CVE-2026-56570

Executive Summary

CVE-2026-56570 affects HCL iControl, a web-based management interface. The vulnerability is rooted in autocomplete-enabled login fields. When a user logs in from a shared or public workstation, the browser may store the submitted username, email address, or account identifier in its local autofill database. A subsequent user — or an attacker with local access to the same browser profile — can trigger autocomplete suggestions and recover valid identity information.

This is a low-severity local information disclosure issue, but it enables credential-prepping, username enumeration, and targeted phishing. The NVD score is 3.7, with an EPSS probability of 0.0%, indicating that mass exploitation is not currently expected. No public exploit-db entry or Nuclei template is available. HCL has not yet published a patch, so all deployments of iControl with default autofill behavior should be considered exposed.

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

The NVD entry does not provide a full CVSS vector, but the attack context of shared workstations suggests a plausible vector such as CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N. The vulnerability does not directly lead to remote code execution, privilege escalation, or credential theft from the server. However, it reliably leaks valid login identifiers, which lowers the cost of subsequent brute force, password spraying, or social engineering campaigns.

Deep Dive & Mechanics

Root Cause

The HCL iControl login form does not explicitly disable browser auto-completion for sensitive fields. The affected form fields likely resemble:

<form id="loginForm" method="POST" action="/iControl/authenticate">
  <input type="text" name="username" placeholder="Username">
  <input type="email" name="email" placeholder="Email">
  <input type="text" name="accountId" placeholder="Account ID">
  <input type="password" name="password">
</form>

Because the autocomplete attribute is either missing or set to an insecure value such as on or true, Chromium-based browsers (Chrome, Edge) and Firefox will save the submitted values into the local profile database.

Information Exposure Chain

1. A legitimate administrator logs in from a shared kiosk, remote desktop session, or common workstation.
2. The browser saves the values of username, email, and accountId in the autofill store.
3. The legitimate user logs out, but the stored autofill entries remain.
4. An attacker using the same machine opens the HCL iControl login page.
5. The attacker clicks the username or email field; the browser displays saved suggestions.
6. The attacker extracts valid account identifiers without any password or server interaction.

This bypasses web application logging, server-side rate limiting, and most perimeter defenses because the data is retrieved locally from the browser.

Why It Matters

Even though no password is disclosed, valid usernames and account identifiers are sensitive. Attackers use such details to build target lists, craft convincing password-reset requests, and evade detection by avoiding invalid username attempts.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

The following sample reflects an insecure implementation where autocomplete is missing.

Vulnerable HTML Pattern

<form id="iControlLogin" method="POST" action="/iControl/authenticate">
  <input type="text" id="username" name="username" placeholder="Username">
  <input type="email" id="email" name="email" placeholder="Email Address">
  <input type="text" id="accountId" name="accountId" placeholder="Account Identifier">
  <input type="password" id="password" name="password">
  <button type="submit">Login</button>
</form>

Patched / Hardened HTML Pattern

<form id="iControlLogin" method="POST" action="/iControl/authenticate" autocomplete="off">
  <input type="text" id="username" name="username" autocomplete="off" placeholder="Username">
  <input type="email" id="email" name="email" autocomplete="off" placeholder="Email Address">
  <input type="text" id="accountId" name="accountId" autocomplete="off" placeholder="Account Identifier">
  <input type="password" id="password" name="password" autocomplete="off">
  <button type="submit">Login</button>
</form>

A proper vendor patch should also include:

• autocomplete="off" on the entire <form>.
• autocomplete="off" on every text/email field.
• autocomplete="one-time-code" on any OTP/token field.
• A global Content Security Policy or HTML header that prevents autofill injection from third-party browser extensions.

Until HCL releases an official patch, engineering teams should apply identical hardening to the frontend codebase and rebuild the application.

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team

No public exploit code is required. The vulnerability is exploited through standard browser autofill behavior. The following lab procedure demonstrates the risk on a shared workstation.

Lab Prerequisites

• A test VM with Google Chrome or Microsoft Edge.
• A shared user profile with a previous HCL iControl login.
• Local access to the browser profile.
• sqlite3 CLI installed.

Step 1 — Confirm the login form is weak

curl -sk https://target-iControl-host/ivc/ -o iControl_login.html
grep -E '<input|autocomplete|<form' iControl_login.html

If the output does not contain autocomplete="off" on the username/email/account fields, the target is likely vulnerable.

Step 2 — Simulate authenticated login from a shared profile

# Log in normally using a browser profile that will be left behind
google-chrome --user-data-dir=/tmp/iControl_shared_profile \
  --disable-notifications \
  https://target-iControl-host/ivc/

Step 3 — Extract autofill data from the local browser store

Chrome/Edge form autofill data is stored in SQLite files under the profile directory.

export PROFILE=/tmp/iControl_shared_profile

sqlite3 "$PROFILE/Default/Web Data" \
  "SELECT name, value, count FROM autofill WHERE value != '';"

For password manager shadow data, inspect the Login Data database.

sqlite3 "$PROFILE/Default/Login Data" \
  "SELECT origin_url, username_value FROM logins WHERE origin_url LIKE '%iControl%';"

Step 4 — Manual browser suggestion leak

1. Open the HCL iControl login page.
2. Click the username field.
3. Press Down Arrow to reveal autocomplete suggestions.
4. Press Enter to insert the saved username.
5. Repeat for email or account identifier fields.

This extraction is silent, does not trigger server-side logging, and succeeds even after the legitimate user logs out.

Blue Team

Defenders should verify whether shared machines store iControl autofill data and remediate immediately.

Check for autofill artifacts

find /home/ -path '*/.config/google-chrome/Default/Web Data' -type f 2>/dev/null
find /home/ -path '*/.config/microsoft-edge/Default/Web Data' -type f 2>/dev/null
find /Users/ -path '*AppData/Local/Google/Chrome/User Data/Default/Web Data' -type f 2>/dev/null

Query all locally stored autofill entries for HCL

sqlite3 /tmp/WebData \
  "SELECT name, value FROM autofill WHERE value LIKE '%iControl%' OR value LIKE '%HCL%';"

Inspect the deployed iControl frontend for autocomplete attributes

grep -R "autocomplete=\|name=\"username\"\|name=\"email\"\|name=\"account" /opt/HCL/iControl/webapp/ 2>/dev/null

Any sensitive input field without autocomplete="off" should be treated as a finding.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

The following artifacts indicate that a browser has stored HCL iControl identity information and is potentially exposing it.

Browser Autofill Artifacts

• Chrome / Edge Web Data SQLite database with entries for:
  • username
  • email
  • accountId
  • URL fragments containing iControl
• Chrome / Edge Login Data SQLite database with entries referencing the HCL iControl origin URL.
• Firefox formhistory.sqlite with matching fieldname / value combinations.

Process and File System Indicators

• Presence of copied browser database files in non-standard locations such as /tmp, /var/tmp, or user Downloads directories:
  • Web Data
  • Login Data
  • formhistory.sqlite
• sqlite3 processes querying browser profile databases on shared hosts.

Network Indicators

• HTTP(s) requests to HCL iControl login URLs originating from shared kiosk or remote desktop session hosts.
• Login attempts using repeated usernames previously leaked via autofill.

Note: These IOCs are forensic in nature rather than malicious. They are useful for incident response when evaluating whether a shared workstation has been used to enumerate identities.

Detection Engineering

The following detection content helps identify both vulnerable login forms and forensic evidence of autofill leakage.

YARA — Scan Web Application Source for Insecure Login Form

rule CVE_2026_56570_HCL_iControl_Autocomplete_Enabled
{
    meta:
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2026-06-10"
        description = "Detects HCL iControl login forms with missing autocomplete=off on sensitive fields"
        reference = "CVE-2026-56570"
        cve = "CVE-2026-56570"
    strings:
        $sensitive_field = /<input[^>]+(name|id)\s*=\s*[\x27\x22](username|email|account|userid)[\x27\x22]/i
        $text_field = /<input[^>]+type\s*=\s*[\x27\x22](text|email|search)[\x27\x22]/i
        $autocomplete_secure = /autocomplete\s*=\s*[\x27\x22](off|false|new-password|one-time-code)[\x27\x22]/i
    condition:
        $sensitive_field and $text_field and not $autocomplete_secure
}

This YARA rule is designed to be run against web application source archives, staging directories, or extracted frontend builds.

Sigma — Detect Browser Autofill Database Access on Shared Hosts

title: HCL iControl Autofill Artifact Access
id: 34c7d459-2a8f-4b5f-8e9d-1c9f34b2b5c5
status: experimental
description: Detects Chrome or Edge accessing autofill/autofill-adjacent databases that may contain HCL iControl account identifiers.
logsource:
  product: windows
  category: file_event
  definition: Requires Sysmon Event ID 11 or equivalent file access auditing.
detection:
  selection_browser:
    Image|endswith:
      - /chrome.exe
      - /msedge.exe
  selection_target:
    TargetFilename|contains:
      - /AppData/Local/Google/Chrome/User Data/Default/Web Data
      - /AppData/Local/Google/Chrome/User Data/Default/Login Data
      - /AppData/Local/Microsoft/Edge/User Data/Default/Web Data
      - /AppData/Local/Microsoft/Edge/User Data/Default/Login Data
  condition: selection_browser and selection_target
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate browser autofill during normal user activity
  - Password manager integrations accessing the same files
level: low

Suricata — Detect Insecure HCL iControl Login Form Over HTTP

alert http any any -> any any (msg:"CVE-2026-56570 HCL iControl Login Form Missing Autocomplete=off"; flow:established,to_client; file_data; content:"<input"; pcre:"/<input(?:(?!autocomplete\s*=\s*[\x27\x22]off[\x27\x22])[^>])+[^>]*(name|id)\s*=\s*[\x27\x22](username|email|account|userid)[\x27\x22][^>]*>/i"; sid:202656570; rev:1; metadata:created_at 2026-06-10, cve CVE-2026-56570, target_hcl_icontrol;)

Detection Notes:

• No public Nuclei template is available for CVE-2026-56570.
• YARA is best used against extracted web application packages.
• Sigma is best used on Windows shared hosts for endpoint visibility.
• Suricata is best used as an extra layer to flag clear-text HTTP responses containing vulnerable forms.

Remediation & Mitigation

Vendor Patching

• HCL has not yet confirmed a stable patch. Monitor the HCL support portal and apply an official update as soon as it is released.
• If an updated version is published, verify that the login form now has autocomplete="off" on all sensitive fields.

Code-Level Fixes

• Add autocomplete="off" to the entire <form> tag.
• Add autocomplete="off" to the following input fields:
  • username
  • email address
  • account identifier
  • One-time password / MFA token fields should use autocomplete="one-time-code".
• Remove any framework-level default values that may override the autocomplete attribute.
• Perform a controlled rebuild and regression test for all authentication flows.

Enterprise Configuration

• Disable browser autofill and autocomplete on shared workstations through Windows Group Policy or MDM.
• Enforce the use of managed browser profiles that wipe user data on logout.
• Use kiosk mode or private/secure browsing for all administrative access to HCL iControl.
• Prevent browser profile persistence in Internet-facing or shared remote desktop environments.

Operational Hardening

• If shared machine autofill is unavoidable, flush autofill data after each session:

rm -rf ~/.config/google-chrome/Default/Web\ Data
rm -rf ~/.config/google-chrome/Default/Login\ Data

• Restrict local access to iControl administrative workstations.
• Monitor failed login activity for sudden spikes using usernames that may have been disclosed.
• Alert on access to browser profile databases by non-browser processes.

Valters IT — DevSecOps & Cyber Threat Intelligence Specialist.