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CVSS: 3.8 🐛 CWE-59
👁️
Common Weakness Enumeration - Identifies the specific category of software weakness or flaw.

CVE-2026-65062

CVE-2026-65062 Privilege Escalation in Data::SortedSet::Shared
📅 PUBLISHED: 2026-07-21 20:17 UTC 🔄 UPDATED: 2026-09-23 20:36 UTC
[ PATCH UNDER REVIEW ↓ ] Remains UNDER REVIEW until an independent source confirms the fix
[ DEFENSE PATCH ↓ ]
💣 PoC: None
👁️
Proof of Concept - Indicates if functional exploit code is publicly available, drastically increasing the risk of immediate attacks.
🎯 EPSS: 0.14%
👁️
0.14% probability
3.5× above the median CVE
Tier: ELEVATED
30-day exploitation window · FIRST.org · updated daily
🥷 MITRE: T1083
👁️
MITRE ATT&CK Tactic - Describes the strategy hackers use to execute this attack.
License: Open Source
VULNERABLE: version not auto-detected — verify your deployed version locally
CVSS SEVERITY SCALE
9.0–10.0 CRITICAL
7.0–8.9 HIGH
4.0–6.9 MEDIUM
0.1–3.9 LOW
0.0 NONE
3.8
THREAT LEVEL
■ tracking this CVE ✓ independent patch confirmation ⧗ same-origin mirror (GHSA) ⚠ active exploitation verification policy →

Executive Summary

Business Impact: This vulnerability affects systems using the Data::SortedSet::Shared Perl module for inter-process communication (IPC) via shared memory segments. Industries relying on Perl-based data processing pipelines, real-time analytics, or multi-process coordination on shared hosts (e.g., shared hosting environments, HPC clusters, containerized microservices) are at risk. The likely attacker is a local unprivileged user on a multi-tenant system seeking to read sensitive IPC data or perform privilege escalation via symlink attacks.

Vulnerability Class & Attack Vector: This is a local vulnerability requiring an attacker to have a user account on the target system. The attack vector is the creation of a world-readable memory-mapped file (mmap) in a shared directory (e.g., /tmp, /dev/shm) without proper file creation flags (O_EXCL, O_NOFOLLOW). The attacker can either read the IPC payloads from the world-readable file or pre-plant a symlink to redirect the file creation to an arbitrary location, potentially overwriting sensitive files.

Urgency Assessment: The CVSS score is 0.0 (Informational) with an EPSS probability of 0.0%. This indicates that while the vulnerability is technically valid, it is not currently being exploited in the wild and is considered low risk for most organizations. However, in high-security, multi-tenant environments, the information disclosure and local privilege escalation potential warrant attention.

Key Facts:

  • Vendor: Data::SortedSet::Shared (Perl module)
  • Affected Versions: All versions before 0.03
  • Patch Status: UNPATCHED (as of 2026-07-21)
  • CISA KEV: Not listed.
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›Detection rules — YARA · Wazuh · Elastic (all plans) · Sigma (Pro)
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CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

Metric Decomposition:

  • AV:L (Local): The attacker must have local access to the system to create files or symlinks in the shared directory.
  • AC:L (Low): No special conditions are required; the attacker simply needs to create a file or symlink before the vulnerable process runs.
  • PR:L (Low): The attacker requires a standard user account on the system.
  • UI:N (None): No user interaction is required from the victim process; the attack is triggered automatically when the vulnerable module initializes.
  • S:U (Unchanged): The compromise does not affect resources beyond the vulnerable component's security scope.
  • C:L (Low): The attacker can read the IPC data stored in the shared memory segment, which may contain sensitive information.
  • I:L (Low): The attacker can modify the shared memory segment by pre-planting a file, potentially corrupting data or causing a denial of service.
  • A:N (None): The vulnerability does not directly cause a denial of service.

Qualitative Severity: Informational (CVSS 0.0). This score reflects the low impact and local nature of the attack.

EPSS Interpretation: An EPSS probability of 0.0% means that as of the report date, there is no observed exploitation activity in the wild. This is consistent with the vulnerability being a local, low-impact issue that is not attractive to mass exploitation.

Historical Comparison: This vulnerability is similar to CWE-377 (Insecure Temporary File) issues found in many applications that create temporary files in shared directories. Examples include CVE-2021-3156 (sudo) and CVE-2022-0847 (Dirty Pipe), though those had higher impact. The core issue—predictable file paths in /tmp—is a classic Unix security problem.

Temporal & Environmental Considerations: Since no patch is available, the temporal score remains unchanged. In environments where multiple users share a system and IPC data is sensitive (e.g., financial transactions, authentication tokens), the environmental score should be elevated to Medium due to increased confidentiality impact.

Technical Deep Dive & Attack Mechanics

Step-by-Step Technical Explanation:

  1. Module Initialization: When Data::SortedSet::Shared is used, it creates a shared memory segment for IPC. The module calls open() in sortedset.h with the following parameters:

    open(path, O_RDWR|O_CREAT, 0666);
    
    • path: Typically a file in /tmp or /dev/shm (e.g., /tmp/sortedset_shared_XXXXX).
    • O_RDWR|O_CREAT: Opens the file for reading and writing, creating it if it doesn't exist.
    • 0666: Sets the file permissions to world-readable and world-writable.
  2. World-Readable File Creation: Under the default umask 022, the file is created with permissions 0644 (owner read/write, group read, others read). This means any local user can read the contents of the shared memory segment, which may contain IPC payloads.

  3. Symlink Attack: The absence of O_NOFOLLOW means that if a symlink already exists at path, the open() call will follow it. A local attacker can pre-plant a symlink pointing to an arbitrary file (e.g., /etc/passwd, /root/.ssh/authorized_keys). When the vulnerable module opens the symlink, it will read/write to the attacker-chosen file.

  4. Pre-Creation Race: The absence of O_EXCL means that if a file already exists at path, the open() call will succeed and use the existing file. An attacker can create a file at the predictable path before the vulnerable process runs, allowing them to control the shared memory segment's contents.

Root Cause Analysis: The developer failed to use secure file creation practices:

  • Missing O_EXCL: Should be used with O_CREAT to ensure the file is created atomically and fails if it already exists.
  • Missing O_NOFOLLOW: Should be used to prevent symlink following.
  • Overly Permissive Mode: 0666 is unnecessarily permissive; 0600 or 0640 would be more appropriate.

Attack Surface:

  • Interface: Local file system in shared directories (/tmp, /dev/shm).
  • Protocol: Standard file I/O operations.
  • Pre-conditions: Attacker must have a local user account and know the predictable file path used by the module.

Attack Variants:

  1. Information Disclosure: Read the world-readable shared memory file to extract IPC data.
  2. Symlink Privilege Escalation: Pre-plant a symlink to overwrite a sensitive file (e.g., /etc/shadow) when the module writes to it.
  3. Data Corruption: Pre-plant a file to inject malicious data into the shared memory segment.

Why Standard Defenses May Fail:

  • File Permissions: The module explicitly sets 0666, overriding any restrictive umask.
  • SELinux/AppArmor: These may not block file creation in /tmp by default.
  • Anti-Virus: Local file operations are typically not monitored.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code Analysis

Vulnerable Code (sortedset.h):

int fd = open(path, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0666);
if (fd == -1) {
    // error handling
}

Patched Code (hypothetical, based on best practices):

// Use O_EXCL to ensure atomic creation and fail if file exists
// Use O_NOFOLLOW to prevent symlink attacks
// Use restrictive permissions (0600) for IPC data
int fd = open(path, O_RDWR | O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_NOFOLLOW, 0600);
if (fd == -1) {
    // error handling
}

What the Patch Changes:

  • O_EXCL: Ensures the file is created atomically and fails if it already exists, preventing pre-creation attacks.
  • O_NOFOLLOW: Prevents the open() call from following symlinks.
  • 0600: Restricts file permissions to owner-only read/write, preventing information disclosure.

Regression Considerations:

  • Atomicity: The O_EXCL flag may cause failures if the file path is reused across process restarts. The module should clean up the file on exit or use a unique path per instance.
  • Compatibility: Existing code that relies on the shared file being world-readable will break. Applications should be updated to use proper IPC mechanisms (e.g., Unix domain sockets, named pipes) if cross-user sharing is required.

Timeline & Disclosure History

  • CVE Publication Date: 2026-07-21T20:17:05.190
  • Estimated Discovery: The vulnerability was likely discovered through code review or static analysis of the Data::SortedSet::Shared module.
  • Disclosure Process: The CVE was assigned by a CNA (likely the Perl security team or a third-party coordinator). No vendor advisory or patch has been released as of the report date.
  • Known Exploitation: No known active exploitation as of 2026-07-21.
  • CISA KEV: Not listed.

Threat Intelligence Context

Threat Actor Profile: This vulnerability is most likely to be exploited by:

  • Script Kiddies: Using publicly available PoCs (if released) to gain unauthorized access to shared hosting environments.
  • Insider Threats: Malicious employees or contractors with local access seeking to exfiltrate IPC data.
  • Low-Sophistication Attackers: Those using automated scanners for local privilege escalation.

Attack Campaign Context: No known campaigns are using this CVE as of the report date.

Geographic Targeting: No specific geographic patterns are expected; the vulnerability affects any system running the vulnerable Perl module.

Industry Verticals Most at Risk:

  • Shared Hosting Providers: Multiple users on the same system.
  • HPC/Research Clusters: Multi-user environments with shared storage.
  • Financial Services: Systems processing sensitive IPC data.
  • Cloud/Container Environments: Where multiple containers share a host kernel.

Connection to Similar Vulnerabilities: This is a classic example of CWE-377 (Insecure Temporary File), which has been exploited in numerous CVEs (e.g., CVE-2021-3156, CVE-2022-0847). The pattern of predictable file paths in /tmp is a recurring theme in Unix security.

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team Section

Lab Setup:

  1. Environment: Ubuntu 22.04 LTS VM with Perl 5.34.0 installed.
  2. Install Vulnerable Module:
    cpan Data::SortedSet::Shared
    
    (Note: This will install the latest version; for testing, use a version < 0.03 from CPAN or a local copy.)
  3. Create Test Script:
    use Data::SortedSet::Shared;
    my $set = Data::SortedSet::Shared->new('/tmp/test_shared');
    $set->insert('sensitive_data');
    

Prerequisites:

  • Local user account on the target system.
  • Knowledge of the predictable file path (e.g., /tmp/sortedset_shared_XXXXX).

Exploitation Walkthrough:

  1. Information Disclosure:

    # As attacker, read the world-readable shared memory file
    cat /tmp/sortedset_shared_XXXXX
    # Output: sensitive_data
    
  2. Symlink Attack:

    # As attacker, pre-plant a symlink to overwrite /etc/passwd
    ln -s /etc/passwd /tmp/sortedset_shared_XXXXX
    # When the victim process runs, it will write to /etc/passwd
    

Expected Output:

  • Successful information disclosure: The attacker can read the IPC data.
  • Successful symlink attack: The attacker can overwrite arbitrary files (requires write permissions to the target).

Post-Exploitation:

  • With access to IPC data, the attacker may extract authentication tokens, session IDs, or other sensitive information.
  • With file overwrite, the attacker can escalate privileges (e.g., overwrite /etc/shadow to change root password).

Blue Team Section

Detection:

  1. Monitor File Creation in /tmp: Look for files with permissions 0644 or 0666 created by Perl processes.
  2. Audit Symlink Creation: Monitor for symlink creation in /tmp pointing to sensitive files.
  3. Log Analysis: Check for open() calls with O_RDWR|O_CREAT and mode 0666 in audit logs.

Log Entries Indicating Exploitation:

  • Auditd: type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1234567890.123:456): arch=c000003e syscall=2 (open) success=yes exit=3 a0=7ffe... a1=42 (O_RDWR|O_CREAT) a2=1b6 (0666) a3=... items=1 ppid=1234 pid=5678 uid=1000 gid=1000 euid=1000 suid=1000 fsuid=1000 egid=1000 sgid=1000 fsgid=1000 tty=pts0 ses=1 comm="perl" exe="/usr/bin/perl" key="vuln_open"
  • Syslog: Jul 21 12:34:56 hostname perl[5678]: Data::SortedSet::Shared created world-readable file /tmp/sortedset_shared_XXXXX

Network Traffic Signatures: None (local vulnerability).

Endpoint Behavioral Indicators:

  • Perl process creating files in /tmp with permissions 0644.
  • Unexpected symlinks in /tmp pointing to system files.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

No confirmed IOCs available — the following patterns are illustrative of exploitation attempts:

Type Value Description
File Path /tmp/sortedset_shared_* Predictable file path used by the vulnerable module
File Permission 0644 or 0666 World-readable permissions on shared memory files
Symlink /tmp/sortedset_shared_* -> /etc/passwd Symlink planted to redirect file creation
Process perl Perl process creating the vulnerable file
Syscall open(path, O_RDWR|O_CREAT, 0666) The vulnerable open() call

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule CVE-2026-65062_Detection {
    meta:
        description = "Detects exploitation of CVE-2026-65062 in Data::SortedSet::Shared"
        author = "Valters IT Hub"
        date = "2026-07-21"
        reference = "https://www.valtersit.com/cve/cve-2026-65062"
    strings:
        $s1 = "O_RDWR|O_CREAT" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "0666" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "sortedset.h" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        any of ($s1,$s2,$s3)
}

Sigma Rule (SIEM)

title: CVE-2026-65062 Data::SortedSet::Shared Exploitation Detection
id: 4d0a2825-b596-4584-9255-40b7c3d9d77f
status: experimental
description: Detects exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2026-65062 in Data::SortedSet::Shared
author: Valters IT Hub
date: 2026-07-21
references:
    - https://www.valtersit.com/cve/cve-2026-65062
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '/perl'
        CommandLine|contains: 'Data::SortedSet::Shared'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of Data::SortedSet::Shared module
level: high

Suricata IDS Rule

alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"CVE-2026-65062 Data::SortedSet::Shared Exploitation Attempt"; flow:to_server; content:"Data::SortedSet::Shared"; nocase; classtype:attempted-admin; sid:1000001; rev:1;)

Elastic (EQL) Query

process where event.type == "start" and process.name == "perl" and process.command_line contains "Data::SortedSet::Shared"

Splunk SPL Query

index=linux sourcetype=syslog OR sourcetype=auditd "Data::SortedSet::Shared" OR "sortedset.h" OR "0666"
| table _time, host, process, command

Wazuh Rule

<group name="perl,vulnerability,">
  <rule id="100001" level="12">
    <if_sid>550</if_sid>
    <field name="command">\.*Data::SortedSet::Shared\.*</field>
    <description>CVE-2026-65062: Data::SortedSet::Shared module detected</description>
    <mitre>
      <id>T1055</id>
    </mitre>
  </rule>
</group>

Remediation & Mitigation

Immediate Actions (0-24 hours)

  • No patch available. As a compensating control, restrict access to /tmp and /dev/shm using filesystem ACLs or mount options (e.g., noexec, nosuid, nodev).
  • Network-Level Mitigation: Not applicable (local vulnerability).
  • Authentication Hardening: Ensure least-privilege principles are applied to local user accounts.

Short-term (1-7 days)

  • Configuration Hardening: Set a restrictive umask (e.g., 077) for Perl processes.
  • Monitoring: Implement the detection rules above to alert on module usage.
  • Vulnerability Scanning: Use a script to check for the vulnerable module:
    perl -MData::SortedSet::Shared -e 'print $Data::SortedSet::Shared::VERSION' 2>/dev/null
    

Long-term

  • Architecture Changes: Replace Data::SortedSet::Shared with a secure IPC mechanism (e.g., Unix domain sockets, Redis, RabbitMQ).
  • Security Controls: Implement mandatory access control (SELinux/AppArmor) to restrict file creation in shared directories.
  • Developer Training: Educate developers on secure file creation practices (use O_EXCL, O_NOFOLLOW, restrictive permissions).

Validation

To confirm the module is no longer vulnerable:

  1. Check the installed version:
    perl -MData::SortedSet::Shared -e 'print $Data::SortedSet::Shared::VERSION'
    
  2. If version >= 0.03, the patch is applied.
  3. If no patch is available, verify that compensating controls are in place (e.g., restrictive umask, filesystem ACLs).

References & Resources


Report generated by Valters IT Hub Neural Engine v25 | 2026-07-21 | https://www.valtersit.com/cve/cve-2026-65062

◈ SOURCE Analysis & enrichment: valtersit.com/cve/CVE-2026-65062/ · CVE data: NVD/MITRE (public domain) · © 2026 ValtersIT Hub
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