CVE-2024-3480

Executive Summary

CVE-2024-3480 is a low-severity vulnerability in the Motorola framework that allows an attacker to read telephony-related data via an implicit intent. The vulnerability has a CVSS score of 2.8, indicating minimal impact, but it could be exploited in local attack scenarios to leak sensitive information such as call logs, SMS data, or device identifiers. No public proof-of-concept (PoC) or exploit code is available, and the patch status remains unknown. The EPSS score of 0.0% suggests very low exploitation likelihood in the wild.

Supply Chain & Package Security

This vulnerability is not related to NPM, PyPI, Go, or Ruby packages. It is a firmware-level issue in Motorola devices.

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

• CVSS Score: 2.8 (Low)
• Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
• Attack Vector: Local (AV:L) – requires physical or ADB access.
• Attack Complexity: Low (AC:L) – no special conditions.
• Privileges Required: Low (PR:L) – attacker needs a user-level app.
• User Interaction: None (UI:N) – no user action needed.
• Scope: Unchanged (S:U) – impact confined to vulnerable component.
• Confidentiality Impact: Low (C:L) – limited data exposure.
• Integrity Impact: None (I:N)
• Availability Impact: None (A:N)

Threat Level: Low. Exploitation requires local access and low privileges, limiting real-world impact.

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The vulnerability resides in the Motorola framework, specifically in how implicit intents are handled. Implicit intents in Android are used to request an action without specifying the exact component (e.g., activity or service) to handle it. When an app sends an implicit intent, the Android system resolves it to the appropriate component based on intent filters.

In this case, a malicious app with low privileges can send a crafted implicit intent to access telephony-related data (e.g., phone numbers, call history, SMS). The Motorola framework fails to properly restrict access to these intents, allowing unauthorized reading of sensitive telephony information.

Root Cause: Lack of permission checks or intent filters on telephony-related components exposed via implicit intents.

Attack Scenario:

1. Attacker installs a malicious app on the device.
2. The app sends an implicit intent targeting telephony data.
3. The Motorola framework resolves the intent and returns the data without proper authorization.
4. Attacker exfiltrates the data (e.g., via network or local storage).

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

Since no patch is available, we can only hypothesize the vulnerable code pattern.

Vulnerable Code (Hypothetical):

// Vulnerable: No permission check on implicit intent
Intent intent = getIntent();
if (intent.getAction().equals("com.motorola.action.GET_TELEPHONY_DATA")) {
    // Directly return telephony data
    String phoneNumber = telephonyManager.getLine1Number();
    // ...
}

Patched Code (Hypothetical):

// Patched: Check for required permission
Intent intent = getIntent();
if (intent.getAction().equals("com.motorola.action.GET_TELEPHONY_DATA")) {
    if (checkCallingPermission("android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE") == PackageManager.PERMISSION_GRANTED) {
        String phoneNumber = telephonyManager.getLine1Number();
        // ...
    } else {
        throw new SecurityException("Permission denied");
    }
}

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team (Attacker)

Prerequisites:

• Motorola device with vulnerable firmware.
• Ability to install a malicious APK (e.g., via sideloading or social engineering).

Exploit Code (Conceptual):

// Malicious app sending implicit intent
Intent intent = new Intent("com.motorola.action.GET_TELEPHONY_DATA");
intent.setPackage("com.motorola.framework");
startActivityForResult(intent, REQUEST_CODE);

@Override
protected void onActivityResult(int requestCode, int resultCode, Intent data) {
    if (requestCode == REQUEST_CODE && resultCode == RESULT_OK) {
        String phoneNumber = data.getStringExtra("phone_number");
        // Exfiltrate data
    }
}

Lab Setup:

1. Set up an Android emulator with Motorola system image (if available) or use a physical device.
2. Compile the malicious APK using Android Studio.
3. Install the APK on the device.
4. Run the app and observe the returned telephony data.

Blue Team (Defender)

Detection:

• Monitor for apps requesting READ_PHONE_STATE permission without legitimate reason.
• Use Android Debug Bridge (ADB) to check for suspicious intent broadcasts:

  adb shell dumpsys activity intents | grep "com.motorola.action.GET_TELEPHONY_DATA"
  

• Review app behavior using tools like logcat:

  adb logcat | grep -i "telephony"
  

Mitigation:

• Apply firmware updates from Motorola when available.
• Restrict app installations to trusted sources (Google Play Store).
• Use mobile device management (MDM) to enforce security policies.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

• Intent Action: com.motorola.action.GET_TELEPHONY_DATA
• Package Name: com.motorola.framework (vulnerable component)
• Log Entries: Suspicious onActivityResult calls with telephony data extras.
• Network Traffic: Outbound connections from apps with no legitimate network need.

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2024_3480_Motorola_ImplicitIntent
{
    meta:
        description = "Detects malicious apps exploiting CVE-2024-3480 via implicit intent"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2025-04-10"
        reference = "CVE-2024-3480"
    strings:
        $intent_action = "com.motorola.action.GET_TELEPHONY_DATA"
        $framework_pkg = "com.motorola.framework"
        $telephony_data = "phone_number" nocase
    condition:
        $intent_action and $framework_pkg and $telephony_data
}

Sigma Rule

title: CVE-2024-3480 - Motorola Implicit Intent Telephony Data Access
id: 8a3b2c1d-4e5f-6a7b-8c9d-0e1f2a3b4c5d
status: experimental
description: Detects attempts to exploit CVE-2024-3480 by sending implicit intents to access telephony data.
author: Valters IT
date: 2025-04-10
references:
    - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-3480
logsource:
    product: android
    service: logcat
detection:
    selection:
        - EventID: "ActivityManager"
          Message|contains: "com.motorola.action.GET_TELEPHONY_DATA"
        - EventID: "Intent"
          Message|contains: "com.motorola.framework"
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate Motorola system apps
level: low

Suricata Rule

alert ip any any -> any any (msg:"CVE-2024-3480 - Motorola Implicit Intent Telephony Data Access"; content:"com.motorola.action.GET_TELEPHONY_DATA"; classtype:attempted-recon; sid:1000001; rev:1;)

Remediation & Mitigation

Immediate Actions:

1. Apply Firmware Updates: Check Motorola's support site for security patches. If unavailable, consider using a custom ROM or alternative device.
2. Restrict App Permissions: Use Android's permission manager to deny READ_PHONE_STATE to suspicious apps.
3. Enable Play Protect: Ensure Google Play Protect is active to scan for malicious apps.

Long-Term Measures:

• Code Review: Motorola should audit all implicit intent handlers and add proper permission checks.
• Security Hardening: Implement Android's exported=false for components that don't need external access.
• User Education: Advise users to avoid installing apps from untrusted sources.

Workaround:

• Use a third-party firewall app to block network access for apps that don't require it.

Valters IT