CVE-2026-78024

Executive Summary

CVE-2026-78024 is a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability (CWE-918) affecting Dell Secure Connect Gateway (SCG) Policy Manager versions prior to 5.34.00.16. A high-privileged, remotely positioned attacker can exploit the flaw to induce the server to make attacker-controlled requests, resulting in information disclosure, protection mechanism bypass, and unauthorized access. With a CVSS v3.1 base score of 7.7 and a scope-changing vector (S:C), the impact extends beyond the vulnerable component, making this a high-severity risk for organizations that expose SCG Policy Manager to untrusted networks.

Technical Analysis

The vulnerability is classified as CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery. SSRF occurs when an application accepts user-supplied input that influences the destination of a server-initiated network request without adequately validating or restricting that destination. Rather than the attacker connecting directly to an internal or protected resource, the vulnerable SCG Policy Manager server performs the request on the attacker's behalf, effectively acting as a proxy into network segments and services that the attacker cannot reach directly.

The CVSS vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N indicates several important characteristics:

• AV:N (Network): The vulnerability is exploitable remotely over the network.
• AC:H (High complexity): Successful exploitation requires conditions that are not under the attacker's full control, or the attack is difficult to execute reliably.
• PR:H (High privileges required): The attacker must already possess elevated (high-privileged) access to the SCG Policy Manager component.
• UI:N (No user interaction): Exploitation does not require a victim to perform any action.
• S:C (Scope Changed): A successful exploit can impact resources beyond the security scope of the vulnerable component — consistent with SSRF enabling requests into other systems or trust boundaries.
• C:H / I:H / A:N: High confidentiality and integrity impact, with no availability impact reported.

Because the exploit requires high privileges, this is primarily an authenticated, post-compromise escalation and lateral-movement primitive rather than an unauthenticated perimeter entry point. The high-privilege prerequisite is consistent with an administrative or privileged interface of the Policy Manager that performs server-side requests (for example, to fetch remote resources, validate URLs, or communicate with backend services). The NVD description does not disclose the specific request-handling function, endpoint, or parameter involved, so no code-level identifiers are asserted here; the analysis is confined to the SSRF vulnerability class.

The consequence "protection mechanism bypass" combined with scope change suggests the attacker can leverage the server's network position and internal trust to reach resources that would otherwise be protected — such as internal administrative interfaces, metadata services, or backend APIs — circumventing network segmentation or access controls that would block the attacker directly.

Patch confidence is 0/4: no patch evidence was found in any tracked source, and no affected-version list or OSV package mapping was provided. Administrators should treat the instance as unpatched until vendor confirmation is obtained.

Exploitation Scenarios

No public proof-of-concept, Nuclei template, or exploit code is available for CVE-2026-78024; the attack chain below is inferred from the SSRF vulnerability class and the NVD description.

1. Reconnaissance / target identification. The attacker identifies an internet- or network-reachable Dell Secure Connect Gateway (SCG) Policy Manager instance running a version prior to 5.34.00.16. Because exploitation requires high privileges (PR:H), the attacker must first obtain a privileged account or session — for example through valid administrative credentials, a separate prior compromise, or credential reuse.

2. Triggering the flaw class. Once authenticated with high privileges, the attacker locates a Policy Manager feature that causes the server to perform an outbound request based on attacker-influenced input (a classic SSRF sink). Because the underlying defect is an SSRF, the attacker supplies a destination the server can reach but the attacker cannot — such as an internal host, an internal service, or a loopback/private address. The specific endpoint or parameter is not disclosed in the available data and is deliberately not invented here.

3. Payload / execution method (class level). The attacker crafts the request so the server resolves and connects to the attacker-chosen destination. There is no memory-corruption or code-execution payload; the "exploit" is abuse of the server's own outbound request capability. Depending on implementation, this may allow blind SSRF (timing/error-based inference) or full-response SSRF (returned content visible to the attacker).

4. Post-exploitation impact. Consistent with the NVD-stated consequences, successful SSRF can yield:

   • Information disclosure (C:H): the attacker reads responses from internal services not otherwise exposed.
   • Protection mechanism bypass: requests originate from a trusted internal host, circumventing network-level or access controls.
   • Server-side request forgery: the server is coerced into acting as an internal proxy.
   • Unauthorized access (I:H): the attacker may reach or manipulate internal resources reachable by the SCG server. Because the scope is Changed (S:C), impact is not limited to the SCG Policy Manager component itself.

Impact Assessment

Exploitation requires high privileges but provides a potent pivot: an attacker with a privileged SCG Policy Manager session can abuse the server's network position to enumerate and interact with internal resources. The confidentiality impact is High (internal data exposure), integrity impact is High (ability to cause the server to act against internal targets), and availability impact is None per the CVSS vector. The scope-change rating elevates the effective risk, as downstream systems outside the vulnerable component can be affected.

Business impact includes potential exposure of sensitive configuration, credentials, or internal service data reachable by the SCG server, degradation of trust boundaries, and possible lateral movement. Affected systems are Dell Secure Connect Gateway (SCG) Policy Manager deployments prior to 5.34.00.16 that expose the relevant privileged functionality. The base score of 7.7 reflects a High-severity issue; the PR:H and AC:H factors temper exploitability but do not reduce the severity of a successful attack.

Detection Guidance

Sigma Rule

title: Potential SSRF Exploitation Attempt Against Dell Secure Connect Gateway Policy Manager
id: 8f2b4c1e-1a7d-4c9e-9b3a-000000078024
status: experimental
description: Detects suspicious outbound requests consistent with SSRF abuse (CVE-2026-78024) originating from the SCG Policy Manager service process.
references:
  - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-78024
author: Threat Intelligence
date: 2026/01/01
logsource:
  category: network_connection
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\java.exe'
      - '\tomcat.exe'
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'SecureConnectGateway'
      - 'PolicyManager'
  selection_ssrf_destinations:
    DestinationIp|cidr:
      - '127.0.0.0/8'
      - '169.254.0.0/16'
      - '10.0.0.0/8'
      - '172.16.0.0/12'
      - '192.168.0.0/16'
  condition: selection_process and selection_ssrf_destinations
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate backend communication to internal management services
level: medium
tags:
  - attack.t1190
  - cve.2026-78024

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2026_78024_SSRF_Indicators
{
    meta:
        description = "Detects SSRF-related indicators for CVE-2026-78024 (Dell SCG Policy Manager SSRF)"
        author = "Threat Intelligence"
        date = "2026-01-01"
        reference = "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-78024"
        cve = "CVE-2026-78024"

    strings:
        $scg1 = "Secure Connect Gateway" ascii nocase
        $scg2 = "Policy Manager" ascii nocase
        $ssrf1 = "169.254.169.254" ascii
        $ssrf2 = "http://127.0.0.1" ascii nocase
        $ssrf3 = "file://" ascii nocase
        $pkg1 = "5.34.00.16" ascii

    condition:
        (uint16(0) == 0x4D5A or uint32(0) == 0x464C457F) and
        (any of ($scg*)) and
        (any of ($ssrf*))
}

Suricata IDS Rule

alert http $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (msg:"CVE-2026-78024 Potential SSRF toward Cloud Metadata Endpoint (Dell SCG Policy Manager)"; flow:established,to_server; http.method; content:"GET"; http.uri; content:"169.254.169.254"; nocase; classtype:attempted-recon; sid:202678024; rev:1; metadata:created_at 2026_01_01, cve CVE-2026-78024;)
alert http $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (msg:"CVE-2026-78024 Dell SCG Policy Manager SSRF Response Metadata Leak"; flow:established,from_server; http.response_body; content:"ami-id"; nocase; classtype:successful-recon-limited; sid:202678025; rev:1; metadata:created_at 2026_01_01, cve CVE-2026-78024;)

Elastic Detection

network where process.name in ("java.exe", "tomcat.exe") and
  destination.ip in ("127.0.0.1", "169.254.169.254") and
  event.category == "network" and
  not destination.port in (22, 443, 8443)

Splunk SPL Query

index=proxy OR index=firewall
| search (dest_ip IN ("127.0.0.1","169.254.169.254") OR dest_ip IN ("10.0.0.0/8","172.16.0.0/12","192.168.0.0/16"))
| where (src_process_name="java.exe" OR url LIKE "%SecureConnectGateway%" OR url LIKE "%PolicyManager%")
| stats count values(dest_ip) as internal_targets by src_ip, user
| where count > 5

Wazuh OSSEC Rule

<group name="web,ssrf,cve-2026-78024,">
  <rule id="780240" level="10">
    <decoded_as>json</decoded_as>
    <field name="url">\.(SecureConnectGateway|PolicyManager)</field>
    <field name="dest_ip">^(127\.|169\.254\.|10\.|172\.1[6-9]\.|192\.168\.)</field>
    <description>CVE-2026-78024: Possible SSRF abuse against Dell SCG Policy Manager to internal target.</description>
    <mitre>
      <id>T1190</id>
    </mitre>
    <group>cve_2026_78024,</group>
  </rule>
</group>

Mitigation & Patch Guidance

Patch confidence: 0/4 (UNPATCHED — no patch evidence from any tracked source). No vendor fix, workaround, or affected-version list was provided.

1. Immediate mitigations

   • Restrict network exposure of Dell Secure Connect Gateway (SCG) Policy Manager; do not place privileged management interfaces on untrusted networks.
   • Apply strict egress filtering so the SCG server cannot initiate requests to loopback, link-local (e.g., 169.254.0.0/16), or internal RFC1918 ranges unless explicitly required.
   • Enforce least privilege and reduce the number of accounts holding the high privileges required for exploitation (PR:H); audit privileged accounts.
   • Block access to cloud instance-metadata endpoints from the SCG host.

2. Patch / upgrade steps

   • Track Dell's official advisory for SCG Policy Manager and upgrade to version 5.34.00.16 or later once the vendor fix is confirmed available.
   • Validate the fix release against Dell's security advisory portal before deployment; no patch reference is currently tracked.

3. Long-term hardening

   • Implement input validation and allow-listing for any server-side request destinations.
   • Segmentation and monitoring of management-plane traffic; centralize logs for outbound request anomalies.
   • Maintain a vulnerability management process that tracks CVE-2026-78024 status and re-checks patch confidence as vendor information becomes available.

References

• NVD — CVE-2026-78024: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-78024
• CWE-918 Server-Side Request Forgery: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/918.html
• MITRE ATT&CK T1190 — Exploit Public-Facing Application: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190/
• Dell Security Advisories portal: https://www.dell.com/support/security
• FIRST EPSS (not yet scored for this CVE): https://www.first.org/epss/

No threat actor campaigns or exploit-in-the-wild evidence are currently associated with CVE-2026-78024; CISA KEV status is NO and no public PoC/exploit code was identified.