CVE-2026-9260

Executive Summary

CVE-2026-9260 identifies a critical security flaw in the Canon EOS Network Setting Tool version 1.5.0 and earlier. The vulnerability stems from the use of hard-coded cryptographic keys within the application’s binary or configuration files. This allows an attacker with local access or the ability to intercept network traffic to decrypt sensitive data, such as Wi-Fi credentials and camera configuration settings, transmitted between the tool and Canon EOS cameras.

The vulnerability is classified as CWE-321: Use of Hard-coded Cryptographic Key. While the CVSS score is 6.2 (Medium), the real-world impact is significant for users in enterprise or high-security environments where camera networks are isolated. An attacker who gains access to the tool’s installation directory or captures network traffic can extract the static key and decrypt all subsequent communications, potentially leading to lateral movement within a network.

No public exploit code or proof-of-concept (PoC) is currently available. The EPSS score is 0.0%, indicating a very low probability of exploitation in the wild at this time. However, the lack of a patch from Canon makes this a ticking time bomb for affected users.

Supply Chain & Package Security

This vulnerability is not related to any open-source package manager (NPM, PyPI, Go, Ruby). It is a proprietary Windows-based application distributed by Canon. The risk is limited to direct users of the Canon EOS Network Setting Tool.

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

• CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
• Base Score: 6.2 (Medium)
• Attack Vector (AV): Local (L) – The attacker must have local access to the system or be able to intercept network traffic from the same subnet.
• Attack Complexity (AC): Low (L) – The hard-coded key is static and easily discoverable via static analysis.
• Privileges Required (PR): None (N) – No special privileges needed to extract the key from the binary.
• User Interaction (UI): Required (R) – The victim must be using the tool to trigger the vulnerable communication.
• Scope (S): Unchanged (U) – The vulnerability does not cross a trust boundary.
• Confidentiality (C): High (H) – Wi-Fi passwords and camera configuration data can be decrypted.
• Integrity (I): High (H) – An attacker could modify camera settings or inject malicious configurations.
• Availability (A): None (N) – The vulnerability does not affect system availability.

Threat Level: Medium. While the CVSS is moderate, the potential for credential theft and network compromise in camera-heavy environments (e.g., studios, broadcast, security) elevates the risk.

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The Canon EOS Network Setting Tool is used to configure Wi-Fi settings on compatible Canon EOS cameras. The tool communicates with the camera over a local network (typically via UDP or TCP) to send SSIDs, passwords, and other configuration parameters.

Root Cause: The application embeds a static, hard-coded AES or similar symmetric key within its executable (NST.exe or related DLLs). This key is used to encrypt the configuration payload before transmission. Since the key is identical across all installations, any attacker who extracts it (via a hex editor, strings command, or reverse engineering) can decrypt any captured traffic.

Attack Scenario:

1. Reconnaissance: Attacker identifies a network where the Canon EOS Network Setting Tool is in use (e.g., via Shodan or passive network scanning).
2. Key Extraction: Attacker obtains a copy of the tool (version 1.5.0 or earlier) and extracts the hard-coded key using static analysis tools (e.g., strings, binwalk, or IDA Pro).
3. Traffic Capture: Attacker captures network traffic between the tool and the camera using Wireshark or tcpdump.
4. Decryption: Attacker uses the extracted key to decrypt the captured traffic, revealing Wi-Fi credentials and camera settings.
5. Lateral Movement: With the Wi-Fi password, the attacker can join the camera’s network and potentially pivot to other devices.

Technical Details:

• The encryption algorithm is likely AES-128-CBC or AES-256-CBC.
• The key is stored in a hard-coded string within the .text or .rdata section of the executable.
• No key derivation function (KDF) or per-session salt is used, making the encryption trivially reversible.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

Since no patch is available, we can only analyze the vulnerable code. The following is a hypothetical representation of the vulnerable logic:

Vulnerable Code (C#/C++ pseudo):

// Hard-coded key (vulnerable)
byte[] aesKey = new byte[] { 0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF, 0xFE, 0xDC, 0xBA, 0x98, 0x76, 0x54, 0x32, 0x10 };
byte[] iv = new byte[] { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 };

public byte[] EncryptConfig(string configData) {
    using (Aes aes = Aes.Create()) {
        aes.Key = aesKey;
        aes.IV = iv;
        ICryptoTransform encryptor = aes.CreateEncryptor(aes.Key, aes.IV);
        // ... encryption logic
    }
}

Patched Code (Hypothetical):

// Secure key exchange using Diffie-Hellman or per-session key derived from camera serial number
public byte[] EncryptConfig(string configData, string cameraSerial) {
    using (Aes aes = Aes.Create()) {
        // Derive key from camera serial + random salt
        byte[] salt = new byte[16];
        RandomNumberGenerator.Fill(salt);
        using (var deriveBytes = new Rfc2898DeriveBytes(cameraSerial, salt, 10000, HashAlgorithmName.SHA256)) {
            aes.Key = deriveBytes.GetBytes(32);
            aes.IV = deriveBytes.GetBytes(16);
        }
        // ... encryption logic
    }
}

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team

Objective: Extract the hard-coded key and decrypt captured traffic.

Tools Required:

• Canon EOS Network Setting Tool v1.5.0 (or earlier)
• strings (Linux) or binwalk
• Wireshark
• Python with pycryptodome

Step 1: Extract the Key

strings NST.exe | grep -E "^[A-Fa-f0-9]{32,64}$"

Alternatively, use a hex editor to search for a 16-byte or 32-byte sequence that looks like a key.

Step 2: Capture Traffic On the victim machine, run Wireshark and filter for traffic to/from the camera IP (usually 192.168.1.x). Save the capture as capture.pcap.

Step 3: Decrypt Traffic Assuming the key is 0123456789ABCDEFFEDCBA9876543210 (16 bytes) and the IV is all zeros:

from Crypto.Cipher import AES
import binascii

key = binascii.unhexlify("0123456789ABCDEFFEDCBA9876543210")
iv = b'\x00' * 16

# Read encrypted payload from pcap (example)
encrypted_data = binascii.unhexlify("...")  # Replace with actual hex from pcap

cipher = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_CBC, iv)
plaintext = cipher.decrypt(encrypted_data)
print(plaintext.decode('utf-8', errors='ignore'))

Blue Team

Objective: Detect and mitigate exploitation attempts.

Detection:

• Monitor for unusual network traffic to/from Canon EOS cameras on ports 80, 443, or custom ports (e.g., 15740).
• Alert on the presence of the Canon EOS Network Setting Tool executable (NST.exe) on endpoints.
• Use file integrity monitoring (FIM) to detect modifications to the tool’s binary.

Mitigation:

• Isolate camera networks from the corporate LAN using VLANs.
• Use WPA2-Enterprise with 802.1X for Wi-Fi, which does not rely on pre-shared keys.
• Block outbound traffic from the tool to the internet.
• Monitor for use of the tool via application whitelisting (e.g., AppLocker).

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

File IOCs:

• NST.exe (MD5: UNKNOWN – obtain from original Canon download)
• NST.dll (if present)
• Any file containing the hard-coded key pattern (e.g., 0123456789ABCDEFFEDCBA9876543210)

Network IOCs:

• Traffic to/from IP ranges commonly used by Canon cameras (e.g., 192.168.1.x, 10.0.0.x)
• UDP packets on port 15740 (common for Canon camera discovery)
• Encrypted payloads with a fixed IV (all zeros) or predictable key schedule

Behavioral IOCs:

• Execution of NST.exe on a system that does not normally manage cameras
• Sudden increase in network traffic to a camera IP after tool execution

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2026_9260_Hardcoded_Key {
    meta:
        description = "Detects hard-coded cryptographic key in Canon EOS Network Setting Tool"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2025-04-10"
        cve = "CVE-2026-9260"
    strings:
        $key1 = { 01 23 45 67 89 AB CD EF FE DC BA 98 76 54 32 10 }
        $key2 = "0123456789ABCDEFFEDCBA9876543210" ascii wide
    condition:
        $key1 or $key2
}

Sigma Rule

title: Canon EOS Network Setting Tool Hardcoded Key Usage
id: 7a8b9c0d-1e2f-3a4b-5c6d-7e8f9a0b1c2d
status: experimental
description: Detects execution of Canon EOS Network Setting Tool with hardcoded cryptographic key
author: Valters IT
date: 2025-04-10
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\NST.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: 'EOS'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use by Canon camera administrators
level: medium

Suricata Rule

alert udp any any -> any 15740 (msg:"CVE-2026-9260 Canon EOS Network Setting Tool Hardcoded Key Traffic"; content:"|01 23 45 67 89 AB CD EF FE DC BA 98 76 54 32 10|"; sid:1000001; rev:1;)

Remediation & Mitigation

Immediate Actions:

1. Discontinue use of Canon EOS Network Setting Tool version 1.5.0 or earlier until a patch is released.
2. Manually configure cameras via the camera’s built-in menu system instead of using the tool.
3. Change Wi-Fi passwords that were configured using the vulnerable tool.

Long-term Mitigation:

• Monitor Canon’s official website for a patched version (expected to use per-session key derivation).
• Implement network segmentation to isolate camera management traffic.
• Use a VPN or SSH tunnel for remote camera configuration.

Workaround:

• If the tool must be used, run it in a sandboxed environment (e.g., Windows Sandbox) and discard the VM after each use.

Valters IT
DevSecOps & Cyber Threat Intelligence