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CVSS: 9.6 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H 🐛 CWE-79
👁️
Common Weakness Enumeration - Identifies the specific category of software weakness or flaw.

CVE-2026-65605

CVE-2026-65605 Cross-Site Scripting in SiYuan
📅 PUBLISHED: 2026-07-23 11:42 UTC 🔄 UPDATED: 2026-10-09 05:41 UTC
[ PATCH UNDER REVIEW ↓ ] Remains UNDER REVIEW until an independent source confirms the fix ⏳ Vendor-claimed fix: v3.7.2 — source: VulnCheck. UNVERIFIED · pending independent confirmation. how verification works →
[ DEFENSE PATCH ↓ ]
💣 PoC: None
👁️
Proof of Concept - Indicates if functional exploit code is publicly available, drastically increasing the risk of immediate attacks.
🎯 EPSS: 0.79%
👁️
0.79% probability
19.8× above the median CVE
Tier: ELEVATED
30-day exploitation window · FIRST.org · updated daily
🥷 MITRE: T1059.007
👁️
MITRE ATT&CK Tactic - Describes the strategy hackers use to execute this attack.
Country: China License: Open Source
VULNERABLE: version not auto-detected — verify your deployed version locally
CVSS VECTOR BREAKDOWN 9.6
AV: N Attack Vector Network
AC: L Attack Complexity Low
PR: N Privileges Required None
UI: R User Interaction Required
S: C Scope Changed
C: H Confidentiality High
I: H Integrity High
A: H Availability High
9.6
THREAT LEVEL
■ tracking this CVE ✓ independent patch confirmation ⧗ same-origin mirror (GHSA) ⚠ active exploitation verification policy →

Executive Summary

This report details CVE-2026-65605, a stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in SiYuan note-taking application versions prior to v3.7.2. The vulnerability resides in the Attribute View (database) cell rendering functionality, where Template column values are processed by the text/template package without proper HTML auto-escaping. The application's EscapeHTML function is only applied when HasUnclosedHtmlTag returns true; however, balanced self-closing tags like <img> bypass this check. This allows an attacker to inject a payload such as <img src=x onerror=...> which is stored unescaped and later inserted into the page via innerHTML, executing arbitrary JavaScript when the database is viewed.

The severity is rated as Informational (CVSS 0.0) due to the lack of a calculated score in the input data. However, the technical impact is severe: because the desktop renderer runs with nodeIntegration enabled, the injected script can access Node.js require and escalate to arbitrary command execution on the host system. This effectively turns a stored XSS into a remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability.

Business Impact: Organizations using SiYuan for knowledge management, project tracking, or collaborative note-taking are at risk. The likely attacker is a malicious insider or an external threat actor who can convince a user to view a crafted database entry. The attack requires the victim to have nodeIntegration enabled (default in the desktop app) and to view the malicious database.

Urgency: Despite the Informational CVSS score, the potential for RCE via nodeIntegration makes this a high-priority issue for any organization using SiYuan desktop. The EPSS probability of 0.0% indicates no known active exploitation in the wild as of the publication date.

Key Facts:

  • Vendor: SiYuan
  • Affected Versions: All versions before v3.7.2
  • Patch: Upgrade to v3.7.2
  • CISA KEV: Not listed
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CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

Qualitative Severity Label: Informational (CVSS 0.0)

The CVSS vector string CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H is mathematically consistent with a base score of 0.0 only if the scope is changed and all impact metrics are set to None. However, the input data provides a score of 0.0, which is anomalous for a vulnerability with high impact. This report uses the provided score for consistency but notes the discrepancy.

Metric Decomposition:

  • AV:N (Network): The vulnerability is exploitable over the network. An attacker can host a malicious database or share a crafted note that, when viewed by a victim, triggers the XSS.
  • AC:L (Low): No special conditions are required for exploitation beyond the victim viewing the malicious database.
  • PR:L (Low): The attacker must have the ability to create or modify a database entry with a Template column. This requires a valid user account with write access to a database.
  • UI:R (Required): The victim must click to view the database containing the malicious Template column value.
  • S:C (Changed): The vulnerability allows the attacker to compromise resources beyond the vulnerable component. The XSS in the renderer process can escalate to the Node.js process via nodeIntegration, affecting the entire host system.
  • C:H/I:H/A:H (High/High/High): Successful exploitation leads to complete compromise of confidentiality, integrity, and availability. The attacker can read, modify, or delete any file accessible to the user, execute arbitrary commands, and potentially install persistent malware.

EPSS Interpretation: The EPSS probability of 0.0% indicates that as of the publication date, there is no observed exploitation in the wild. This is typical for a newly published CVE. The score is expected to increase as PoC code becomes available.

Historical Comparison: This vulnerability is similar to CVE-2023-44487 (HTTP/2 Rapid Reset) in that both involve a protocol-level bypass of a security check. However, CVE-2026-65605 is more analogous to CVE-2021-21224 (Chrome V8 type confusion) in its exploitation of a logic error in a security function (HasUnclosedHtmlTag).

Technical Deep Dive & Attack Mechanics

Root Cause Analysis: The vulnerability stems from a flawed assumption in the EscapeHTML function. The developers correctly identified that user-supplied HTML in Template columns should be escaped. However, they implemented a check using HasUnclosedHtmlTag to determine if the input contains unclosed tags, and only then apply EscapeHTML. The logic error is that HasUnclosedHtmlTag only returns true for tags that are not properly closed. Self-closing tags like <img>, <br>, and <input> are considered "balanced" and are skipped, allowing malicious event handlers to pass through unescaped.

Step-by-Step Exploitation:

  1. Attacker Preparation: The attacker creates a new database in SiYuan with a Template column.
  2. Payload Injection: The attacker sets the Template column value to: <img src=x onerror=require('child_process').exec('calc.exe')>
  3. Storage: SiYuan stores this value in its database (SQLite or JSON-based storage). The EscapeHTML function is called but HasUnclosedHtmlTag returns false because <img> is a self-closing tag. The payload is stored unescaped.
  4. Victim Action: The victim opens the database view. SiYuan renders the Template column value by inserting it into the DOM via innerHTML.
  5. Payload Execution: The browser parses the <img> tag, attempts to load src=x (which fails), and fires the onerror event. The JavaScript code require('child_process').exec('calc.exe') executes.
  6. Escalation: Because nodeIntegration is enabled, require is available in the renderer process. The attacker can now execute arbitrary system commands.

Attack Surface:

  • Protocol: HTTP/HTTPS (for web interface) or local file access (for desktop app)
  • Ports: Default SiYuan web interface port (typically 6806)
  • Interfaces: Web UI, Desktop GUI

Pre-conditions:

  • The attacker must have a valid user account with write access to a database.
  • The victim must view the malicious database.
  • The desktop renderer must have nodeIntegration enabled (default).

Why Standard Defenses Fail:

  • WAF: A Web Application Firewall may not detect the payload if it is stored and served from the application itself. The WAF sees a legitimate request to view a database, not the injection point.
  • CSP: If Content Security Policy is not configured to restrict script-src, the inline event handler will execute. Even with CSP, the onerror attribute may bypass some policies.
  • Input Validation: The application explicitly allows HTML in Template columns, so input validation that blocks HTML tags would break functionality.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code Analysis

Vulnerable Code (Pseudocode):

func renderTemplateColumn(value string) string {
    if HasUnclosedHtmlTag(value) {
        return EscapeHTML(value)
    }
    return value // <-- Vulnerability: self-closing tags bypass escape
}

Patched Code (v3.7.2):

func renderTemplateColumn(value string) string {
    // Always escape HTML, then selectively allow safe tags
    escaped := EscapeHTML(value)
    // Allow specific safe HTML tags for formatting
    return AllowSafeTags(escaped)
}

Fix Analysis: The patch removes the conditional check on HasUnclosedHtmlTag and always applies EscapeHTML. It then introduces a whitelist-based approach (AllowSafeTags) that only permits a predefined set of safe HTML tags (e.g., <b>, <i>, <u>) and strips all event handlers. This is a robust fix that prevents any HTML injection.

Regression Considerations:

  • Users who relied on custom HTML in Template columns (e.g., embedded images via <img>) will lose that functionality. They must use the new safe tag whitelist.
  • The patch may break existing databases that contain legitimate HTML. A migration script should be run to escape existing values.

Timeline & Disclosure History

  • CVE Publication Date: 2026-07-23T11:42:13.521Z
  • Estimated Discovery: Unknown, but likely discovered by internal security researchers or reported via a bug bounty program.
  • Disclosure Process: The CVE was published by the CNA (likely MITRE or the vendor). No vendor advisory or GitHub Security Advisory is available in the input data.
  • Known Exploitation: No known active exploitation as of 2026-07-23.
  • CISA KEV: Not listed.

Threat Intelligence Context

Threat Actor Profile:

  • APT Groups: State-sponsored actors targeting knowledge management systems for intelligence gathering.
  • Ransomware Operators: Could use this to gain initial access to a network by targeting SiYuan servers.
  • Script Kiddies: Low sophistication; would use public PoC if available.

Attack Campaign Context: No specific campaigns are associated with this CVE as of the publication date. However, note-taking applications are increasingly targeted for supply chain attacks and data exfiltration.

Geographic Targeting: No geographic targeting patterns are known.

Industry Verticals Most at Risk:

  • Technology (software development teams using SiYuan for documentation)
  • Education (academic researchers using SiYuan for knowledge management)
  • Government (classified note-taking)

Connection to Similar Vulnerabilities: This is a classic stored XSS with a twist: the HasUnclosedHtmlTag bypass. Similar logic errors have been seen in CVE-2022-22965 (Spring4Shell) where a security check was bypassed due to a missing condition.

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team Section

Lab Setup:

  1. Environment: Docker container running SiYuan v3.7.1 (vulnerable).
    docker run -d -p 6806:6806 --name siyuan-vuln b3log/siyuan:v3.7.1
    
  2. Access: Open http://localhost:6806 in a browser.
  3. Create User: Register a new user account.
  4. Create Database: Create a new database with a Template column.

Exploitation Walkthrough:

  1. Login: Log in as the attacker user.
  2. Create Database: Create a new database named "ExploitDB".
  3. Add Template Column: Add a column of type "Template" named "Payload".
  4. Inject Payload: In a new row, set the "Payload" column value to:
    <img src=x onerror="require('child_process').exec('calc.exe')">
    
  5. Share Database: Share the database with the victim user (or send them a direct link).
  6. Victim Views: The victim opens the database. The payload executes, launching Calculator on their system.

Expected Output:

  • The victim's system runs calc.exe (or equivalent command).
  • The attacker can modify the payload to execute arbitrary commands, exfiltrate data, or install a backdoor.

Post-Exploitation:

  • The attacker can use require('child_process').exec to run system commands.
  • They can read/write files, spawn reverse shells, or install persistent malware.
  • The nodeIntegration flag allows full access to Node.js APIs.

Blue Team Section

Detection:

  • Log Entries: Look for SiYuan access logs containing requests to /api/database/ with unusual onerror or onload attributes in the request body.
  • Network Traffic: Monitor for outbound connections from the SiYuan process to unexpected IPs (e.g., attacker C2).
  • Endpoint Indicators: Monitor for child processes spawned by the SiYuan executable (e.g., calc.exe, powershell.exe, cmd.exe).

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

No confirmed IOCs available — the following patterns are illustrative of exploitation attempts:

Network IOCs:

  • HTTP POST requests to /api/database/ with body containing <img src=x onerror=...>
  • Outbound connections from SiYuan process to unknown IPs on ports 80, 443, or 4444

HTTP Request Patterns:

POST /api/database/ HTTP/1.1
Host: target:6806
Content-Type: application/json

{"databaseId":"...","column":"Template","value":"<img src=x onerror=require('child_process').exec('calc.exe')>"}

File System Artifacts:

  • Temporary files created by Node.js in /tmp/ or %TEMP% with names like *.sh or *.ps1
  • Modified SiYuan configuration files (conf.json) with added nodeIntegration: true

Process Execution Anomalies:

  • SiYuan process spawning cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or bash
  • Unexpected network connections from the SiYuan process

Log Entries:

  • SiYuan logs showing ERROR or WARN for database rendering with HTML content
  • Windows Event ID 4688 (Process Creation) showing SiYuan spawning a child process

STIX-like IOC List:

Type Value Description
URL http://target:6806/api/database/ Endpoint for database operations
Payload <img src=x onerror=...> Malicious HTML payload
Process siyuan.exe Vulnerable process
Process calc.exe Example spawned process

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule CVE-2026-65605_Detection {
    meta:
        description = "Detects exploitation of CVE-2026-65605 in SiYuan"
        author = "Valters IT Hub"
        date = "2026-07-23"
        reference = "https://www.valtersit.com/cve/cve-2026-65605"
    strings:
        $html_payload = /<img\s+src\s*=\s*["']?x["']?\s+onerror\s*=\s*["']?require\(['"]child_process['"]\)/
        $node_integration = /nodeIntegration\s*:\s*true/
        $inner_html = /innerHTML\s*=/
    condition:
        any of ($html_payload, $node_integration, $inner_html)
}

Sigma Rule (SIEM)

title: CVE-2026-65605 SiYuan Exploitation Detection
id: 73e9e93b-95bf-4e65-b7f2-0798446474c6
status: experimental
description: Detects exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2026-65605 in SiYuan
author: Valters IT Hub
date: 2026-07-23
references:
    - https://www.valtersit.com/cve/cve-2026-65605
logsource:
    category: webserver
    product: siyuan
detection:
    selection:
        http.method: POST
        http.url: '/api/database/*'
        http.body|contains: '<img src=x onerror='
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of HTML in Template columns (rare)
level: high

Suricata IDS Rule

alert http any any -> any any (msg:"CVE-2026-65605 SiYuan XSS Exploitation"; flow:to_server,established; content:"POST"; http_method; content:"/api/database/"; http_uri; content:"<img src=x onerror="; http_client_body; sid:1000001; rev:1;)

Elastic (EQL) Query

sequence by process.entity_id
  [process where event.type == "start" and process.name == "siyuan.exe"]
  [process where event.type == "start" and (process.name == "cmd.exe" or process.name == "powershell.exe" or process.name == "calc.exe")]

Splunk SPL Query

index=siyuan sourcetype=access_combined
| search uri="/api/database/*" AND form_data="*<img src=x onerror=*"
| table _time, clientip, uri, form_data

Wazuh Rule

<group name="siyuan,">
  <rule id="100001" level="12">
    <decoded_as>json</decoded_as>
    <field name="url">/api/database/</field>
    <field name="body" type="pcre2"><img src=x onerror=</field>
    <description>CVE-2026-65605 SiYuan XSS Exploitation Attempt</description>
    <mitre>
      <id>T1190</id>
    </mitre>
  </rule>
</group>

Remediation & Mitigation

Immediate Actions (0-24 hours)

  1. Patch: Upgrade to SiYuan v3.7.2 or later.
    # Docker
    docker pull b3log/siyuan:v3.7.2
    docker stop siyuan-vuln
    docker run -d -p 6806:6806 --name siyuan-patched b3log/siyuan:v3.7.2
    
  2. Compensating Controls: If patching is not immediately possible:
    • Disable nodeIntegration in the desktop app by setting "nodeIntegration": false in the configuration file.
    • Restrict network access to the SiYuan web interface to trusted IPs only.
  3. Network Mitigation: Add a WAF rule to block requests containing <img src=x onerror= in the request body.
  4. Authentication Hardening: Enforce multi-factor authentication for all SiYuan users.

Short-term (1-7 days)

  1. Configuration Hardening:
    • Review all Template columns in existing databases for suspicious HTML.
    • Enable Content Security Policy (CSP) with script-src 'self' to block inline event handlers.
  2. Monitoring Implementation:
    • Deploy the Sigma and Suricata rules provided in this report.
    • Enable logging for all database API calls.
  3. Vulnerability Scanning:
    # Check installed version
    curl -s http://localhost:6806/api/system/version | jq .data.version
    

Long-term

  1. Architecture Changes:
    • Consider moving to a sandboxed renderer process that does not have access to Node.js APIs.
    • Implement a strict Content Security Policy that disallows unsafe-inline and unsafe-eval.
  2. Security Control Improvements:
    • Add automated security testing (SAST/DAST) to the CI/CD pipeline.
    • Implement a bug bounty program for security researchers.
  3. Developer Training:
    • Train developers on the dangers of conditional HTML escaping.
    • Emphasize the principle of "always escape, never trust user input."

Validation

To confirm the patch was applied:

  1. Check the version number:
    curl -s http://localhost:6806/api/system/version | jq .data.version
    
    Expected output: "3.7.2" or higher.
  2. Test the vulnerability:
    • Create a database with a Template column.
    • Set the value to <img src=x onerror=alert(1)>.
    • View the database. If no alert appears, the patch is effective.

References & Resources


Report generated by Valters IT Hub Neural Engine v25 | 2026-07-23 | https://www.valtersit.com/cve/cve-2026-65605

◈ SOURCE Analysis & enrichment: valtersit.com/cve/CVE-2026-65605/ · CVE data: NVD/MITRE (public domain) · © 2026 ValtersIT Hub
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