CVE-2026-9613
Executive Summary
CVE-2026-9613 is an authorization bypass (CWE-862, Missing Authorization) in the WordPress plugin "Datalogics Ecommerce Delivery – Datalogics," affecting all versions up to and including 2.6.65. The flaw allows any authenticated user with subscriber-level privileges or higher to invoke privileged plugin functionality — creating and canceling real shipping orders via an external logistics API, modifying arbitrary WooCommerce order post meta, overwriting the plugin's stored API token, and triggering shipping notification emails to customers. Because exploitation requires only a low-privileged account and yields modest but meaningful integrity impact, CVSS v3.1 scores it 4.3 (Medium) — but the business consequences (fraudulent shipments, data tampering, notification abuse) outweigh the numeric score.
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Technical Analysis
The vulnerability is classified as CWE-862 (Missing Authorization) and maps to the "authorization bypass through user-controlled key / improper access control" family. Per the NVD description, the root cause is that the plugin "does not properly verify that a user is authorized to perform an action." In WordPress plugin development this class of bug typically manifests when a privileged operation is registered as an AJAX action, REST route, or admin-post handler, but the callback performs only a nonce check — or in the worst case, merely checks that the user is logged in — rather than verifying a capability (e.g., current_user_can('manage_woocommerce')) or the correct user role. As a result, every authenticated principal, including the lowest-privileged subscriber role, is treated as authorized.
The CVSS vector is instructive: AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N. Network reachable (AV:N), low attack complexity (AC:L), requires low privileges (PR:L — an authenticated account), no user interaction (UI:N), scope unchanged (S:U), no confidentiality impact (C:N), low integrity impact (I:L), and no availability impact (A:N). The absence of confidentiality impact and the "low" integrity rating are consistent with a state-change/authorization-bypass pattern rather than data exfiltration.
At the vulnerability-class level, the exploitable surface is a privileged backend operation reachable over HTTP by any authenticated account. The specific impacted actions described by NVD are:
- Order creation/cancellation on the external logistics API — the plugin calls the upstream carrier/logistics API using the store's stored authentication token. A subscriber can therefore cause real-world shipping orders to be created or canceled, consuming the store's API quota and triggering physical logistics consequences.
- Arbitrary WooCommerce order post meta modification — the plugin does not verify ownership or role before writing post meta on any order, so a subscriber can modify order metadata across all orders, not just their own.
- API token overwrite — the stored authentication token the plugin uses for the logistics API can be replaced by an unauthorized user, enabling persistence/denial of legitimate shipping operations.
- Shipping notification email abuse — arbitrary customers can have shipping notifications triggered, enabling spam, social-engineering, or reputational harm.
No patched version exists, no public PoC, no Nuclei template, and no exploit code are available. All technical claims above are drawn from the CNA/NVD description; where the description is sparse (e.g., exact endpoint paths, nonce names), no implementation detail is guessed.
Exploitation Scenarios
1. Reconnaissance / target identification. An attacker enumerates WordPress sites running WooCommerce with the Datalogics Ecommerce Delivery plugin, e.g., by fingerprinting wp-content/plugins/datalogics/ asset paths or the plugin's front-end markers. Public listings and search engines can surface candidate sites; no authentication is required for this phase.
2. Privilege acquisition. The attacker registers a normal customer account or obtains any subscriber-level credential (e.g., via an open registration form, a discarded/low-value credential, or a purchase with a throwaway email). This satisfies the PR:L precondition of the CVSS vector.
3. Triggering the flaw. Because the vulnerable action lacks a capability check, the authenticated subscriber submits a crafted request to the plugin's order-management handler (AJAX/REST/admin-post — the exact route is not disclosed in the advisory). The plugin proceeds to process the request as if it originated from an authorized administrator/shop manager, since it fails to verify authorization per CWE-862.
4. Post-exploitation impact. Using that request path the attacker can: (a) create or cancel genuine shipping orders against the store's external logistics API using the store's stored token, causing real fulfillment activity and rate/quota consumption; (b) modify WooCommerce order post meta on arbitrary orders, corrupting order state, addresses, status flags, or pricing metadata; (c) overwrite the plugin's stored API token, breaking shipping integration and potentially redirecting API traffic; and (d) trigger shipping notification emails to arbitrary customers, facilitating spam or phishing pretexting.
No public PoC is available; the attack chain is inferred from the vulnerability class. No specific endpoint, parameter, nonce, or function names are asserted because none appear verbatim in the source data.
Impact Assessment
Exploitation requires only a subscriber-level account, which is trivial to obtain on stores with open registration — hence the low Attack Complexity and low Privileges Required in the CVSS vector. The plugin's stored logistics API token acts as an amplifier: a low-privileged user effectively wields the store's external shipping integration.
Business impact includes: fraudulent shipment creation or cancellation (financial loss, customer disputes, carrier penalties); integrity compromise of WooCommerce order post meta across the estate (silent corruption of order records, reconciliation failures); token overwrite (loss of legitimate shipping capability, potential redirection of the store's API identity); and abuse of shipping notification emails (mass notification spam, deliverability damage, social-engineering leverage).
Blast radius is per-store but can cascade — a compromised logistics API token affects fulfillment across the store's entire order flow, not just the attacker's orders. The CVSS subscores (I:L, C:N, A:N) indicate limited but non-trivial integrity impact; however, in WooCommerce environments, seemingly "low" integrity changes to orders have disproportionate downstream business effect. This CVE is not in CISA KEV and there is no evidence of in-the-wild exploitation as of writing.
Detection Guidance
Sigma Rule
title: Datalogics Ecommerce Delivery WordPress Plugin Authorization Bypass
id: 4f8c2b6e-9613-4a7d-9c1e-datalogics9613
status: experimental
description: Detects subscriber-level authenticated requests abusing the Datalogics plugin's missing authorization check (CVE-2026-9613) to manipulate WooCommerce orders / API token.
references:
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-9613
author: valtersit.com
date: 2026/01/01
logsource:
category: webserver
detection:
selection_path:
cs-uri-stem|contains:
- '/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php'
- '/wp-json/'
selection_plugin:
cs-uri-query|contains:
- 'datalogics'
- 'datalogics'
selection_action:
cs-uri-query|contains:
- 'action='
condition: selection_plugin and selection_action
fields:
- c-ip
- cs-uri-stem
- cs-uri-query
- cs-username
falsepositives:
- Legitimate administrator/manager order operations
- Plugin maintenance jobs
level: medium
YARA Rule
rule WORDCRAFT_Datalogics_AuthzBypass_CVE_2026_9613
{
meta:
description = "Detects Datalogics Ecommerce Delivery WordPress plugin files relevant to CVE-2026-9613 authorization bypass"
author = "valtersit.com"
date = "2026-01-01"
reference = "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-9613"
cve = "CVE-2026-9613"
strings:
$plugin_header = "Plugin Name: Datalogics Ecommerce Delivery" ascii nocase
$plugin_slug = "datalogics" ascii nocase
$version = /Version:\s*2\.6\.[0-9]+/ ascii nocase
$woo_ref = "woocommerce" ascii nocase
$api_ref = "shipping" ascii nocase
condition:
($plugin_header or $plugin_slug) and $version and ($woo_ref or $api_ref)
}
Suricata IDS Rule
alert http any any -> any any (msg:"CVE-2026-9613 Datalogics WordPress Plugin Authorization Bypass Attempt"; flow:established,to_server; http.method; content:"POST"; http.uri; content:"/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php"; http.request_body; content:"datalogics"; nocase; http.request_body; content:"action="; nocase; reference:cve,CVE-2026-9613; classtype:attempted-user; sid:20269613; rev:1;)
Elastic Detection
sequence by source.ip, user.name with maxspan=5m
[authentication where event.outcome == "success" and user.roles contains "subscriber"]
[http where http.request.method == "POST"
and http.request.body contains "datalogics"
and (http.request.body contains "action=")]
Splunk SPL Query
index=web OR index=wordpress
| eval ua=coalesce(http_user_agent, cs_user_agent)
| search (uri_path IN ("/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php", "*wp-json*") uri_query="*datalogics*" uri_query="*action=*")
| stats count values(uri_path) as paths values(uri_query) as queries by src_ip user
| where count > 5
| sort - count
Wazuh OSSEC Rule
<group name="wordpress,datalogics,">
<rule id="961300" level="10">
<if_sid>31100,31101,31103,31106</if_sid>
<url>/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php</url>
<url>/wp-json/</url>
<match>datalogics</match>
<description>CVE-2026-9613: Possible Datalogics plugin authorization bypass from low-privileged user</description>
<mitre>
<id>T1190</id>
</mitre>
</rule>
</group>
Mitigation & Patch Guidance
Patch confidence: 0/4 (UNPATCHED — no patch evidence from any tracked source).
Immediate mitigations.
- Restrict account registration and remove/limit the subscriber role if WooCommerce does not require customer self-registration; enforce email verification and rate-limit account creation.
- Deploy a WAF/virtual patch filtering POST requests to plugin order-management endpoints (
/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php,/wp-json/*) that reference the plugin, rejecting requests originating from subscriber-level sessions. - If the plugin is not essential, deactivate and remove "Datalogics Ecommerce Delivery – Datalogics" until a fix is released.
- Rotate the plugin's stored logistics API token immediately (assume it may be exposed or has been overwritten) and monitor the upstream API for anomalous shipment creation/cancellation.
Patch / upgrade steps.
- No patched version is available from any tracked source. Monitor the WordPress.org plugin repository and the vendor for a release above 2.6.65. As of this report, all versions up to and including 2.6.65 remain vulnerable.
- When a fix is published, validate the change, back up the database and code, apply the update during a maintenance window, and re-verify order/API functionality.
Long-term hardening.
- Enforce capability and nonce checks in all plugin code that performs privileged actions; adopt least-privilege role design.
- Maintain an inventory of WordPress plugins and versions with automated monitoring for new CVEs; subscribe to NVD/CVE feeds.
- Apply virtual patching / WAF rules on e-commerce stacks and monitor WooCommerce order mutation logs for anomalies.
- Segregate logistics API credentials and scope them narrowly, with anomaly alerting on shipping activity.
References
- NVD — CVE-2026-9613: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-9613
- MITRE CWE-862 (Missing Authorization): https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/862.html
- MITRE ATT&CK T1190 (Exploit Public-Facing Application): https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190/
- FIRST EPSS (not yet scored as of this report): https://www.first.org/epss/
- CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (no entry for CVE-2026-9613): https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog
No exploit-in-the-wild activity, PoC, Nuclei template, or threat-actor campaign has been reported for CVE-2026-9613 as of the date of this report.