CVE-2023-41825

Executive Summary

CVE-2023-41825 is a path traversal vulnerability in the Motorola Ready For application. This flaw allows a local attacker with low privileges to read arbitrary files on the device, bypassing intended access controls. The vulnerability has a low CVSS score of 2.8 due to the requirement of local access and the limited impact on confidentiality. No public proof-of-concept (PoC) or exploit code is currently available, and the patch status remains unknown. The vulnerability is classified under CWE-22 (Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory).

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

• CVSS Score: 2.8 (Low)
• Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
• Attack Vector: Local (AV:L) – The attacker must have physical or shell access to the device.
• Attack Complexity: Low (AC:L) – No special conditions are required.
• Privileges Required: Low (PR:L) – The attacker needs a standard user account.
• User Interaction: None (UI:N) – No user action is needed.
• Scope: Unchanged (S:U) – The vulnerability does not affect other components.
• Confidentiality Impact: Low (C:L) – Limited file read access.
• Integrity Impact: None (I:N) – No file modification.
• Availability Impact: None (A:N) – No denial of service.

Threat Level: Low. Exploitation requires local access and yields limited information disclosure. However, in enterprise or multi-user environments, this could expose sensitive configuration files or user data.

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The Motorola Ready For application is designed to provide a desktop-like experience when connecting a Motorola device to an external display. The vulnerability resides in how the application handles file path requests. When a local user requests a file, the application fails to properly sanitize user-supplied input, allowing directory traversal sequences (e.g., ../) to escape the intended sandbox directory.

Root Cause: The application does not validate or canonicalize file paths before serving them. An attacker can craft a request like file:///../../../etc/passwd to read system files outside the application's designated storage area.

Attack Flow:

1. Attacker gains local access to the device (e.g., via ADB or a malicious app).
2. Attacker sends a crafted path traversal request to the Ready For application's file serving component.
3. The application reads and returns the contents of the requested file, bypassing sandbox restrictions.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

Since no patch details are available, the following is a hypothetical comparison based on common path traversal fixes.

Vulnerable Code (Conceptual):

def serve_file(user_path):
    base_dir = "/data/data/com.motorola.readyfor/files/"
    full_path = base_dir + user_path
    with open(full_path, 'r') as f:
        return f.read()

Patched Code (Conceptual):

import os

def serve_file(user_path):
    base_dir = "/data/data/com.motorola.readyfor/files/"
    # Canonicalize and validate path
    full_path = os.path.realpath(os.path.join(base_dir, user_path))
    if not full_path.startswith(os.path.realpath(base_dir)):
        raise PermissionError("Access denied")
    with open(full_path, 'r') as f:
        return f.read()

The patched version uses os.path.realpath() to resolve any ../ sequences and then checks that the resolved path still falls within the allowed base directory.

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team (Exploitation)

Prerequisites:

• Local access to a Motorola device with the Ready For application installed.
• ADB (Android Debug Bridge) enabled or a malicious app with file read permissions.

Exploitation Steps:

1. Connect to the device via ADB:

   adb shell
   

2. Identify the Ready For application's file serving endpoint (e.g., content provider or local HTTP server).
3. Send a path traversal request:

   # Example using content:// URI
   content://com.motorola.readyfor.provider/files/../../../etc/hosts
   

4. Read the returned file content.

Note: No public exploit code is available. The above is a conceptual demonstration.

Blue Team (Detection & Prevention)

Detection:

• Monitor for unusual file access patterns from the Ready For application.
• Log and alert on any attempts to access files outside the application's sandbox.

Prevention:

• Apply input validation and path canonicalization as shown in the patched code.
• Use Android's FileProvider with proper path restrictions.
• Restrict local access to the device via ADB and app permissions.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

• File Paths: Any attempt to access files outside /data/data/com.motorola.readyfor/files/ via the application.
• Log Entries: Errors or warnings related to path traversal in application logs.
• Network Traffic: Unusual file read requests to localhost or content providers.

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2023_41825_Path_Traversal {
    meta:
        description = "Detects path traversal attempts in Motorola Ready For application"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2025-04-10"
        reference = "CVE-2023-41825"
    strings:
        $traversal1 = "../"
        $traversal2 = "..\\"
        $traversal3 = "%2e%2e%2f"
        $traversal4 = "%2e%2e/"
    condition:
        any of ($traversal*) and
        // Look for file read operations
        for any of ($traversal*) : (# > 0)
}

Sigma Rule

title: CVE-2023-41825 Path Traversal in Motorola Ready For
id: 8a9b3c4d-5e6f-7a8b-9c0d-1e2f3a4b5c6d
status: experimental
description: Detects path traversal attempts targeting the Motorola Ready For application
author: Valters IT
date: 2025-04-10
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: android
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: 'com.motorola.readyfor'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '../'
            - '..\\'
            - '%2e%2e%2f'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate file operations within sandbox
level: medium

Suricata Rule

alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (msg:"CVE-2023-41825 Path Traversal in Motorola Ready For"; flow:to_server,established; content:"../"; http_uri; pcre:"/(\.\.\/|%2e%2e%2f)/i"; classtype:attempted-recon; sid:1000001; rev:1;)

Remediation & Mitigation

Immediate Actions:

1. Disable the Ready For application if not required.
2. Restrict local access to the device via ADB and app permissions.
3. Monitor for suspicious file access patterns.

Long-term Fix:

• Apply input validation and path canonicalization as described in the patched code section.
• Update to a patched version when Motorola releases one.
• Implement Android's FileProvider with strict path restrictions.

Workarounds:

• Use a third-party file manager with sandboxing.
• Limit user privileges on shared devices.

Valters IT