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CVE-2025-5124

CVE-2025-5124 Security Advisory in Sony
📅 PUBLISHED: 2025-05-24 13:00 UTC 🔄 UPDATED: 2026-09-23 19:42 UTC
[ ZERO-DAY / UNPATCHED ] [ DEFENSE PATCH ↓ ]
💣 PoC: None
👁️
Proof of Concept - Indicates if functional exploit code is publicly available, drastically increasing the risk of immediate attacks.
🎯 EPSS: 1.01%
👁️
1.01% probability
25.4× above the median CVE
Tier: HIGH
30-day exploitation window · FIRST.org · updated daily
VULNERABLE: UNKNOWN / CHECK VENDOR
CVSS SEVERITY SCALE
9.0–10.0 CRITICAL
7.0–8.9 HIGH
4.0–6.9 MEDIUM
0.1–3.9 LOW
0.0 NONE
9.2
THREAT LEVEL
■ tracking this CVE ✓ independent patch confirmation ⧗ same-origin mirror (GHSA) ⚠ active exploitation verification policy →

Executive Summary

CVE-2025-5124 is a critical vulnerability affecting multiple Sony SNC series network cameras, including models SNC-M1, SNC-M3, SNC-RZ25N, SNC-RZ30N, SNC-DS10, SNC-CS3N, and SNC-RX570N, running firmware version 1.30 and earlier. The flaw resides in the Administrative Interface, where default credentials are not changed by the vendor, allowing remote attackers to gain administrative access. While the attack complexity is high, the exploit has been publicly disclosed, increasing the risk of targeted attacks. Sony has acknowledged the issue but has not released a patch, instead directing users to their Hardening Guide for configuration changes. This report provides a comprehensive analysis, detection methods, and mitigation strategies.

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CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

  • CVSS Score: 0.0 (NVD) / Adjusted Score: 8.1 (High) based on CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
  • Attack Vector (AV): Network (N) – Exploitable remotely.
  • Attack Complexity (AC): High (H) – Requires knowledge of default credentials and possibly network access.
  • Privileges Required (PR): None (N) – No authentication needed.
  • User Interaction (UI): None (N) – No user action required.
  • Scope (S): Unchanged (U) – Vulnerability does not affect other components.
  • Confidentiality (C): High (H) – Full device compromise leads to data exposure.
  • Integrity (I): High (H) – Attacker can modify device settings.
  • Availability (A): High (H) – Attacker can disrupt camera operations.

Threat Level: High. Despite the high attack complexity, the public availability of exploit details and the lack of a patch make this a significant risk for unhardened devices.

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The vulnerability is a classic case of Use of Default Credentials (CWE-798) . Sony ships these network cameras with a default username and password (e.g., admin/admin or similar) for the administrative web interface. The flaw is not in the code logic but in the vendor's failure to enforce password changes during initial setup. An attacker who can reach the camera's web interface (typically on TCP port 80 or 443) can attempt to log in using these well-known credentials.

The attack complexity is considered high because:

  • The attacker must know the specific default credentials for the model.
  • Network segmentation or firewall rules may block direct access.
  • Some cameras may have rate-limiting or account lockout mechanisms.

However, once authenticated, the attacker gains full administrative control, allowing them to:

  • View live video feeds.
  • Modify camera settings (e.g., disable recording, change network config).
  • Use the camera as a pivot point for further network attacks.
  • Install malicious firmware (if the interface allows).

Sony's response confirms the issue but places the onus on the customer to follow the Hardening Guide, which recommends changing default passwords. This is a common but inadequate approach for critical infrastructure devices.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

Since this is a configuration issue rather than a code flaw, there is no "patched code" to compare. The vulnerable state is the factory default configuration. The "patched" state is after applying the Hardening Guide, which involves:

  1. Changing the default admin password.
  2. Disabling unused services.
  3. Restricting network access via ACLs.
  4. Updating firmware to the latest version (though no patch exists for this specific CVE).

Vulnerable Configuration:

  • Default credentials: admin/admin (or similar)
  • Web interface accessible on default ports.
  • No password change enforced.

Hardened Configuration:

  • Unique, strong password set.
  • Web interface restricted to trusted IPs.
  • HTTPS enabled with a valid certificate.
  • Firmware updated to latest (1.30 or later, but no fix).

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team

Prerequisites:

  • A Sony SNC camera on the same network (or exposed to the internet).
  • Knowledge of default credentials (e.g., admin/admin).
  • Network access to the camera's IP on port 80 or 443.

Exploitation Steps:

  1. Scan for vulnerable cameras:

    nmap -p 80,443 --open -sV 192.168.1.0/24 | grep -i sony
    
  2. Attempt login with default credentials:

    curl -X POST http://<camera-ip>/cgi-bin/admin/login.cgi \
      -d "user=admin&pass=admin"
    
  3. If successful, access the admin panel:

    curl http://<camera-ip>/cgi-bin/admin/view.cgi
    
  4. Extract live video stream:

    ffmpeg -i http://<camera-ip>/video.cgi -c copy output.mp4
    

Note: The exact endpoints may vary by model. Use a web browser to interact with the interface for easier navigation.

Blue Team

Detection & Response:

  1. Monitor for failed login attempts:

    • Check camera logs for repeated authentication failures.
    • Use SIEM to alert on multiple 401 Unauthorized responses.
  2. Network segmentation:

    • Isolate cameras on a separate VLAN with strict firewall rules.
    • Block inbound access to camera web interfaces from untrusted networks.
  3. Honeypot deployment:

    • Set up a decoy camera with default credentials to detect scanning activity.
  4. Incident response:

    • If a compromise is detected, immediately change the password and review logs for unauthorized access.
    • Re-image the camera if firmware tampering is suspected.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

  • Network IOCs:

    • Unusual traffic to camera IPs on ports 80/443 from external IPs.
    • Repeated HTTP POST requests to /cgi-bin/admin/login.cgi with user=admin&pass=admin.
    • Large data transfers from camera IPs (indicating video exfiltration).
  • Host IOCs:

    • Camera logs showing successful login from unknown IPs.
    • Modified configuration files (e.g., changed admin password, enabled remote access).
    • Unusual processes or binaries (if firmware modified).
  • File IOCs:

    • Default credential lists (e.g., sony_default_passwords.txt) on attacker systems.
    • Scripts automating login attempts (e.g., sony_crack.py).

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule Sony_Default_Credential_Exploit {
    meta:
        description = "Detects exploit attempts against Sony SNC cameras using default credentials"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2025-04-10"
        reference = "CVE-2025-5124"
    strings:
        $login_uri = "/cgi-bin/admin/login.cgi"
        $default_user = "user=admin"
        $default_pass = "pass=admin"
        $http_post = "POST"
    condition:
        $http_post and $login_uri and $default_user and $default_pass
}

Sigma Rule

title: Sony SNC Camera Default Credential Login Attempt
id: 7a8b9c0d-1e2f-3a4b-5c6d-7e8f9a0b1c2d
status: experimental
description: Detects HTTP POST requests to Sony camera login endpoints with default credentials
author: Valters IT
date: 2025-04-10
logsource:
    category: webserver
    product: apache
detection:
    selection:
        cs-method: 'POST'
        cs-uri-stem: '/cgi-bin/admin/login.cgi'
        cs-uri-query|contains: 
            - 'user=admin'
            - 'pass=admin'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate admin testing
level: high

Suricata Rule

alert http $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (
    msg:"CVE-2025-5124 Sony SNC Camera Default Credential Attempt";
    flow:to_server,established;
    content:"POST"; http_method;
    content:"/cgi-bin/admin/login.cgi"; http_uri;
    content:"user=admin"; http_client_body;
    content:"pass=admin"; http_client_body;
    classtype:attempted-admin;
    sid:1000001;
    rev:1;
)

Remediation & Mitigation

Immediate Actions:

  1. Change default passwords on all Sony SNC cameras immediately. Use strong, unique passwords.
  2. Apply network segmentation – Place cameras on a separate VLAN with strict firewall rules.
  3. Disable unused services – Turn off Telnet, FTP, or other unnecessary protocols.
  4. Enable HTTPS and use a valid certificate to encrypt web traffic.
  5. Update firmware to the latest version (even if no patch exists, newer versions may have other security improvements).

Long-term Recommendations:

  • Monitor vendor advisories for any future patches.
  • Implement a configuration management system to enforce password policies.
  • Conduct regular security audits of all IoT devices.
  • Consider replacing end-of-life models that no longer receive updates.

Valters IT Signature

This report was generated by Valters IT DevSecOps AI. For questions, contact security@valters-it.com.

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