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CVSS: 7.8 CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H 🐛 CWE-427
👁️
Common Weakness Enumeration - Identifies the specific category of software weakness or flaw.

CVE-2026-68955

CVE-2026-68955 Vulnerability in Rakuten
📅 PUBLISHED: 2026-09-14 00:00 UTC 🔄 UPDATED: 2026-09-22 10:15 UTC
[ ZERO-DAY / UNPATCHED ] [ DEFENSE PATCH ↓ ]
💣 PoC: Public
👁️
Proof of Concept - Indicates if functional exploit code is publicly available, drastically increasing the risk of immediate attacks.
🎯 EPSS: 0.18%
👁️
0.18% probability
4.5× above the median CVE
Tier: ELEVATED
30-day exploitation window · FIRST.org · updated daily
🥷 MITRE: T1574.001
👁️
MITRE ATT&CK Tactic - Describes the strategy hackers use to execute this attack.
VULNERABLE: Unknown (no version range published in available intelligence)
CVSS VECTOR BREAKDOWN 7.8
AV: L Attack Vector Local
AC: L Attack Complexity Low
PR: N Privileges Required None
UI: R User Interaction Required
S: U Scope Unchanged
C: H Confidentiality High
I: H Integrity High
A: H Availability High
7.8
THREAT LEVEL
■ tracking this CVE ✓ independent patch confirmation ⧗ same-origin mirror (GHSA) ⚠ active exploitation verification policy →

Executive Summary

CVE-2026-68955 is an uncontrolled search path element vulnerability (CWE-427) in the Windows installer for the Rakuten Kobo Desktop Application, which insecurely loads Dynamic Link Libraries. An attacker who can place a crafted DLL in the same directory as the installer and persuade a user to invoke that installer may achieve arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the installing user. The vulnerability carries a CVSS v3.0 base score of 7.8 (HIGH) and is currently unpatched, with no public exploit code or proof-of-concept observed at the time of writing.

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›Detection rules — YARA · Wazuh · Elastic (all plans) · Sigma (Pro)
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Technical Analysis

The vulnerability is classified under CWE-427, "Uncontrolled Search Path Element," and more specifically maps to the DLL search-order hijacking subclass (MITRE ATT&CK T1574.001). Per the NVD description, the affected component is the installer for the Rakuten Kobo Desktop Application (Windows version). When the installer executes, it resolves one or more Dynamic Link Libraries using the standard Windows DLL search order rather than an absolute path or a hardened load configuration.

Under the default Windows DLL search order behavior, the directory from which the executable is launched is searched before system directories (subject to the SafeDllSearchMode / SetDefaultDllDirectories settings). Because the installer does not pin library locations to a trusted absolute path, any DLL with a name matching one that the installer attempts to resolve is loaded from the current working directory if an attacker-controlled copy is present there. The result is that attacker-supplied code from a crafted DLL runs in the installer's process context.

Key characteristics derived strictly from the available data:

  • Attack vector: Local (AV:L) — the malicious DLL must be placed on the same filesystem/directory as the installer. This is not a remote network-triggerable flaw.
  • Privileges required: None (PR:N) — the attacker does not need prior account privileges on the target to prepare the payload; they only need the ability to write a file into the installer's directory.
  • User interaction: Required (UI:R) — a user must invoke the affected installer. The flaw is not self-triggering.
  • Scope: Unchanged (S:U) — execution remains within the security context of the invoking user.
  • Confidentiality / Integrity / Availability: All rated HIGH (C:H/I:H/A:H). Successful hijack yields full code execution at the user's privilege level.

The specific DLL name(s) resolved by the installer, the exact install path, and the concrete load logic are not disclosed in the available NVD description or CNA title. No function names, file paths, endpoints, or parameters are provided in the source intelligence, and none are asserted here. The analysis therefore remains at the vulnerability-class level: an uncontrolled search path in a Windows installer that permits DLL search-order hijacking.

Because the vulnerable component is an installer, exploitation is gated on triggering the installation workflow. This commonly (though not always) coincides with a moment when the user may be running the installer with elevated privileges to write to Program Files — in which case the hijacked code would execute in that elevated context. The CVSS vector, however, scores privileges at the user level (PR:N, S:U), and the description explicitly states execution occurs "with the privileges of the user who performed the installation."

Exploitation Scenarios

No public PoC is available for CVE-2026-68955; the attack chain below is inferred from the CWE-427 / DLL search-order hijacking vulnerability class and the NVD description. It is presented at the class level and does not assume undisclosed implementation details.

  1. Reconnaissance / target identification. An adversary identifies a target user or host where the Rakuten Kobo Desktop Application (Windows) installer is present, staged, or being distributed. This is relevant in scenarios such as shared download folders, USB/removable media, network shares, or a help-desk delivery of the installer to an end user. Because the flaw is local and requires user interaction, reconnaissance focuses on locating the installer directory and confirming it is writable by the attacker.

  2. Trigger of the flaw class. The attacker places a crafted DLL into the same directory as the affected installer. Per the description, "if there is a crafted DLL at the same directory when invoking the affected installer," the installer will insecurely load it. The trigger condition is therefore the co-location of a malicious DLL with the installer plus a DLL name that the installer attempts to resolve through the insecure search path. The exact DLL name to spoof is not published; in the general DLL-hijack pattern, the adversary identifies an unresolved import or runtime-loaded library the installer pulls from the working directory.

  3. Payload / execution (class level). When the victim invokes the installer, Windows resolves the DLL from the attacker-writable directory ahead of legitimate system locations, and attacker-controlled code inside that DLL executes within the installer process and at the privilege level of the installing user — exactly as stated in the NVD description: "arbitrary code may be executed with the privileges of the user who performed the installation."

  4. Post-exploitation impact. With code running in the installer's context, an attacker can perform any action available to that user: accessing user-readable data, modifying files, establishing persistence, or further escalating/lateralizing depending on the user's rights (including elevated rights, if the user is running the installer as administrator). CVSS rates Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability impacts all HIGH, consistent with full code execution at the invoking user's privileges.

Note: The success of the attack depends on the user actually running the installer (UI:R) and on the attacker's ability to write to the installer's directory (a local precondition, not a remote vector).

Impact Assessment

The impact is local code execution in the context of the user who runs the affected installer.

  • Confidentiality (HIGH): Arbitrary code in the installer process can read any data accessible to that user, including application data, credentials cached in the user's context, and documents.
  • Integrity (HIGH): The attacker's code can modify files, configuration, and installed software components reachable by the user.
  • Availability (HIGH): The injected code inherits the ability to disrupt or destroy user-accessible resources.
  • Scope (Unchanged): The security authority of the process does not cross a privilege boundary as scored (S:U). If the installer is launched elevated, real-world impact could be higher than the baseline user-context score implies, but CVSS does not model that condition.
  • Privileges Required (None) / User Interaction (Required): No pre-existing privileges are needed on the target; a single user action (invoking the installer) is required.
  • Attack Vector (Local): Blast radius is confined to hosts where the attacker can stage a DLL alongside the installer and induce execution. This limits mass-worming potential but does not reduce the severity where the precondition is met.

Business impact: Organizations that deploy the Kobo Desktop Application — for example via software distribution, shared download locations, or user-driven installs — face a hijack risk at install time. Because the vulnerable component is an installer, the exposure window is any environment where users obtain and run the installer from a location an attacker can write to (shared folders, removable media, unmanaged downloads). The CVSS 7.8 HIGH rating and the absence of a vendor patch (0/4 confidence) mean defenders must rely on compensating controls rather than vendor remediation.

Detection Guidance

Sigma Rule

title: Potential DLL Search Order Hijack via Rakuten Kobo Desktop Installer
id: 7f3a1c2e-9b6d-4a11-8c3e-0d5f6a7b8c9d
status: experimental
description: Detects a Kobo Desktop installer process loading a DLL from its own directory (uncontrolled search path / DLL hijack, CWE-427).
references:
  - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68955
author: valtersit.com
date: 2026/01/01
logsource:
  category: image_load
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_installer:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\KoboSetup.exe'
      - '\KoboDesktopSetup.exe'
      - '\Setup.exe'
    Image|contains: 'Kobo'
  selection_susp_dll_path:
    ImageLoaded|contains:
      - '\Downloads\'
      - '\Temp\'
      - '\Users\Public\'
      - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
    ImageLoaded|endswith: '.dll'
  condition: selection_installer and selection_susp_dll_path
fields:
  - Image
  - ImageLoaded
  - User
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate installers bundling DLLs in their own directory (verify signer)
level: high
tags:
  - attack.defense_evasion
  - attack.t1574.001
  - cve.2026.68955

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2026_68955_Kobo_Installer_DLL_Hijack
{
    meta:
        author      = "valtersit.com"
        description = "Detects suspicious DLLs positioned to hijack the Kobo Desktop installer (CWE-427)"
        reference   = "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68955"
        cve         = "CVE-2026-68955"
        date        = "2026-01-01"

    strings:
        // Portable executable DLL characteristics
        $mz          = { 4D 5A }
        $pe          = { 50 45 00 00 }
        $dllchar     = { 20 00 }   // IMAGE_FILE_DLL characteristic bit region

        // Common post-hijack behaviors (process/network/exec)
        $api1 = "LoadLibrary" ascii nocase
        $api2 = "WinExec"     ascii nocase
        $api3 = "CreateProcess" ascii nocase
        $api4 = "ShellExecute" ascii nocase
        $api5 = "URLDownloadToFile" ascii nocase
        $api6 = "VirtualAlloc" ascii nocase

    condition:
        $mz at 0 and $pe and $dllchar and
        ( 2 of ($api*) )
}

Suricata IDS Rule

alert http any any -> any any (msg:"CVE-2026-68955 Potential Kobo Desktop Installer / DLL Hijack Staging Download"; flow:established,to_client; http.uri; content:".dll"; http.header; content:"Content-Disposition"; nocase; classtype:trojan-activity; reference:cve,2026-68955; reference:url,nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68955; sid:202668955; rev:1;)

Note: CVE-2026-68955 is a local (AV:L) installer DLL-hijack flaw with no disclosed network endpoint. The Suricata rule above targets only the adjacent staging behavior — retrieval of a DLL payload that would be placed alongside the installer. There is no CVE-specific network signature derivable from the available description.

Elastic Detection

// Detects the Kobo installer loading DLLs from user-writable staging directories
// (DLL search-order hijacking, CWE-427)
sequence by host.id, process.entity_id with maxspan=30s
  [ process where process.name : ("KoboSetup.exe", "KoboDesktopSetup.exe", "Setup.exe") and
      process.command_line : "*Kobo*" ]
  [ library where dll.path : ("*\\Downloads\\*", "*\\Temp\\*", "*\\Users\\Public\\*",
                              "*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\*") and
      dll.name : "*.dll" ]

Splunk SPL Query

index=windows sourcetype="WinEventLog:Sysmon" EventCode=7
| where match(Image, "(?i)Kobo.*Setup\.exe$|KoboDesktop")
| where match(ImageLoaded, "(?i)\\\\(Downloads|Temp|Users\\\\Public|AppData\\\\Local\\\\Temp)\\\\.+\.dll$")
| stats count min(_time) as firstSeen max(_time) as lastSeen
        values(ImageLoaded) as loaded_dlls by Computer, User, Image, ImageLoaded
| sort - lastSeen

Wazuh OSSEC Rule

<group name="windows,sysmon,dll_hijack,">
  <rule id="202699" level="12">
    <if_sid>61609</if_sid>
    <field name="win.eventdata.image">(?i)Kobo.*Setup\.exe$|KoboDesktop</field>
    <field name="win.eventdata.imageLoaded">(?i)\\(Downloads|Temp|Users\\Public|AppData\\Local\\Temp)\\.+\.dll$</field>
    <description>CVE-2026-68955: Kobo Desktop installer loaded a DLL from a user-writable directory (possible DLL search order hijack).</description>
    <mitre>
      <id>T1574.001</id>
    </mitre>
    <group>attack,defense_evasion,</group>
  </rule>
</group>

Mitigation & Patch Guidance

Patch confidence: 0/4 — UNPATCHED. No patch evidence from any tracked source; no vendor fix or affected version range has been published. Because no official fix exists, mitigation must be compensating and defense-in-depth.

1) Immediate mitigations

  • Isolate the installer directory. Ensure the folder containing the Kobo Desktop Application installer is writable only by trusted administrators. Restrict write access to Users, Everyone, and Authenticated Users on any shared staging location holding the installer.
  • Warn users — do not co-locate files. Instruct users not to place unrelated files (especially DLLs) in the same folder from which they run the installer, and to run the installer only from a controlled location.
  • Verify installer integrity. Obtain the installer only from an official Rakuten/Kobo source and verify signatures before execution. Reject installers received over email or removable media from untrusted parties.
  • Restrict execution paths. If feasible, apply application control (WDAC/AppLocker) so the installer can only run from a controlled, non-user-writable directory.
  • Privilege minimization. Do not run the installer with elevated privileges unless required; this limits post-hijack impact (CVSS scores user-level execution).
  • Endpoint detection. Deploy the Sigma/YARA/Suricata/Elastic/Splunk/Wazuh detections above to catch DLLs loaded from user-writable directories during installer execution.

2) Patch / upgrade steps

  • No patch is available. Monitor the vendor (Rakuten / Kobo) for an updated installer. When a fixed installer version is released, obtain it solely from the official source, validate its digital signature, and uninstall/replace prior vulnerable installers.
  • Until then, treat the installer as untrusted for the purpose of co-location — never allow attacker-writable files in the same directory.

3) Long-term hardening

  • Adopt safe DLL loading practices organization-wide: enforce SetDefaultDllDirectories / LoadLibraryEx with LOAD_LIBRARY_SEARCH_SYSTEM32 where possible, and eliminate current-directory DLL resolution.
  • Enforce directory permissions that prevent unprivileged writes to any directory containing executables or installers.
  • Baseline and monitor installer execution with Sysmon Image Load (Event ID 7) and Process Creation (Event ID 1) telemetry.
  • Include third-party installer hijack risk (CWE-427) in software intake/vetting processes; scan installers for unresolved DLL imports before broad deployment.
  • Keep asset inventory of installed applications so affected Kobo Desktop installers can be rapidly located and remediated once a fix ships.

References

Threat actor / exploit-in-the-wild note: No exploit-in-the-wild evidence, no CISA KEV listing, no public PoC, no Nuclei template, and no exploit code were observed in the available intelligence at the time of writing. EPSS is 0.00181 (7.9th percentile of exploited CVEs), indicating low near-term exploitation probability. The attack chain described above is inferred from the CWE-427 vulnerability class and the NVD description only; several specific implementation details remain undisclosed.

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product:"Rakuten"
title:"Rakuten"

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