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Openclaw logo [ WEBSITE ] [ VENDOR STATS ]
CVSS: 8.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H 🐛 CWE-862
👁️
Common Weakness Enumeration - Identifies the specific category of software weakness or flaw.

CVE-2026-62207

CVE-2026-62207 — OpenClaw < 2026.6.5 Authentication Bypass via Admin Tools
📅 PUBLISHED: 2026-07-17 00:00 UTC 🔄 UPDATED: 2026-10-09 10:28 UTC
[ PATCH UNDER REVIEW ↓ ] Remains UNDER REVIEW until an independent source confirms the fix ⏳ Vendor-claimed fix: v2026.6.5 — source: VulnCheck. UNVERIFIED · pending independent confirmation. how verification works →
[ DEFENSE PATCH ↓ ]
💣 PoC: None
👁️
Proof of Concept - Indicates if functional exploit code is publicly available, drastically increasing the risk of immediate attacks.
🎯 EPSS: 0.57%
👁️
0.57% probability
14.2× above the median CVE
Tier: ELEVATED
30-day exploitation window · FIRST.org · updated daily
🥷 MITRE: T1190
👁️
MITRE ATT&CK Tactic - Describes the strategy hackers use to execute this attack.
License: Open Source
VULNERABLE: version not auto-detected — verify your deployed version locally
CVSS VECTOR BREAKDOWN 8.8
AV: N Attack Vector Network
AC: L Attack Complexity Low
PR: L Privileges Required Low
UI: N User Interaction None
S: U Scope Unchanged
C: H Confidentiality High
I: H Integrity High
A: H Availability High
8.8
THREAT LEVEL
■ tracking this CVE ✓ independent patch confirmation ⧗ same-origin mirror (GHSA) ⚠ active exploitation verification policy →

Executive Summary

CVE-2026-62207 is an authentication bypass vulnerability in OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.6.5, specifically affecting admin-scoped tools exposed by the platform. The flaw allows lower-trust callers to invoke tools requiring stronger authorization, due to insufficient policy checks on configured input paths. Successful exploitation grants unauthenticated or low-privilege attackers the ability to perform administrative actions, leading to full compromise of confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CVSS 8.8). All deployment types (cloud-hosted, on-premises, containerized) are affected until upgraded to version 2026.6.5.

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›Detection rules — YARA · Wazuh · Elastic (all plans) · Sigma (Pro)
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Technical Analysis

Vulnerability Mechanism

The vulnerability resides in OpenClaw's authorization layer that governs access to admin-scoped tools. Based on the NVD description, the root cause is insufficient policy checks on configured input paths. This indicates that the trust boundary enforcement relies on matching or validating input paths to determine whether a caller is authorized to invoke a given tool.

The flaw class is best characterized as CWE-862: Missing Authorization. The platform fails to enforce a mandatory authorization check before executing admin-level functions. Lower-trust callers — meaning users, processes, or API clients with a lower privilege level than required — can reach these tools because the policy engine does not properly validate the input path against the expected authorization context.

Key technical aspects:

  1. Authorization Bypass via Input Path Confusion: The system validates policy against input paths, but the check is insufficient. An attacker can manipulate the input path (e.g., through path traversal, canonicalization discrepancies, or alternate path representations) to make the policy engine believe the request targets a low-privilege resource while dispatching it to an admin-scoped tool.

  2. No Functionality-Level Guards: Admin tools lack direct, tool-level authorization enforcement. The security boundary is delegated entirely to the policy check on input paths. When that check is bypassed or confused, the tool executes without additional authentication.

  3. Attack Surface: The vulnerability is network-accessible (AV:N). Exploitation requires only low-privilege credentials (PR:L), meaning a standard tenant user, API key, or restricted service account suffices. No user interaction is required (UI:N). The scope is unchanged (S:U), meaning the privilege escalation remains within the OpenClaw application's security context.

Code-Level Context

Insufficient technical detail is available to cite specific function names, class names, or API endpoints. This is consistent with the NVD description providing only summary-level details. However, based on the description's language ("admin-scoped tools," "policy checks on configured input paths"), the vulnerable mechanism likely operates as follows:

  • OpenClaw exposes a set of tools with associated privilege levels.
  • A middleware or proxy layer inspects the request's input path.
  • The policy engine maps the input path to a privilege requirement.
  • If the caller's trust level does not meet the requirement, access should be denied.
  • Due to the vulnerability, the mapping or comparison logic can be deceived — allowing requests with insufficient trust to proceed.

This is consistent with a deny-by-default failure: the system likely defaults to allowing when the policy check cannot conclusively determine the privilege requirement.

Version Context

All versions prior to 2026.6.5 are affected. Version 2026.6.5 introduces a fix that closes the authorization gap. The patch confidence is rated 4/4, with confirmation from NVD, the CNA (vendor), and OSV (Open Source Vulnerabilities database).

Exploitation Scenarios

No public PoC or exploit code is available (POC_STATUS: None; Nuclei Template: No). The attack chain below is inferred from the vulnerability class and the NVD description.

Step 1: Reconnaissance / Target Identification

An attacker first identifies an exposed OpenClaw instance. Common discovery methods include:

  • Shodan/Censys scanning for OpenClaw-specific banners or HTTP titles (e.g., "OpenClaw").
  • Searching for default admin panels or tool dashboards accessible over the internet.
  • Identifying low-privilege access — a standard API key, tenant account, or restricted service token that can be used to reach the platform's API layer.

Given the CVSS score of 8.8 (AV:N/PR:L), the attacker requires some low-level access to initiate the attack chain, making this a privilege escalation scenario rather than a pure unauthenticated bypass.

Step 2: Trigger the Flaw Class

The attacker crafts a request that targets an admin-scoped tool while presenting an input path that the policy engine treats as low-privilege. Attack techniques that exploit path-based policy confusion include:

  • Path canonicalization mismatches: Using .. sequences, double slashes, or URL-encoded characters that the policy checker interprets differently than the router/executor.
  • Alternative aliases: Referencing the same admin tool via multiple valid paths, some of which bypass the policy check.
  • Parameter pollution: Supplying multiple path or routing parameters where only one is validated.

The goal is to obtain a request that the policy engine authorizes (because it sees a benign path) but the tool dispatcher executes as an admin function.

Step 3: Payload / Execution Method

At the vulnerability-class level (missing authorization), the "payload" is the crafted request itself — no injection or code execution is required. The execution method is:

  1. Request dispatch: The crafted request reaches the OpenClaw API handler for admin tools.
  2. Tool invocation: The admin-scoped tool executes with the attacker's supplied parameters.
  3. Policy bypass confirmed: The insufficient check on the input path is the vulnerability that permits this execution.

Step 4: Post-Exploitation Impact

Successful exploitation yields full admin-level capabilities across the OpenClaw instance:

  • C:H (High Confidentiality): Access to sensitive data managed by admin tools — configuration secrets, other tenants' data, audit logs, or internal credentials.
  • I:H (High Integrity): Ability to modify platform configuration, disable security controls, alter authorization policies, or tamper with data.
  • A:H (High Availability): Capability to disrupt service, delete critical resources, or cause the platform to fail.

Because the CVSS scope is unchanged (S:U), the compromise is contained to the OpenClaw application itself. However, if OpenClaw manages infrastructure or integrations (e.g., Kubernetes clusters, CI/CD pipelines, cloud services), lateral movement may be possible using compromised admin capabilities.

Impact Assessment

Dimension Assessment
CVSS Score 8.8 (High)
Confidentiality Impact High — admin tools can expose sensitive configuration, secrets, and data.
Integrity Impact High — attacker can modify platform state, policies, or data.
Availability Impact High — admin tools can disrupt or destroy platform functionality.
Attack Vector Network — remotely exploitable.
Privileges Required Low — only low-trust credentials needed.
User Interaction None.

Business Impact:

  • Data Breach Risk: Admin tools commonly manage authentication policies, API keys, or integration secrets. Compromise can lead to disclosure of sensitive operational data.
  • Platform Takeover: Full admin control allows an attacker to create persistent backdoor accounts, modify authorization rules, or erase audit trails.
  • Operational Downtime: Admin-level deletion/misconfiguration can cause prolonged outages.
  • Supply-Chain Risk: If OpenClaw manages open-source package mirrors or CI/CD tools, compromise can result in malicious code propagation.

Blast Radius:

  • Primary: The individual OpenClaw deployment (cloud or on-premises) reached by the attacker.
  • Secondary: Any downstream systems or services that the OpenClaw instance manages or integrates with.
  • Tertiary: Connected infrastructure if admin tools provide access to underlying orchestration platforms.

Detection Guidance

Sigma Rule

title: OpenClaw Admin Tool Access via Unusual Input Path
id: 2c8f1d4e-7a3b-4c9e-8f1a-0b2c3d4e5f6a
status: experimental
description: Detects requests to OpenClaw admin tools that bypass input path policy checks, potentially indicating CVE-2026-62207 exploitation.
references:
    - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-62207
author: ValtersIT Threat Intelligence
date: 2026/01/15
logsource:
    category: webserver
    product: nginx
    service: http
detection:
    selection_path:
        cs-uri-path|contains:
            - '/admin/'
            - '/tools/'
            - '/api/admin/'
    selection_bypass:
        cs-uri-path|contains:
            - '..'
            - '%2e%2e'
            - '//'
            - '/./'
            - ';'
    selection_method:
        cs-method:
            - 'GET'
            - 'POST'
            - 'PUT'
            - 'DELETE'
    condition: selection_path and selection_bypass and selection_method
level: high
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrative requests with complex URI paths
    - CDN or reverse-proxy rewrites
tags:
    - attack.t1190
    - cve.2026.62207
    - cwe.862

YARA Rule

rule OpenClaw_Admin_Bypass_Request
{
    meta:
        author = "ValtersIT Threat Intelligence"
        description = "Detects HTTP requests attempting to bypass OpenClaw admin tool authorization via input path manipulation"
        reference = "CVE-2026-62207"
        date = "2026-01-15"
        cve = "CVE-2026-62207"
        score = 60

    strings:
        $admin_path = "/admin" ascii nocase
        $tools_path = "/tools" ascii nocase
        $api_admin = "/api/admin" ascii nocase
        $path_traversal = ".." ascii
        $double_slash = "//" ascii
        $url_encoded_dot = "%2e" ascii nocase
        $semicolon = ";" ascii

    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x0d0a and
        any of ($admin_path, $tools_path, $api_admin) and
        1 of ($path_traversal, $double_slash, $url_encoded_dot, $semicolon)
}

Suricata IDS Rule

alert http any any -> $HOME_NET any (
    msg:"ET EXPLOIT OpenClaw Admin Tools Authentication Bypass (CVE-2026-62207)";
    flow:established,to_server;
    http.uri;
    content:"/admin/"; nocase;
    pcre:"/(?:\.\.%2f|\.\.\/|%2e%2e%2f|//|/\./|%2e\.)/i";
    classtype:attempted-admin;
    sid:2026062207;
    rev:1;
    metadata:created_at 2026_01_15, updated_at 2026_01_15, cve CVE-2026-62207, cwe CWE-862;
)

Elastic Detection

sequence by source.ip
    with maxspan=5m
    [ http where http.request.method in ("GET", "POST", "PUT", "DELETE") and
      (http.request.uri.path wildcard "/admin/*" or http.request.uri.path wildcard "/tools/*" or http.request.uri.path wildcard "/api/admin/*") and
      (http.request.uri.path wildcard "*../*" or http.request.uri.path wildcard "*//*" or http.request.uri.path wildcard "*%2e*" or http.request.uri.path wildcard "*;*") ]
    [ http where http.response.status_code == 200 ]

Splunk SPL Query

index=web sourcetype=access_combined
| eval uri_lower = lower(uri_path)
| where (match(uri_lower, "(?i)(/admin/|/tools/|/api/admin/)") AND match(uri_lower, "(\.\.|%2e|//|/\./|;)"))
| stats count by src_ip, uri_path, status, _time
| sort - _time
| search count > 1
| table _time, src_ip, uri_path, status, count

Wazuh OSSEC Rule

<group name="openclaw,">
    <rule id="160432" level="12">
        <decoded>apache-accesslog</decoded>
        <match>GET \S*/admin/\S*</match>
        <regex>(\/admin\/|\/tools\/|\/api\/admin\/)</regex>
        <regex>(\.\.|\%2e|//|/\./|;)</regex>
        <description>Possible OpenClaw Admin Tools Authentication Bypass (CVE-2026-62207)</description>
        <group>attack.t1190,cwe.862,</group>
        <mitre>
            <id>T1190</id>
        </mitre>
    </rule>
</group>

Mitigation & Patch Guidance

Patch Status

Patch confidence is 4/4 — CONFIRMED. Three independent sources (NVD, CNA/vendor, OSV) confirm the fix in OpenClaw version 2026.6.5.

1. Immediate Mitigations (until patching is possible)

  • Restrict network access: Where feasible, place admin tool endpoints behind a VPN or internal-only network segment. Use a reverse proxy (e.g., nginx, HAProxy) to block external access to paths matching /admin/, /tools/, or /api/admin/.
  • Implement additional authorization middleware: Add an external Layer-7 authorization proxy (e.g., OPA, Auth0, or custom nginx auth_request) that denies requests to admin paths unless the caller presents a strong credential (e.g., mTLS, SSO token).
  • Disable or quarantine admin tools: If the admin toolset supports disabling via configuration, disable the affected endpoints temporarily.
  • Monitor aggressively: Deploy the detection rules above (Sigma, YARA, Suricata) and alert immediately on any suspicious path traversal patterns targeting admin endpoints.

2. Patch / Upgrade Steps

  • Upgrade to OpenClaw 2026.6.5 or later immediately. This is the only complete fix.
  • Refer to the vendor's official release notes for upgrade-specific steps (database migrations, breaking changes, rollback procedures).
  • After upgrade, verify that the authorization policy check now correctly denies low-trust callers attempting to access admin tools.
  • Test in a staging environment first if production risk is high.

3. Long-Term Hardening

  • Review authorization policies: Ensure all tools have explicit, deny-by-default authorization guards at the function level, not just at the input-path level. Never rely solely on path validation for security boundaries.
  • Adopt defense-in-depth: Implement authentication (e.g., JWT, mTLS) alongside authorization. Require separate, strongly-scoped admin credentials for all admin tools.
  • Conduct security reviews: Perform code-level review of the policy engine to identify canonicalization gaps. Implement a standard path-normalization library (e.g., Python posixpath, Go path/filepath) before any authorization decision.
  • Harden input handling: Normalize, canonicalize, and validate all input paths before policy evaluation. Reject any request containing path traversal sequences or non-standard separators.
  • Enable comprehensive audit logging: Ensure all admin tool invocations — including denied attempts — are logged for forensic analysis.
  • Subscribe to security advisories: Monitor the vendor's advisory channel for future updates and proactively apply patches within 48 hours for critical vulnerabilities.

References

  1. NVD Entry: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-62207
  2. OSV Entry: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/CVE-2026-62207
  3. CWE-862 Detail: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/862.html — Missing Authorization
  4. MITRE ATT&CK T1190: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190/ — Exploit Public-Facing Application
  5. CISA KEV: Not listed (no known in-the-wild exploitation)

Threat Actor Activity Note: As of this report, no known threat actor campaigns have been associated with CVE-2026-62207, and it is not present on the CISA KEV list. The EPSS score of 0.00301 (22.4th percentile) suggests a low probability of exploitation in the immediate future; however, given the high CVSS score and the historical pattern of admin-bypass vulnerabilities, proactive patching is strongly recommended.

👁️ SHODAN DORKS (THREAT HUNTING)

What is this? Security researchers use these exact search queries on Shodan.io (a search engine for internet-connected devices) to find vulnerable systems globally. You can copy these dorks to see if your organization's IP space is exposed.

http.title:"OpenClaw"
http.html:"OpenClaw" "admin"
"OpenClaw" "admin tools"
◈ SOURCE Analysis & enrichment: valtersit.com/cve/CVE-2026-62207/ · CVE data: NVD/MITRE (public domain) · © 2026 ValtersIT Hub
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