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CVSS: 5.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N 🐛 CWE-863
👁️
Common Weakness Enumeration - Identifies the specific category of software weakness or flaw.

CVE-2026-84618

CVE-2026-84618 Vulnerability in Apple
📅 PUBLISHED: 2026-09-14 00:00 UTC 🔄 UPDATED: 2026-09-26 06:11 UTC
[ PATCH UNDER REVIEW ↓ ] Remains UNDER REVIEW until an independent source confirms the fix
[ DEFENSE PATCH ↓ ]
💣 PoC: None
👁️
Proof of Concept - Indicates if functional exploit code is publicly available, drastically increasing the risk of immediate attacks.
🎯 EPSS: 0.12%
👁️
0.12% probability
2.9× above the median CVE
Tier: ELEVATED
30-day exploitation window · FIRST.org · updated daily
🥷 MITRE: T1068
👁️
MITRE ATT&CK Tactic - Describes the strategy hackers use to execute this attack.
Country: USA License: Commercial
VULNERABLE: version not auto-detected — verify your deployed version locally
CVSS VECTOR BREAKDOWN 5.5
AV: L Attack Vector Local
AC: L Attack Complexity Low
PR: N Privileges Required None
UI: R User Interaction Required
S: U Scope Unchanged
C: H Confidentiality High
I: N Integrity None
A: N Availability None
5.5
THREAT LEVEL
INTEL SOURCES NVD EPSS HOW WE SCORE →
■ tracking this CVE ✓ independent patch confirmation ⧗ same-origin mirror (GHSA) ⚠ active exploitation verification policy →

Executive Summary

CVE-2026-84618 is a permission-validation weakness in Apple macOS that allows a local application to access sensitive user data by bypassing expected access controls. The vulnerability affects macOS Sequoia, macOS Tahoe, and macOS Golden Gate prior to their patched releases (15.8, 26.7, and 27 respectively). Successful exploitation results in unauthorized disclosure of confidential user information, violating the operating system's data-protection boundaries, though no public exploit, PoC, or in-the-wild activity has been observed as of this report.

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›Patch confidence — UNVERIFIED to CONFIRMED, cross-referenced NVD + RHSA + Debian
›Exploit & PoC — poc_status, poc_url, has_exploit. Not in NVD.
›Shodan dorks — ready-made queries to find exposed vulnerable systems
›Detection rules — YARA · Wazuh · Elastic (all plans) · Sigma (Pro)
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Technical Analysis

The NVD description states plainly: "A permissions issue was addressed with improved validation." This is the canonical Apple disclosure language for a sandbox/entitlement or privacy-control (TCC) validation defect. The core weakness maps to CWE-863 (Incorrect Authorization): the system fails to correctly validate whether a calling app is authorized to access a protected resource, so a malicious or compromised local app can read data it should not.

Key facts derivable strictly from the provided data:

  • Attack vector is local ("An app may be able to access sensitive user data"). This is a local privilege/permission-escalation class issue, not a remotely reachable service.
  • The remedy is "improved validation" — i.e., the patch strengthened the check that gates access, not encryption or storage of the data itself.
  • No CWE was assigned by the CNA; the closest defensible classification is a broken-access-control / incorrect-authorization family weakness.
  • No CVSS vector or score was published (NVD value is N/A), so severity must be reasoned from impact language and EPSS rather than a vendor score.

Because the description does not name specific APIs, entitlements, TCC permission strings, XPC services, file paths, or frameworks, no code-level claim about which control was bypassed can be made without fabrication. What can be stated is the vulnerability class: a validation gap in a permission gate that a local application can satisfy improperly, gaining access to data protected by the OS privacy model.

Exploitation Scenarios

No public PoC exists; the following is inferred at the vulnerability-class level from the NVD description ("An app may be able to access sensitive user data") and should not be read as a specific exploit recipe.

  1. Reconnaissance/target identification: The attacker must already have code execution as a local app on the target macOS host (for example, a user-launched or persistence-installed app). No network scanning is involved; targeting is per-endpoint. The attacker assesses which sensitive data sources the host exposes to apps on the affected OS builds.

  2. Triggering the flaw class: The malicious app invokes the OS permission/authorization check that should gate access to protected user data. Due to the "permissions issue" fixed by "improved validation," the check returns an allow result that the app is not legitimately entitled to, letting the app reach data outside its granted scope.

  3. Execution method: At the class level, this is an authorization-bypass — the app abuses the flawed validation path rather than exploiting memory corruption. No payload delivery, network callback, or crafted file is required beyond the app itself running locally.

  4. Post-exploitation impact: The app gains read access to sensitive user data, enabling exfiltration of confidential information, potential follow-on credential or identity theft, and — if the accessed data supports further system access — a stepping stone for deeper compromise. Confidentiality impact is the primary concern; the description does not indicate integrity or availability effects.

Impact Assessment

  • Affected systems: Endpoints running macOS Sequoia (< 15.8), macOS Tahoe (< 26.7), or macOS Golden Gate (< 27).
  • Attack vector/privileges: Local, low complexity, no privileges required for the app, but requires user interaction to run the app. There is no unauthenticated remote vector.
  • Impact reasoning: The description supports a confidentiality (C:H) impact — disclosure of sensitive user data. No integrity/availability language is present, so those are treated as none.
  • Blast radius: Per-endpoint. An attacker needs a foothold (a running local app) on each target; the flaw does not self-propagate. Enterprise exposure scales with the number of unpatched managed Macs.
  • Likelihood: EPSS 0.00162 (~5.7th percentile) and no CISA KEV listing indicate observed exploitation is currently very unlikely. Severity is real but the short-term operational risk is low absent a published exploit.

Detection Guidance

Because this is a local, non-network flaw with no signature artifacts named in the advisory, detections below are behavioral/heuristic. They aim to catch anomalous access-to-protected-data patterns by app processes and should be tuned to avoid false positives.

Sigma Rule

title: Potential macOS Permission-Bypass Sensitive Data Access (CVE-2026-84618)
id: 6f1c9a2e-7b4d-4e21-9c3a-0d5b6e8a1f22
status: experimental
description: Detects a process accessing protected user-data locations typical of a macOS permission-validation bypass.
logsource:
  product: macos
  category: process_creation
detection:
  selection_paths:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - '/Library/Application Support/com.apple.TCC'
      - '/Users/Shared/'
      - 'Library/Messages/'
      - 'Library/Mail/'
  selection_untrusted:
    ParentImage|startswith:
      - '/Users/'
      - '/private/var/folders/'
  condition: selection_paths and selection_untrusted
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate backup or sync agents
  - Admin troubleshooting scripts
level: medium
tags:
  - attack.privilege_escalation
  - attack.t1068
  - cve.2026.84618

YARA Rule

rule MACOS_PermissionBypass_Indicator_CVE_2026_84618
{
    meta:
        description = "Heuristic detection for apps abusing a macOS permission-validation bypass; matches references to protected privacy databases - not a definitive signature"
        author = "valtersit.com"
        reference = "CVE-2026-84618"
        date = "2026-01-01"
        severity = "medium"
    strings:
        $tcc1 = "com.apple.TCC" nocase
        $tcc2 = "kTCCService" nocase
        $db1  = "TCC.db" nocase
        $api1 = "access sensitive user data" nocase
    condition:
        uint32be(0) == 0xFEEDFACE or uint32be(0) == 0xFEEDFACF or uint32be(0) == 0xCAFEBABE
        and 2 of ($tcc*)
        or any of ($db1)
}

Suricata IDS Rule

alert http any any -> any any (msg:"valtersit CVE-2026-84618 macOS Permission-Bypass Post-Exploitation Exfiltration (heuristic)"; flow:established,to_server; http.method; content:"POST"; http.header; content:"User-Agent"; pcre:"/(curl|python-requests|NSURLSession)/i"; dsize:>4096; threshold:type both, track by_src, count 5, seconds 60; classtype:policy-violation; sid:202684618; rev:1;)

Elastic Detection

process where event.type == "start" and process.parent.name != null and
  process.args like ("*Library/Messages*", "*Library/Mail*", "*com.apple.TCC*", "*TCC.db*") and
  process.parent.executable like ("/Users/*", "/private/var/folders/*") and
  not process.executable like ("/System/*", "/usr/*")

Splunk SPL Query

index=macos sourcetype=osquery:results OR sourcetype=edr:process
| search (process_path="/Users/*" OR process_path="/private/var/folders/*")
         (target_path="*Library/Messages*" OR target_path="*Library/Mail*" OR target_path="*TCC.db*" OR command_line="*com.apple.TCC*")
| stats count values(target_path) as accessed values(command_line) as cmd by host process_path user
| where count > 0
| sort - count

Wazuh OSSEC Rule

<group name="macos,cve-2026-84618,">
  <rule id="100618" level="10">
    <if_sid>60000</if_sid>
    <field name="command">com.apple.TCC|TCC.db|Library/Messages|Library/Mail</field>
    <description>CVE-2026-84618: Possible macOS permission-bypass access to sensitive user data</description>
    <mitre>
      <id>T1068</id>
    </mitre>
    <group>privilege_escalation,</group>
  </rule>
</group>

Mitigation & Patch Guidance

Patch confidence: 2/4 (CLAIMED — single source claims patch, not independently confirmed). The NVD entry states the issue is fixed in specific macOS releases, but no independent vendor advisory was cross-verified in the supplied data.

  1. Immediate mitigations:

    • Enforce least-privilege app execution: restrict what local applications can run on managed Macs and remove unvetted apps.
    • Harden privacy controls (TCC/Full Disk Access): audit and minimize which apps hold Full Disk Access, Accessibility, and similar grants.
    • Increase EDR telemetry on app processes accessing protected user-data directories and alert on untrusted parents (see Detection Guidance).
    • Until fully patched, treat local-apps-as-attack-path as a monitoring priority; there is no network control that blocks this class.
  2. Patch/upgrade steps:

    • Update macOS Golden Gate to 27 or later, macOS Tahoe to 26.7 or later, and macOS Sequoia to 15.8 or later, per NVD.
    • Prioritize internet-facing/power-user and executive endpoints first; verify version post-upgrade across the fleet.
    • Confirm the update actually applied (Apple's patch confirmation is single-sourced here, so validate on-host version reporting).
  3. Long-term hardening:

    • Maintain rapid macOS patch SLAs for OS privacy/authorization fixes.
    • Continuously review TCC and Full Disk Access assignments as part of baseline hardening.
    • Retain local-app behavioral monitoring and least-privilege execution policy as durable controls, since permission-validation bugs recur across macOS releases.

References

Note on threat activity: The supplied intelligence contains no evidence of public PoC, exploit code, Nuclei template, CISA KEV listing, or known threat-actor campaigns associated with CVE-2026-84618. EPSS is low (0.00162). All exploitation content in this report is inferred from the vulnerability class and must not be represented as observed in-the-wild behavior.

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product:"Apple"
title:"Apple"
◈ SOURCE Analysis & enrichment: valtersit.com/cve/CVE-2026-84618/ · CVE data: NVD/MITRE (public domain) · © 2026 ValtersIT Hub
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