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CVSS: 7.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H 🐛 CWE-22
👁️
Common Weakness Enumeration - Identifies the specific category of software weakness or flaw.

CVE-2024-7600

CVE-2024-7600 Directory Traversal in Logsign
📅 PUBLISHED: 2024-08-21 16:06 UTC 🔄 UPDATED: 2026-08-12 08:59 UTC
[ ZERO-DAY / UNPATCHED ] [ DEFENSE PATCH ↓ ]
💣 PoC: Public
👁️
Proof of Concept - Indicates if functional exploit code is publicly available, drastically increasing the risk of immediate attacks.
🎯 EPSS: 3.63%
👁️
3.63% probability
90.8× above the median CVE
Tier: HIGH
30-day exploitation window · FIRST.org · updated daily
🥷 MITRE: T1561.002
👁️
MITRE ATT&CK Tactic - Describes the strategy hackers use to execute this attack.
VULNERABLE: UNKNOWN / CHECK VENDOR
CVSS VECTOR BREAKDOWN 7.1
AV: N Attack Vector Network
AC: L Attack Complexity Low
PR: L Privileges Required Low
UI: N User Interaction None
S: U Scope Unchanged
C: N Confidentiality None
I: H Integrity High
A: H Availability High
7.1
THREAT LEVEL
■ tracking this CVE ✓ independent patch confirmation ⧗ same-origin mirror (GHSA) ⚠ active exploitation verification policy →

Executive Summary

CVE-2024-7600 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.1) directory traversal vulnerability in the Logsign Unified SecOps Platform. The flaw resides in the HTTP API service (TCP 443) and allows an authenticated remote attacker to delete arbitrary files on the system with root privileges. The vulnerability stems from improper validation of user-supplied paths in file operations. Given the EPSS score of 0.0%, active exploitation is currently unlikely, but the potential for complete system compromise via file deletion (e.g., deleting critical binaries, configuration files, or logs) makes this a critical risk for any organization using Logsign. No public proof-of-concept (PoC) or patch details are available at this time.

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CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

  • CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
  • Base Score: 7.1 (High)
  • Attack Vector (AV): Network (N) – Exploitable remotely.
  • Attack Complexity (AC): Low (L) – No special conditions required.
  • Privileges Required (PR): Low (L) – Authentication is required, but only low-level privileges.
  • User Interaction (UI): None (N) – No user action needed.
  • Scope (S): Unchanged (U) – The vulnerable component and affected system are the same.
  • Confidentiality (C): None (N) – No data exposure.
  • Integrity (I): High (H) – Arbitrary file deletion can severely compromise system integrity.
  • Availability (A): High (H) – Deleting critical files can lead to denial of service.

Threat Level: High. While authentication is required, the impact of arbitrary file deletion as root is severe. An attacker could delete system binaries, configuration files, or security logs, leading to complete system compromise or persistent denial of service.

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The vulnerability is a classic directory traversal (path traversal) flaw in the HTTP API service of Logsign Unified SecOps Platform. The service listens on TCP port 443 (HTTPS) by default.

Root Cause: The application fails to properly sanitize user-supplied file paths before using them in file deletion operations. An attacker can inject path traversal sequences (e.g., ../) to escape the intended directory and delete files anywhere on the filesystem.

Attack Flow:

  1. An attacker authenticates to the Logsign platform (e.g., via a low-privilege account).
  2. The attacker crafts a malicious API request to a vulnerable endpoint that accepts a file path parameter.
  3. The request includes path traversal sequences (e.g., ../../etc/shadow or ../../etc/nginx/nginx.conf).
  4. The server, lacking proper validation, passes the path directly to a file deletion function (e.g., unlink() or DeleteFile()).
  5. The file is deleted with root privileges, potentially causing system instability or enabling further attacks.

Impact: An attacker could:

  • Delete critical system files (e.g., /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, SSH keys) to cause denial of service or privilege escalation.
  • Delete application configuration files to disrupt the Logsign platform.
  • Delete security logs to cover tracks.
  • Delete binaries to render the system inoperable.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

Since no patch details are available, the following is a hypothetical example of the vulnerable code pattern and a secure implementation.

Vulnerable Code (Python/Flask example):

@app.route('/api/delete_file', methods=['POST'])
def delete_file():
    file_path = request.json.get('path')
    # VULNERABLE: No path validation
    os.remove(file_path)
    return jsonify({'status': 'deleted'})

Patched Code (Secure):

import os
from pathlib import Path

ALLOWED_DIR = Path('/var/logsign/data')

@app.route('/api/delete_file', methods=['POST'])
def delete_file():
    file_path = request.json.get('path')
    # Secure: Resolve the path and check it's within the allowed directory
    resolved_path = (ALLOWED_DIR / file_path).resolve()
    if not str(resolved_path).startswith(str(ALLOWED_DIR.resolve())):
        return jsonify({'error': 'Invalid path'}), 400
    if not resolved_path.exists():
        return jsonify({'error': 'File not found'}), 404
    os.remove(str(resolved_path))
    return jsonify({'status': 'deleted'})

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team (Offensive)

Lab Setup:

  1. Deploy a vulnerable Logsign Unified SecOps Platform instance (version unknown, but any version prior to patch).
  2. Obtain low-privilege credentials (e.g., via phishing or default credentials).
  3. Use a tool like Burp Suite or curl to interact with the API.

Exploitation Steps:

  1. Authenticate to the Logsign platform and obtain a session token.
  2. Identify the vulnerable API endpoint (e.g., /api/delete_file or similar).
  3. Send a crafted POST request with a path traversal payload:
    curl -k -X POST https://target/api/delete_file \
      -H "Authorization: Bearer <token>" \
      -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
      -d '{"path": "../../etc/shadow"}'
    
  4. Verify deletion by attempting to read the file or observing system behavior.

Advanced Payloads:

  • Delete SSH authorized keys: ../../root/.ssh/authorized_keys
  • Delete systemd service files: ../../etc/systemd/system/logsign.service
  • Delete log files: ../../var/log/auth.log

Blue Team (Defensive)

Detection:

  • Monitor for API requests containing path traversal sequences (../, ..\\, %2e%2e%2f).
  • Alert on file deletion events from the Logsign process (e.g., via auditd or Sysmon).
  • Correlate authentication logs with file deletion attempts.

Mitigation:

  • Immediately restrict network access to the Logsign API (port 443) to trusted IPs only.
  • Implement a Web Application Firewall (WAF) rule to block path traversal patterns.
  • Enable strict input validation and path sanitization on the server side.
  • Monitor for unexpected file deletions using file integrity monitoring (FIM) tools.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

  • Network IOCs:
    • HTTP POST requests to /api/delete_file or similar endpoints with path traversal sequences.
    • Unusual outbound connections from the Logsign server after file deletion.
  • File System IOCs:
    • Unexpected deletion of system files (e.g., /etc/shadow, /etc/passwd, /etc/nginx/nginx.conf).
    • Missing log files in /var/log/.
    • Deletion of SSH authorized keys or configuration files.
  • Process IOCs:
    • The Logsign process (logsign-api or similar) executing unlink() or DeleteFile() on paths outside its intended directory.
  • Log IOCs:
    • Audit logs showing file deletion events by the Logsign user.
    • Application logs containing path traversal patterns.

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2024_7600_Logsign_Path_Traversal {
    meta:
        description = "Detects path traversal attempts targeting Logsign Unified SecOps Platform"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2025-04-10"
        cve = "CVE-2024-7600"
    strings:
        $path_traversal1 = "../" ascii wide nocase
        $path_traversal2 = "..\\" ascii wide nocase
        $path_traversal3 = "%2e%2e%2f" ascii wide nocase
        $path_traversal4 = "%2e%2e\\" ascii wide nocase
        $api_endpoint = "/api/delete_file" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        any of ($path_traversal*) and $api_endpoint
}

Sigma Rule

title: Logsign Unified SecOps Platform Directory Traversal Attempt
id: 7b8c3d4e-5f6a-7b8c-9d0e-1f2a3b4c5d6e
status: experimental
description: Detects HTTP requests with path traversal sequences targeting Logsign API
author: Valters IT
date: 2025-04-10
tags:
    - attack.t1561.002
    - cve.2024.7600
logsource:
    category: webserver
    product: apache
    service: access_log
detection:
    selection:
        cs-method: 'POST'
        cs-uri-stem: '/api/delete_file'
        cs-uri-query|contains: 
            - '../'
            - '..\\'
            - '%2e%2e%2f'
            - '%2e%2e\\'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of path traversal in non-exploit scenarios (rare)
level: high

Suricata Rule

alert http any any -> any any (msg:"CVE-2024-7600 Logsign Directory Traversal Attempt"; flow:to_server; content:"POST"; http_method; content:"/api/delete_file"; http_uri; content:"../"; http_client_body; nocase; sid:1000001; rev:1;)

Remediation & Mitigation

Immediate Actions:

  1. Isolate: Restrict network access to the Logsign API (port 443) to only trusted administrative IPs.
  2. Monitor: Enable detailed logging and alerting for file deletion events and path traversal attempts.
  3. WAF: Deploy a Web Application Firewall rule to block requests containing ../, ..\\, or URL-encoded variants.

Long-Term Fix:

  • Patch: Apply the official patch from Logsign as soon as it becomes available. Monitor Logsign's security advisories.
  • Code Review: If you have access to the source code, implement proper path validation using a whitelist of allowed directories and resolve paths before use.
  • Upgrade: Consider upgrading to a patched version of the Logsign Unified SecOps Platform.

Compensating Controls:

  • File Integrity Monitoring (FIM): Use tools like Tripwire, AIDE, or OSSEC to monitor critical system files for unauthorized changes.
  • Least Privilege: Ensure the Logsign service runs with the minimum necessary privileges. If possible, run it as a non-root user.
  • Backup: Maintain regular backups of critical system files and configuration.

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title:"Logsign"
http.html:"Logsign Unified SecOps Platform"

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