CVE-2026-92611

Executive Summary

CVE-2026-92611 is an authorization bypass vulnerability in Eclipse Ankaios, an open-source container/workload orchestration framework for software-defined vehicles and edge systems, affecting versions 0.6.0 through before 1.0.4. The defect resides in the agent control-interface authorizer: LogRule::matches terminates evaluation at the first wildcard pattern within a rule instead of continuing to later entries, causing deny LogRule entries to be skipped. The result is that an authenticated principal can read logs belonging to a workload it is not authorized to access, a confidentiality-only breach with no confirmed integrity or availability impact, and no public exploit or patch evidence currently available in tracked sources.

Technical Analysis

Eclipse Ankaios is a workload orchestration tool that manages the lifecycle of containerized and native workloads across distributed nodes. A central server distributes desired state to agents that run on individual nodes; the agent exposes a control interface through which clients (the server, CLI tools, or other authorized components) can query status and retrieve workload logs. Authorization for that control interface is enforced by an authorizer component that evaluates a set of rules against each incoming request.

The vulnerable component is the log-access rule type, LogRule. Each LogRule contains one or more matching entries, and each entry may contain wildcard patterns that match against workload identifiers and/or log targets. The CWE-863 (Incorrect Authorization) defect manifests in the matching routine LogRule::matches:

• When LogRule::matches encounters a rule whose entries include a wildcard pattern first, it evaluates that wildcard entry and stops — it does not continue iterating over subsequent entries in the same rule.
• Because evaluation short-circuits at the first wildcard, later entries that would have produced a deny decision are never reached.
• Consequence: a request to read another workload's logs is authorized (allowed) although a deny entry existed later in the same rule set, skipping the intended denial and permitting unauthorized log access.

This is a logic error in rule evaluation order/iteration, not a memory-safety bug, injection flaw, or cryptographic failure. The attack surface is the agent control interface that consumes LogRule entries and the authorization layer that calls LogRule::matches. Because the flaw is in authorization decision-making, exploitation is only meaningful to a caller that can reach the control interface and issue log-retrieval requests — i.e., a party that already has some level of interface access but whose log-read permissions are supposed to be restricted per workload. Specific API method names, endpoints, IPC transport details, or configuration file paths are not provided in the available NVD/CNA data and are therefore not asserted here. What is verifiable from the description is limited to: the affected versions (0.6.0 to before 1.0.4), the affected function (LogRule::matches), the component (agent control-interface authorizer), the defect mechanism (stopping at the first wildcard instead of evaluating later entries), and the impact class (skipping deny LogRule entries → unauthorized log access).

The absence of a published CVSS score from NVD means the analyst must reason about severity qualitatively. Treated as an authorization bypass with high confidentiality impact, network-reachable attack vector, low complexity (the logic error is deterministic given a rule set containing a leading wildcard followed by a deny entry), and privileges required on the control interface, a representative vector is provided in METADATA. That vector is an analyst estimate for prioritization only and must not be presented as an official score.

Exploitation Scenarios

The following describes the attack at the vulnerability-class level, consistent with the information available. It does not invent function names, endpoints, or parameters beyond those explicitly named in the description (LogRule::matches, LogRule).

1. Reconnaissance / target identification. An adversary first identifies an Eclipse Ankaios deployment running an affected version (0.6.0 through before 1.0.4). Because the flaw is in the agent's control-interface authorizer, the adversary must be able to reach that control interface — this typically implies a position with access to the orchestration network or to a workload that can speak to the agent interface. The adversary also benefits from knowing or inferring the authorization rule set: specifically, rules that begin with a wildcard pattern (e.g., matching broadly on an identifier) and contain a later explicit deny entry. This configuration pattern is the precondition for the bypass.

2. Triggering the flaw class. The adversary issues a log-retrieval request targeting a workload it is not entitled to read. When the agent's authorizer evaluates the governing LogRule, LogRule::matches hits the leading wildcard pattern and stops evaluating the rule — the later deny entry is never processed. The authorization decision therefore returns allow.

3. Payload / execution method. No exploit payload, memory corruption, or code execution is involved. The "payload" is simply the legitimate-looking log-retrieval request directed at a workload outside the requester's authorization scope. Exploitation is purely a matter of request construction and the deployed rule configuration; no public PoC is available and none is fabricated here. It is accurate to state: No public PoC is available; the attack chain is inferred from the vulnerability class (incorrect authorization / logic error in rule matching).

4. Post-exploitation impact. Success yields unauthorized read access to another workload's logs. Logs are a rich secondary target: they frequently contain environment variables, service identifiers, connection strings, error traces exposing internal paths, and operational metadata. The adversary can use this to map the deployment, harvest credentials or secrets leaked into logging output, and prepare further lateral movement or persistence. The flaw provides confidentiality impact only; there is no described mechanism for modifying workload state, executing code, or causing denial of service. Sustained, low-noise log harvesting is feasible because each request is an ordinary authorized-looking control-interface operation from the authorizer's perspective.

Impact Assessment

• Confidentiality: High. Unauthorized access to other workloads' logs is the direct consequence. Log contents often expose sensitive operational and, in misconfigured environments, secret material.
• Integrity: None described. The flaw does not permit mutating workloads, state, or configuration.
• Availability: None described. No DoS vector is identified.
• Scope: Unchanged in the analyst estimate; the vulnerability affects the authorizer's decision within the Ankaios agent of the targeted node, while the sensitive data exposed belongs to other workloads managed by the same deployment.

Affected systems. Any Eclipse Ankaios deployment running versions 0.6.0 to before 1.0.4 in which the authorization configuration for log access contains rules beginning with a wildcard pattern followed by deny entries. Multi-tenant or multi-workload environments — particularly automotive/software-defined-vehicle platforms and edge fleets where Ankaios is designed to run, and any environment where distinct principals are meant to be isolated from each other's logs — face the greatest blast radius. The exact set of affected products/packages was not resolvable from the supplied OSV/package data (listed as N/A), so asset owners must match on installed Ankaios agent version directly.

Blast radius drivers. (1) Number of nodes/agents sharing one authorization configuration; (2) presence of wildcard-first rule patterns with subsequent deny entries; (3) how much sensitive data is written to workload logs; (4) network exposure of the agent control interface. Because there is no public exploit, no EPSS score yet, and no KEV listing, near-term exploitation likelihood is assessed as low-to-moderate — but the technical bar for abuse is low once an attacker has any control-interface access. Severity per the analyst-estimated vector is elevated by high confidentiality impact and network attack vector; organizations should prioritize based on log sensitivity, not solely on the absence of a public PoC.

Detection Guidance

Detection strategy: this is an authorization logic error, so network signatures are weak. The most reliable detections monitor (a) unusual log-retrieval request patterns against agent control interfaces and (b) post-exploitation content in retrieved logs. Rules below are provided as starting points and require environment tuning; because no specific endpoint or parameter names are available in the advisory data, the Suricata and network-oriented rules use generic protocol/port placeholders that must be adjusted to the deployment's actual control-plane transport.

Sigma Rule

title: Eclipse Ankaios Unauthorized Workload Log Access Attempt (CVE-2026-92611)
id: 8f3a1c2e-5b7d-4a91-9c0e-ankaios-logrule
status: experimental
description: Detects log-retrieval requests to the Eclipse Ankaios agent control interface that may indicate exploitation of the LogRule authorization bypass (wildcard short-circuit skipping deny entries), affecting Ankaios 0.6.0 to before 1.0.4.
references:
  - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-92611
author: valtersit.com Threat Intelligence
date: 2026/01/01
tags:
  - attack.t1190
  - cwe.863
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: linux
detection:
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
      - '/ankaios'
      - '/ank'
      - '/ank-cli'
  selection_action:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'logs'
      - 'log'
      - 'get logs'
  selection_cross_workload:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - '--workload'
      - '--agent'
      - 'workload_name'
  condition: selection_process and selection_action and selection_cross_workload
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate administrators and automation retrieving logs for workloads they own
  - Monitoring agents collecting logs across the fleet by design
level: medium

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2026_92611_Ankaios_LogRule_Bypass
{
    meta:
        description = "Detects Ankaios agent binaries in affected version range and references to the vulnerable LogRule::matches authorizer logic (CVE-2026-92611)"
        author = "valtersit.com Threat Intelligence"
        reference = "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-92611"
        date = "2026-01-01"
        severity = "high"

    strings:
        $f1 = "LogRule::matches" ascii
        $f2 = "LogRule" ascii
        $f3 = "control-interface" ascii
        $f4 = "ankaios" ascii nocase
        $v1 = "0.6." ascii
        $v2 = "0.7." ascii
        $v3 = "1.0.0" ascii
        $v4 = "1.0.1" ascii
        $v5 = "1.0.2" ascii
        $v6 = "1.0.3" ascii

    condition:
        uint32(0) == 0x464c457f and
        filesize < 100MB and
        (any of ($f1, $f2, $f3) or $f4) and
        any of ($v*)
}

Suricata IDS Rule

alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $HOME_NET 25551 (msg:"CVE-2026-92611 Eclipse Ankaios LogRule Authorization Bypass - Suspicious Log Retrieval"; flow:established,to_server; content:"log"; nocase; content:"workload"; nocase; distance:0; within:200; threshold:type both, track by_src, count 20, seconds 60; classtype:attempted-recon; reference:cve,CVE-2026-92611; reference:url,https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-92611; sid:9261101; rev:1;)

Note: port 25551 is a placeholder for the Ankaios agent control interface; the actual transport and port must be confirmed locally. Because the vulnerability is an authorization decision on the agent, no reliable byte-level signature exists — this rule only flags anomalous log-request volume.

Elastic Detection

process where process.name in ("ank", "ankaios", "ank-cli")
  and process.command_line : ("*log*" or "*logs*")
  and process.command_line : ("*--workload*" or "*--agent*" or "*workload_name*")
  and not process.parent.name : ("systemd", "monitoring-agent")

Detects control-interface clients enumerating logs, especially where the requesting parent process does not match the normal orchestration or monitoring chain — a pattern consistent with an attacker attempting to read another workload's logs via the bypass.

Splunk SPL Query

index=ankaios sourcetype=ankaios:agent:audit (action="read_log" OR message="*log*" OR command="*logs*")
| stats count values(workload_name) as target_workloads dc(workload_name) as workload_cnt
        by src_ip, user, agent_id
| where workload_cnt > 1 OR count > 50
| sort - count
| eval severity = if(workload_cnt > 3, "HIGH", "MEDIUM")
| table _time, src_ip, user, agent_id, workload_cnt, target_workloads, count, severity

Tune field names (action, workload_name, agent_id) to the actual Ankaios audit/log schema. The heuristic: a single principal reading logs across multiple workloads, or issuing log reads at anomalous volume, may indicate exploitation of the rule-matching bypass.

Wazuh OSSEC Rule

<group name="ankaios,cve-2026-92611,">
  <rule id="926110" level="8">
    <decoded_as>json</decoded_as>
    <field name="component">agent.authorizer</field>
    <field name="rule_type">LogRule</field>
    <match>allow</match>
    <description>Ankaios log access authorized via LogRule - possible CVE-2026-92611 authorization bypass</description>
    <mitre>
      <id>T1190</id>
    </mitre>
  </rule>

  <rule id="926111" level="10">
    <if_sid>926110</if_sid>
    <field name="requested_workload">\.\*|\*</field>
    <description>Ankaios wildcard LogRule allow for cross-workload log access - CVE-2026-92611 exploitation suspected</description>
    <mitre>
      <id>T1190</id>
    </mitre>
  </rule>
</group>

Field names reflect the conceptual audit event (component, rule type, decision, requested workload) and must be mapped to the actual Ankaios audit log format before deployment.

Mitigation & Patch Guidance

Patch confidence: 0/4 — UNPATCHED — no patch evidence from any tracked source. The advisory references version 1.0.4 as the boundary at which affected versions stop ("0.6.0 to before 1.0.4"), so 1.0.4 is the version to target, but no confirmed vendor patch artifact, commit, or release note could be validated in the supplied data.

1. Immediate mitigations (compensating controls).

   • Eliminate or reorder the vulnerable rule pattern: audit all LogRule configurations and remove leading wildcard entries that precede deny entries. Where possible, place explicit deny entries first and avoid wildcard-first log rules entirely until the matcher is fixed.
   • Restrict reachability of the agent control interface to trusted components only (network segmentation, host firewalls, mTLS/peer authentication where supported). Because exploitation presupposes interface access, reducing who can reach the interface directly reduces exposure.
   • Minimize sensitive data in workload logs; scrub secrets, tokens, and connection strings from log output to reduce the value of any unauthorized log access.
   • Monitor control-interface log-retrieval activity per the detection rules above, focusing on cross-workload access by single principals.

2. Patch / upgrade steps.

   • Prepare to upgrade Eclipse Ankaios to 1.0.4 (or later) once a verified vendor release is confirmed available from the Eclipse Ankaios project. Validate release provenance and checksums before deployment.
   • Inventory all nodes/agents running affected versions (0.6.0 through before 1.0.4); prioritize agents whose log rules contain wildcard-first patterns or whose logs contain sensitive data.
   • After upgrade, re-verify that deny LogRule entries are honored and that cross-workload log access is properly blocked; regression-test the authorizer behavior with representative rule sets.

3. Long-term hardening.

   • Add unit/property tests for the authorizer that include wildcard-first rules followed by deny entries, so this class of rule-evaluation ordering bug is caught in CI.
   • Adopt least-privilege and deny-by-default authorization configurations for all control-interface operations.
   • Centralize and retain control-interface audit logs, alert on cross-workload access anomalies, and integrate with SIEM.
   • Track the Eclipse Ankaios project's advisories and release notes for an official fix; upgrade promptly when a verified patch ships.

References

1. NVD — CVE-2026-92611: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-92611
2. Eclipse Ankaios project (vendor product home and release information): https://projects.eclipse.org/projects/automotive.ankaios
3. CWE-863 — Incorrect Authorization: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/863.html
4. MITRE ATT&CK T1190 — Exploit Public-Facing Application: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190/
5. CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog (checked — CVE-2026-92611 is not listed as of this report): https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog

Threat actor / exploit-in-the-wild status. No public proof-of-concept, no exploit code, no Nuclei template, and no CISA KEV entry exist for CVE-2026-92611 in the supplied data. EPSS has not yet scored this CVE. There is no evidence of active exploitation or named threat actor campaigns. The attack chain in this report is inferred strictly from the vulnerability class (CWE-863, incorrect authorization) and the described LogRule::matches short-circuit behavior; specific implementation details beyond those stated in the advisory are not asserted.