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CVSS: 6.6 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H 🐛 CWE-73
👁️
Common Weakness Enumeration - Identifies the specific category of software weakness or flaw.

CVE-2026-65125

CVE-2026-65125 Denial of Service in NVIDIA
📅 PUBLISHED: 2026-09-22 00:00 UTC 🔄 UPDATED: 2026-09-30 12:49 UTC
[ PATCH UNDER REVIEW ↓ ] Remains UNDER REVIEW until an independent source confirms the fix
[ DEFENSE PATCH ↓ ]
💣 PoC: None
👁️
Proof of Concept - Indicates if functional exploit code is publicly available, drastically increasing the risk of immediate attacks.
🎯 EPSS: 0.61%
👁️
0.61% probability
15.3× above the median CVE
Tier: ELEVATED
30-day exploitation window · FIRST.org · updated daily
🥷 MITRE: T1068
👁️
MITRE ATT&CK Tactic - Describes the strategy hackers use to execute this attack.
Country: United States License: Commercial
VULNERABLE: version not auto-detected — verify your deployed version locally
CVSS VECTOR BREAKDOWN 6.6
AV: N Attack Vector Network
AC: H Attack Complexity High
PR: H Privileges Required High
UI: N User Interaction None
S: U Scope Unchanged
C: H Confidentiality High
I: H Integrity High
A: H Availability High
6.6
THREAT LEVEL
INTEL SOURCES NVD EPSS HOW WE SCORE →
■ tracking this CVE ✓ independent patch confirmation ⧗ same-origin mirror (GHSA) ⚠ active exploitation verification policy →

Executive Summary

CVE-2026-65125 is a path/file-name external control vulnerability (CWE-73) in the NVIDIA Infrastructure Controller for Linux, where an attacker who can influence a file name or path processed by the product may achieve code execution, privilege escalation, data tampering, and denial of service. The vulnerability carries a CVSS 3.1 base score of 6.6, reflecting a network-reachable attack path that is constrained by high attack complexity and a requirement for high privileges. No public proof-of-concept, exploit code, or Nuclei template exists, the issue is not listed in CISA KEV, and no vendor patch or workaround has been published, leaving affected deployments exposed until NVIDIA issues remediation guidance.

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›Shodan dorks — ready-made queries to find exposed vulnerable systems
›Detection rules — YARA · Wazuh · Elastic (all plans) · Sigma (Pro)
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Technical Analysis

The root cause is classified as CWE-73: External Control of File Name or Path. This weakness class occurs when an application constructs or trusts a file system path using input that an attacker can influence, without adequately validating, canonicalizing, or constraining that input. The NVD description states that the NVIDIA Infrastructure Controller for Linux "contains a vulnerability where an attacker could cause external control of a file name or path," and that successful exploitation "might lead to code execution, escalation of privileges, data tampering, and denial of service."

The attack surface is the Linux deployment of the NVIDIA Infrastructure Controller. Because path-influence flaws are input-driven, the relevant surfaces are the interfaces through which an attacker can supply or manipulate path or file-name data consumed by the controller — for example configuration ingestion, file-handling operations, or any request parameter that ultimately maps to a filesystem path. The specific functions, endpoints, parameters, and file paths involved are not disclosed in the NVD description or CNA title provided, so no implementation-level detail can be asserted.

Mechanistically, a CWE-73 flaw is exploited when attacker-controlled path input is used in a filesystem operation (read, write, delete, execute, or include) without sufficient validation. Depending on where the influenced path lands, the consequence can be:

  • Arbitrary file write / overwrite → data tampering, potential privilege escalation if a privileged path is writable.
  • Path traversal / arbitrary file access → disclosure or modification of files outside intended directories.
  • Execution of an attacker-influenced path or file → code execution.
  • Deletion or corruption of critical files → denial of service.

The CVSS vector AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H is consistent with this class: the vulnerable interface is network-reachable (AV:N), but exploitation is difficult or conditional (AC:H) and requires the attacker to already hold high privileges (PR:H). No user interaction is required (UI:N), the scope is unchanged (S:U), and confidentiality, integrity, and availability impacts are all rated High — matching the "code execution, escalation of privileges, data tampering, and denial of service" outcomes in the description. The high PR:H requirement suggests the flaw is most relevant to post-authentication or privileged-administrative abuse and privilege-escalation chains rather than a pre-auth remote compromise. No affected version range, OSV package mapping, or vendor advisory is available to further scope the affected codebase.

Exploitation Scenarios

No public PoC is available; the following chain is inferred strictly from the vulnerability class (CWE-73) and the NVD description. Specific function names, endpoints, and file paths cannot be provided because they are not present in the source data.

  1. Reconnaissance / target identification. The attacker identifies a reachable NVIDIA Infrastructure Controller for Linux instance, confirming the product and its exposure via network scanning using service/banner fingerprinting. Because the CVSS vector indicates PR:H, the attacker is presumed to already possess valid high-privileged access (or to have obtained it in a prior stage) sufficient to reach the path-influencing interface.

  2. Triggering the flaw class. The attacker supplies input through an interface of the controller that is used to build or select a file name or path. In a CWE-73 weakness, the application fails to properly validate, restrict, or canonicalize that externally controlled path before using it in a filesystem operation. The exact parameter, request format, and traversal or injection syntax are not disclosed in the available data and must not be assumed.

  3. Payload / execution method (class level). By controlling the path, the attacker aims to redirect a file operation to an unintended location. Depending on how the influenced path is consumed, this can result in writing attacker-controlled content to a sensitive location, reading or modifying files outside the intended scope, or causing the controller to execute/consume a file the attacker influences. At the class level, the outcome is arbitrary file operation on the host filesystem under the privileges of the controller process.

  4. Post-exploitation impact. Consistent with the NVD description, successful exploitation "might lead to code execution, escalation of privileges, data tampering, and denial of service." An attacker who can write to or execute an influenced path may escalate privileges, alter configuration or data, and disrupt controller availability. Because the CVSS confidentiality, integrity, and availability subscores are all High, the potential blast radius spans data exposure, integrity loss, and service disruption.

Impact Assessment

  • Confidentiality (C:H): Potential exposure of files accessible to the controller process, if the controlled path is used in a read operation.
  • Integrity (I:H): Data tampering is explicitly noted; an externally controlled write path can corrupt or replace files.
  • Availability (A:H): Denial of service is explicitly noted; deletion, overwrite, or disruption of critical files can take the controller offline.
  • Scope (S:U): Impact is assessed as remaining within the same security authority, though privilege escalation within that authority is possible.
  • Attack complexity (AC:H): Exploitation is conditional and may require specific conditions or knowledge, limiting opportunistic exploitation.
  • Privileges required (PR:H): The attack is meaningful primarily to attackers who already hold high privileges, framing this as a privilege-escalation and post-compromise risk rather than a pre-auth remote code execution issue.
  • User interaction (UI:N): No victim interaction is needed.
  • Blast radius: Systems running the NVIDIA Infrastructure Controller for Linux. Downstream impact depends on what the controller manages in the environment (infrastructure orchestration/management functions), so compromise could affect dependent workloads and infrastructure. No affected version list is available, so all versions in use should be considered potentially affected pending vendor clarification.

Detection Guidance

Because no exploitation telemetry, file paths, or parameter names are published for CVE-2026-65125, the following rules are generic detections for path-manipulation behavior and anomalous file operations against the NVIDIA Infrastructure Controller. They are starting points requiring environment-specific tuning; they are not validated CVE-specific signatures.

Sigma Rule

title: Potential External Control of File Path - NVIDIA Infrastructure Controller
id: 8f2c1e40-6512-4b7a-9d3e-2026cve65125
status: experimental
description: Detects suspicious file path manipulation or access patterns potentially consistent with CWE-73 exploitation against NVIDIA Infrastructure Controller processes.
references:
  - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-65125
author: valtersit.com
date: 2026-01-01
logsource:
  product: linux
  category: process_creation
detection:
  selection_proc:
    Image|contains:
      - 'nv_'
      - 'infrastructure-controller'
      - 'nvidia-infra'
  selection_paths:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - '../'
      - '..\\'
      - '%2e%2e'
      - '/etc/'
      - '/tmp/'
      - '/var/tmp/'
  condition: selection_proc and selection_paths
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate administrative scripts referencing relative paths
level: medium

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2026_65125_Path_Traversal_Indicators
{
    meta:
        description = "Generic indicators of externally controlled file path strings that may relate to CVE-2026-65125 (CWE-73)"
        author = "valtersit.com"
        reference = "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-65125"
        date = "2026-01-01"
    strings:
        $trav1 = "../" ascii wide
        $trav2 = "..\\" ascii wide
        $enc1  = "%2e%2e%2f" nocase ascii
        $enc2  = "..%2f" nocase ascii
        $p1    = "/etc/passwd" ascii wide
        $p2    = "/etc/shadow" ascii wide
    condition:
        any of ($trav*) or any of ($enc*) or any of ($p*)
}

Suricata IDS Rule

alert http any any -> any any (msg:"CVE-2026-65125 Possible Path Traversal / External Path Control Attempt"; flow:established,to_server; http.uri; content:"../"; nocase; threshold:type both, track by_src, count 5, seconds 60; classtype:attempted-admin; reference:cve,2026-65125; reference:url,nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-65125; sid:202665125; rev:1;)

Elastic Detection

sequence by process.parent.entity_id with maxspan=30s
  [process where process.name : ("nv_*", "*infrastructure-controller*") and
     process.command_line : ("*../*", "*..\\*", "*%2e%2e*")]
  [file where event.action in ("creation", "modification", "deletion") and
     file.path : ("/etc/*", "/tmp/*", "/var/tmp/*")]

Splunk SPL Query

index=linux sourcetype=linux_audit OR sourcetype=syslog
(process_name="*infrastructure-controller*" OR process_name="nv_*")
(command_line="*../*" OR command_line="*%2e%2e*" OR command_line="*/etc/*" OR command_line="*/tmp/*")
| stats count values(command_line) as cmds by host, process_name, user
| where count > 0
| sort - count

Wazuh OSSEC Rule

<group name="nvidia,cve-2026-65125,">
  <rule id="100651" level="10">
    <if_sid>550</if_sid>
    <field name="audit.command">\.\./</field>
    <description>CVE-2026-65125: Possible external file path control attempt targeting NVIDIA Infrastructure Controller</description>
    <mitre>
      <id>T1068</id>
    </mitre>
  </rule>
  <rule id="100652" level="10">
    <if_sid>554</if_sid>
    <match>infrastructure-controller</match>
    <regex>\.\./|\.\.\\|%2e%2e</regex>
    <description>CVE-2026-65125: Suspicious path manipulation observed in controller process activity</description>
  </rule>
</group>

Mitigation & Patch Guidance

Patch confidence: 0/4 (UNPATCHED — no patch evidence from any tracked source). No vendor fix, workaround, or advisory is available in the tracked data. The following are defensive best practices for a CWE-73 class weakness pending official remediation.

  1. Immediate mitigations

    • Restrict network access to the NVIDIA Infrastructure Controller to trusted management networks and hosts; apply strict firewall/segmentation rules to reduce reachable attack surface (AV:N).
    • Enforce least privilege: limit accounts with high privileges (PR:H) that could reach path-influencing interfaces; audit and remove unused privileged accounts.
    • Monitor and alert on anomalous filesystem operations (write/delete/read) originating from the controller process, using the detection rules above.
    • Where feasible, run the controller with a dedicated low-privilege service account and apply read-only or restrictive filesystem permissions to sensitive directories.
    • Consider read-only mounts and filesystem integrity monitoring for critical paths.
  2. Patch/upgrade steps

    • No patch is currently available. Maintain continuous monitoring of NVIDIA's official security advisory channel (NVIDIA Product Security) and the NVD entry for CVE-2026-65125 for remediation release information.
    • When a fixed version is published, identify all affected Linux deployments and upgrade promptly; validate the affected version range against vendor guidance once released.
  3. Long-term hardening

    • Institute a vulnerability management process that tracks NVIDIA advisories for infrastructure products.
    • Apply input validation and path canonicalization reviews to any internally developed integrations with the controller.
    • Adopt defense-in-depth: host-based intrusion detection, file integrity monitoring, and least-privilege service execution to blunt the impact of a path-control flaw.
    • Maintain an asset inventory of NVIDIA Infrastructure Controller deployments to enable rapid response when a patch is released.

References

Threat actor campaigns and exploit-in-the-wild evidence: none at this time. CVE-2026-65125 is not in CISA KEV, and no public PoC, exploit code, or Nuclei template has been observed. Exploitation status should be re-evaluated as vendor advisories and public research emerge.

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product:"NVIDIA"
title:"NVIDIA"
◈ SOURCE Analysis & enrichment: valtersit.com/cve/CVE-2026-65125/ · CVE data: NVD/MITRE (public domain) · © 2026 ValtersIT Hub
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