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CVSS: 7.4 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N 🐛 CWE-295
👁️
Common Weakness Enumeration - Identifies the specific category of software weakness or flaw.

CVE-2026-78556

CVE-2026-78556 Vulnerability in Siemens
📅 PUBLISHED: 2026-10-13 00:00 UTC 🔄 UPDATED: 2026-10-14 05:00 UTC
[ ZERO-DAY / UNPATCHED ] [ DEFENSE PATCH ↓ ]
💣 PoC: None
👁️
Proof of Concept - Indicates if functional exploit code is publicly available, drastically increasing the risk of immediate attacks.
🥷 MITRE: T1557
👁️
MITRE ATT&CK Tactic - Describes the strategy hackers use to execute this attack.
Country: Germany License: Commercial
VULNERABLE: < V1.27.9 (all versions prior to V1.27.9)
CVSS VECTOR BREAKDOWN 7.4
AV: N Attack Vector Network
AC: H Attack Complexity High
PR: N Privileges Required None
UI: N User Interaction None
S: U Scope Unchanged
C: H Confidentiality High
I: H Integrity High
A: N Availability None
7.4
THREAT LEVEL
■ tracking this CVE ✓ independent patch confirmation ⧗ same-origin mirror (GHSA) ⚠ active exploitation verification policy →

Executive Summary

CVE-2026-78556 is a TLS server certificate validation failure (CWE-295) in Siemens Industrial Edge App Publisher affecting all versions prior to V1.27.9. The application does not properly validate the server certificate when establishing a TLS connection, enabling an adversary positioned on the network path to conduct a Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attack, intercept, and relay communications, and impersonate a trusted server. With a CVSS base score of 7.4 (High), the flaw carries high confidentiality and integrity impact, though exploitation requires a high-complexity network position and no user privileges or interaction.

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Technical Analysis

The vulnerability is classified under CWE-295 (Improper Certificate Validation). Per the NVD description, "the affected software does not properly validate the server certificate when initiating a TLS connection." This means that when Industrial Edge App Publisher acts as a TLS client and connects to a server, it fails to enforce proper certificate trust verification — the core binding mechanism that authenticates the remote endpoint in a TLS session.

TLS relies on the client validating the server's X.509 certificate chain against a trusted Certificate Authority (CA), checking validity dates, and confirming that the certificate's subject/SAN matches the intended hostname. When this validation is absent, incomplete, or bypassed, an attacker who controls the communication path can present an arbitrary or self-signed certificate. Because the client does not reject the untrusted certificate, the TLS handshake succeeds with the attacker, and the attacker effectively terminates the client's TLS session and opens a separate session to the intended server — a classic MitM relay.

The attack surface is the TLS client connection path within Industrial Edge App Publisher. Network position is critical: the CVSS vector reflects AC:H (Attack Complexity: High), consistent with the requirement to intercept and relay traffic on the path between the client and server (e.g., via ARP/DNS spoofing, rogue gateway, or compromised network segment).

The exact code-level mechanism (e.g., whether the client disables chain validation, ignores hostname mismatch, accepts any certificate, or fails to check revocation) is not specified in the available data, and no function names, endpoints, or parameters are provided in the NVD description or CNA title. This report therefore limits technical claims to the vulnerability class and the behavior explicitly described.

CVSS subscores:

  • AV:N — Network-exploitable.
  • AC:H — Requires a non-trivial MitM position/relay.
  • PR:N — No prior privileges required.
  • UI:N — No user interaction.
  • S:U — Impact scoped to the affected component.
  • C:H / I:H — High confidentiality and integrity impact from interception and tampering.
  • A:N — No availability impact.

Exploitation Scenarios

Based strictly on the NVD description, the attack chain is inferred from the vulnerability class (improper TLS server certificate validation enabling MitM). No public PoC or exploit code is available.

  1. Reconnaissance / target identification. The attacker identifies an Industrial Edge App Publisher instance and the TLS server endpoints it communicates with. Positioning must be on the network path between the client and those servers.

  2. Triggering the flaw class. The attacker interposes on the communication path — e.g., via ARP spoofing, DNS spoofing, rogue access point, or control of an intermediate hop — and presents a certificate the client should not trust. Because the application does not properly validate the server certificate, the verification step fails to reject the untrusted certificate, and TLS is established with the attacker.

  3. Interception and relay. The attacker terminates the client's TLS connection and opens a corresponding connection to the intended server, relaying traffic. This enables the adversary to read and potentially modify the communication in transit. The NVD description explicitly notes the attacker can "spoof a trusted entity by interfering in the communication path between the client and the intended server."

  4. Post-exploitation impact. With a working MitM relay, the attacker can harvest data transmitted over the connection (C:H), alter content in transit (I:H), and impersonate the trusted server to the client. No availability impact is indicated.

Note: No public PoC is available; the attack chain above is described at the vulnerability-class level per the available description.

Impact Assessment

Successful exploitation yields high confidentiality and integrity impact against any data or trust decisions made over the affected TLS connection. Because the client may accept a spoofed server identity, an attacker can impersonate a trusted endpoint, potentially influencing the application's behavior and any artifacts it fetches or publishes through that connection. The availability impact is none (A:N).

Blast radius is governed by which servers the Industrial Edge App Publisher connects to and what those connections carry. Any environment where this tool operates across untrusted or partially trusted network segments — including OT/industrial edge deployments — is at elevated risk, as is any deployment where an adversary could gain an on-path position. The High attack complexity (AC:H) somewhat limits opportunistic mass exploitation, but a determined or well-positioned adversary (e.g., on a shared network, untrusted Wi-Fi, or a compromised switch/router) can satisfy the precondition. CISA KEV status is NO, and no exploit-in-the-wild evidence is available.

Detection Guidance

Sigma Rule

title: Suspicious TLS to Untrusted/Self-Signed Server by Industrial Edge App Publisher
id: 8f3c1e2a-7855-4b10-9c0e-00000000785
status: experimental
description: Detects Industrial Edge App Publisher initiating TLS connections to servers presenting untrusted or self-signed certificates, consistent with CVE-2026-78556 MitM conditions.
logsource:
  category: network_connection
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_proc:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\IndustrialEdgeAppPublisher.exe'
      - '\edge-app-publisher.exe'
  selection_tls:
    Initiated: 'true'
    DestinationPort: 443
  filter_trusted:
    DestinationIp|startswith:
      - '10.'
      - '192.168.'
      - '172.16.'
  condition: selection_proc and selection_tls and not filter_trusted
fields:
  - Image
  - DestinationIp
  - DestinationPort
  - User
level: medium
tags:
  - attack.t1557
  - cve.2026.78556

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2026_78556_TLS_NoCertValidation
{
    meta:
        description = "Heuristic detection of TLS client code paths lacking server certificate validation associated with CVE-2026-78556 (Industrial Edge App Publisher)."
        cve = "CVE-2026-78556"
        cwe = "CWE-295"
        author = "Threat Intelligence"
        date = "2026-01-01"

    strings:
        $tls1 = "TLS" ascii nocase
        $tls2 = "SSL" ascii nocase
        $ver1 = "verify" ascii nocase
        $ver2 = "ServerCertificateValidationCallback" ascii
        $ver3 = "checkServerTrusted" ascii
        $ver4 = "getPeerCertificate" ascii
        $skip = "trustAll" ascii nocase
        $skip2 = "allowAll" ascii nocase
        $edge = "AppPublisher" ascii nocase

    condition:
        $edge and ($tls1 or $tls2) and 2 of ($ver*) and 1 of ($skip*)
}

Suricata IDS Rule

alert tls any any -> any 443 (msg:"CVE-2026-78556 Potential MitM - Industrial Edge App Publisher TLS to Untrusted Cert"; flow:established,to_server; tls.subject:!"CN="; threshold:type limit, track by_src, count 5, seconds 60; classtype:attempted-recon; reference:cve,2026-78556; reference:url,nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-78556; sid:7855601; rev:1;)

Elastic Detection

network where network.transport == "tcp" and destination.port == 443 and
process.name in ("IndustrialEdgeAppPublisher.exe", "edge-app-publisher") and
tls.server.certificate not in trusted_ca_list

Splunk SPL Query

index=network sourcetype=zeek_ssl OR sourcetype=pan:traffic
| where dest_port=443
| search process_name IN ("IndustrialEdgeAppPublisher.exe","edge-app-publisher")
| eval untrusted=if(validation_status!="ok" OR cert_issuer="self-signed",1,0)
| where untrusted=1
| stats count values(dest_ip) as destinations by src_ip process_name
| where count > 3

Wazuh OSSEC Rule

<group name="cve_2026_78556,tls,mitm,">
  <rule id="785560" level="10">
    <decoded_as>json</decoded_as>
    <field name="process.name">IndustrialEdgeAppPublisher\.exe</field>
    <field name="destination.port">443</field>
    <field name="tls.certificate.validation">failed|none|bypassed</field>
    <description>CVE-2026-78556: Industrial Edge App Publisher TLS connection with unvalidated server certificate (possible MitM)</description>
    <mitre>
      <id>T1557</id>
    </mitre>
  </rule>
</group>

Mitigation & Patch Guidance

Patch confidence: 0/4 (UNPATCHED — no patch evidence from any tracked source).

  1. Immediate mitigations.

    • Segment and harden the network path: eliminate on-path attacker positions (disable uncontrolled ARP, enforce DHCP snooping/Dynamic ARP Inspection, block rogue gateways).
    • Restrict Industrial Edge App Publisher traffic to trusted, internal endpoints using network ACLs and trusted-TLS interception boundaries.
    • Where feasible, pin or explicitly trust only the expected server endpoint via managed trust stores, and monitor for unexpected certificate issuers on publisher connections.
  2. Patch/upgrade steps.

    • The NVD description states the flaw affects "All versions < V1.27.9." Upgrade Industrial Edge App Publisher to V1.27.9 or later as the fix version. Verify the release through Siemens' official Industrial Edge update channel before deploying.
    • Re-validate TLS client behavior after upgrade (confirm certificate chain and hostname validation is enforced).
  3. Long-term hardening.

    • Enforce strict server certificate validation (chain, hostname, validity, and revocation) as a default in all TLS clients and pipelines.
    • Add MitM-resilient controls (mutual TLS where supported, certificate pinning) for client-server trust.
    • Continuously monitor for CWE-295 patterns in software supply and review dependencies for certificate-validation bypasses.

References

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product:"Siemens"
title:"Siemens"
◈ SOURCE Analysis & enrichment: valtersit.com/cve/CVE-2026-78556/ · CVE data: NVD/MITRE (public domain) · © 2026 ValtersIT Hub
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