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CVSS: 6.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H 🐛 CWE-476
👁️
Common Weakness Enumeration - Identifies the specific category of software weakness or flaw.

CVE-2026-65412

CVE-2026-65412 Null Pointer Dereference in Apple
📅 PUBLISHED: 2026-09-14 00:00 UTC 🔄 UPDATED: 2026-09-26 06:26 UTC
[ PATCH UNDER REVIEW ↓ ] Remains UNDER REVIEW until an independent source confirms the fix
[ DEFENSE PATCH ↓ ]
💣 PoC: Public
👁️
Proof of Concept - Indicates if functional exploit code is publicly available, drastically increasing the risk of immediate attacks.
🎯 EPSS: 0.46%
👁️
0.46% probability
11.4× above the median CVE
Tier: ELEVATED
30-day exploitation window · FIRST.org · updated daily
🥷 MITRE: T1203
👁️
MITRE ATT&CK Tactic - Describes the strategy hackers use to execute this attack.
Country: USA License: Commercial
VULNERABLE: version not auto-detected — verify your deployed version locally
CVSS VECTOR BREAKDOWN 6.5
AV: N Attack Vector Network
AC: L Attack Complexity Low
PR: N Privileges Required None
UI: R User Interaction Required
S: U Scope Unchanged
C: N Confidentiality None
I: N Integrity None
A: H Availability High
6.5
THREAT LEVEL
■ tracking this CVE ✓ independent patch confirmation ⧗ same-origin mirror (GHSA) ⚠ active exploitation verification policy →

Executive Summary

CVE-2026-65412 is a null pointer dereference (CWE-476) in Apple's WebKit/WebContent processing pipeline that was addressed through improved input validation. The flaw is reachable by processing maliciously crafted web content and results in a denial-of-service condition (application or system crash) rather than code execution. All Apple platforms shipping the affected WebKit stack are impacted — iOS, iPadOS, macOS (Sequoia, Tahoe, Golden Gate), visionOS, and watchOS — meaning the blast radius spans essentially every current Apple device with a web rendering surface.

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›Detection rules — YARA · Wazuh · Elastic (all plans) · Sigma (Pro)
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Technical Analysis

The vulnerability is classified as CWE-476: NULL Pointer Dereference, which CWE parenthetically describes as occurring "when an application dereferences a pointer that it expects to be valid but is NULL." In Apple's WebKit architecture, web content is parsed and rendered by a sandboxed WebContent process, while the UI/embedding process (Safari, Mail, the WKWebView host, or any app rendering remote HTML) communicates across a process boundary. The NVD description states the defect was "addressed with improved input validation," a remediation pattern consistent with a code path where attacker-influenced input (markup, script, or a structured data blob delivered over the network) is not validated before it reaches a dereference.

Because the description does not name a specific function, class, or API, the precise trigger component cannot be asserted from the provided data. What can be stated factually:

  • Weakness class: null pointer dereference, i.e. a missing or insufficient validity check on a pointer/value that the code assumes is non-NULL.
  • Reachability: the "Processing web content may lead to a denial-of-service" statement places the vulnerable code on the web-content ingestion path. This is the same general attack surface family historically associated with WebKit parsing and rendering bugs.
  • Remediation shape: "improved input validation" implies the patch adds a guard/check (for example, rejecting malformed input early) rather than restructuring memory management. This is typical of DoS-class fixes and is also why the impact is confined to availability.

The relevant CVSS v3.1 subscores reinforce this reading. The vector AV:N (Network) and UI:R (User Interaction Required) describe remote delivery that requires the victim to load attacker-controlled content. PR:N (no privileges required) and AC:L (low attack complexity) mean no authentication and no special conditions beyond the rendering of the content. C:N/I:N (no confidentiality or integrity impact) with A:H (high availability impact) confirms that the worst-case outcome is a crash or hang of the rendering process, not data disclosure or code execution.

One important architectural nuance: because modern Apple browsers and many apps render web content in an isolated WebContent process, a null pointer dereference in that process should — under normal operation — terminate the render process and surface as a crashed tab or reloaded page rather than a whole-device outage. Reports of broader impact (device-level instability or reboot) would depend on whether the dereference occurs in a privileged component; the data provided does not establish that, so the conservative interpretation is process/application-level denial-of-service with the possibility of user-visible disruption.

Exploitation Scenarios

No public proof-of-concept, Nuclei template, or exploit code is available for this CVE (PoC/Exploit: None; Nuclei: NO; Exploit Code: NO). The attack chain below is therefore inferred strictly from the vulnerability class and the NVD description, not from observed exploit artifacts.

  1. Reconnaissance / target identification. An adversary identifies a victim who uses an affected Apple platform and is willing to open attacker-supplied web content — a phishing email with a link, a malicious or compromised website, an ad/iframe, or an embedded web view inside a third-party app. Because the vector is AV:N/UI:R, delivery only requires that the target load the content; no network positioning or credentials are needed.

  2. Triggering the flaw class. The attacker hosts or injects web content engineered to reach the parsing/rendering path guarding the vulnerable pointer. The defect manifests as a null pointer dereference during processing of that content. AC:L indicates the attacker does not need to defeat advanced mitigations — the bug is reachable through ordinary content processing; the specific markup or encoding that triggers it would be determined by the attacker through fuzzing or analysis, but no such detail is public.

  3. Payload / execution method (at the vulnerability-class level). The "payload" is malformed web content, not shellcode. Delivery is via any channel that causes the WebContent renderer to process attacker-controlled input: a visited URL, a rendered HTML email, an iframe, or an embedded web view. There is no exploitation primitive for memory corruption — the null dereference aborts the code path, giving a crash.

  4. Post-exploitation impact. The realistic outcome is denial-of-service: the web-content rendering process crashes or the application becomes unresponsive. Depending on which component owns the vulnerable pointer (renderer vs. embedding process — not specified in the data), the user may see a crashed tab, a reloaded page, a hung app, or, in the worst documented case, broader device instability. There is no code execution, no privilege escalation, and no data exfiltration implied by the CVSS profile.

Availability of weaponization: Because the crash is easy to cause once a triggering input is known, the primary risk over time is a DoS-only nuisance/flood vector (crash loops, forced reloads), not a high-severity compromise pathway. Absence of a KEV listing and the low EPSS score (0.00455, 38.6th percentile) indicate no observed in-the-wild exploitation at time of writing.

Impact Assessment

The CVSS v3.1 base score is 6.5 (Medium) with vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H. Interpreting each metric:

  • AV:N / AC:L / PR:N — trivially reachable from the network, low complexity, no privileges required. The only barrier is the user action below.
  • UI:R — the victim must load the malicious web content (click a link, open a message, view an embedded page). This user-interaction requirement is what keeps the score at Medium rather than High.
  • S:U — impact is scoped to the vulnerable component; the exploit does not beget impacts on other security authorities.
  • C:N / I:N / A:H — no confidentiality or integrity impact; high availability impact only.

Business impact. For most enterprises this is an availability/operational-disruption issue rather than a breach: potential for repeated application crashes, disrupted browsing or in-app web views, and user-visible instability on managed Apple fleets. It is not a data-loss or lateral-movement primitive on its own. Blast radius is broad in device count (all listed Apple OS families below their fixed versions) but shallow in severity per device. The relatively low EPSS (0.00455) and absence from CISA KEV suggest low current exploitation pressure.

Detection Guidance

Sigma Rule

title: Potential Apple WebKit Null Pointer Dereference DoS (CVE-2026-65412) - Renderer Crash
id: 8f3c1a62-0d5b-4e77-9c21-65412a1b7e10
status: experimental
description: Detects recurring crashes of the Apple WebKit web-content rendering process, consistent with a DoS via a null pointer dereference (CVE-2026-65412).
references:
  - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-65412
author: valtersit.com Threat Intelligence
date: 2026/01/01
logsource:
  product: macos
  service: crashreport
detection:
  selection_proc:
    Process|contains:
      - 'com.apple.WebKit.WebContent'
      - 'com.apple.WebKit.Networking'
      - 'Safari'
  selection_reason:
    TerminationReason|contains:
      - 'EXC_BAD_ACCESS'
      - 'SIGSEGV'
      - 'SIGBUS'
  selection_mem:
    ExceptionType|contains: 'EXC_BAD_ACCESS (SIGSEGV)'
  timeframe: 10m
  condition: selection_proc and (selection_reason or selection_mem) | count() by Process > 3
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate renderer crashes from unrelated bugs or memory pressure
level: medium
tags:
  - attack.t1203
  - cve.2026.65412

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2026_65412_WebKit_NullDeref_DoS
{
    meta:
        description = "Heuristic hunt for Apple WebKit web-content crash artifacts / crash log markers consistent with CVE-2026-65412 null pointer dereference DoS"
        author = "valtersit.com Threat Intelligence"
        reference = "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-65412"
        date = "2026-01-01"
        cve = "CVE-2026-65412"
        cwe = "CWE-476"

    strings:
        $webkit = "com.apple.WebKit" ascii wide nocase
        $content = "WebContent" ascii wide nocase
        $crash1 = "EXC_BAD_ACCESS" ascii wide
        $crash2 = "SIGSEGV" ascii wide
        $crash3 = "NULL pointer" ascii wide nocase
        $null = "0x0000000000000000" ascii wide

    condition:
        uint32be(0) == 0x7B7D7D7B or
        (filesize < 5MB and any of ($webkit, $content) and 1 of ($crash1, $crash2, $crash3) and $null)
}

Note: This rule targets crash-report/hunt artifacts, not an exploit payload, since no exploit code exists. Adjust the file-type magic condition for your collection pipeline.

Suricata IDS Rule

alert http any any -> any any (msg:"CVE-2026-65412 Possible Apple WebKit Web-Content DoS Activity (Suspicious Content Delivery)"; flow:established,to_client; http.referer; content:"WebKit"; nocase; threshold: type both, track by_src, count 20, seconds 60; classtype:attempted-dos; reference:cve,2026-65412; reference:url,nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-65412; sid:202665412; rev:1;)

Note: Because CVE-2026-65412 is a client-side renderer bug triggered by web content with no published signature, this rule is a coarse volumetric/behavioral trigger rather than an exact match. Network-layer detection is inherently limited here; primary detection is host-side crash telemetry.

Elastic Detection

// Detect sustained crashes of Apple WebKit render process (possible CVE-2026-65412 DoS)
process where event.type == "end" and
  process.name : ("com.apple.WebKit.WebContent", "Safari", "com.apple.WebKit.Networking") and
  process.exit_code != 0
sequence by host.name with maxspan=10m
  [process where process.name : "com.apple.WebKit.WebContent" and process.exit_code != 0] with runs=4

Splunk SPL Query

index=endpoint sourcetype="macos:crashreport" OR sourcetype="apple:crash"
| search (process_name="com.apple.WebKit.WebContent" OR process_name="Safari" OR process_name="com.apple.WebKit.Networking")
| search (exception_type="EXC_BAD_ACCESS (SIGSEGV)" OR termination_reason="*SIGSEGV*" OR termination_reason="*SIGBUS*")
| bin _time span=10m
| stats count values(process_name) as processes by host, _time
| where count >= 4
| table _time, host, processes, count

Escalation hint: correlate with recent URL/proxy logs to identify the delivered web content that preceded the crash burst.

Wazuh OSSEC Rule

<group name="apple_webkit,cve_2026_65412,">
  <rule id="2026654" level="6">
    <decoded_as>json</decoded_as>
    <field name="process.name">com\.apple\.WebKit\.WebContent</field>
    <field name="exception_type">EXC_BAD_ACCESS</field>
    <description>CVE-2026-65412: Apple WebKit web-content process terminated with bad access - possible null pointer dereference DoS</description>
    <mitre>
      <id>T1203</id>
    </mitre>
    <group>availability_dos,</group>
  </rule>

  <rule id="2026655" level="10" frequency="4" timeframe="600">
    <if_matched_sid>2026654</if_matched_sid>
    <same_field>host.name</same_field>
    <description>CVE-2026-65412: Repeated WebKit render-process crashes on same host - probable denial-of-service exploitation</description>
    <mitre>
      <id>T1203</id>
    </mitre>
  </rule>
</group>

Mitigation & Patch Guidance

Patch confidence: 2/4 — CLAIMED. A single source (NVD) asserts that the fix is available in the listed OS versions; this has not been independently confirmed by a second source. Treat as likely-correct but verify against Apple's own security advisory before relying on it operationally. Vendor fix and workaround fields were not provided in the dataset.

1) Immediate mitigations (prior to or as a stopgap for patching):

  • Reduce exposure to untrusted web content: enforce browser/URL filtering and block unclassified or newly registered domains where policy allows; isolate browsing of untrusted sites to non-production devices.
  • Increase the priority of patching for users who routinely process untrusted email HTML or browse in embedded web views (for example via line-of-business apps that host a WKWebView).
  • Apply email gateway rules that strip or sandbox active HTML/web content from external senders where operationally feasible.
  • Monitor for crash-loop patterns (see Detection Guidance) as a tripwire for attempted DoS rather than waiting for a signature.

2) Patch / upgrade steps:

  • Upgrade every affected Apple platform to or above the fixed versions named in the data: iOS 26.7 / 27, iPadOS 26.7 / 27, macOS Sequoia 15.8, macOS Tahoe 26.7, macOS Golden Gate 27, visionOS 27, watchOS 27.
  • Because Apple security fixes are bundled into point releases, confirm the build number maps to the fixed version, and verify the corresponding CVE appears in the Apple security advisory for that release (the CNA/NVD "NVD" source is the only patch reference supplied; treat it as unverified).
  • Prioritize patching managed fleets via MDM/declarative device management to guarantee coverage of mobile and wearable endpoints that are often missed.

3) Long-term hardening:

  • Maintain a rapid OS-update cadence for Apple endpoints and enroll devices in automated patching so point-release fixes are applied within policy SLAs.
  • Preserve modern WebKit process isolation and do not disable sandboxing features; it is the primary containment boundary that keeps renderer-class DoS bugs from becoming device-wide outages.
  • Feed renderer-crash telemetry into SIEM to build a baseline, so anomalous crash bursts can be detected even absent a vendor CVE-specific signature.
  • Track EPSS and CISA KEV for this CVE; re-score priority if exploitation evidence emerges or if KEV listing occurs.

References

Threat actor / ITW evidence: None available. No public PoC, exploit code, or Nuclei template was observed; the CVE is not in CISA KEV. EPSS is low at time of writing. Exploitation pressure is currently assessed as minimal.

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◈ SOURCE Analysis & enrichment: valtersit.com/cve/CVE-2026-65412/ · CVE data: NVD/MITRE (public domain) · © 2026 ValtersIT Hub
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