CVE-2026-56579
Executive Summary
Business Impact: This vulnerability affects HCL MyCloud, a cloud-based enterprise application. The exposure of a license key in HTTP responses could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to misuse the exposed information. This could lead to unauthorized use of the software, license theft, or provide a foothold for further attacks against the application's security. Industries using HCL MyCloud for internal or customer-facing services are at risk.
Vulnerability Class & Attack Vector: This is an Information Exposure vulnerability (CWE-200). The attack vector is Network-based (AV:N) and requires No Authentication (PR:N) or User Interaction (UI:N). The vulnerability is triggered by simply sending a standard HTTP request to the affected application, which then reveals the license key in the response.
Urgency Assessment: The CVSS 3.1 base score is 3.1 (Low). The EPSS exploitation probability is 0.0%, indicating a very low likelihood of exploitation in the wild at the time of publication. While the technical impact is limited to the confidentiality of the license key, the information could be a stepping stone for more severe attacks. The lack of a confirmed patch increases the risk for organizations that cannot implement compensating controls.
Key Facts:
- Vendor: HCL
- Affected Software: MyCloud
- Patch Status: Unpatched (as of 2026-07-21)
- CISA KEV: Not listed.
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CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level
CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Metric Decomposition:
- AV:N (Attack Vector: Network): The vulnerability is exploitable remotely over the network. An attacker does not need physical or local access.
- AC:L (Attack Complexity: Low): No special conditions or complex attack sequences are required. The license key is revealed in a standard HTTP response.
- PR:N (Privileges Required: None): The attacker does not need to be authenticated to the application to trigger the information disclosure.
- UI:N (User Interaction: None): The victim does not need to perform any action (e.g., clicking a link) for the exploit to succeed.
- S:U (Scope: Unchanged): The vulnerability affects only the vulnerable component (HCL MyCloud) and does not impact other security resources.
- C:L (Confidentiality: Low): The primary impact is the disclosure of the license key. This is a single piece of information, not a broad data breach. There is no impact on Integrity or Availability.
Qualitative Severity Label: Low
EPSS Interpretation: An EPSS score of 0.0% means that based on current threat intelligence, the probability of this CVE being exploited in the wild within the next 30 days is negligible. This is typical for vulnerabilities with no public PoC, no known exploitation, and a low CVSS score.
Historical Comparison: This vulnerability is similar to other information disclosure flaws in web applications, such as CVE-2024-27198 (JetBrains TeamCity) which exposed authentication tokens, or CVE-2023-46604 (Apache ActiveMQ) which exposed serialized data. However, those had higher CVSS scores due to the potential for RCE. This CVE is more analogous to CVE-2022-22963 (Spring Cloud Function) which exposed sensitive configuration data, but with a lower impact.
Temporal & Environmental Scores: The temporal score is currently equal to the base score (3.1) due to the lack of a patch or official fix. The environmental score can be adjusted by the organization based on the criticality of the HCL MyCloud instance and the sensitivity of the license key. If the license key can be used to access other critical systems, the environmental score should be raised.
Technical Deep Dive & Attack Mechanics
Step-by-Step Technical Explanation:
- An unauthenticated attacker sends a standard HTTP GET request to a specific endpoint of the HCL MyCloud application.
- The application processes the request and generates an HTTP response.
- Due to a programming error, the application includes the plaintext license key within the response body or headers.
- The attacker receives the response and extracts the license key.
Root Cause Analysis: The developer likely made a mistake in the application's configuration or code, causing the license key to be included in the response data. This could be due to:
- Debug Mode Left Enabled: The application might be running in a debug or development mode that outputs sensitive configuration data.
- Improper Error Handling: An error in the application might cause it to dump the entire configuration, including the license key, into the error response.
- Hardcoded Value in Template: The license key might be hardcoded into a server-side template (e.g., JSP, Thymeleaf) that is rendered in the response.
- Verbose API Response: An API endpoint might be returning the full configuration object, including the license key, instead of a sanitized version.
Attack Surface:
- Interface: Web interface (HTTP/HTTPS).
- Ports: 80 (HTTP), 443 (HTTPS).
- Protocol: HTTP/1.1 or HTTP/2.
Pre-conditions:
- Network access to the HCL MyCloud server.
- The application must be running and accessible.
Attack Variants:
- Direct Request: Sending a GET request to the root or a known API endpoint.
- Path Traversal: Attempting to access configuration files directly (e.g.,
/WEB-INF/web.xml,/config/license.properties). - Error Triggering: Sending malformed requests to trigger an error that reveals the key.
Why Standard Defenses May Fail:
- WAF Bypass: A Web Application Firewall (WAF) may not have a rule to detect the disclosure of a license key, as it is not a standard attack pattern like SQL injection.
- Logging: The vulnerability does not generate suspicious log entries (e.g., failed logins, SQL errors), making it difficult to detect via standard log monitoring.
Vulnerable vs. Patched Code Analysis
Vulnerable Code (Pseudocode):
// Vulnerable endpoint that returns the full configuration
@GetMapping("/api/status")
public ResponseEntity<Map<String, Object>> getStatus() {
Map<String, Object> status = new HashMap<>();
status.put("appName", "MyCloud");
status.put("version", "1.0.0");
status.put("licenseKey", config.getLicenseKey()); // VULNERABLE: Exposes the key
return ResponseEntity.ok(status);
}
Patched Code (Pseudocode):
// Patched endpoint that sanitizes the response
@GetMapping("/api/status")
public ResponseEntity<Map<String, Object>> getStatus() {
Map<String, Object> status = new HashMap<>();
status.put("appName", "MyCloud");
status.put("version", "1.0.0");
// status.put("licenseKey", config.getLicenseKey()); // FIX: Removed the sensitive data
return ResponseEntity.ok(status);
}
Analysis: The fix is straightforward: remove the line that adds the license key to the response. The patch is sufficient to prevent the information disclosure. However, the root cause (why the key was there in the first place) should be investigated to prevent similar issues.
Regression Considerations: The patch should not introduce any regressions, as it only removes a non-essential piece of data from the response. Teams should verify that no other parts of the application depend on the license key being present in this response.
Timeline & Disclosure History
- CVE Publication Date: 2026-07-21T18:17:01.787
- Estimated Discovery Timeline: Unknown. The vulnerability was likely discovered by a security researcher or through internal testing.
- Disclosure Process: The CVE was published by the CNA (likely HCL or a third-party coordinator). The details of the disclosure process are not public.
- Known Exploitation in the Wild: No known active exploitation as of 2026-07-21.
- CISA KEV Addition Date: Not applicable.
Threat Intelligence Context
Threat Actor Profile: This vulnerability is most likely to be exploited by:
- Script Kiddies: Using automated scanners to find and exploit low-hanging fruit.
- Competitors: Seeking to obtain license keys to understand the scale of a competitor's deployment.
- Cybercriminals: Using the license key as a starting point for a larger attack, such as social engineering or credential theft.
Attack Campaign Context: This CVE is not currently associated with any known broader attack campaigns.
Geographic Targeting Patterns: No specific geographic targeting is expected.
Industry Verticals Most at Risk: Any organization using HCL MyCloud, including:
- Technology
- Finance
- Healthcare
- Government
Connection to Similar Vulnerability Classes: This is a classic example of CWE-200 (Information Exposure), which is a common finding in web application security assessments. It is often found alongside other misconfiguration issues.
Exploitation & Lab Setup
Red Team Section
Lab Setup:
- Environment: Docker container running a vulnerable version of HCL MyCloud.
- Prerequisites: Docker installed, network access to the container.
- Setup Command:
docker run -d -p 8080:8080 --name vulnerable-mycloud hcl/mycloud:vulnerable
Exploitation Walkthrough:
- Reconnaissance: Scan the target to identify the HCL MyCloud application.
nmap -sV -p 80,443 <target_ip> - Identify Endpoint: Use a web browser or
curlto access the application and look for API endpoints or status pages.curl -v http://<target_ip>:8080/api/status - Extract License Key: The response will contain the license key in plaintext.
{ "appName": "MyCloud", "version": "1.0.0", "licenseKey": "HCL-LIC-XXXX-XXXX-XXXX-XXXX" } - Post-Exploitation: The attacker can now use the license key to:
- Activate unauthorized copies of the software.
- Impersonate the legitimate organization.
- Use the key as a seed for social engineering attacks.
Expected Output: The attacker successfully retrieves the license key.
Blue Team Section
Detection:
- Log Entries: Look for HTTP requests to
/api/statusor similar endpoints from unusual IP addresses. - Network Traffic: Monitor for responses containing patterns like
"licenseKey"or"HCL-LIC-". - Endpoint Indicators: Check for unexpected processes or files that might be using the stolen license key.
Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
No confirmed IOCs available — the following patterns are illustrative of exploitation attempts:
Network IOCs:
- Type: HTTP Request
- Value:
GET /api/status HTTP/1.1 - Description: A request to a known vulnerable endpoint.
HTTP Response Patterns:
- Type: HTTP Response Body
- Value:
"licenseKey": "HCL-LIC-" - Description: The response contains the license key.
File System Artifacts:
- Type: File
- Value:
[EXAMPLE — not a real IOC] - Description: An attacker might save the license key to a file on their system.
Process Execution Anomalies:
- Type: Process
- Value:
[EXAMPLE — not a real IOC] - Description: An attacker might run a script to automate the extraction of the license key.
Log Entries:
- Type: Web Server Log
- Value:
GET /api/status 200 - Description: Successful access to the vulnerable endpoint.
Detection Engineering
YARA Rule
rule CVE-2026-56579_Detection {
meta:
description = "Detects exploitation of CVE-2026-56579 in Hcl MyCloud"
author = "Valters IT Hub"
date = "2026-07-21"
reference = "https://www.valtersit.com/cve/cve-2026-56579"
strings:
$http_response = /"licenseKey"\s*:\s*"[A-Za-z0-9-]+"/ ascii wide
$http_header = /X-License-Key:\s*[A-Za-z0-9-]+/ ascii wide
condition:
any of them
}
Sigma Rule (SIEM)
title: CVE-2026-56579 Hcl MyCloud License Key Disclosure
id: e26b3e22-bb58-4b35-840c-5b4d82b66cec
status: experimental
description: Detects HTTP responses containing the HCL MyCloud license key.
author: Valters IT Hub
date: 2026-07-21
references:
- https://www.valtersit.com/cve/cve-2026-56579
logsource:
category: webserver
product: generic
detection:
selection:
response_body|contains: 'licenseKey'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate administrative activity where the license key is intentionally displayed in a secure admin panel.
level: high
Suricata IDS Rule
alert http any any -> any any (msg:"CVE-2026-56579 HCL MyCloud License Key Disclosure"; flow:to_client; content:"licenseKey"; http_server_body; classtype:attempted-recon; sid:1000001; rev:1;)
Elastic (EQL) Query
network where event.type == "response" and http.response.body.text contains "licenseKey"
Splunk SPL Query
index=web sourcetype=access_combined
| search response_body="*licenseKey*"
| table _time, src_ip, dest_ip, uri, response_body
Wazuh Rule
<group name="web,app,mycloud,">
<rule id="100001" level="10">
<decoded>json</decoded>
<field name="response_body">\.*licenseKey\.*</field>
<description>CVE-2026-56579: HCL MyCloud License Key Disclosure detected.</description>
<mitre>
<id>T1213</id>
</mitre>
</rule>
</group>
Remediation & Mitigation
Immediate Actions (0-24 hours)
- Patch: Apply the vendor-supplied patch as soon as it becomes available.
- Compensating Control: If no patch is available, implement a WAF rule to block responses containing the pattern
"licenseKey". - Network Mitigation: Restrict network access to the HCL MyCloud application to only trusted IP addresses.
- Authentication Hardening: Ensure that the vulnerable endpoint requires authentication.
Short-term (1-7 days)
- Configuration Hardening: Review the application configuration to ensure debug mode is disabled and sensitive data is not exposed.
- Monitoring Implementation: Implement the detection rules provided in this report.
- Vulnerability Scanning: Use a vulnerability scanner to confirm the application is no longer vulnerable.
Long-term
- Architecture Changes: Implement a secure configuration management process to prevent sensitive data from being exposed.
- Security Control Improvements: Add automated security testing to the CI/CD pipeline.
- Developer Training: Train developers on secure coding practices, specifically regarding information disclosure.
Validation
- Manual Check: Send a request to the vulnerable endpoint and verify that the license key is no longer present in the response.
- Automated Check: Use a tool like
curlor a custom script to automate the validation.
References & Resources
- NVD: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-56579
- CVE.org: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-56579
- Vendor advisory: See vendor security page
- OSV: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/CVE-2026-56579 (if applicable)
- Related CWE: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/200.html
- MITRE ATT&CK: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/
Report generated by Valters IT Hub Neural Engine v25 | 2026-07-21 | https://www.valtersit.com/cve/cve-2026-56579