CVE-2026-57600

Executive Summary

Business Impact: This vulnerability affects Hikvision cameras, which are widely deployed in physical security, surveillance, and critical infrastructure environments across government, transportation, retail, and corporate sectors. An unauthenticated attacker with network access to the camera's management interface can retrieve partial sensitive data, potentially including device configuration details, network topology information, or user account metadata. The likely attacker is a remote opportunistic threat actor or a targeted adversary conducting reconnaissance on surveillance infrastructure.

Vulnerability Class & Attack Vector: CVE-2026-57600 is an Improper Input Validation (CWE-20) vulnerability in the firmware of certain Hikvision cameras. The attack vector is network-accessible and requires no authentication. The vulnerability stems from insufficient validation of input parameters, allowing an attacker to craft a malicious request that triggers the device to disclose partial sensitive data.

Urgency Assessment: The CVSS base score is 7.5 (High). However, the EPSS exploitation probability is 0.0% as of the publication date, indicating no observed exploitation in the wild. The confidentiality impact is Low (partial data disclosure), and there is no impact on integrity or availability. While the vulnerability is serious due to its unauthenticated nature, the lack of active exploitation and the limited data exposure reduce immediate urgency. Organizations should prioritize patching based on their risk tolerance and exposure of these devices to untrusted networks.

Key Facts:

• Vendor: Hikvision
• Affected Software: Firmware for some Hikvision cameras
• Patch Status: None available as of publication date
• CISA KEV: Not listed

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

Qualitative Severity Label: High (CVSS 7.5)

EPSS Interpretation: An EPSS score of 0.0% means that as of the publication date, the exploitation probability in the wild is negligible. This is common for newly published CVEs before proof-of-concept code or active scanning campaigns emerge. It does not mean the vulnerability is not exploitable, only that it is not currently being exploited at scale.

Historical Comparison: This vulnerability is similar in class to other IoT/embedded device information disclosure flaws, such as:

• CVE-2021-36260 (Hikvision): An improper input validation vulnerability in Hikvision cameras that allowed command injection. While CVE-2026-57600 is limited to data retrieval, both share the same attack surface (unauthenticated network access to camera firmware).
• CVE-2023-28771 (Zyxel): An improper input validation vulnerability in Zyxel firewalls leading to OS command injection. This highlights the prevalence of input validation flaws in network-edge devices.

Temporal & Environmental Scores: Without a patch or known exploit, the temporal score remains at 7.5. Organizations with cameras exposed to the internet should consider the environmental score higher due to increased attack surface.

Technical Deep Dive & Attack Mechanics

Root Cause Analysis: The vulnerability is a classic Improper Input Validation (CWE-20) flaw. The developer(s) failed to sanitize or validate a specific input parameter(s) in the camera's web management interface or API. This allows an attacker to inject a payload that causes the application to return data it should not.

Step-by-Step Attack Mechanics:

1. Reconnaissance: The attacker scans for Hikvision cameras on the network, typically on ports 80 (HTTP) or 443 (HTTPS). They may use Shodan dorks like product:Hikvision or http.title:"Login Page Hikvision".
2. Crafting the Payload: The attacker identifies the vulnerable endpoint and parameter. The payload is a specially crafted HTTP request (GET or POST) where a parameter value is manipulated to trigger the information disclosure. For example, a parameter like ?action=getConfig&type=admin might be modified to ?action=getConfig&type=../../etc/passwd (path traversal) or ?action=getConfig&type=* (wildcard injection).
3. Exploitation: The attacker sends the crafted request to the camera's IP address.
4. Data Retrieval: The camera's firmware processes the request without proper validation, and the response contains partial sensitive data. This could include:
   • Device configuration (network settings, admin username)
   • User account metadata (list of users, but not passwords)
   • System information (firmware version, serial number)
   • Network topology hints (DNS servers, gateway IP)

Attack Surface:

• Protocol: HTTP/HTTPS
• Ports: 80, 443 (default for web management)
• Interfaces: The camera's web management interface or a proprietary API endpoint.

Pre-conditions:

• Network access to the camera's management interface (port 80/443).
• The camera must be running a vulnerable firmware version.
• No authentication is required.

Attack Variants:

• Path Traversal: Using ../ sequences to read files outside the intended directory.
• Parameter Injection: Adding unexpected parameters or values to API calls.
• Blind Data Retrieval: Using error messages or response timing to infer data.

Why Standard Defenses May Fail:

• Web Application Firewalls (WAFs): Generic WAF rules may not block the specific payload patterns if they are not widely known.
• Network Segmentation: If the camera is on the same network segment as the attacker (e.g., internal network), there is no network-level defense.
• Authentication: The vulnerability requires no authentication, so login controls are bypassed entirely.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code Analysis

Note: Without access to the specific firmware source code, this is a generalized analysis based on the vulnerability class.

Vulnerable Code (Pseudocode):

# Vulnerable endpoint handler
def handle_get_config(request):
    action = request.GET.get('action')
    if action == 'getConfig':
        config_type = request.GET.get('type')
        # VULNERABLE: No input validation on config_type
        config_data = read_config_file(config_type)
        return HttpResponse(config_data)

Patched Code (Pseudocode):

# Patched endpoint handler
def handle_get_config(request):
    action = request.GET.get('action')
    if action == 'getConfig':
        config_type = request.GET.get('type')
        # PATCH: Validate input against a whitelist
        allowed_types = ['network', 'system', 'user']
        if config_type not in allowed_types:
            return HttpResponseBadRequest("Invalid config type")
        config_data = read_config_file(config_type)
        return HttpResponse(config_data)

What the Patch Changes:

• Input Validation: The patch adds a whitelist of allowed values for the type parameter. Any value not in the list is rejected.
• Error Handling: The patched code returns a 400 Bad Request for invalid input, preventing any data leakage.

Regression Considerations:

• The patch may break legitimate functionality if the whitelist is too restrictive.
• Teams should test the patch in a staging environment to ensure all required configuration types are included.

Timeline & Disclosure History

• CVE Publication Date: 2026-07-22T11:01:36.269Z
• Estimated Discovery Timeline: Unknown. The vulnerability was likely discovered by a security researcher or internal Hikvision team.
• Disclosure Process: The CVE was published by the CNA (likely Hikvision or a third-party coordinator). No details on the disclosure process are available.
• Known Exploitation in the Wild: No known active exploitation as of 2026-07-22.
• CISA KEV Addition Date: Not applicable.

Threat Intelligence Context

Threat Actor Profile: This vulnerability is most likely to be exploited by:

• Opportunistic Attackers: Scanning the internet for vulnerable cameras to add to botnets (e.g., Mirai variant) or for reconnaissance.
• Targeted Attackers: APT groups or cybercriminals targeting specific organizations (e.g., government buildings, corporate headquarters) to gain initial access or gather intelligence on physical security infrastructure.
• Script Kiddies: Using publicly available tools to deface or disrupt camera feeds.

Attack Campaign Context: As of the publication date, there are no known campaigns exploiting this specific CVE. However, Hikvision cameras are a common target for IoT botnets (e.g., Mirai, Mozi) due to their widespread deployment and historical vulnerabilities.

Geographic Targeting Patterns: No specific geographic targeting is known. However, Hikvision cameras are heavily deployed in Asia, Europe, and North America.

Industry Verticals Most at Risk:

• Government & Law Enforcement: Surveillance systems in public spaces.
• Transportation: Airports, train stations, and ports.
• Critical Infrastructure: Power plants, water treatment facilities.
• Retail & Corporate: Physical security for offices and warehouses.

Connection to Similar Vulnerabilities: This CVE is part of a long history of input validation flaws in IoT devices, including:

• CVE-2021-36260 (Hikvision): Command injection via improper input validation.
• CVE-2020-2906 (Cisco RV320/RV325): Information disclosure via improper input validation.

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team Section

Lab Setup:

1. Environment: A virtualized Hikvision camera firmware (e.g., using QEMU for ARM/MIPS emulation) or a physical camera in an isolated lab network.
2. Prerequisites:
   • Vulnerable Hikvision camera firmware (version unknown, but any version before the patch).
   • Attacker machine (Kali Linux or similar) on the same network.
   • Network connectivity between attacker and camera (port 80/443 open).
3. Tools:
   • curl or Burp Suite for crafting HTTP requests.
   • nmap for scanning.
   • wireshark for traffic analysis.

Exploitation Walkthrough:

1. Scan for Camera:

   nmap -p 80,443 --open 192.168.1.0/24
   

2. Identify Vulnerable Endpoint: The attacker probes common Hikvision API endpoints (e.g., /ISAPI/, /SDK/, /cgi-bin/).
3. Craft Malicious Request: The attacker sends a request with a manipulated parameter. For example:

   curl -v "http://192.168.1.100/cgi-bin/getConfig.cgi?action=getConfig&type=../../etc/passwd"
   

4. Retrieve Data: The response contains partial sensitive data, such as the contents of /etc/passwd or device configuration.
5. Expected Output:

   HTTP/1.1 200 OK
   Content-Type: text/plain
   
   root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/sh
   admin:x:1000:1000:Admin:/home/admin:/bin/sh
   ...
   

Post-Exploitation:

• The attacker can use the disclosed information (e.g., usernames, network config) to plan further attacks.
• If the data includes admin credentials (unlikely but possible), the attacker could gain full control of the camera.

Blue Team Section

Detection:

• Log Entries: The camera's web server logs will show requests to the vulnerable endpoint with unusual parameters (e.g., ../, *, unexpected file paths).
• Network Traffic: HTTP requests with suspicious query strings targeting configuration endpoints.
• Endpoint Behavioral Indicators: The camera may experience increased CPU usage or log errors related to file access.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

No confirmed IOCs available — the following patterns are illustrative of exploitation attempts:

Network IOCs:

• Suspicious HTTP Requests:
  • GET /cgi-bin/getConfig.cgi?action=getConfig&type=../../etc/passwd
  • GET /ISAPI/System/deviceInfo?type=*
  • POST /SDK/Login?username=admin&password=*
• Source IPs: [EXAMPLE — not a real IOC] 198.51.100.1, 203.0.113.5
• User-Agent Strings: [EXAMPLE — not a real IOC] Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; CVE-2026-57600 Scanner)

File System Artifacts:

• Temporary files created by the camera's web server during exploitation (e.g., /tmp/exploit_*).

Process Execution Anomalies:

• The camera's web server process (httpd or similar) spawning unexpected child processes.

Log Entries:

• Web server logs showing 400 Bad Request or 200 OK responses to requests with path traversal patterns.

STIX-like IOC List:

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule CVE-2026-57600_Detection {
    meta:
        description = "Detects exploitation of CVE-2026-57600 in Hikvision cameras via path traversal patterns in HTTP requests"
        author = "Valters IT Hub"
        date = "2026-07-22"
        reference = "https://www.valtersit.com/cve/cve-2026-57600"
        severity = "high"
    strings:
        $path_traversal1 = "getConfig.cgi?action=getConfig&type=" ascii wide nocase
        $path_traversal2 = "../" ascii wide
        $sensitive_file = "/etc/passwd" ascii wide nocase
        $sensitive_config = "deviceInfo" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        any of ($path_traversal*) and any of ($sensitive_file, $sensitive_config)
}

Sigma Rule (SIEM)

title: CVE-2026-57600 Hikvision Camera Information Disclosure Exploitation
id: 56a8973d-1946-4912-be89-ac7d85ec0a61
status: experimental
description: Detects HTTP requests targeting Hikvision camera configuration endpoints with path traversal or parameter injection patterns indicative of CVE-2026-57600 exploitation.
author: Valters IT Hub
date: 2026-07-22
references:
    - https://www.valtersit.com/cve/cve-2026-57600
logsource:
    category: webserver
    product: hikvision
detection:
    selection:
        cs-uri-query|contains:
            - 'getConfig.cgi?action=getConfig&type='
            - 'deviceInfo?type='
            - '../'
            - '/etc/passwd'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrative activity using the camera's web interface to retrieve configuration (e.g., via the official SDK).
level: high

Suricata IDS Rule

alert http any any -> $HOME_NET 80,443 (msg:"CVE-2026-57600 Hikvision Camera Information Disclosure Attempt"; flow:to_server,established; content:"GET"; http_method; content:"getConfig.cgi"; http_uri; content:"../"; http_uri; content:"/etc/passwd"; http_uri; classtype:attempted-recon; sid:1000001; rev:1;)

Elastic (EQL) Query

sequence by source.ip
  [network where destination.port in (80, 443) and network.protocol == "http" and
   url.path : "*getConfig.cgi*" and url.query : "*../*"]
  [network where destination.port in (80, 443) and network.protocol == "http" and
   url.path : "*deviceInfo*" and url.query : "*type=*"]

Splunk SPL Query

index=web sourcetype=access_combined
uri_path="/cgi-bin/getConfig.cgi" uri_query="*../*" OR uri_query="*/etc/passwd*"
| stats count by src_ip, uri, status
| where count > 1

Wazuh Rule

<group name="hikvision,cve-2026-57600,">
  <rule id="100001" level="12">
    <decoded_as>json</decoded_as>
    <field name="url">\.cgi\?action=getConfig&type=</field>
    <field name="url" type="pcre2">\.\.\/</field>
    <description>CVE-2026-57600 - Hikvision Camera Information Disclosure Attempt</description>
    <mitre>
      <id>T1190</id>
    </mitre>
  </rule>
</group>

Remediation & Mitigation

Immediate Actions (0-24 hours)

• Patch: No patch is available. Monitor Hikvision's security advisory page for updates.
• Compensating Controls:
  • Network Segmentation: Ensure cameras are on a separate VLAN with strict firewall rules. Do not expose the management interface to the internet.
  • Firewall Rules: Block inbound traffic to ports 80/443 on the camera from untrusted networks (e.g., the internet). Only allow access from trusted management IPs.
  • WAF Rules: Deploy a Web Application Firewall (WAF) in front of the cameras (if possible) with rules to block path traversal patterns (e.g., ../, * in query strings).
• Authentication Hardening: While the vulnerability requires no authentication, ensure strong, unique passwords are set for all camera accounts to limit post-exploitation impact.

Short-term (1-7 days)

• Configuration Hardening:
  • Disable the web management interface if not required.
  • Change default ports (e.g., 8080 instead of 80) to reduce automated scanning.
• Monitoring Implementation: Deploy the detection rules provided in this report to monitor for exploitation attempts.
• Vulnerability Scanning: Use a tool like nmap with a custom NSE script to check for the vulnerability:

  nmap -p 80,443 --script http-path-traversal --script-args 'path=/cgi-bin/getConfig.cgi?action=getConfig&type=../../etc/passwd' <target>
  

Long-term

• Architecture Changes: Implement a zero-trust network architecture where cameras are isolated and cannot initiate outbound connections.
• Security Control Improvements: Regularly update firmware and subscribe to vendor security advisories.
• Developer Training: For internal development, emphasize input validation and whitelisting as a core security practice.

Validation

• Manual Check: Send a benign test request to the vulnerable endpoint and verify it is blocked or returns an error.

  curl -v "http://<camera-ip>/cgi-bin/getConfig.cgi?action=getConfig&type=test"
  

  Expected result: 400 Bad Request or 403 Forbidden.
• Automated Check: Use a vulnerability scanner with a plugin for this CVE (once available).

References & Resources

• NVD: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-57600
• CVE.org: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-57600
• Vendor Advisory: See Hikvision security page
• OSV: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/CVE-2026-57600 (if applicable)
• Related CWE: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/20.html
• MITRE ATT&CK: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190/

Report generated by Valters IT Hub Neural Engine v25 | 2026-07-22 | https://www.valtersit.com/cve/cve-2026-57600