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SOON 🐛 CWE-787
👁️
Common Weakness Enumeration - Identifies the specific category of software weakness or flaw.

CVE-2026-59783

CVE-2026-59783 Out-of-Bounds Access in Zabbix
📅 PUBLISHED: 2026-10-05 00:00 UTC 🔄 UPDATED: 2026-10-06 05:00 UTC
⏳ SCORE PENDING — ANALYSIS IN PROGRESS [ DEFENSE PATCH ↓ ]
💣 PoC: None
👁️
Proof of Concept - Indicates if functional exploit code is publicly available, drastically increasing the risk of immediate attacks.
🥷 MITRE: T1190
👁️
MITRE ATT&CK Tactic - Describes the strategy hackers use to execute this attack.
VULNERABLE: Unknown (no explicit version range provided in source data)
CVSS SEVERITY SCALE
9.0–10.0 CRITICAL
7.0–8.9 HIGH
4.0–6.9 MEDIUM
0.1–3.9 LOW
0.0 NONE
SOON
PENDING NVD
■ tracking this CVE ✓ independent patch confirmation ⧗ same-origin mirror (GHSA) ⚠ active exploitation verification policy →

Executive Summary

CVE-2026-59783 is a memory corruption vulnerability (CWE-787: Out-of-bounds Write) in the Zabbix Server and Zabbix Proxy that is triggered when processing binary items containing certain NULL byte input. Successful triggering crashes the Server/Proxy process, resulting in a denial-of-service condition and potential loss of monitoring availability. The vulnerability is explicitly scoped to deployments using MySQL or MariaDB as the Zabbix backend database, meaning PostgreSQL and other backends are not affected by this specific defect. No public proof-of-concept, exploit code, or vendor patch is currently available, and the CVE has not been scored by FIRST.org (EPSS) or added to CISA KEV.

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›Patch confidence — UNVERIFIED to CONFIRMED, cross-referenced NVD + RHSA + Debian
›Exploit & PoC — poc_status, poc_url, has_exploit. Not in NVD.
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›Detection rules — YARA · Wazuh · Elastic (all plans) · Sigma (Pro)
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Technical Analysis

The NVD description states that "binary items can crash the Server/Proxy on certain NULL byte input" and that this "only affects deployments where MySQL/MariaDB database is used as the Zabbix database." This ties the root cause to the interaction between Zabbix's binary item processing logic and the MySQL/MariaDB data-handling path.

Zabbix "binary" item types store opaque binary data (for example, file contents or raw byte sequences) collected by agents or returned by checks and then persisted to the backend database. The CWE-787 classification indicates that the fault is an out-of-bounds write — memory is written beyond the bounds of an allocated buffer. The trigger condition described is "certain NULL byte input." Because C string handling in C (the language Zabbix Server/Proxy are written in) treats the NUL byte (0x00) as a string terminator, code paths that mix length-based binary handling with NUL-terminated string operations can compute an incorrect length. A length or offset derived from a truncated/terminated string can then be used as a write size or destination offset, producing a write beyond the intended buffer.

The MySQL/MariaDB dependency in the description indicates that the affected code path is reached specifically when binary values are read from or written to a MySQL/MariaDB backend — for example when a stored binary value containing embedded NUL bytes is materialized and processed. In a PostgreSQL-backed deployment, the same item may take a different code path (different driver, different length semantics), which is consistent with the vendor's scoping of the issue to MySQL/MariaDB only. The precise buffer, function, and offset are not disclosed in the source data, so no specific code-level symbol can be confirmed beyond the general mechanism above.

Attack surface: the Zabbix Server (port 10051) and Zabbix Proxy (port 10051) process data from active and passive checks. The vulnerability is reachable through data that flows into a binary item — i.e., the input originates from checks/agents and lands in the server or proxy processing pipeline rather than from an unauthenticated network endpoint directly. This limits the attack surface to actors who can influence binary item data.

Exploitation Scenarios

No public PoC or exploit code exists; the following chain is inferred from the vulnerability class and the NVD description.

  1. Reconnaissance / target identification. The attacker identifies a Zabbix deployment by fingerprinting Zabbix Server/Proxy services and confirming that the backend database is MySQL or MariaDB. Deployments using PostgreSQL are out of scope. The attacker must also determine whether binary item types are in use or can be configured, since the flaw is specific to binary item processing.

  2. Triggering the flaw class. The attacker arranges for input containing crafted NULL byte content to reach a binary item that is being processed under a MySQL/MariaDB backend. At the class level, this is a malformed-length condition: a binary value containing embedded NUL bytes causes length handling to diverge from the true buffer size, which drives an out-of-bounds write in the server/proxy process.

  3. Payload / execution method. Because no implementation specifics are disclosed, the only confirmed outcome is that the crafted input crashes the Zabbix Server/Proxy process. There is no evidence of a controlled payload, code execution, or write primitive being demonstrated; the effect described is process termination (availability loss).

  4. Post-exploitation impact. The crash causes the Server or Proxy to terminate, halting collection and processing of monitoring data for the interval before it is restarted, and interrupting proxy-to-server data forwarding. If the triggering input persists (for example, is stored and reprocessed), it may cause a crash loop, degrading monitoring continuously. This is a denial-of-service/availability impact; no integrity or confidentiality impact is stated in the source data.

Impact Assessment

The impact is availability-focused. A crash of the Zabbix Server disrupts centralized monitoring, alerting, and dashboards for all monitored hosts; a crash of a Zabbix Proxy disrupts monitoring and data forwarding for the hosts it serves. Because Zabbix is frequently relied upon for infrastructure monitoring and on-call alerting, an outage can conceal other operational events and delay incident response. The effective blast radius is every host whose monitoring depends on the crashed component.

The MySQL/MariaDB condition is a meaningful scoping factor: only a subset of Zabbix deployments is affected. No CVSS score or vector was provided in the source data, so no official subscores can be reported. The requirements implied by the mechanism — the ability to influence binary item input, and a MySQL/MariaDB backend — are more restrictive than a remotely reachable, unauthenticated flaw. No evidence of in-the-wild exploitation, threat actor campaigns, or CISA KEV listing exists for this CVE.

Detection Guidance

Sigma Rule

title: Potential Zabbix Server or Proxy Crash From Malformed Binary Item (CVE-2026-59783)
id: 8f3c1b62-4d2a-4b6e-9c1f-7a5e0d2b6f41
status: experimental
description: Detects abnormal termination of the Zabbix server or proxy process, which may indicate exploitation of CVE-2026-59783 via malformed binary item input on MySQL/MariaDB-backed deployments.
references:
  - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59783
author: valtersit.com
logsource:
  product: linux
  service: syslog
detection:
  selection_proc:
    - 'zabbix_server*'
    - 'zabbix_proxy*'
  selection_action:
    - 'segfault'
    - 'signal 11'
    - 'core dumped'
    - 'exited on signal'
  condition: selection_proc and selection_action
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate service restarts or unrelated memory faults
level: medium
tags:
  - attack.t1190
  - cve.2026.59783

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2026_59783_Zabbix_BinaryItem_NullByte
{
    meta:
        description = "Heuristic detection of binary item payloads containing embedded NULL bytes that may trigger CVE-2026-59783 in Zabbix server/proxy on MySQL/MariaDB"
        reference = "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59783"
        author = "valtersit.com"
        date = "2026-01-01"
        severity = "medium"

    strings:
        $nul = { 00 }
        $binary_marker1 = "binary" ascii nocase
        $binary_marker2 = "ZBX" ascii

    condition:
        $binary_marker1 and $nul
}

Suricata IDS Rule

alert tcp any any -> any 10051 (msg:"CVE-2026-59783 Zabbix binary item NULL byte processing attempt"; flow:to_server,established; content:"|00|"; within:512; classtype:attempted-dos; reference:cve,2026-59783; reference:url,nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59783; sid:202659783; rev:1;)

Elastic Detection

process where event.action == "exited" and
  process.name in ("zabbix_server", "zabbix_proxy") and
  process.exit_code in (11, 139)

Splunk SPL Query

index=linux sourcetype=syslog ("zabbix_server" OR "zabbix_proxy")
| search ("segfault" OR "signal 11" OR "core dumped" OR "exited on signal")
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen by host process
| where count >= 1

Wazuh OSSEC Rule

<group name="zabbix,">
  <rule id="100783" level="10">
    <decoded_as>syslog</decoded_as>
    <match>zabbix_server|zabbix_proxy</match>
    <regex>segfault|signal 11|core dumped|exited on signal</regex>
    <description>CVE-2026-59783: Zabbix server/proxy crashed, possible malformed binary item NULL byte input</description>
    <mitre>
      <id>T1190</id>
    </mitre>
    <group>cve_2026_59783,availability,</group>
  </rule>
</group>

Mitigation & Patch Guidance

Patch confidence: 0/4 (UNPATCHED — no patch evidence from any tracked source). No vendor fix, workaround, or affected version range is available in the source data.

  1. Immediate mitigations.

    • Restrict access to Zabbix Server/Proxy ports (default 10051) and to the frontend so that only trusted management and monitoring hosts can reach them.
    • Audit binary item definitions and disable or remove binary item types that are not operationally required, eliminating the input path for the described trigger.
    • Monitor for repeat process crashes of zabbix_server/zabbix_proxy and identify which item/host correlation precedes them; isolate the offending item if a specific data source is implicated.
    • Increase process supervision (auto-restart/service watchdog) to limit monitoring downtime pending a fix.
  2. Patch/upgrade steps.

    • No patch is currently available; monitor the Zabbix security advisories and the NVD entry for CVE-2026-59783 for an official fix and affected version range.
    • Once a vendor release is published, validate it in a staging environment, then upgrade Zabbix Server and all Zabbix Proxies to the fixed release.
    • Apply the same upgrade to all proxy instances, since proxies independently process item data.
  3. Long-term hardening.

    • Keep Zabbix Server/Proxy and the MySQL/MariaDB backend current with vendor security updates.
    • Enforce least privilege on the MySQL/MariaDB database account used by Zabbix.
    • Maintain centralized crash/core-dump collection and alerting to shorten detection time for this and future availability-impacting flaws.
    • Track EPSS and CISA KEV for this CVE and re-prioritize if exploitation evidence emerges.

References

No threat actor campaigns, exploit-in-the-wild evidence, PoC, or Nuclei template are known for this CVE.

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product:"Zabbix"
title:"Zabbix"
◈ SOURCE Analysis & enrichment: valtersit.com/cve/CVE-2026-59783/ · CVE data: NVD/MITRE (public domain) · © 2026 ValtersIT Hub
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