CVE-2026-76717

Executive Summary

CVE-2026-76717 is an unauthenticated information disclosure vulnerability in the Aruba Networks Analytics and Location Engine (ALE) API, tracked under CWE-200. A remote attacker with no credentials can supply specially crafted input to a specific API endpoint and cause the disclosure of sensitive user information, including password hashes. Successful exploitation exposes credential material that can be cracked offline or reused directly, materially increasing the risk of downstream authentication attacks against the ALE platform and federated systems.

Technical Analysis

The vulnerability resides in the Analytics and Location Engine (ALE) API, a component of the Aruba Networks portfolio used to ingest, correlate, and expose location and analytics data (for example, Wi-Fi client location, presence, and associated user metadata). The core defect is classified as CWE-200 (Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor). In this case, the NVD description states that the exposure includes password hashes — a high-value secret class that elevates the impact beyond a typical read-only data leak.

The attack is reachable without authentication (CVSS:AV:N, PR:N, UI:N), meaning the vulnerable API endpoint does not enforce a functioning authentication check before processing the crafted input. The trigger is "specially crafted input" to "a specific API endpoint." This phrasing indicates the input is interpreted by the API in a way that causes it to return or leak data beyond the intended scope — a classic input-handling flaw in the CWE-200 family, such as a request that manipulates a query, filter, identifier, or serialization path to surface records the caller is not entitled to see, or that returns verbose diagnostic/internal data.

Because only high-level details are published, the following cannot be established from available data and should not be assumed: the exact API path, the HTTP method, the offending parameter name, the parsing/library responsible, whether the flaw is a logic error, a path/parameter injection, or an improper access control on a data-returning endpoint. No function names, class names, URL paths, or parameter names are provided by the vendor, NVD, or any tracked source, and none should be inferred. What can be stated with confidence is the vulnerability class (unauthenticated sensitive-information disclosure in an API), the attack surface (the ALE HTTP API, network-exposed), and the confidentiality impact (C:L — partial disclosure, but of high-value credential material).

The CVSS score of 5.3 reflects a remote, low-complexity, no-privilege, no-interaction attack with limited but meaningful confidentiality impact and no integrity or availability impact. The EPSS score of 0.00420 (33.8th percentile) indicates a low modeled probability of exploitation within 30 days despite public PoC status; however, EPSS is a probabilistic signal, not a guarantee, and the presence of a public proof of concept (PoC_STATUS: Public) raises the practical risk relative to the EPSS percentile alone.

Exploitation Scenarios

The following attack chain is constructed strictly from the vulnerability class and the NVD description. No specific API path, parameter, or payload is published, so the mechanism is described at the class level.

1. Reconnaissance / target identification. The attacker enumerates internet-facing or horizontally reachable Aruba ALE deployments. ALE management/API interfaces are frequently exposed on internal networks and, in misconfigured cases, on the public internet. Discovery uses standard service and HTTP fingerprinting (title/body fingerprints, TLS certificate subject) to identify ALE API services.

2. Triggering the flaw class. With no authentication required, the attacker sends a request to the specific ALE API endpoint that exhibits the improper input handling. The request carries specially crafted input — at the class level, this is input that the endpoint fails to validate or scope correctly, causing it to return data beyond what an unauthenticated caller should receive. No specific parameter or syntax is published; the exploitation primitive is "malformed or manipulated request to a data-returning endpoint."

3. Execution / payload method. Because the flaw is information disclosure (CWE-200), there is no code execution step. The "payload" is the crafted request itself; successful exploitation is observed as an anomalous server response containing sensitive user information, including password hashes, that should not be returned to an unauthenticated client. A public PoC is reported to exist, which lowers the skill barrier for reproduction, but the PoC is not described in the available data.

4. Post-exploitation impact. The attacker harvests the disclosed data. Password hashes are exfiltrated and attacked offline (dictionary, brute force, or rainbow-table/cracking pipelines). Recovered plaintext credentials enable follow-on attacks — authentication to the ALE platform, lateral movement to management interfaces, or credential reuse against federated identity systems. The disclosure of user information beyond hashes may also enable spear-phishing and account enumeration. No integrity or availability impact is expected from this vulnerability alone.

No public PoC details, exploit code, or in-the-wild campaign attribution are available in the provided data; the attack chain above is inferred from the vulnerability class and must be validated against the vendor advisory when it is published.

Impact Assessment

The CVSS v3.1 base score is 5.3 (Medium) with vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N.

• AV:N (Network): exploitable remotely over the network — no physical or local access required.
• AC:L (Low): no special conditions or race windows; the crafted input reliably triggers the flaw.
• PR:N (None): no authentication is required — a significant aggravating factor for an information disclosure flaw.
• UI:N (None): no victim interaction required; the attacker acts unilaterally.
• S:U (Unchanged): impact is confined to the ALE component.
• C:L (Low confidentiality impact): a limited but meaningful disclosure — the affected data is partial relative to the whole system, yet it includes password hashes, which are high-value and reusable/crackable.
• I:N / A:N: no integrity or availability impact.

Business impact. The disclosed password hashes create direct credential-compromise risk. Because ALE ingests and exposes user/location analytics, the exposed "sensitive user information" may include identifiers of users tracked by the wireless environment, amplifying privacy and regulatory exposure (e.g., under GDPR/CCPA given location-adjacent data). Cracked credentials can enable lateral movement into network management, wireless controllers, or federated identity systems, expanding the blast radius beyond the ALE host itself.

Blast radius / affected systems. All deployments of the Aruba Analytics and Location Engine whose API is reachable by the attacker. The exact affected version range is not published in tracked sources (AFFECTED_VERSION unknown), so all unpatched ALE instances that expose the vulnerable endpoint should be treated as at risk. The vulnerability is unpatched (patch confidence 0/4), meaning exposure persists until a vendor remedy is released.

Exploit likelihood. EPSS 0.00420 (33.8th percentile) suggests low near-term exploitation probability in aggregate, but a public PoC exists, which raises real-world risk above what EPSS alone implies. CISA KEV: No — no confirmed exploitation in the wild at time of writing.

Detection Guidance

Detection must focus on anomalous, unauthenticated requests to ALE API endpoints and on server responses containing credential material. Because no specific endpoint or parameter is published, the rules below are built around behavior (unauthenticated access to sensitive API paths, HTTP responses carrying hash-like strings, and error/verbose responses) rather than a fixed signature.

Sigma Rule

title: Aruba ALE API Unauthenticated Information Disclosure Attempt (CVE-2026-76717)
id: 7c3e9a10-ale-2026-76717-sigma
status: experimental
description: Detects suspected exploitation of CVE-2026-76717 - unauthenticated crafted input to the ALE API returning sensitive information such as password hashes.
references:
  - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76717
author: Threat Intelligence
date: 2026/01/01
logsource:
  category: webserver
  product: aruba_ale
detection:
  selection_method:
    cs-method:
      - GET
      - POST
  selection_path:
    cs-uri-stem|contains:
      - '/api/'
      - '/ale/'
  selection_status:
    sc-status:
      - 200
      - 500
  selection_unauth:
    cs-username: '-'
  condition: selection_method and selection_path and selection_status and selection_unauth
fields:
  - c-ip
  - cs-uri-stem
  - cs-uri-query
  - sc-status
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate unauthenticated health or status endpoints under /api/
level: medium
tags:
  - attack.t1190
  - cve.2026.76717

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2026_76717_ALE_API_Info_Disclosure
{
    meta:
        description = "Detects credential/hash disclosure content or exploit artifacts related to Aruba ALE API CVE-2026-76717"
        author = "Threat Intelligence"
        date = "2026-01-01"
        reference = "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76717"
        cve = "CVE-2026-76717"

    strings:
        $pwd1 = "password" nocase
        $pwd2 = "password_hash" nocase
        $pwd3 = "passwd" nocase
        $hash = /\$2[aby]\$[0-9]{2}\$[./A-Za-z0-9]{53}/
        $ntlm = /\$NT\$[A-Za-z0-9./+]{27}/
        $ale = "Analytics and Location Engine" nocase
        $apiresp = "apiversion" nocase

    condition:
        uint16be(0) != 0x504b and
        (
            ($ale and any of ($pwd*) and $apiresp) or
            (any of ($pwd*) and 1 of ($hash, $ntlm))
        )
}

Suricata IDS Rule

alert http any any -> any any (msg:"CVE-2026-76717 Aruba ALE API Potential Unauthenticated Information Disclosure"; flow:established,to_server; http.method; content:"GET"; http.uri; content:"/api/"; nocase; http.uri; pcre:"/\/api\/[^\s]*(user|passwd|password|hash|config)/i"; nocase; threshold:type both, track by_src, count 5, seconds 60; classtype:attempted-recon; reference:cve,CVE-2026-76717; reference:url,nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76717; sid:202676717; rev:1;)

Elastic Detection

sequence by source.ip with maxspan=60s
  [ network where network.protocol == "http" and http.request.method == "GET"
      and url.path : ("/api/*" or "/ale/*") ]
  [ network where network.protocol == "http" and http.response.status_code == 200
      and http.response.body : ("*password*", "*password_hash*", "*$2y$*", "*$2a$*", "*$NT$*") ]

Splunk SPL Query

index=web (sourcetype=access_combined OR sourcetype=aruba:ale:api)
| eval uri_path=coalesce(uri_path, url, cs_uri_stem)
| where match(uri_path, "(?i)/(api|ale)/")
| where status=200 OR status=500
| search (uri_path="*user*" OR uri_path="*config*" OR uri_path="*hash*" OR uri_path="*password*" OR uri_path="*passwd*")
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(status) as statuses by src_ip, uri_path
| where count >= 3
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)
| sort - count

Wazuh OSSEC Rule

<group name="aruba,ale,web,cve-2026-76717,">
  <rule id="202676717" level="10">
    <if_sid>31100</if_sid>
    <decoded_as>web-accesslog</decoded_as>
    <url_contains>/api/</url_contains>
    <regex match="password|passwd|password_hash|\$2[aby]\$|\$NT\$" type="pcre2">(?i)(password|passwd|password_hash|\$2[aby]\$|\$NT\$)</regex>
    <description>Possible exploitation of CVE-2026-76717: unauthenticated request to Aruba ALE API returning sensitive credential-like content.</description>
    <mitre>
      <id>T1190</id>
    </mitre>
    <group>cve_2026_76717,information_disclosure,</group>
  </rule>
</group>

Mitigation & Patch Guidance

Patch confidence: 0/4 (UNPATCHED). There is no vendor fix, workaround, or affected version range in any tracked source. All guidance below is defensive-in-depth and must be re-evaluated when Aruba publishes an advisory or fixed release.

1. Immediate mitigations (do not remediate the flaw — they reduce exposure):

   • Restrict network access to the ALE API. Place the ALE management/API interface behind a firewall and limit reachability to trusted management subnets and VPN/zero-trust entry points. Never expose the ALE API directly to the internet; validate this with external attack-surface scanning.
   • Enforce authentication at the perimeter. Front the API with an authenticating reverse proxy/gateway so unauthenticated requests cannot reach the vulnerable endpoint, directly neutralizing the PR:N exploitation precondition.
   • Segment ALE from identity infrastructure. If ALE credentials can be reused against directory, wireless-controller, or federated identity systems, isolate it to limit the credential-reuse blast radius.
   • Hunt for prior exposure. Because exploitation may have already occurred, review API access logs for unauthenticated 200/500 responses to /api/-style paths and for anomalous response sizes; audit for signs of mass data retrieval.
   • Prepare for credential rotation. If there is any suspicion the vulnerable endpoint was reachable by untrusted parties, force a password reset and rotate any credentials, tokens, or secrets that may have been exposed.

2. Patch / upgrade steps:

   • Monitor the Aruba Networks security advisory portal and the Aruba ALE product page for a fixed release and the affected version range.
   • When a fixed version ships, upgrade all ALE instances promptly; verify the version post-upgrade.
   • Until then, treat the system as vulnerable and maintain the compensating controls in step 1.

3. Long-term hardening:

   • Adopt authenticated, allow-listed API access as a standing design requirement for all ALE/management interfaces.
   • Integrate ALE and network-management CVEs into vulnerability management with SLA-driven patching.
   • Deploy the detection content above and alert on unauthenticated access to sensitive API paths.
   • Apply least-privilege and strong password hashing (e.g., memory-hard algorithms) across the estate so that any future hash disclosure has reduced crackability.
   • Enforce network segmentation and egress filtering to constrain lateral movement if credentials are compromised.

References

• NVD — CVE-2026-76717: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76717
• CWE-200 — Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/200.html
• Aruba Networks Security Advisories (vendor advisory portal — check for ALE advisory): https://www.arubanetworks.com/support-services/security-bulletins/
• CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog — CVE-2026-76717 status: Not listed (checked at time of writing): https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog
• FIRST EPSS — CVE-2026-76717 score page: https://api.first.org/data/v1/epss?cve=CVE-2026-76717

Threat actor / exploit-in-the-wild note: No threat actor attribution or confirmed in-the-wild exploitation was identified in the provided data. CISA KEV: No. A public proof-of-concept is reported to exist (POC_STATUS: Public), but no exploit code or PoC details were available in tracked sources; monitoring for weaponization is advised given the unauthenticated nature of the flaw and the credential-value of the disclosed data.