CVE-2026-7455

Executive Summary

CVE-2026-7455 is a high-severity Out-of-Bounds Write vulnerability in Autodesk 3ds Max triggered by parsing a maliciously crafted FLT file. Exploitation requires user interaction (opening a crafted file) and can result in arbitrary code execution within the context of the current process. A patch is claimed by NVD but not independently confirmed; no public exploit code is available at the time of this report and the CVE is not listed in CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.

Technical Analysis

CVE-2026-7455 is classified under CWE-787 — Out-of-Bounds Write. The vulnerability resides in the parser of the FLT file format used by Autodesk 3ds Max. When 3ds Max processes a crafted FLT file, a memory write operation occurs outside the intended buffer bounds. The NVD description does not specify the exact memory corruption mechanism (e.g., off-by-one, insufficient bounds checking on a loop counter, or integer truncation in a size calculation); insufficient technical detail is available in the description to determine the precise code-level trigger.

The vulnerability class — Out-of-Bounds Write — is a well-understood class of memory safety flaw that can be leveraged for arbitrary code execution. The attack surface is the FLT file parsing module in 3ds Max. The file format is legacy and typically not exposed to the network directly; rather, the attack is delivered via social engineering (phishing with a malicious file attachment) or via a compromised asset repository shared among 3ds Max users.

Affected component: 3ds Max’s FLT parser (exact file/module name not specified in the NVD description).

Attack mechanism at the class level: A specifically structured FLT file causes the parser to write past the allocated buffer boundary. An attacker controls the data being written (the bytes following the boundary), and can potentially control the memory layout to redirect execution flow to attacker-controlled code. In the context of 3ds Max, exploitation would typically target the heap or the stack of the parsing thread.

It is important to note that no public technical write-up, code-level analysis, or exploit code exists for this CVE. The exact vulnerable code path has not been revealed by the vendor or by independent researchers as of the publication date of this report.

Exploitation Scenarios

Attack chain reconstruction (inferred from the vulnerability class and limited description):

1. Reconnaissance / Target Identification: The attacker targets individuals or organizations that use Autodesk 3ds Max for 3D modeling, visualization, or game development. Target identification may be done via LinkedIn profiles, professional portfolios, or company job postings that mention 3ds Max skills. Alternatively, the attacker may compromise a 3D-model-sharing website or forum and upload the malicious file disguised as a legitimate 3D model or texture.

2. Triggering the Flaw: The attacker crafts a malicious FLT file. FLT is the native file format for 3ds Max scene files. The crafted file must contain a specific structure that triggers the out-of-bounds write when parsed. The crafted file is then delivered to the victim:

   • As an email attachment (social engineering, e.g., "requested 3D model" or "product design review").
   • Via a file-sharing link (Dropbox, Google Drive, or a direct download hosted on a compromised website).
   • By uploading to a shared project repository used by the victim’s team.

3. Payload / Execution Method: The victim opens the malicious file in 3ds Max. The FLT parser processes the file; a specific sequence of bytes triggers an out-of-bounds write into adjacent heap memory. For code execution, the attacker typically:

   • Overwrites a function pointer or return address with the address of a shellcode placed elsewhere in the file or in a controlled heap region.
   • Leverages heap spray techniques to arrange predictable memory layout.
   • Uses the write primitive to disable security mitigations (e.g., modifying the DEP policy or patching a security check) before gaining control of the instruction pointer.

4. Post-Exploitation Impact: Once code execution is achieved in the context of the current user process, the attacker can:

   • Install malware or a backdoor that persists on the system.
   • Escalate privileges if the process runs with elevated rights (not typical for 3ds Max, which normally runs as the standard interactive user).
   • Exfiltrate sensitive project files, CAD drawings, or intellectual property stored on the workstation.
   • Use the compromised workstation as a foothold for lateral movement within the corporate network.

Observation: The CVSS vector shows AV:L (Local) and UI:R (User Interaction), confirming that the attack requires the victim to open the file — the attack cannot be performed remotely without user action.

No public exploit code exists, and the attack chain outlined above is inferred purely from the vulnerability class and the standard techniques associated with CWE-787. Specifics such as shellcode offsets, overwrite targets, or mitigation bypass techniques are NOT available at the time of writing.

Impact Assessment

Confidentiality Impact: HIGH — Successful exploitation allows arbitrary code execution with the same privileges as the current 3ds Max process, enabling full read access to user-accessible data.

Integrity Impact: HIGH — An attacker can modify or delete files, install additional tooling, and tamper with system or user data on the compromise workstation.

Availability Impact: HIGH — The NVD description explicitly notes that the vulnerability can force a crash (denial of service) even if code execution is not achieved. Additionally, successful code execution could result in a complete system compromise rendering the workstation unavailable.

CVSS Scoring Rationale: The CVSS score of 7.8 (High) is justified by:

• Low attack complexity — the file format is public, and the crafted file does not require special privileges.
• No privileges required (PR:N).
• User interaction required only to open the file.
• High impact on all three security objectives.

Affected Systems / Blast Radius: All workstation installations of Autodesk 3ds Max that parse FLT files are potentially affected. In enterprise environments, this includes design, engineering, architecture, and media-production teams. The blast radius of a successful attack is limited to the local machine (local escalation context), but the downstream risk of intellectual property theft and lateral intrusion is significant for organizations involved in product design or content creation.

Mass Exploitation Potential: LOW — No active exploitation in the wild has been reported, no exploit code is publicly available, and the EPSS score of 0.00127 (2.6th percentile) indicates a low probability of exploitation in the near term. However, that assessment can change rapidly once public proof-of-concept code is released.

Detection Guidance

Sigma Rule

title: Suspicious File Activity Associated with CVE-2026-7455 (3ds Max FLT Out-of-Bounds Write)
id: e9f7c3c4-9c62-4f54-8e44-1a2b4d6f8a9e
status: experimental
description: Detects the creation or execution of FLT files that may be associated with exploitation of CVE-2026-7455 in Autodesk 3ds Max.
author: Valter's Threat Intelligence Team
date: 2026-01-15
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_file:
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.flt'
        Image|endswith|contains: '3dsmax.exe'
    selection_event:
        EventID:
            - 11               # File Create
            - 1                # Process Execution
    condition: selection_file AND selection_event
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate opening of 3ds Max FLT files by authorized users
level: medium
tags:
    - attack.t1203
    - attack.execution
    - cve.2026-7455

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2026_7455_FLT_MALICIOUS_3DSMAX
{
    meta:
        author = "Valter's Threat Intelligence Team"
        description = "Detects suspicious FLT files that may exploit the out-of-bounds write vulnerability CVE-2026-7455 in Autodesk 3ds Max"
        cve = "2026-7455"
        date = "2026-01-15"
        filetype = "FLT"
    strings:
        $flt_magic = "3DS Max" ascii nocase
        $chunk_oversize = /(\x0F\x00\x00\x00){4,}/  // suspicious run of 0x0F markers suggesting oversized data
        $shellcode_indicators = { 68 00 00 00 00 FF 15 } // CALL to virtual address (common in ROP chains)
        $nopsled = { 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 }
    condition:
        (uint16(0) == 0x4D4D) // MMAB (FLT header magic)
        and 2 of them
}

Note: The YARA rule above uses the FLT header magic (MMAB) which is known for 3ds Max files, and looks for generic exploitation indicators. Because the exact file structure that triggers the vulnerability is not known, this rule is not a definitive indicator — it is designed to flag suspicious files for further analysis.

Suricata IDS Rule

alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"CVE-2026-7455 - Suspicious FLT file transfer for 3ds Max Exploitation"; flow:established,to_client; file.magic:"MMAB"; file.store; content:"3DS Max"; nocase; sid:20267455; rev:1; classtype:attempted-user; priority:2; reference:cve,2026-7455;)

Note: this rule detects the transfer of FLT files containing a "3DS Max" string within the initial data. It does NOT detect the exploit itself — detection of exploit content requires deeper inspection which is currently not possible given the lack of specific exploit characteristics.

Elastic Detection

sequence with maxspan=2s
  [ file where event.action == "create" and process.name : "3dsmax.exe" and file.extension : "flt" ]
  [ process where event.action == "exec" and process.name : "cmd.exe" or process.name : "powershell.exe" ]

Note: This EQL rule detects the sequence of 3ds Max creating an FLT file followed by an execution of a shell — a behavior commonly observed after successful exploitation. This is a behavioral detection approach meant to catch post-exploitation activity rather than the initial file-opens event.

Splunk SPL Query

index="windows_security" OR index="windows_endpoint"
| search (Image="*3dsmax.exe" OR process_name="3dsmax.exe") 
| search (file_name="*.flt" OR TargetFilename="*.flt")
| stats count by host, Image, TargetFilename, action
| eval malicious_pattern = if(count > 10, "high_frequency", "normal")

This query logs all 3ds Max processes interacting with FLT files. Aggregated counts and high-frequency interactions are flagged for review. The query uses standard Windows file creation event fields (on recent versions of Windows 10/11) and can be adjusted to the specific EDR log field names used in the enterprise Splunk deployment.

Wazuh OSSEC Rule

<group name="local_parsing,">
  <rule id="841129" level="12">
    <if_sid>554</if_sid>
    <match>3dsmax</match>
    <description>CVE-2026-7455: 3ds Max launched with FLT file - potential malicious file activity</description>
    <group>local_policy,</group>
    <options>no_full_log</options>
  </rule>
  
  <rule id="841130" level="9">
    <if_sid>1007455</if_sid>
    <regex>\.FLT</regex>
    <description>CVE-2026-7455: FLT extension detected in 3dsMax command-line execution</description>
    <group>local_policy,</group>
  </rule>
</group>

Note: These Wazuh rules look for command-line execution of 3dsmax (rule 554 detects Windows process execution events), flagging instances where an FLT file is invoked. It relies on the process creation being captured, and it is a heuristic rather than a precise exploit detection.

Mitigation & Patch Guidance

Patch Confidence: 2/4 — CLAIMED — The NVD data includes a reference to a patch, but no independent source has confirmed specifics. This is a single-source claim and should be treated with caution until the vendor advisory and patched version numbers are published and verified.

1. Immediate Mitigations (before patch is verified/installed):

• Restrict File Access: Use application control policies to restrict which users can open FLT files in 3ds Max. Only allow trusted, vetted employees to open FLT files from external sources.
• Sandboxing: Run 3ds Max in an isolated environment (separate virtual machine or a sandboxed user profile) when processing FLT files received from untrusted sources. This limits the blast radius in case of exploitation.
• Egress Filtering: Ensure network egress is monitored and restricted to prevent the exfiltration of data post-compromise.
• File Reputation Screening: Use security solutions that scan incoming files against reputation and emulation engines — such tools can flag unusual FLT file structures for quarantine even before a patch exists.
• User Awareness: Notify users to not open FLT files received via email or from untrusted sources, and to verify the source of any received 3ds Max files.

2. Patch / Upgrade Steps:

• Monitor the official Autodesk Advisory page (keep track of CVE-2026-7455) for a dedicated update.
• When the updated version of Autodesk 3ds Max is released, deploy it through the organization’s software management tool (SCCM, Intune, etc.) as soon as possible.
• It is strongly recommended to test the patch in a staging environment that mirrors production — specifically testing the functionality of 3ds Max with standard production FLT files — before broad deployment to minimize disruption.

3. Long-Term Hardening:

• Principle of Least Privilege: Run 3ds Max with the least privileges required, never with local administrator rights. This limits the impact of code execution and complicates privilege escalation.
• Memory Mitigations: Ensure the OS-level mitigations are enabled — ASLR, DEP, and Control Flow Guard (CFG) — and verify that 3ds Max is compiled with these modern mitigations on the latest available version.
• Network Segmentation: Workstations used for design work should be placed on a separate VLAN with firewalls preventing broad lateral movement towards critical servers (domain controllers, file servers).
• Monitor for Lateral Movements: Deploy EDR agents with behavioral detection rulesets to catch post-exploitation activities such as PowerShell download cradles, credential harvesting, and lateral traversal.
• Logging: Ensure full process creation command lines and file creation events are logged and retained for at least 90 days to enable forensic investigation in the event of a compromise.

References

1. NVD Entry — CVE-2026-7455: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-7455 (Contains the official CVE metadata, CVSS vector, and CWE classification).
2. Autodesk Security Advisory Center: https://www.autodesk.com/trust/security-advisories (Official vendor platform for security bulletins; monitor for CVE-2026-7455 authoritative patch advisories).
3. MITRE CWE-787 (Out-of-bounds Write): https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/787.html (Reference for the vulnerability class mechanism).
4. EPSS data for CVE-2026-7455: https://www.first.org/epss/ (Indicates the low probability of exploitation in the wild based on real-world telemetry).

Known Threat Actor Campaigns / Exploit-in-the-Wild Evidence: NONE. CVE-2026-7455 is not listed in CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, no exploit code is publicly available, and no threat-actor campaigns have been attributed to this CVE as of the publication date of this report. The risk of opportunistic exploitation increases if a proof-of-concept exploit is subsequently published.