☠️
EXFILTRATING
DATA...
01010111 10110010 00101001 11000110 01101100 10011011 00010001 11100101 01000010 10101111
[ <-- BACK_TO_SEARCH ]
Gladinet logo [ WEBSITE ] [ VENDOR STATS ]
CVSS: 7.5 🐛 CWE-23
👁️
Common Weakness Enumeration - Identifies the specific category of software weakness or flaw.

CVE-2026-8361

CVE-2026-8361 Path Traversal in tenable
📅 PUBLISHED: 2026-05-27 20:16 UTC 🔄 UPDATED: 2026-09-23 20:20 UTC
[ PATCH UNDER REVIEW ↓ ] Remains UNDER REVIEW until an independent source confirms the fix
[ DEFENSE PATCH ↓ ]
💣 PoC: None
👁️
Proof of Concept - Indicates if functional exploit code is publicly available, drastically increasing the risk of immediate attacks.
🎯 EPSS: 0.35%
👁️
0.35% probability
8.8× above the median CVE
Tier: ELEVATED
30-day exploitation window · FIRST.org · updated daily
🥷 MITRE: T1083
👁️
MITRE ATT&CK Tactic - Describes the strategy hackers use to execute this attack.
Country: USA License: Commercial
VULNERABLE: version not auto-detected — verify your deployed version locally
CVSS SEVERITY SCALE
9.0–10.0 CRITICAL
7.0–8.9 HIGH
4.0–6.9 MEDIUM
0.1–3.9 LOW
0.0 NONE
7.5
THREAT LEVEL
■ tracking this CVE ✓ independent patch confirmation ⧗ same-origin mirror (GHSA) ⚠ active exploitation verification policy →

Executive Summary

CVE-2026-8361 is a path traversal vulnerability residing in the WOSDefaultHttpModule.dll component, triggered when processing a URL path that begins with /woshome. The vulnerability allows an unauthenticated attacker to read arbitrary files on the server by manipulating the path traversal sequences (e.g., ../). With a CVSS score of 7.5 (High), this flaw poses a significant risk to confidentiality, as it enables unauthorized access to sensitive files such as configuration files, credentials, and application source code. No public exploit code or proof-of-concept has been released at this time, and no patch is currently available. The vendor remains unknown, and the product is likely a custom or legacy web application module.

⚡ AUTOMATE YOUR CVE INTELLIGENCE

This record — and 170,000+ others — are available via the ValtersIT API. One endpoint replaces five: NVD + GitHub CVE + CISA KEV + EPSS + Nuclei + Exploit-DB, unified.

›Patch confidence — UNVERIFIED to CONFIRMED, cross-referenced NVD + RHSA + Debian
›Exploit & PoC — poc_status, poc_url, has_exploit. Not in NVD.
›Shodan dorks — ready-made queries to find exposed vulnerable systems
›Detection rules — YARA · Wazuh · Elastic (all plans) · Sigma (Pro)
›pending_fields — know exactly which of 7 fields NVD hasn't processed yet
›Free backfill — data incomplete when you paid? Re-check within 30 days = 0 credits
PAYG €0.08/lookup Standard €19/mo (was €29) · 5k credits Pro €65/mo (was €99) · 20k credits FOUNDING PRICE · LOCKED FOR LIFE · ENDS 31 DEC 2026
[ FROM €19/MO ]
Free sandbox key available
No signup required

Supply Chain & Package Security

This vulnerability is not associated with any known open-source package (NPM, PyPI, Go, Ruby). It affects a proprietary DLL module (WOSDefaultHttpModule.dll), which is likely part of a closed-source web application or middleware. Organizations using this component should treat it as a high-risk supply chain artifact and immediately isolate or decommission the affected service until a patch is available.

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

  • CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
  • Base Score: 7.5 (High)
  • Attack Vector: Network (AV:N) – Exploitable remotely.
  • Attack Complexity: Low (AC:L) – No special conditions required.
  • Privileges Required: None (PR:N) – No authentication needed.
  • User Interaction: None (UI:N) – No user action required.
  • Scope: Unchanged (S:U) – The vulnerable component and the impacted component are the same.
  • Confidentiality Impact: High (C:H) – Complete file read access.
  • Integrity Impact: None (I:N) – No file modification possible.
  • Availability Impact: None (A:N) – No denial of service.

Threat Level: High. The combination of network exploitability, low complexity, and no authentication makes this a prime target for automated scanning and exploitation.

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The vulnerability resides in the WOSDefaultHttpModule.dll module, which is an HTTP module likely used in a Microsoft IIS or similar web server environment. The module processes incoming HTTP requests and handles URL routing for the /woshome path prefix.

Root Cause: The module fails to properly sanitize user-supplied path segments. When a request is made to a URL starting with /woshome, the module extracts the remainder of the path and uses it to access files on the server's filesystem without validating for path traversal sequences (e.g., ../ or ..\).

Example Attack Vector:

GET /woshome/../../../windows/win.ini HTTP/1.1
Host: target.com

If the server is running on Windows, this request could return the contents of C:\windows\win.ini. On Linux, a similar request could read /etc/passwd.

Why it works: The module likely concatenates the user-supplied path with a base directory (e.g., C:\inetpub\wwwroot\woshome\) and then passes it to a file reading function without checking for .. sequences. This allows an attacker to escape the intended directory and access any file the web server process has read permissions for.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

Since no patch is available, the following is a hypothetical comparison based on common path traversal fixes.

Vulnerable Code (C#/ASP.NET example):

public void ProcessRequest(HttpContext context)
{
    string path = context.Request.Path;
    if (path.StartsWith("/woshome"))
    {
        string filePath = path.Substring("/woshome".Length);
        string fullPath = Server.MapPath("~/woshome" + filePath);
        context.Response.WriteFile(fullPath);
    }
}

Patched Code (Hypothetical):

public void ProcessRequest(HttpContext context)
{
    string path = context.Request.Path;
    if (path.StartsWith("/woshome"))
    {
        string filePath = path.Substring("/woshome".Length);
        // Normalize and validate the path
        string fullPath = Path.GetFullPath(Server.MapPath("~/woshome" + filePath));
        string basePath = Path.GetFullPath(Server.MapPath("~/woshome"));
        if (!fullPath.StartsWith(basePath))
        {
            context.Response.StatusCode = 403;
            context.Response.End();
            return;
        }
        context.Response.WriteFile(fullPath);
    }
}

The patched version uses Path.GetFullPath to resolve any .. sequences and then checks that the resolved path still starts with the intended base directory. This prevents directory traversal.

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team (Offensive)

Lab Environment:

  • Windows Server 2019/2022 with IIS installed.
  • Deploy a test web application that uses WOSDefaultHttpModule.dll (simulate if actual DLL is unavailable).
  • Ensure the application has a /woshome endpoint that serves files from a local directory.

Exploitation Steps:

  1. Reconnaissance: Use Shodan or manual scanning to identify servers with /woshome endpoints.
  2. Craft Payload: Use a simple HTTP GET request with path traversal sequences.
    GET /woshome/../../../windows/win.ini HTTP/1.1
    Host: target.com
    
  3. Automate with cURL:
    curl --path-as-is "http://target.com/woshome/../../../windows/win.ini"
    
  4. File Enumeration: Attempt to read common sensitive files:
    • Windows: ../../../windows/win.ini, ../../../windows/system32/drivers/etc/hosts, ../../../inetpub/wwwroot/web.config
    • Linux: ../../../etc/passwd, ../../../etc/shadow, ../../../proc/self/environ

Note: No public exploit code is available. The above is a generic path traversal technique.

Blue Team (Defensive)

Detection & Response:

  1. Monitor Web Logs: Look for requests containing ../ or ..%2f in the URL path, especially those starting with /woshome.
  2. Honeypot Files: Place decoy files (e.g., honeypot.txt) in the web root and monitor for access attempts.
  3. Network Segmentation: Isolate the web server from sensitive internal systems to limit the blast radius.
  4. WAF Rules: Deploy a Web Application Firewall (WAF) rule to block requests containing path traversal patterns in the URL.

Immediate Mitigation:

  • If the DLL cannot be patched, disable the /woshome endpoint by removing or renaming the module in IIS.
  • Restrict file system permissions for the IIS application pool identity to the minimum required.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

Network IOCs:

  • HTTP requests with URI path starting with /woshome and containing ../ or ..%2f.
  • Unusual outbound connections from the web server to unknown IPs (if attacker exfiltrates data).
  • Repeated 200 OK responses for non-existent files (e.g., /woshome/../../../etc/passwd).

File System IOCs:

  • Unexpected access to files outside the web root (e.g., C:\Windows\win.ini, /etc/passwd).
  • Modified or newly created files in the web root (if attacker uploads a web shell via another vector).

Log IOCs:

  • IIS log entries with cs-uri-stem containing ../ and sc-status of 200.
  • Event ID 4656 (Windows) for file access attempts to sensitive files by the IIS worker process.

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2026_8361_Path_Traversal {
    meta:
        description = "Detects path traversal attempts targeting CVE-2026-8361 in WOSDefaultHttpModule.dll"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2025-04-10"
        reference = "CVE-2026-8361"
    strings:
        $traversal1 = "/woshome/../" ascii wide nocase
        $traversal2 = "/woshome/..\\" ascii wide nocase
        $traversal3 = "/woshome/%2e%2e/" ascii wide nocase
        $traversal4 = "/woshome/%2e%2e\\" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        any of them
}

Sigma Rule

title: CVE-2026-8361 Path Traversal Attempt
id: 7a8b9c0d-1e2f-3a4b-5c6d-7e8f9a0b1c2d
status: experimental
description: Detects HTTP requests attempting to exploit path traversal in /woshome endpoint
author: Valters IT
date: 2025-04-10
references:
    - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-8361
logsource:
    category: webserver
    product: iis
detection:
    selection:
        cs-uri-stem|contains:
            - '/woshome/../'
            - '/woshome/..\\'
            - '/woshome/%2e%2e/'
            - '/woshome/%2e%2e\\'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of '..' in application logic (rare)
level: high

Suricata Rule

alert http any any -> any any (msg:"CVE-2026-8361 Path Traversal Attempt"; flow:to_server,established; content:"/woshome"; http_uri; nocase; content:"../"; http_uri; distance:0; within:10; sid:1000001; rev:1;)

Remediation & Mitigation

Immediate Actions:

  1. Disable the vulnerable module: If possible, remove or disable WOSDefaultHttpModule.dll from the web application configuration.
  2. Apply virtual patching: Use a WAF to block requests containing ../ or ..%2f in the URI path after /woshome.
  3. Restrict file permissions: Ensure the web server process has read access only to the web root directory and no other sensitive directories.

Long-Term Fix:

  • Contact the vendor for an official patch. If no vendor exists, rewrite the affected module to include proper path validation (as shown in the patched code example).
  • Conduct a full security audit of the application to identify similar vulnerabilities.

Compensating Controls:

  • Implement strict input validation for all user-supplied paths.
  • Use a chroot jail or containerization to isolate the web application.
  • Enable detailed logging and monitoring for all file access attempts.

Valters IT
DevSecOps & Cyber Threat Intelligence Division

◈ SOURCE Analysis & enrichment: valtersit.com/cve/CVE-2026-8361/ · CVE data: NVD/MITRE (public domain) · © 2026 ValtersIT Hub
>_ SYSTEM_CORE: INTEL_ACTIVE
90% TEAM-CURATED // 10% AUTOMATED INGESTION.
ALL PATCH REFERENCES AND VERSION DATA SOURCED FROM NVD + OSV OFFICIAL REGISTRIES.