CVE-2026-65111

Executive Summary

CVE-2026-65111 is a code injection vulnerability (CWE-77) in NVIDIA NeMo Speech affecting all platforms. An attacker who can supply crafted input that reaches the vulnerable component can achieve code execution, information disclosure, and data tampering. With a CVSS 3.1 base score of 7.8 (High) and a local attack vector requiring low privileges but no user interaction, the flaw most plausibly manifests in workloads that process untrusted model, configuration, or audio/text input within the NeMo Speech toolchain. No public exploit, PoC, or patch is currently available.

Technical Analysis

The NVD description establishes three facts with certainty: (1) the affected product is NVIDIA NeMo Speech, (2) it is affected on all platforms, and (3) the root cause is "malicious input created by an attacker" leading to "code injection." The assigned CWE is CWE-77 — Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ("Command Injection"). Taken together, these indicate a vulnerability class in which attacker-controlled input is incorporated into an interpreter, shell, or command-evaluation context without adequate neutralization, allowing injected elements to be parsed as executable instructions rather than inert data.

The CVSS vector AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H is highly informative about the realistic attack surface:

• AV:L (Local) — the attacker's path to the vulnerable component is local, not directly network-reachable. In practice this is consistent with a scenario where the attacker must already have some form of access to the host, container, or process context that is running NeMo Speech — for example, the ability to place a crafted file in a directory the application reads, to submit input to a locally exposed service, or to influence configuration/data consumed by the toolkit.
• PR:L (Low Privileges) — no administrative or elevated rights are required. Any user or process with local interaction capability can plausibly trigger the flaw.
• AC:L (Low Complexity) — no race condition, unusual timing, or special preconditions are needed; the injection succeeds reliably once the crafted input is delivered.
• UI:N (No User Interaction) — no victim must open a file or click a link; the trigger is programmatic.
• S:U (Scope Unchanged) — exploitation is contained within the security authority of the vulnerable component; there is no cross-boundary privilege escalation described at the CVSS scope level.
• C:H / I:H / A:H — full compromise of confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the affected component's data and execution context.

The impact triad described by NVD (code execution, information disclosure, data tampering) maps directly onto the C/I/A:H subscores: injected code can read sensitive data processed by the toolkit (audio, transcripts, model artifacts, credentials in environment), modify or corrupt that data, and execute arbitrary commands within the process context.

Because NeMo Speech is a machine-learning speech toolkit, the realistic injection surface is broad: it processes untrusted inputs including audio files, text transcripts, manifests, and configuration/YAML-style data. CWE-77 in such a toolkit commonly arises when these inputs are passed to a shell, subprocess invocation, or a command-evaluation primitive without sanitization.

Important accuracy note: The NVD description and CNA title provided do not disclose specific function names, file paths, endpoints, parameters, or code constructs. No public advisory from NVIDIA, no PoC, and no patch data are available. Accordingly, this report deliberately describes the vulnerability at the class and mechanism level and does not fabricate implementation specifics. Claims about exact code paths would exceed the available evidence.

Exploitation Scenarios

No public PoC exists for CVE-2026-65111; the attack chain below is inferred strictly from the vulnerability class (CWE-77 command/code injection) and the CVSS vector (AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N). It describes the mechanism at the class level and does not assert specific function names or parameter names, none of which are disclosed in the source data.

1. Reconnaissance / target identification. An adversary with existing local access to a host or container running NVIDIA NeMo Speech enumerates the installation, identifies input ingestion paths (audio files, text/transcript inputs, manifests, or configuration consumed by the toolkit), and determines which of those inputs are attacker-influenceable. Because the vector is AV:L, this step assumes the attacker already has a foothold (insider, compromised low-privileged account, or a co-resident process/workload).

2. Triggering the flaw class. The attacker crafts input containing special elements that are not properly neutralized before being incorporated into a command or code-evaluation context. Per CWE-77, the vulnerable component fails to properly neutralize special elements used in a command, so the injected elements are interpreted as commands/code rather than data. The crafted input is delivered to the NeMo Speech component through the identified local ingestion path. AC:L means no elaborate preconditions are required for the injection to take effect.

3. Payload / execution method (class level). The injected command executes within the security context of the NeMo Speech process. Because PR:L is required and the scope is unchanged, the executed code runs with the privileges of that process — which may exceed those of the attacker's own account, depending on how the service or toolkit is deployed. UI:N means the payload fires without any victim interaction once the input is processed.

4. Post-exploitation impact. Consistent with CVSS C:H/I:H/A:H and the description, successful exploitation yields: code execution (arbitrary instructions in the process context), information disclosure (access to sensitive data the process handles — models, transcripts, audio, and possibly environment secrets), and data tampering (modification or corruption of processed data and artifacts). Persistence or lateral movement would depend on the privileges of the NeMo Speech process and the surrounding environment, which are deployment-specific and not established by the available data.

Caveat: Any more granular chain — naming specific files, functions, or parameters — would be speculation. Detection content below therefore targets behavioral indicators (child-process spawning, shell invocation, anomalous file writes) that are generically indicative of command-injection exploitation rather than any single disclosed code path.

Impact Assessment

CVE-2026-65111 carries a CVSS 3.1 base score of 7.8 (High) with vector CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H.

• Confidentiality (C:H): Full loss of confidentiality of data handled by the affected component, supporting the "information disclosure" impact.
• Integrity (I:H): Full loss of integrity, supporting "data tampering."
• Availability (A:H): Full loss of availability of the affected component's data/execution.
• Attack Vector (L) / Privileges Required (L): The flaw is not directly exploitable from the internet without a local foothold or low-privileged access, which constrains mass remote exploitation but makes it attractive for post-compromise escalation and laterally positioned attackers.
• User Interaction (N) / Complexity (L): Reliable, programmatic triggering favors automated exploitation once an attacker has local access.

Affected systems / blast radius. Any environment running NVIDIA NeMo Speech is in scope, across all platforms, per the NVD description. NeMo-based speech pipelines frequently operate in ML training/serving clusters, GPU nodes, and containerized inference services. Because ML infrastructure often has broad access to datasets, model registries, and network-attached storage, a single compromised component can expose or corrupt large volumes of sensitive data.

EPSS: Not yet scored by FIRST.org. No EPSS value is asserted. CISA KEV: Not listed. Exploit maturity: No public PoC, no Nuclei template, no exploit code observed.

Detection Guidance

Detection focuses on behavioral signatures of command/code injection: unexpected child-process creation from ML/speech processes, shell interpreter invocation, and anomalous file writes from the NeMo Speech process context. Because no specific vulnerable function or endpoint is disclosed, rules target process-lineage and command-pattern behavior rather than a fixed signature.

Sigma Rule

title: Potential Code Injection Exploitation in NVIDIA NeMo Speech
id: 6f2a9c1e-2b77-4e10-9a3c-5d1f0c7e65aa
status: experimental
description: Detects process-creation behavior consistent with command/code injection (CWE-77) in the context of NVIDIA NeMo Speech workloads (CVE-2026-65111).
references:
  - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-65111
author: valtersit.com
date: 2026/01/01
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: linux
detection:
  selection_parent:
    ParentImage|contains:
      - 'nemo'
      - 'NeMo'
      - 'speech'
  selection_child:
    Image|endswith:
      - '/sh'
      - '/bash'
      - '/dash'
      - '/zsh'
  selection_payload:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'curl '
      - 'wget '
      - 'chmod +x'
      - '/dev/tcp/'
      - 'base64 -d'
      - 'python -c'
  condition: selection_parent and selection_child and selection_payload
fields:
  - ParentImage
  - Image
  - CommandLine
  - User
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate shell execution within ML tooling pipelines
level: high
tags:
  - attack.t1059
  - attack.t1190
  - cve.2026.65111

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2026_65111_NVIDIA_NeMo_Speech_CodeInjection_Artifacts
{
    meta:
        description = "Detects shell-command injection artifacts and crafted payload indicators associated with NVIDIA NeMo Speech code injection (CVE-2026-65111, CWE-77)"
        author = "valtersit.com"
        reference = "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-65111"
        date = "2026-01-01"
        severity = "high"

    strings:
        $cmd1 = "sh -c" ascii wide nocase
        $cmd2 = "bash -c" ascii wide nocase
        $cmd3 = "/bin/sh" ascii wide nocase
        $cmd4 = "$(" ascii wide
        $cmd5 = "`" ascii wide
        $p1  = "/dev/tcp/" ascii wide
        $p2  = "base64 -d" ascii wide nocase
        $p3  = "chmod +x" ascii wide nocase

    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x213C or
        (2 of ($cmd*) and 1 of ($p*)) or
        (all of ($cmd*) and any of ($p*))
}

Suricata IDS Rule

alert http any any -> any any (msg:"CVE-2026-65111 NVIDIA NeMo Speech Code Injection Attempt"; flow:established,to_server; http.request_body; content:"sh -c"; nocase; content:"curl "; distance:0; nocase; pcre:"/(\$\(|`)[^)]{0,200}(sh|bash|wget|curl)/i"; reference:cve,2026-65111; reference:url,nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-65111; classtype:attempted-admin; sid:202665111; rev:1; metadata:created_at 2026_01_01, cve CVE-2026-65111;)

Elastic Detection

process where event.type == "start" and
  process.parent.name : ("nemo*", "*speech*", "python*") and
  process.name : ("sh", "bash", "dash", "zsh", "cmd.exe", "powershell.exe") and
  process.args : ("*sh -c*", "*bash -c*", "*curl *", "*wget *", "*base64 -d*", "*chmod +x*")

Splunk SPL Query

index=main (sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR sourcetype=linux:sysmon)
(EventCode=1)
| search (ParentImage="*nemo*" OR ParentImage="*speech*" OR ParentCommandLine="*nemo*")
| search (Image="*/bin/sh" OR Image="*/bin/bash" OR Image="*cmd.exe" OR Image="*powershell.exe")
| search (CommandLine="*sh -c*" OR CommandLine="*bash -c*" OR CommandLine="*curl *" OR CommandLine="*wget *" OR CommandLine="*base64 -d*" OR CommandLine="*chmod +x*")
| table _time host User ParentImage Image CommandLine
| sort - _time

Wazuh OSSEC Rule

<group name="nvidia_nemo,cve-2026-65111,">
  <rule id="100611" level="12">
    <if_sid>592</if_sid>
    <field name="audit.parent_image">nemo|speech</field>
    <field name="audit.execve">sh -c|bash -c|curl |wget |base64 -d|chmod \+x</field>
    <description>CVE-2026-65111: Possible NVIDIA NeMo Speech code injection - suspicious shell execution spawned by NeMo/speech process.</description>
    <mitre>
      <id>T1059</id>
      <id>T1190</id>
    </mitre>
    <group>cve_2026_65111,command_injection,</group>
  </rule>
</group>

Mitigation & Patch Guidance

Patch confidence: 0/4 — UNPATCHED. No patch evidence exists from any tracked source; the vendor advisory is not yet available and no affected version range has been published.

1. Immediate mitigations (compensating controls).

   • Restrict local access to hosts and containers running NVIDIA NeMo Speech to the minimum set of trusted users and processes; the vector is AV:L/PR:L, so reducing local attack surface is the highest-leverage control.
   • Treat all inputs to NeMo Speech — audio, text/transcripts, manifests, and configuration — as untrusted. Sanitize and validate before ingestion, and avoid passing externally influenced values into any shell, subprocess, or command-evaluation context.
   • Run NeMo Speech workloads with least-privilege service accounts, in containers with read-only root filesystems, dropped Linux capabilities, and no unnecessary shell utilities where feasible.
   • Deploy the detection content above and alert on unexpected shell/child-process creation from NeMo Speech process contexts.
   • Isolate ML workloads from sensitive data stores and credential material to limit the C:H/I:H blast radius if exploitation occurs.

2. Patch / upgrade steps.

   • Monitor NVIDIA's security bulletin channel (NVIDIA Product Security) and the NVD entry for CVE-2026-65111 for an official fix and affected-version clarification.
   • Because no fixed version is published, there is currently no target version to upgrade to. Do not assume any release is patched. When NVIDIA publishes a fix, validate the fixed version against your deployed release, apply it in a staged rollout, and re-test any compensating input-validation controls.
   • Until a fix exists, treat mitigation as the primary control.

3. Long-term hardening.

   • Enforce secure coding practices that eliminate CWE-77 at the source: avoid string-concatenated command construction, prefer parameterized/argument-vector APIs, and never pass untrusted data to a shell.
   • Adopt an ML supply-chain and runtime security program: signed model/artifact pipelines, provenance tracking, and runtime monitoring for ML workloads.
   • Maintain SBOM-level visibility into ML toolkits so future advisories can be mapped to deployed components quickly.
   • Institutionalize vulnerability-management SLAs for High-severity (CVSS 7.0–8.9) issues, especially those that remain unpatched.

References

• NVD — CVE-2026-65111: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-65111
• MITRE CWE-77 — Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection'): https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/77.html
• MITRE ATT&CK T1190 — Exploit Public-Facing Application: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190/
• NVIDIA Product Security (vendor advisory channel): https://www.nvidia.com/en-us/security/
• FIRST EPSS: Not yet scored for CVE-2026-65111.

Exploit-in-the-wild / campaign evidence: None. CVE-2026-65111 is not listed in CISA KEV, has no public PoC, no Nuclei template, and no observed exploit code. No threat-actor campaign is associated with this CVE in the available data. Exploitation remains theoretical pending disclosure of technical details or a working proof of concept.