critical heap buffer overflow vulnerability in the libXfont2 library, specifically within the ComputeScaledProperties() function. The flaw arises from a missing size check when parsing PCF (Portable Compiled Format) font files, allowing an authenticated X client to trigger a heap-based buffer overflow. This can lead to arbitrary code execution within the X server process, potentially compromising the entire graphical session and the underlying system. The vulnerability affects all versions of libXfont2 before 2.0.8. No public proof-of-concept (PoC) or exploit code is currently available, and the EPSS score is 0.0%, indicating low exploitation activity in the wild. However, given the severity (CVSS 8.5) and the potential for privilege escalation, immediate patching is strongly recommended.

⚡ AUTOMATE YOUR CVE INTELLIGENCE

This record — and 170,000+ others — are available via the ValtersIT API. One endpoint replaces five: NVD + GitHub CVE + CISA KEV + EPSS + Nuclei + Exploit-DB, unified.

›Patch confidence — UNVERIFIED to CONFIRMED, cross-referenced NVD + RHSA + Debian
›Exploit & PoC — poc_status, poc_url, has_exploit. Not in NVD.
›Shodan dorks — ready-made queries to find exposed vulnerable systems
›Detection rules — YARA · Wazuh · Elastic (all plans) · Sigma (Pro)
›pending_fields — know exactly which of 7 fields NVD hasn't processed yet
›Free backfill — data incomplete when you paid? Re-check within 30 days = 0 credits
PAYG €0.08/lookup Standard €19/mo (was €29) · 5k credits Pro €65/mo (was €99) · 20k credits FOUNDING PRICE · LOCKED FOR LIFE · ENDS 31 DEC 2026
[ FROM €19/MO ]
Free sandbox key available
No signup required

Supply Chain & Package Security

This vulnerability is in the libXfont2 library, which is a core component of the X.Org X server. It is not an NPM, PyPI, Go, or Ruby package. The supply chain risk is primarily for Linux distributions and systems that bundle libXfont2 as part of their X11 implementation. Organizations should verify that their Linux distribution has patched to version 2.0.8 or later.

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

  • CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
  • Base Score: 8.5 (High)
  • Attack Vector (AV): Local (L) – The attacker must have local access to the system.
  • Attack Complexity (AC): Low (L) – No special conditions are required.
  • Privileges Required (PR): Low (L) – The attacker needs an authenticated X client session.
  • User Interaction (UI): None (N) – No user interaction is required.
  • Scope (S): Unchanged (U) – The vulnerability does not affect resources beyond the X server.
  • Confidentiality (C): High (H) – Full compromise of X server memory.
  • Integrity (I): High (H) – Arbitrary code execution possible.
  • Availability (A): High (H) – Potential for denial of service or system crash.

Threat Level: High. While local access is required, the low complexity and high impact make this a serious threat for multi-user systems or environments where untrusted users have X client access.

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The vulnerability resides in the ComputeScaledProperties() function within libXfont2. When parsing PCF font files, the function allocates a buffer for font properties. However, it fails to properly validate the size of the incoming property data against the allocated buffer size. This missing size check allows a crafted PCF file to write data beyond the allocated heap buffer.

Technical Flow:

  1. An authenticated X client sends a request to the X server to load a malicious PCF font file.
  2. The X server, using libXfont2, parses the PCF file.
  3. During parsing, ComputeScaledProperties() is called to process font properties.
  4. The function allocates a heap buffer based on an initial size calculation.
  5. When reading property data from the PCF file, the function does not check if the data exceeds the allocated buffer size.
  6. An attacker can craft the PCF file to include property data larger than the allocated buffer, causing a heap buffer overflow.
  7. This overflow can overwrite adjacent heap metadata or other data structures, leading to arbitrary code execution within the X server process.

The X server typically runs with elevated privileges (often as root), making this a critical privilege escalation vector.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

The fix in version 2.0.8 introduces a size check before copying property data into the buffer.

Vulnerable Code (libXfont2 < 2.0.8):

// In ComputeScaledProperties()
// No size validation before memcpy
memcpy(prop->name, pcfProp->name, pcfProp->nameLength);
prop->name[pcfProp->nameLength] = '\0';

Patched Code (libXfont2 >= 2.0.8):

// In ComputeScaledProperties()
// Added size check
if (pcfProp->nameLength > prop->nameSize) {
    // Handle error, reject the font
    return BadAlloc;
}
memcpy(prop->name, pcfProp->name, pcfProp->nameLength);
prop->name[pcfProp->nameLength] = '\0';

The patch ensures that the length of the property name from the PCF file does not exceed the allocated buffer size (prop->nameSize). If it does, the function returns an error, preventing the overflow.

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team

Prerequisites:

  • Local access to a system running an X server with libXfont2 < 2.0.8.
  • Ability to run an X client (e.g., via SSH with X11 forwarding or a local terminal).

Exploitation Steps:

  1. Craft a Malicious PCF File: Create a PCF font file with a property entry that has a nameLength field larger than the allocated buffer in ComputeScaledProperties(). The overflow data should be crafted to overwrite a function pointer or other critical data structure to redirect execution to shellcode.
  2. Load the Font: Use an X client (e.g., xfontsel, xlsfonts, or a custom program) to load the malicious PCF font.
  3. Trigger the Overflow: The X server will parse the font, triggering the heap buffer overflow.
  4. Gain Code Execution: The overflow overwrites a function pointer (e.g., in the heap metadata or a vtable), redirecting execution to attacker-controlled shellcode. This shellcode can spawn a reverse shell or execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the X server (often root).

Example (Conceptual):

# Create a malicious PCF file (requires custom tooling)
# Load the font using xfontsel or a custom X client
xfontsel -pattern /path/to/malicious.pcf

Note: No public exploit code is available. This is a conceptual description.

Blue Team

Detection:

  • Monitor for unusual font loading activity, especially from non-standard paths.
  • Use file integrity monitoring (FIM) to detect the creation of suspicious PCF files.
  • Enable auditing of X server events (e.g., auditd rules for X server processes).

Mitigation:

  • Immediately patch libXfont2 to version 2.0.8 or later.
  • Restrict local access to trusted users only.
  • Use application whitelisting to prevent execution of untrusted X clients.
  • Consider disabling X11 forwarding on SSH if not required.

Hunting:

  • Search for crashes or segmentation faults in X server logs (/var/log/Xorg.0.log).
  • Look for heap corruption indicators in system logs.
  • Analyze core dumps from X server crashes for signs of heap overflow.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

  • File Hashes: (No known malicious files yet)
  • Process Anomalies: X server process (Xorg, X) crashing unexpectedly.
  • Network Connections: Unusual outbound connections from the X server process (if shellcode spawns a reverse shell).
  • Log Entries:
    • /var/log/Xorg.0.log: Entries indicating font loading errors or crashes.
    • /var/log/syslog or /var/log/messages: Segmentation faults in the X server.
  • File System: Suspicious PCF files in /usr/share/fonts/ or user home directories.

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

🔒 DETECTION RULE — API ACCESS REQUIRED

The full machine-readable detection artifact (Sigma, YARA, Suricata, Elastic, Splunk or Wazuh rule body) is available through the ValtersIT API — moved there in response to large-scale automated scraping, to keep this independently-researched intelligence sustainable. The written analysis on every record remains fully open.

[ GET API ACCESS ] →

Sigma Rule

🔒 DETECTION RULE — API ACCESS REQUIRED

The full machine-readable detection artifact (Sigma, YARA, Suricata, Elastic, Splunk or Wazuh rule body) is available through the ValtersIT API — moved there in response to large-scale automated scraping, to keep this independently-researched intelligence sustainable. The written analysis on every record remains fully open.

[ GET API ACCESS ] →

Suricata Rule

🔒 DETECTION RULE — API ACCESS REQUIRED

The full machine-readable detection artifact (Sigma, YARA, Suricata, Elastic, Splunk or Wazuh rule body) is available through the ValtersIT API — moved there in response to large-scale automated scraping, to keep this independently-researched intelligence sustainable. The written analysis on every record remains fully open.

[ GET API ACCESS ] →

Remediation & Mitigation

  1. Patch Immediately: Upgrade libXfont2 to version 2.0.8 or later. This is the only complete fix.
  2. Workaround: If patching is not possible, restrict local access to the X server. Use xhost to limit which users can connect to the X server.
  3. Disable X11 Forwarding: On SSH servers, set X11Forwarding no in /etc/ssh/sshd_config if not required.
  4. Monitor: Implement the detection rules above to identify potential exploitation attempts.
  5. Least Privilege: Run the X server with the minimum necessary privileges. Consider using a dedicated user account for the X server.

Valters IT

◈ SOURCE Analysis & enrichment: valtersit.com/cve/CVE-2026-56003/ · CVE data: NVD/MITRE (public domain) · © 2026 ValtersIT Hub
>_ SYSTEM_CORE: INTEL_ACTIVE
90% TEAM-CURATED // 10% AUTOMATED INGESTION.
ALL PATCH REFERENCES AND VERSION DATA SOURCED FROM NVD + OSV OFFICIAL REGISTRIES.