CVE-2026-78470

## Executive Summary

CVE-2026-78470 is an unauthenticated-to-the-vulnerable-function SQL Injection vulnerability affecting the WP Project Manager Pro plugin for WordPress, in all versions up to and including 4.0.1. The root cause is improper escaping of a user-supplied parameter combined with insufficient preparation of the existing SQL query, allowing an authenticated attacker with Subscriber-level access or higher to inject arbitrary SQL. The primary impact is the unauthorized extraction of sensitive information from the WordPress database, including user credentials, password hashes, and potentially other application data, resulting in a High confidentiality impact (CVSS 6.5). No patch is currently available from the vendor, and no public exploit code or PoC has been identified at this time.

## Technical Analysis

The vulnerability class is CWE-89 (SQL Injection). The NVD description indicates two specific and critical root causes: (1) insufficient escaping on a user-supplied parameter, and (2) lack of sufficient preparation on the existing SQL query. The combination of these two flaws means that the application constructs a SQL query where an attacker-controlled value is concatenated directly into the query string without being safely parameterized.

The attack surface is the public-facing WordPress installation running the WP Project Manager Pro plugin. This plugin is a commercial project management suite and is likely installed on websites managing business operations, making them attractive targets for data exfiltration. Because the vulnerable parameter is supplied by the user and the existing query is not properly prepared, the attack mechanism is a classic UNION-based or stacked-query SQL injection, depending on the query structure and the database system in use.

The specific function names, class names, URL endpoints, or parameter names are **not included in the NVD Description or CNA Title**. Therefore, it is not possible to provide code-level detail regarding the exact request parameter or the hook where the injection occurs. We must rely on the vulnerability-class-level analysis. However, given that the attacker must be authenticated, the injection point is likely within an AJAX handler or a shortcode execution path that is only accessible to logged-in users.

The fact that Subscriber-level access is sufficient means there is no privilege escalation required to reach the vulnerable code path. This expands the attack surface to any registered user on the WordPress site, not just admins or editors.

## Exploitation Scenarios

Given the lack of public PoC, explosion details are inferred, but the following attack chain is consistent with the vulnerability description.

1) **Reconnaissance and Target Identification:** The attacker identifies a WordPress site running the WP Project Manager Pro plugin. This can be accomplished via fingerprinting the plugin's assets (e.g., reading the plugin directory path, scanning for specific JavaScript or CSS files) or via Google dorking and Shodan scans. The attacker then confirms the plugin version (<= 4.0.1) via the plugin readme or changelog.

2) **Authentication and Permission Check:** The attacker must have a valid account on the WordPress site. This is achieved either by creating a new account (if self-registration is enabled) or compromising a low-privilege user account. Subscriber-level access is the minimum required.

3) **Triggering the SQL Injection:** Once logged in, the attacker crafts a request to the vulnerable application function, injecting SQL payloads into the user-supplied parameter. Because the application does not properly escape the input nor prepare the SQL statement, the payload is concatenated into the SQL query. The payload would be designed to extract data, such as a UNION SELECT to retrieve `user_login` and `user_pass` from the `wp_users` table.

4) **Post-Exploitation:** The attacker retrieves password hashes. These hashes can be subjected to offline cracking attacks. A successful crack grants the attacker administrative-level access to the WordPress dashboard. From there, the attacker can upload a webshell, install a backdoor plugin, or modify core themes to achieve persistent Remote Code Execution (RCE).

Impact: Because the CVSS vector is `PR:L` (requires authentication), this is not a zero-click vulnerability. However, the attacker needs only the lowest privilege level to exploit the database, making it a significant risk for high-value WordPress deployments.

## Impact Assessment

**Business Impact:** The successful exploitation of this vulnerability directly compromises the Confidentiality` indicator of the CIA triad. An attacker can dump the entire database contents, to include subscriber accounts, administrator password hashes (which are salted but crackable), and any sensitive business data stored in custom tables by the plugin itself, such as client details, project budgets, and financial records.

**Affected Systems:** Any WordPress installation using the WP Project Manager Pro plugin version 4.0.1 or earlier is vulnerable. The vendor is listed as "Unknown", but the plugin is commercial and presumably distributed. The plugin is developed by a third party, and there is no evidence of prompt patching.

**Blast Radius:** The CVSS score of 6.5 (Medium) reflects High complexity? No, actually it reflects Low attack complexity (AC:L), Low privileges required (PR:L), No user interaction (UI:N), and a High Confidentiality impact with No Integrity or Availability impact (`C:H/I:N/A:N`). The blast radius is limited to the database of the single site, but since the plugin is often part of a business-critical SaaS (Software as a Service), the data leakage can be severe.

## Detection Guidance

### Sigma Rule

```yaml
title: SQL Injection Attempt in WP Project Manager Pro Query Parameter
status: experimental
description: Detects potential SQL injection attempts targeting WP Project Manager Pro by searching for SQL metacharacters in common request parameters.
logsource:
  category: webserver
  product: apache
  service: access_combined
detection:
  selection:
    cs-uri-query|contains:
      - 'UNION'
      - 'SELECT'
      - 'SLEEP('
      - 'BENCHMARK('
      - '0x5f'
      - 'information_schema'
  condition: selection
level: high
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate business logic queries containing 'SELECT' text in the URL.
  - URL encoded payloads may bypass this simple regex detection.

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2026_78470_SQLi_Detection
{
    meta:
        author = "Valtersit Threat Intel"
        description = "Detects suspicious strings in HTTP POST data or log files associated with SQL injection patterns."
        date = "2026-01-01"
        cve = "CVE-2026-78470"
    strings:
        $sql_meta1 = "UNION SELECT" ascii wide nocase
        $sql_meta2 = "information_schema.columns" ascii wide nocase
        $sql_meta3 = "group_concat(" ascii wide nocase
        $sql_meta4 = "extractvalue(" ascii wide nocase
        $http_agent = "WPScan" ascii wide nocase
        $http_agent2 = "sqlmap" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        any of ($sql_meta*) and (any of ($http_agent*) or filesize < 20KB)
}

Suricata IDS Rule

alert http any any -> $HOME_NET any (msg:"CVE-2026-78470 - SQL Injection Attempt Against WP Project Manager Pro"; flow:to_server,established; content:"POST"; http_method; content:"admin-ajax.php"; http_uri; pcre:"/(union|information_schema|sleep|benchmark)/iP"; classtype:web-application-attack; sid:2026784701; rev:1;)

Elastic Detection

process where event.action == "web-request" and http.request.method == "POST" and http.request.headers.referer == "*wp-admin*" and wildcard(http.request.body, "*union*select*")

Note: This EQL is too simplistic for production. A realistic rule would parse the http.request.body field for query parameters like action and perform a regex pattern match on the parameter values. For brevity, the above is a basic placeholder. A more robust rule would use the regex query syntax as an EQL search for specific parameters.

Splunk SPL Query

index=web sourcetype="access_combined_wcookie" form_data=* SELECT * OR form_data=* UNION *
| rex field=form_data "(?<payload>(?:SELECT|UNION|information_schema).*)"
| eval is_sqli=if(match(payload, "(?i)(select|union|sleep|benchmark)"), "true", "false")
| where is_sqli=="true"
| table _time, src_ip, http_method, uri_path, form_data, payload

Wazuh OSSEC Rule

<rule id="100470" level="12">
  <decoded>json</decoded>
  <field name="alert.grouping">Web Server</field>
  <field name="alert.action">POST</field>
  <regex>admin-ajax\.php</regex>
  <regex>UNION SELECT</regex>
  <description>Potential SQL injection attempt against WP Project Manager Pro detected.</description>
  <options>no_full_log</options>
  <mitre>
    <id>T1190</id>
  </mitre>
</rule>

Mitigation & Patch Guidance

Patch Confidence: 0/4 — UNPATCHED. No patch evidence from any tracked source has been identified. The Affected Versions list is empty (conflicting with the description indicating <= 4.0.1, but no patched version to upgrade to). The Vendor Fix is N/A.

Immediate Mitigations:

1. Disable the Plugin: If possible, disable the WP Project Manager Pro plugin until a vendor patch is released or an alternative mitigation is found. This may break business workflows.
2. Restrict User Registration: If self-registration is enabled, set the registration level to "Admin approval" or disable open registration. This reduces the potential pool of attackers.
3. Web Application Firewall (WAF): Deploy a WAF rule to block requests containing SQL injection patterns on the specific plugin's parameters. Block requests to admin-ajax.php with action attributes related to the plugin unless required.
4. Activity Logging: Enable strict logging for subscriber-level account actions, specifically focusing on POST requests to admin-ajax.php.

Patch/Upgrade Steps:

1. Monitor the vendor's official channels for a patched version. As of now, there are no update paths.
2. If a patched version (e.g., 4.0.2 or higher) is released, apply the update immediately after testing in a staging environment.

Long-Term Hardening:

1. Least Privilege Principle: Avoid granting "Author" roles or custom roles with access to plugin features to low-trust users.
2. Database Security: Rotate database credentials regularly and ensure the DB user used by WordPress is not the root/admin user.
3. Backups: Maintain offline, encrypted backups of the database to facilitate recovery in case of data destruction.
4. Vulnerability Scanning: Implement a WordPress vulnerability scanner (e.g., WPScan) in the CI/CD pipeline to detect vulnerable plugins automatically.

References

1. NVD Reference: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-78470
2. CWE-89 Reference: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/89.html — SQL Injection class definition.
3. MITRE ATT&CK Technique: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190/ — Exploit Public-Facing Application.
4. WordPress Plugin DB: https://wordpress.org/plugins/ — On-prem resource for checking plugin versions (note: this plugin is "Pro" and may not be listed here).
5. CISA KEV Catalog: Not listed in CISA KEV. (No evidence of exploitation in the wild yet).

Note: There is no evidence of active exploitation in the wild, nor is there a known threat actor campaign associated with this CVE at the time of writing. This report will be updated if the status changes.