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CVSS: 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N 🐛 CWE-319
👁️
Common Weakness Enumeration - Identifies the specific category of software weakness or flaw.

CVE-2026-82826

CVE-2026-82826 Vulnerability in Hitachi
📅 PUBLISHED: 2026-10-01 00:00 UTC 🔄 UPDATED: 2026-10-02 05:00 UTC
[ ZERO-DAY / UNPATCHED ] [ DEFENSE PATCH ↓ ]
💣 PoC: None
👁️
Proof of Concept - Indicates if functional exploit code is publicly available, drastically increasing the risk of immediate attacks.
🥷 MITRE: T1040
👁️
MITRE ATT&CK Tactic - Describes the strategy hackers use to execute this attack.
Country: Japan License: Commercial
VULNERABLE: through 3.3.0
CVSS VECTOR BREAKDOWN 7.5
AV: N Attack Vector Network
AC: L Attack Complexity Low
PR: N Privileges Required None
UI: N User Interaction None
S: U Scope Unchanged
C: H Confidentiality High
I: N Integrity None
A: N Availability None
7.5
THREAT LEVEL
■ tracking this CVE ✓ independent patch confirmation ⧗ same-origin mirror (GHSA) ⚠ active exploitation verification policy →

Executive Summary

CVE-2026-82826 is a cleartext transmission of sensitive information vulnerability (CWE-319) in Hitachi Coding Software Suite affecting all versions through 3.3.0. An attacker positioned on the network path can passively eavesdrop on authentication credentials and sensitive data transmitted without encryption, resulting in high confidentiality impact with no integrity or availability impact (CVSS 7.5). The vulnerability requires no authentication or user interaction, making any deployment relying on unencrypted transport for this product a viable target for passive interception.

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›Shodan dorks — ready-made queries to find exposed vulnerable systems
›Detection rules — YARA · Wazuh · Elastic (all plans) · Sigma (Pro)
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Technical Analysis

The vulnerability is classified under CWE-319: Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information. This weakness class occurs when an application transmits data that should be protected — most notably authentication credentials and other sensitive payloads — over a channel that is not encrypted, or is encrypted with protocols offering insufficient protection. In this instance, the NVD description explicitly states the issue allows an attacker to "eavesdrop on with authentication credentials and sensitive data in transit."

The affected product is Hitachi Coding Software Suite, versions through 3.3.0 inclusive. The CVSS v3.1 vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N) establishes the following characteristics:

  • Attack Vector (Network): The vulnerable communication is reachable over a network — the attacker does not require local host access.
  • Attack Complexity (Low): No special conditions or race windows are required; interception of plaintext traffic is deterministic once the attacker is on-path.
  • Privileges Required (None): The attacker needs no prior credentials.
  • User Interaction (None): No victim action beyond normal use of the product is required.
  • Scope (Unchanged): The impact is confined to the vulnerable component's security authority.
  • Confidentiality (High): Credentials and sensitive data are fully exposed.
  • Integrity / Availability (None): The vulnerability enables reading, not modification or disruption.

The attack surface is the network transport layer used by the Coding Software Suite when handling authentication and sensitive data. Because the underlying weakness is the absence of adequate transport encryption (or the use of a cleartext protocol), exploitation does not depend on flaws within application logic such as injection or memory corruption. Instead, the attacker's capability is fundamentally a network-position advantage: control of a segment, switch port, wireless medium, or upstream routing path between client and server.

No specific protocol, port, endpoint, function, or code path is disclosed in the available intelligence. The NVD description and CNA data provide only the vulnerability class and the affected product line. Accordingly, precise code-level analysis — for example, identifying the exact function responsible for opening the socket or the configuration flag that disables TLS — cannot be performed from the supplied data. What can be stated with confidence is that the product transmits authentication material and other sensitive data in a form recoverable by a passive observer.

The absence of an EPSS score (not yet scored by FIRST.org), the absence of a CISA KEV listing, and the lack of any public PoC, Nuclei template, or exploit code indicate that this CVE is, as of the available data, not under active weaponization in public feeds. Patch confidence is 0/4: no vendor fix, workaround, or version data has been published through tracked sources. This elevates operational risk because defenders cannot currently remediate by upgrading to a fixed release.

Exploitation Scenarios

No public PoC is available; the attack chain below is inferred from the CWE-319 vulnerability class and the CVSS vector.

  1. Reconnaissance / Target Identification. The attacker identifies hosts running Hitachi Coding Software Suite (through version 3.3.0) via network scanning, Shodan, or internal asset enumeration. Because the CVSS vector is AV:N, the attacker needs only a network path to the product's traffic — not host-level access. Useful fingerprints include service banners, HTTP responses, and TLS certificates (or the conspicuous absence of TLS) associated with the product.

  2. Positioning on the Network Path. The attacker gains an on-path vantage point. In the vulnerability-class terms, this means any of: a mirrored/SPAN switch port, a compromised router or switch, a man-in-the-middle position on a shared segment or wireless network, or control of an upstream hop. This step is prerequisite and is itself a separate ATT&CK technique (T1040 — Network Sniffing).

  3. Triggering the Flaw Class. The flaw is "triggered" simply by normal, legitimate use of the vulnerable product. When a user or service authenticates to the Coding Software Suite — or when the suite itself transmits sensitive data to a peer — the credentials and data travel across the network in cleartext. No crafted payload, malformed request, or user trickery is required. The attacker passively captures the traffic as it traverses the intercepted link.

  4. Payload / Execution Method. At the vulnerability-class level, there is no injected payload. The attacker's "execution" is the capture and extraction of credentials and sensitive data from the observed stream — for example, parsing authentication exchanges captured from the plaintext session. Because the disclosure is cleartext, no decryption or key recovery is necessary; the data is readable directly from the captured frames.

  5. Post-Exploitation Impact. Captured authentication credentials can be reused to access the Coding Software Suite and potentially adjacent systems through credential reuse (lateral movement). Intercepted sensitive data may include proprietary source code, project metadata, intellectual property, or customer information, depending on what the suite transmits. Because integrity and availability impacts are rated None, the immediate effect is unauthorized disclosure and the downstream risk of credential-based compromise rather than direct data modification or service disruption.

Note: Any exploitation claim beyond passive interception would require assumptions not supported by the provided NVD description. Defenders should treat this CVE as a confidentiality-only, on-path interception risk.

Impact Assessment

CVSS 7.5 (High). The vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N maps to the following operational conclusions:

  • Confidentiality — High: Authentication credentials and sensitive data are fully exposed to any on-path observer. Credential exposure enables follow-on account takeover; sensitive data exposure may constitute a regulatory or contractual breach depending on content.
  • Integrity / Availability — None: The attacker cannot alter or disrupt traffic through this weakness alone. Detection is therefore harder, because there is no anomaly in application behavior — only an unauthorized observer.
  • Attack Vector — Network: The blast radius extends to every host pair whose traffic traverses an untrusted or compromised segment. This includes remote users connecting across WAN/VPN-less links, cross-site replication, and wireless clients.
  • AC:L / PR:N / UI:N: Exploitation is trivial and unattended; no attacker skill beyond standard sniffing tooling is required.

Affected systems: All deployments of Hitachi Coding Software Suite versions through 3.3.0 (inclusive). Any instance where the suite's authentication or data-transfer traffic is not encapsulated within an independent encrypted tunnel (e.g., IPsec, TLS-wrapped transport, or a hardened VPN) should be treated as exposed.

Business impact: Primary risk is credential compromise leading to unauthorized access, plus potential disclosure of intellectual property (the product is a coding/development suite, implying source code, repositories, and developer credentials may transit the vulnerable channel). Secondary risks include regulatory exposure (e.g., data protection obligations if personal data is in scope) and loss of trust. Because no patch exists, this risk cannot be retired by upgrade alone and must be mitigated architecturally.

Blast radius: Determined by where the product's traffic is exposed. Internet-facing or WAN-traversing deployments, multi-tenant networks, and shared wireless environments represent the highest exposure. Single isolated LAN deployments with physically controlled switching infrastructure carry lower but non-zero risk.

Detection Guidance

Because this vulnerability concerns cleartext transmission, detection focuses on (a) identifying the affected product and its unencrypted protocols on the wire, and (b) identifying sniffing behavior on hosts that suddenly capture network traffic. Detection is difficult by nature: legitimate use produces no attack signature, and the adversary's traffic capture may be entirely passive.

Sigma Rule

title: Potential Network Sniffing Tool Execution (Hitachi Coding Suite Cleartext Exposure Context)
id: 5f0a3c9e-8282-6cve-8a26-hitachi0001
status: experimental
description: Detects execution of common packet capture/sniffing utilities that could be used to eavesdrop on cleartext traffic (CVE-2026-82826 context). Correlate with hosts that communicate with Hitachi Coding Software Suite.
references:
  - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-82826
author: valtersit.com
date: 2026-01-01
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_img:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\tshark.exe'
      - '\dumpcap.exe'
      - '\windump.exe'
      - '\tcpdump.exe'
      - '\wireshark.exe'
  selection_cli:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - ' -i '
      - '-w '
      - 'host '
      - 'port '
  condition: selection_img and selection_cli
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate network troubleshooting by administrators
  - Authorized packet capture for performance analysis
level: medium
tags:
  - attack.t1040
  - cve.2026.82826

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2026_82826_Hitachi_Coding_Suite_Cleartext_Indicators
{
    meta:
        description = "Detects plaintext Hitachi Coding Software Suite artifacts and cleartext credential markers associated with CVE-2026-82826. Low-fidelity hint rule; corroborate with network evidence."
        author = "valtersit.com"
        reference = "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-82826"
        date = "2026-01-01"
        cve = "CVE-2026-82826"
        severity = "high"

    strings:
        $prod1 = "Hitachi Coding Software Suite" ascii wide nocase
        $prod2 = "Coding Software Suite" ascii wide nocase
        $ver   = "3.3.0" ascii wide
        $clear1 = "Authorization: Basic" ascii nocase
        $clear2 = "password=" ascii nocase
        $clear3 = "passwd=" ascii nocase

    condition:
        (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D or uint32(0) == 0x464C457F) and
        ($prod1 or $prod2) and
        ($clear1 or $clear2 or $clear3 or $ver)
}

Suricata IDS Rule

alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"CVE-2026-82826 Hitachi Coding Software Suite Possible Cleartext Credential Transmission (Basic Auth)"; flow:established,to_server; content:"Hitachi"; http_header; nocase; content:"Authorization|3a 20|Basic"; http_header; nocase; reference:cve,2026-82826; reference:url,nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-82826; classtype:policy-violation; sid:2026828260; rev:1;)

alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"CVE-2026-82826 Hitachi Coding Software Suite Cleartext Sensitive Data Stream (no TLS)"; flow:established,to_server; content:"Coding Software Suite"; http_header; nocase; reference:cve,2026-82826; classtype:policy-violation; sid:2026828261; rev:1;)

Elastic Detection

sequence by process.entity_id with maxspan=1m
  [ process where event.type == "start" and
      process.name in ("tcpdump", "tshark", "dumpcap", "windump") ]
  [ network where
      (destination.port in (80, 8080, 8443) or network.protocol == "http") and
      process.name in ("tcpdump", "tshark", "dumpcap", "windump") ]

Splunk SPL Query

index=netflow OR index=zeek sourcetype=bro_conn OR sourcetype=suricata
| eval is_hitachi = if(match(_raw, "(?i)hitachi.*coding software suite") OR match(_raw, "(?i)coding software suite"), 1, 0)
| eval is_cleartext = if(dest_port IN (80, 8080, 21, 23, 143, 110) OR match(_raw, "(?i)authorization: basic"), 1, 0)
| where is_hitachi=1 AND is_cleartext=1
| stats count values(src_ip) as sources values(dest_ip) as destinations by dest_port
| where count >= 1
| sort - count

Wazuh OSSEC Rule

<group name="hitachi,cve-2026-82826,cleartext,">
  <rule id="2026828" level="10">
    <if_sid>0</if_sid>
    <match>CVE-2026-82826|Coding Software Suite|Cleartext Sensitive Data</match>
    <description>CVE-2026-82826: Possible cleartext transmission of credentials/sensitive data from Hitachi Coding Software Suite (through 3.3.0).</description>
    <mitre>
      <id>T1040</id>
    </mitre>
    <group>confidentiality_exposure,</group>
  </rule>

  <rule id="2026829" level="12">
    <if_sid>2026828</if_sid>
    <match>Authorization: Basic|password=</match>
    <description>CVE-2026-82826: Cleartext credentials observed in Hitachi Coding Software Suite traffic.</description>
    <mitre>
      <id>T1040</id>
    </mitre>
  </rule>
</group>

Mitigation & Patch Guidance

Patch confidence: 0/4 (UNPATCHED — no patch evidence from any tracked source).

1) Immediate mitigations (no vendor fix required):

  • Enforce encrypted transport end-to-end for all Coding Software Suite traffic. Where the product does not natively support TLS, tunnel its traffic through an independent encrypted channel (e.g., IPsec site-to-site tunnels, a hardened VPN for remote users, or an authenticated TLS-terminating reverse proxy).
  • Segment the product onto a dedicated, tightly controlled VLAN to prevent on-path availability to untrusted hosts; disable SPAN/mirror ports in that segment except for authorized monitoring.
  • Eliminate wireless transmission of the product's traffic across shared/open WLANs; require encrypted WLAN (WPA3/802.1X) with client isolation.
  • Enforce 802.1X port authentication and switch-port security to prevent unauthorized devices from joining the same broadcast/segment.
  • Hunt for rogue sniffing tools (see Detection Guidance) and audit switch configurations for unauthorized mirrors or spanning.
  • Rotate credentials used with the product if any traffic may have traversed an untrusted path; assume potential exposure.

2) Patch/upgrade steps:

  • No patch or fixed version is available through tracked sources as of this report. Monitor the Hitachi vendor security advisory channel and the NVD record for CVE-2026-82826 for an updated release. Because versions "through 3.3.0" are affected, any future fixed version will fall above 3.3.0; verify the exact minimum-safe version directly with the vendor before deployment.
  • Subscribe to vendor notifications and re-evaluate patch confidence on each update cycle.

3) Long-term hardening:

  • Mandate encryption-in-transit as a baseline requirement for all development tooling and internal services; treat cleartext transmission of credentials as a policy violation irrespective of vendor CVEs.
  • Deploy network-layer encryption (MACsec) on internal segments handling sensitive development traffic.
  • Integrate asset inventory so affected installations are identified and tracked; the absence of a vendor patch means architectural controls carry the full risk burden.
  • Adopt credential hygiene (short-lived credentials, rotation, MFA where supported) to reduce the value of any intercepted credential.
  • Continuous monitoring: retain full packet capture capability for segments traversing the product to support future forensic confirmation of exposure.

References

No CISA KEV listing, no known threat-actor campaign, and no exploit-in-the-wild evidence is associated with CVE-2026-82826 in the available data. No public PoC, Nuclei template, or exploit code was identified.

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product:"Hitachi"
title:"Hitachi"
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