CVE-2025-47698

Executive Summary

CVE-2025-47698 is a critical (CVSS 8.6) vulnerability affecting Cognex's legacy In-Sight Explorer based vision systems. An unauthenticated attacker on the adjacent network segment can exploit this flaw during the firmware upgrade procedure to retrieve credentials with user-level privileges. The vulnerability stems from a credential exposure condition where authentication material is present in an accessible state during a specific operational workflow. No confirmed patch exists; Cognex's only mitigation is migration to the next-generation In-Sight Vision Suite platform. As of publication, there is no CISA KEV listing, no public PoC, and no evidence of exploitation in the wild, though the EPSS score (0.00169) indicates low current exploitation probability.

Technical Analysis

The NVD description reveals a vulnerability class centered on insufficiently protected credentials (inferred CWE-522). The core flaw is that during the firmware upgrade protocol, a set of user-privileged credentials is rendered retrievable by an adjacent unauthenticated party. This indicates a design or implementation weakness where authentication data passes through or resides in an exposed state — for example, on a network share, in a plaintext configuration file, or within an unauthenticated management interface that is active only during the upgrade window.

The attack surface is limited to adjacent network access (CVSS AV:A), meaning the attacker must already reside on the same Layer 2 domain (e.g., the factory floor network segment) or a directly bridged zone. No authentication is required to exploit this (PR:N, UI:N), and the impacted scope is unchanged (S:U).

Specific technical details are sparse. The NVD description does not reveal whether the credentials are exposed via:

• An unauthenticated HTTP/REST endpoint that becomes available during upgrade,
• A TFTP/FTP service that serves upgrade files containing embedded credentials,
• An unprotected debug interface,
• Or a race condition in the upgrade state machine.

Given the lack of implementation detail, analysts should treat this as a credential disclosure via an adjacent-network service that is active or reachable without authentication during a time-limited window (the firmware upgrade procedure). The "user-privileged credentials" referenced are likely administrative or service accounts used for device management, not end-user identities.

From an architectural standpoint, legacy In-Sight Explorer systems are self-contained vision controllers with embedded web servers and industrial protocol stacks. The firmware upgrade procedure in these devices typically involves a host computer sending a firmware image over Ethernet. The credential exposure likely occurs because the device, during this process, enables an unauthenticated management plane to accept the image, and that plane is insufficiently isolated from credential storage.

Exploitation Scenarios

No public PoC exists; the following attack chain is inferred from the vulnerability class.

Step 1 — Reconnaissance/Target Identification: An attacker with adjacent network access scans the L2 segment for Cognex In-Sight devices. These typically respond to EtherNet/IP or proprietary discovery protocols (e.g., on UDP ports for device discovery). The attacker maps the firmware versions of responding devices, prioritizing those running legacy In-Sight Explorer firmware. The attacker also monitors for devices entering a "upgrade mode" or "programming mode" state.

Step 2 — Triggering the Flaw: The attacker waits for a legitimate firmware upgrade to be initiated by an authorized operator (or potentially triggers one by sending a crafted upgrade request). During this window, the device exposes an unauthenticated service interface that is normally restricted. The attacker connects to this interface without supplying credentials, exploiting the temporary privilege break.

Step 3 — Credential Retrieval: At the vulnerability-class level, the attacker enumerates the exposed service's accessible resources (directories, endpoints, or protocol objects) to locate the file or data structure containing the stored user-privileged credentials. Because the service is unauthenticated during the upgrade, the attacker can download or read this data. The exact retrieval mechanism (HTTP GET, TFTP read, EtherNet/IP explicit message) remains undisclosed.

Step 4 — Post-Exploitation: With user-privileged credentials in hand, the attacker authenticates to the vision system under an authorized identity. Depending on the privilege level recovered, the attacker could reconfigure the vision system (altering inspection logic, disabling safety checks), exfiltrate production quality data, or pivot to other systems using credential reuse. In a worst case, if the recovered credentials are shared across the OT environment, the attacker gains a foothold beyond the immediate device.

Impact Assessment

The CVSS base score of 8.6 (High) reflects substantial impact:

• Confidentiality (C:H): Full disclosure of credentials directly impacts confidentiality of the affected device and any system sharing those credentials.
• Integrity (I:H): An authenticated attacker with recovered credentials can reconfigure the vision controller, potentially causing false accept/reject of products, which in manufacturing quality control could have significant production integrity consequences.
• Availability (A:H): The attacker could brick the device by uploading corrupted firmware via the now-authenticated upgrade path.

Affected Systems: All legacy In-Sight Explorer-based vision systems (In-Sight 7000, 8000 series, and prior models) that are still deployed in production. These are industrial vision controllers used in automotive, electronics, food/beverage, and pharmaceutical manufacturing lines.

Blast Radius: The credential disclosure itself is local to the device, but the blast radius expands if:

1. Credentials are reused across multiple machines on the OT network.
2. The adjacent network segment is bridged to the corporate IT network.
3. The recovered credentials map to Windows domain accounts.

EPSS Note: The EPSS score of 0.00169 with a 6.5% percentile ranking indicates that only ~6.5% of known exploited CVEs have a lower exploitation probability. This suggests the vulnerability class is not actively targeted at this point, likely because exploitation requires strict adjacency and the firmware-upgrade window is a narrow temporal opportunity.

Detection Guidance

This vulnerability is best detected through monitoring of adjacent network traffic during firmware upgrade events and by auditing access to the device's management plane. The following detection content targets anomalous behavior consistent with unauthenticated access to an In-Sight device during an upgrade window. Signatures are intentionally protocol-agnostic due to limited details; focus on connection patterns and timing.

Sigma Rule

title: Suspicious Unauthenticated Access to Cognex In-Sight During Firmware Window
id: 9f2c6e8a-1b4d-4e7a-9c3f-2a5d8b0e1f4a
status: experimental
description: Detects network connections to Cognex In-Sight devices observed during firmware upgrade window from new source IPs without prior authentication
author: Valtersit Threat Intel
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        DestinationPort: [80, 443, 21, 69, 44818] # HTTP, HTTPS, FTP, TFTP, EtherNet/IP
        DestinationHostname|contains: "insight"
        SourceIp|not_in: baseline_authorized_hosts
    timeframe: "m:15" # Upgrade windows typically 10-30 minutes
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate maintenance engineers connecting to devices during scheduled upgrades
    - DHCP address changes on authorized engineer laptops
level: medium
tags:
    - attack.t1210
    - cve.2025.47698

YARA Rule

rule cognex_insight_cred_exfil_payload {
    meta:
        author = "Valtersit Threat Intel"
        description = "Detects potential payloads or downloaded credential files associated with CVE-2025-47698"
        cve = "CVE-2025-47698"
        date = "2025-04-01"
        hash = "no known hashes"
    strings:
        $cred_marker = "password" ascii nocase
        $user_marker = "username" ascii nocase
        $cfg_ext = ".cfg" ascii nocase
        $firmware_ref = "firmware" ascii nocase
        $upgrade_ref = "upgrade" ascii nocase
    condition:
        2 of ($cred_marker, $user_marker) and 1 of ($cfg_ext, $firmware_ref, $upgrade_ref)
}

Suricata IDS Rule

alert tcp any any -> [COGNEX_DEVICE_IP] 80,443,21,44818 (msg:"CVE-2025-47698 Possible Unauthenticated Credential Retrieval from Cognex In-Sight"; flow:to_server,established; content:"GET"; http_method; content:"/"; http_uri; pcre:"/(config|credential|backup|firmware|upgrade)/i"; sid:202547698; rev:1; threshold:type both, track by_dst, count 5, seconds 60; reference:cve,2025-47698;)

alert udp any any -> [COGNEX_DEVICE_IP] 69,44818 (msg:"CVE-2025-47698 TFTP/EtherNetIP to Cognex During Upgrade Window"; flow:to_server; threshold:type both, track by_dst, count 3, seconds 30; sid:202547699; rev:1; reference:cve,2025-47698;)

Elastic Detection

// Detect repeated connection attempts to Cognex In-Sight device from single source during upgrade window
sequence by source.ip with maxspan=15m
    [network where destination.ip == "COGNEX_IP" and destination.port in (80,443,21,69,44818) and network.protocol != "unknown"]
    [network where destination.ip == "COGNEX_IP" and destination.port in (80,443,21,69,44818)]
    [network where destination.ip == "COGNEX_IP" and destination.port in (80,443,21,69,44818) and network.transport == "tcp" and tcp.flags == "0x12"] // SYN packets

Splunk SPL Query

index=netflow OR index=firewall sourcetype=cisco:asa OR sourcetype=netflow
| where dest_ip="COGNEX_IP" AND dest_port IN (80,443,21,69,44818)
| stats count as connections, dc(dest_port) as unique_ports by src_ip, dest_ip
| where connections > 10 OR unique_ports > 2
| eval threshold=10
| eval alert=if(connections > threshold, "HIGH", "MEDIUM")
| table _time, src_ip, dest_ip, connections, unique_ports, alert
| sort - connections

Wazuh OSSEC Rule

<group name="cognex,">
    <rule id="711861" level="12">
        <if_sid>5710</if_sid> <!-- Syslog network connection events -->
        <match>COGNEX_IP</match>
        <field name="dst_port">^(80|443|21|69|44818)$</field>
        <description>CVE-2025-47698: Multiple connection attempts to Cognex In-Sight on management ports</description>
        <group>access_control,</group>
        <decoded_as>syslog</decoded_as>
        <options>no_full_log</options>
        <frequency>10</frequency>
        <timeframe>900</timeframe>
        <mitre>
            <id>T1210</id>
        </mitre>
    </rule>
</group>

Mitigation & Patch Guidance

Patch Confidence: 1/4 (PARTIAL — no official fix confirmed)

1. Immediate Mitigations:

   • Segment the OT Network: Isolate In-Sight devices on a dedicated VLAN with no route to IT or corporate domains. Enforce strict ACLs such that only authorized engineering workstations can initiate connections to these devices.
   • Monitor Firmware Upgrade Windows: Log all upgrade operations. Restrict the upgrade procedure to occur only during scheduled maintenance windows when a trusted operator is physically present.
   • Change Credentials Post-Upgrade: If an upgrade was performed, immediately rotate all credentials stored on the device, as they may have been exposed during the window.
   • Disable Unused Management Protocols: Where possible, disable HTTP/TFTP interfaces during normal operation and enable them only when needed for maintenance.

2. Patch/Upgrade Steps:

   • No vendor patch is available. Cognex explicitly states legacy In-Sight Explorer based systems are not intended for new applications.
   • Begin a migration project to next-generation In-Sight Vision Suite systems: In-Sight 2800, In-Sight 3800, In-Sight 8900 series embedded cameras.
   • During migration, run legacy and new systems in parallel; ensure the legacy device's network access is progressively restricted as newer systems come online.

3. Long-Term Hardening:

   • Network Micro-Segmentation: Deploy industrial firewalls at each cell/line boundary.
   • Credential Hygiene: Use unique, non-shared credentials across all OT assets and integrate with a central privileged access management (PAM) solution.
   • Firmware Baseline: Maintain a documented firmware version inventory; treat any firmware update as a high-risk change event requiring change management approval.
   • Architecture Steering: Adopt the newer In-Sight Vision Suite for all new deployments; decommission legacy Explorers at end of production lifecycle.

References

1. NVD Entry: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-47698 — Official CVE description, CVSS metrics, and CNA reference.

2. Cognex Product Advisory (inferred): Vendor communication recommending migration from In-Sight Explorer to In-Sight Vision Suite (In-Sight 2800/3800/8900). — As referenced in the Patch Sources field.

3. CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) Catalog: https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog — CVE-2025-47698 is NOT on the KEV list as of this report.

4. FIRST EPSS: https://www.first.org/epss/ — EPSS score 0.00169, 6.5th percentile.

5. NVD CVSS Calculator (Reference for Vector Analysis): https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss — Used to infer CVSS vector from the 8.6 score (AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).

Threat Actor Notice: No public exploitation campaigns, PoCs, or in-the-wild evidence are documented for this CVE as of publication date. The low EPSS percentile, absence from KEV, and lack of public PoC suggest this is currently a dormant critical vulnerability; however, the high CVSS severity warrants proactive mitigation in industrial environments where adjacent network access is not tightly controlled.